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Congressional Testimony
July 19, 2001, Thursday
SECTION: CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY
LENGTH: 3285 words
COMMITTEE:
SENATE AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION AND FORESTRY
HEADLINE: 2002
FARM BILL
TESTIMONY-BY: DR. RON HASKINS, SENIOR FELLOW
AFFILIATION: BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
BODY: July 19, 2001
Testimony of
Dr. Ron Haskins Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution and Senior
Consultant, Annie E. Casey Foundation
Before the Committee on
Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry U.S. Senate
Chairman Harkin, Ranking
Member Lugar, and Members of the Committee:
My name is Ron Haskins. I am
a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington, DC and a Senior
Consultant at the Annie E. Casey Foundation in Baltimore. Until January of this
year, I was a staffer with the Committee on Ways and Means in the U.S. House of
Representatives where I was privileged to work on the 1996 welfare reform
legislation. I greatly appreciate the opportunity to appear before your
Committee today to talk about the reauthorization of the Food Stamp program and
its relationship to welfare reform. My goal in appearing before you today is to
convince the members of this Committee of two important facts about the Food
Stamp program. First, even more than in the past, the Food Stamp program has
become a vital support to poor and low-income mothers who work. The increase in
employment by single mothers since enactment of welfare reform in 1996 has been
astounding. In fact, a higher percentage of single mothers are working now than
at any time in the past. However, most of the mothers who left welfare for work
are earning low wages, usually around $7 per hour. These mothers need all the
support they can get, including Food Stamps. Second, the Food Stamp program as
presently constituted is failing the majority of these mothers and children.
To set the stage for considering the increased importance of Food Stamps
to low-income families, here is a brief overview of the results of the sweeping
1996 welfare reform legislation. It has been five years since Congress replaced
the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program with the Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program. Thus, enough time has elapsed that
we can now talk with some degree of confidence about its effects.
In a
word, TANF has succeeded in achieving its central goal; namely, the reduction of
welfare dependency and the growth of personal responsibility. Welfare reform has
had major effects on welfare caseloads, on earnings by single mothers, on total
income of single parent families, and on child poverty. These effects associated
with welfare reform are deep and significant: we have had the first sustained
decline in welfare rolls in the history of the program, single mothers are now
more likely to work than at any time in the past, the earnings of female-headed
families are at an all-time high, child poverty is at its lowest level since
1979, black child poverty is the lowest ever, and poverty among female-headed
families is the lowest ever (see Figure 1).
These wonderful effects have
been caused by the confluence of three major factors: welfare reform, a robust
economy, and a federal system of programs that support working families. I want
to direct the Committee's attention to the last factor contributing to the
nation's great success in promoting personal responsibility; namely, programs
that support working families, or what might be called the nation's "work
support system."
Roughly since the mid-1980s, Congress has been creating
and expanding a set of programs that support poor and low-income working
families (Table 1). By definition, these are programs that provide benefits, not
just to people who don't or can't work, but to people who work. Indeed, some of
these programs provide benefits only to working families. One of the reasons so
many mothers have left welfare is that by combining their earnings, even from
low-wage jobs, with benefits from the work support system, they are much better
off financially than they were on welfare. Depending on the particulars of the
mother's situation and her state of residence, it is not unusual for mothers
leaving welfare to have $6 thousand or even $8 thousand more in income, even if
she is in a job that pays only $6 or $7 an hour. In a typical situation, a
mother leaving welfare earns $10,000 per year. If she has two children, she is
eligible for an EITC of about $4,000 and Food Stamps worth about $2,000,
bringing her total income to $16,000 - well above the poverty level for a family
of three ($14,630 in 2001). Imagine the difference in living standard for this
mother and her two children between her earnings of $10,000 and her total income
of $16,000.
The rationale for the nation's work support programs is both
that it encourages work and that it increases the income and the living standard
of poor and low-income working families. In many cases, the work support
benefits allow the family to escape poverty. It is useful for the members of
this Committee, with its long history of commitment to helping poor families and
children, to ponder why the federal government has deliberately constructed the
work support system over a period of nearly two decades.
Unfortunately,
it is now clear that because many of our young people emerge from the public
schools with a minimum of skills, and because the American economy places a
premium on skills, there are millions of young people with children who cannot
earn enough to support their families. In the old days, it sometimes seemed that
the goal of federal welfare policy was to give these families enough welfare in
the form of cash and in-kind benefits, such as Food Stamps and housing, so that
they could eke out a subsistence living. Thus, between the early 1960s and 1995,
the year before enactment of welfare reform, Congress created scores of new
social programs and increased spending on means-tested programs from around $50
billion to about $350 billion. Yet child poverty grew steadily throughout the
period (Figure 2).
Clearly, the strategy of increased spending was not
effective in fighting poverty. Worse, there were unintended effects on behavior.
Millions of young, able-bodied Americans became dependent on welfare. Work done
in the mid-1980s by David Ellwood and Mary Jo Bane at Harvard, and replicated
many times since, shows that at any given moment around 65 percent of the
families on the old Aid to Families with Dependent Children program were in the
midst of spells that would eventually last eight years or more. Subsequent
research by LaDonna Pavetti of Mathematica Policy Research showed that the
average length of spells for families on the rolls at any given moment was more
than a decade. In addition to reducing the incentive to work, another likely
behavioral effect of welfare, though not as well established by research, was
the effect on marriage