Electronic Warfare Working Group

Statement of Congressman Joseph R. Pitts

Lexington Institute Forum on Electronic Warfare

October 5, 2001

 Good morning.

I want to thank the Lexington Institute for sponsoring this important forum on electronic warfare, or EW.  The Lexington Institute is a leader in public policy, especially defense, and they have been an invaluable partner in the Electronic Warfare Working Group that I founded and co-chair.

The timing for this forum could not be more appropriate.  We all watched with horror the terrorist attacks that took place on September 11.  This tragedy changed America; it changed the world; and I believe it will change history.

As we carry out the war on terrorism, as we draw battle plans and form alliances, we realize we face an elusive enemy and a complex network of terrorist organizations and resources.  And, we really do not know how this war will look six months, a year, five years from now.  In other words, we have to be ready for anything, anywhere.

So, what does this have to do with EW?  It is my firm belief that our military must have a robust EW capability to ensure that it has access to and control of any battle space in which it must operate.  We need EW to win effectively and efficiently this war on terrorism.

As most of you know, the definition of EW is broad and vague.  But essentially, it is the control and manipulation of the electromagnetic spectrum and the ability to deny its use by the enemy.  One of our most recognizable EW assets is the EA-6B Prowler, our only dedicated support-jamming platform, but EW is much more than that.  It encompasses jamming, stealth, self-protection, electronic intelligence (ELINT), and signals intelligence (SIGINT).  EW is invaluable for air superiority and for the suppression and/or destruction of enemy air defenses.

History has taught us that dominance in electronic warfare leads to success in military operations.  Unfortunately, it has also taught us that we tend to forget about EW in peacetime and unnecessarily place the lives of our service men and women in harm’s way.  As an Air Force Captain and EW officer, I served three tours of duty in Vietnam where I flew 116 combat missions onboard B-52s.  I know first-hand the value of EW, the protection it provides our armed forces, and the edge it gives us over our adversaries.  During the Vietnam War, our forces were forced to play a game of catch up -- a game we cannot afford to play again.

Today, our military is at a critical juncture.  After a decade of careless and shortsighted cuts in our defense, we now face the transformation policy of a new administration, a new – and unanticipated – war on terrorism, a reevaluation of our current military commitments around the world, and the need to continue our global presence.

With this in mind, I want to briefly touch on some key issues I believe are essential in achieving the goal of ensuring a robust and dominant EW capability.  This will not be an exhaustive list, but I hope that it will spur on further discussion.  I also want to touch on what role I believe EW will play on the war on terrorism.

First, we need to do a better job of balancing our investment in the major areas of EW: support jamming, self-protection, and EW support.  Balance means providing the necessary resources to ensure that each layer of EW adequately meets operational goals and requirements, both for today and the future.  Each time America has fought an air campaign adversaries learned new ways of coping with our EW methods, forcing the Pentagon to come up with more clever electronic countermeasures.  We must be prepared for whatever tactics and technology our adversaries throw at us.  Properly balancing investment in a multi-layered EW strategy will offer our forces greater protection and save lives.

Second, we need to dedicate ourselves to the research, development, and production of advanced EW technology.  As you know, technology is rapidly advancing and to ensure a robust EW capability, we must keep up with the curve.  It concerns me when I hear discussion of upgrades that would replace 1970s technology with late 1980s/early 1990s technology.  We must replace it with 2001 technology.  Technology advances rapidly, but development, testing, and production in the DoD moves, often times, at a snails pace.  Congress and DoD share the burden for this.  For too long EW has lived off of congressional plus-ups through the appropriations process.  This makes it extremely difficult to map out the future of EW when you don’t know from year to year whether the money will be there – and too often it isn’t.  While DoD must improve its effort to fund critical EW programs in its initial budget request, Congress must do a better job at understanding the importance of EW and working with DoD to develop an EW roadmap to which we in the defense community are committed.

Third, we need to streamline our EW programs and management.  I have mentioned this before and stand committed to the idea of establishing a joint EW office to coordinate and fund critical EW programs.  EW is not simply the responsibility of one service.  It is not about access to the battle space for only the Navy or the Air Force, but rather our entire military. The services need to work together to identify cross-service EW priorities that will unite each of their strengths and address each of their weaknesses.  The joint EW office would provide a single “belly-button” stream for funding EW programs.

Finally, we need to improve joint training in EW.  We should not pursue Navy EW, Air Force EW, and Army EW separately.  We should look at EW as a joint requirement and train that way – allowing the services to work and train together for the common goal of access to and control of any battle space.  Trust me, as an Air Force veteran, this is not always easy to swallow, but it is what we need to do today.  Further, in our joint training we must improve what we train against.  In other words, we need to provide the opportunity for our forces to train against more advanced foreign military equipment.  We must train together against the best out there to ensure that we are ready for anything.

These are simply a few key issues, but there are many more areas that need to be addressed.  We need to expand and improve our EW capabilities.  We need to be prepared to fight wherever, whenever, and against whomever.

This is the case as we begin the war on terrorism.  I want to make a few brief observations on what role I believe EW will play in any military action in South Asia.

It appears that the U.S. and allied forces will face a minimal air-to-air threat.  The primary threat will come from air defense systems.  The Taliban’s air defense systems are not as advanced as those we faced in Iraq or Serbia; however, we must be prepared for IR guided, man-portable SAMs.  Therefore, we need to ramp up self-protection countermeasures, such as RF towed decoys, IR countermeasures, and covert materials decoys.  This is especially important in protecting our large aircraft, such as C-130s.  The Large Aircraft Infra-Red Counter-Measure (LAIRCM) program and the next generation system that will provide the aircraft with a closed-loop infrared countermeasures capability are extremely important.  I commend to your attention a recent EW Working Group issue brief on these programs provided by my colleague Rep. Tom Sawyer.

Further, our air forces do not have adequate missile warning systems.  This needs to be address immediately.  Communications jamming will also play an important role.  While the Taliban may not have an advanced integrated air defense system, they do have a communications network that we will need to disrupt.

Finally, I would be remised if I did not mention that, again, the Prowler will be heavily tasked.  Recent reports indicate that the Prowler still faces significant shortfalls in maintenance.  It also needs various upgrades to its jamming suite, its radar, it needs an automatic flight control system, and the list goes.  Unfortunately, this has been the same list for several years.

This is why I have established the Electronic Warfare Working Group.  I want to provide a resource to Members of Congress and the defense community at-large, so that EW is properly understood and priorities and shortfalls are addressed. 

The Working Group is here to help relay the message about the importance of EW in maintaining military superiority.  We do not seek to advocate one program over another, but inform the defense community about the options before them and push EW into the center of the debate.

I am pleased to be working with so many in the defense community who are dedicated to EW and Members of Congress who are interested in learning more about the need to advance EW priorities.  In fact, another co-chair of the Working Group, Congressman Mark Kirk, will be addressing you shortly.  His expertise in EW has been invaluable and his leadership is needed.

Again, I want to again thank the Lexington Institute for convening this forum.  And I look forward to continuing our effort rebuilding of America’s EW capabilities.

Welcome ·  About Joe Pitts ·  The 16th District ·  Key Initiatives ·  Legislation ·  Constituent Services
Press & Speeches · The Federal Government ·  Links ·  Contact Information ·  Home