Copyright 2001 eMediaMillWorks, Inc.
(f/k/a Federal
Document Clearing House, Inc.)
Federal Document Clearing House
Congressional Testimony
July 17, 2001, Tuesday
SECTION: CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY
LENGTH: 2335 words
COMMITTEE:
SENATE AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION AND FORESTRY
HEADLINE: 2002
FARM BILL
TESTIMONY-BY: MR. WILBUR GAMBLE, PRODUCER AND CHAIRMAN
OF THE,
AFFILIATION: NATIONAL PEANUT GROWERS GROUP
DAWSON, GA.
BODY: July 17, 2001
TESTIMONY
OF THE NATIONAL PEANUT GROWERS GROUP
By: Mr. Wilbur Gamble Producer and
Chairman of the, National Peanut Growers Group Dawson, Ga.
before the
Senate Agriculture Committee
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this
opportunity to discuss options for a new
Farm Bill. Peanut
producers want and need your support.
My name is Wilbur Gamble, I am a
farmer from Dawson, Georgia.
I am here today representing the National
Peanut Growers Group and my purpose is to help sustain thousands of active farm
families in peanut production. Our organization is the only national peanut
producer organization and represents all of the nation's peanut producing
families. We are governed by a farmer- selected steering committee made up of
representatives from grower-elected association boards all across the peanut
growing regions. The NPGG is made up of the following organizations: Alabama
Peanut Producers Association, Georgia Agricultural Commodity Commission For
Peanuts, GFA Peanut Association, Georgia Peanut Producers Association, Texas
Peanut Growers Association, Southwestern Peanut Growers' Association, Oklahoma
Peanut Growers Association, Virginia Peanut Growers Association, Inc., North
Carolina Peanut Growers Association, Peanut Growers Cooperative Marketing
Association, New Mexico Peanut Growers Association, South Carolina Peanut Board
and Florida Peanut Producers Association.
Mr. Chairman, the Peanut
Program is absolutely necessary to peanut producers. U. S. producers are
dependent on the Program and in turn, so are the hundreds of rural communities
that are supported by peanut growing families and support industries associated
with peanut production and marketing. Additionally consumers and manufacturers
are dependent upon a program that provides a safe and economical supply of
peanuts.
The peanut farmer is a family producer and a solid citizen in
his community. However, that small family producer must work an entire year to
produce a crop that, because of its perishable nature, must be sold almost
immediately at harvest. We are told that about 80% of U. S. peanuts are sold to
only two processing companies. One of these companies is owned by the nation's
largest agri-business processor. These shelling companies in turn sell to
various product manufacturers. Again, this portion of the peanut industry is
dominated by "very" big business. Six multinational billion dollar corporations
purchase 75% to 80% of the domestically used peanuts.
What marketing
ability does a small family farmer have in this situation? The clear answer is
very little, without the Peanut Program. We are deeply dependent on, and
appreciative to this Committee for the Peanut Program.
There are strong
consumer benefits to the Peanut Program also. Consumers benefit greatly from the
Peanut Program because, to receive program benefits, peanut producers must
produce a consistent supply and comply with one of the strictest quality
programs in agriculture. This steady supply has held prices in check and avoided
the "boom and bust" that has plagued other commodities. The result has been that
peanut butter is one of the least expensive protein sources in the U. S. diet
and peanuts are the least expensive nut for a snack food.
Mr. Chairman,
just as the recent trade agreements have not been kind to peanut producers,
neither has the current farm program. As compared with the program before the
current law, peanut producers have lost 10% of the peanut support price,
resulting in a loss in income of millions of dollars to peanut producers.
Growers also lost the escalator provision in this current program, thus the
peanut support price, and thus farm income from peanuts has been frozen since
1996.
And Mr. Chairman, there has been essentially no benefit to the
housewife from these losses to producers. Consumer peanut and peanut butter
prices have risen since 1996.
The current situation, Mr. Chairman, adds
to the economic difficulty facing peanut farmers today. Every farm input has
increased since 1996. I know you are fully aware of the dramatic increase in
fuel costs that farmers faced last year and the outlook is only for more
increases in fuel costs. This factor alone will force many producers off their
farms this year.
Mr. Chairman, we have two recommendations for this
Committee, short term and long term.
Short term, if a new farm policy
cannot be developed quickly, then peanut producers must again receive market
loss payments as has been made available the last two years. Again, Mr.
Chairman, we are deeply appreciative to you and this Committee for helping make
those payments available to peanut producers. It is only in this manner that the
economic losses faced by peanut farmers from current policy can be offset.
In the long term, Mr. Chairman, despite the value of the Peanut Program,
peanut producers realize the political realities in Washington involving
budgets, trade agreements and anti-program proponents. The National Peanut
Growers Group has voted on various options for consideration as a new
Farm Bill begins, and present to you today a description of the
option we feel is best for the taxpayer, consumer, processor, manufacturer and
most importantly the farmer.
This is a serious matter for producers, Mr.
Chairman. Today, we are facing oversupply stemming from record high peanut
imports, and record high peanut butter imports. GATT and NAFTA were not kind to
peanut producers as it is projected we will lose to imports more than 10% of our
domestic market over the next several years. We make these recommendations with
this increased competition in mind.
Marketing Competitiveness Option
In reviewing the options to make producers competitive with imports and
at the same time offering the consumer a product with no domestic price
disadvantage, the Step-Two Concept/Market Competitiveness Option (similar to
cotton) is viewed as the most viable option by the National Peanut Growers
Group.
Under the Market Competitiveness /Step-Two Option, producers are
offered a price support level that will allow them to keep up with cost of
production. Additionally, the processor will be afforded a peanut that is priced
competitively to imports. This will also answer consumer advocacy organizations
that wrongly contend that U. S. peanuts artificially drive up retail prices,
although we believe that this is not the case. Finally, we believe the cost
associated with this option will be below the current WTO support levels
attributed to peanuts.
Since the world edible market is primarily in the
U. S., it is important that we work to keep domestic peanuts into our home
market as well as the world market. The Market Competitiveness/Step-Two Option
was offered by the Commission on 21st Century Production Agriculture as an
option, that while similar to the Cotton Program, it would stimulate the
purchase of U. S. peanuts domestically at a competitive price. Under the current
Program, quota or domestic peanuts are generally priced at a level that is above
world price due to U. S. production costs, regulations and various other
reasons. This option would allow the domestic poundages to be bought at a price
competitive with other origins.
The quality of U. S. produced peanuts
continues to be generally superior to imported peanuts. A domestic
competitiveness option for peanuts would be helpful to processors and would
ensure that U. S. consumers continue to have high quality peanuts available. The
processor would be buying based upon quality and delivery.
The
introduction of a domestic Market Competitiveness/Step-Two Option creates a
viable domestic support rate, when adjusted for cost of production it also means
a more viable producer. Secondly, the peanuts could then be bought by the
processor at a determined competitive price rate. Differences between the
support rate and adjusted price would be a program cost that is estimated to be
lower than WTO attributed spending for peanuts. The price could be determined by
using an average import U. S. price, North American Import price and a converted
Rotterdam market price. We realize that developing a world price mechanism is
important, but is also difficult considering that there are limited price
discovery markets for peanuts.
Under this concept the producer would not
receive a direct government payment and thus should not be affected by payment
limits or annual Appropriation battles. Marketing options for any production
above domestic consumption levels then could be enhanced by an increased loan
level for additional or export production. Current additional peanut producers
would have increased access to quota.
One mechanism for delivery of the
domestic support rate would be through established CCC draft mechanisms,
utilizing the area marketing associations. The processor would then repay the
CCC for delivered domestic peanuts at an established price level. This would
eliminate any government dollars from moving into processor hands.
As
was mentioned earlier, estimated Program cost should be less than the current
$347 million attributed to U. S. Peanut Program support. Which is the only
industry proposal that meets the House announced program expenditure levels. As
an example, if the cost adjusted domestic price support rate for the producer
was $0.34 per pound or $680 per farmers stock ton and the determined world price
was $.25 per pound or $500 per ton (average converted price including C.I.F.)
the competitiveness costs would be $.09 per pound or $180 per ton. Therefore,
there would be a government cost of $216 million ($180 per ton times 1.2 million
tons of domestic consumption).
The competitiveness provision is also a
cost containment provision. By limiting domestic support to domestic average
consumption, the cost of this option is limited.
In addition to
providing the producer a cost of production adjusted support rate, the processor
is buying on quality and delivery. Therefore, there would be no price incentive
to purchase foreign peanuts, and reduce the need for tariffs that are currently
being reduced under trade agreements. At the same time this would not be
considered trade distorting, because there is only leveling of the market and
not undercutting the market.
Although the NPGG did not specifically
address what are currently referred to as additional peanuts, there are ways to
assist in marketing peanuts for the export market. Peanuts produced primarily
for the export market could then be supported at a higher rate using an optional
marketing loan concept. If an export loan level was in place, the producer could
have the choice to produce for the world export market or utilize the
Association loan pools. The export market would be made more attractive by an
improved loan rate, without relying solely on a purchaser contract. Costs are
estimated to be minimal because the market would dictate production for the
export market. Additionally, the support rate expense would be offset by returns
from alternative oil and meal markets that is closely priced to the export
support rate and export loan sales.
Other items that were deemed
important for producer survival were cost management, and maintaining high
product quality. We feel the best cost containment tool is the use of a supply
management mechanism. This is not to control the amount of peanuts grown, but to
control the amount eligible for domestic support. There would be no planting
restrictions. However, only an amount of peanuts equal to domestic consumption
would be eligible for the domestic support rate with the Competitive Option. The
only measure of official support for a supply management program was the U. S.
referendum on program continuation for the current program. In this USDA vote,
94.8% of all producers support a supply management program. Additionally, about
85% of producers oppose the marketing loan concept according to responses to a
recent peanut grower magazine poll.
Furthermore, if buyers are going to
make purchasing decisions based on quality, the NPGG feels they must maintain
the current grading system. The Federal/State Inspection Service is a pivotal
part of delivering quality peanuts to the processor.
As was mentioned
earlier, peanut farmers have lost a great deal of income since 1995. In part due
to the cuts in price in the budget driven 1996
Farm Bill, but
also partly because of a frozen loan rate. Therefore, a price support adjustment
is needed. The NPGG supports a farmer stock price support adjusted for
inflation. Additionally, we support a cost of production adjustment provision
that would be adjusted annually at a rate of not less than two percent using the
Consumer Price Index.
It is also important there be an adequate supply
of peanuts for the domestic market. Therefore, we recommend that peanuts grown
for export would be allowed to move into the domestic market if a shortage
occurred.
The Market Competitiveness/Step-Two option brings about a
condition enabling the producer to stay viable and to keep up with cost of
production. At the same time there is maintenance of the base structure of the
Peanut Program with more flexibility and competitiveness. With no direct payment
there is no payment limit problems or AMTA cost. The processor will be able to
buy the domestic peanut at a level competitive with imports, thus eliminating
the price incentive for foreign peanuts. This option also creates minimal
government outlays with positive returns for the producer, processor,
manufacturer and consumer.
Mr. Chairman we developed these
recommendations with cost considerations in mind. while we support the
elimination of the no-net cost provision, we have taken a step towards being
competitive, all this with the taxpayer, consumer, processor, manufacturer and
farmer in mind.
Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the National Peanut Growers
Group we thank you for this opportunity.
LOAD-DATE: July 17, 2001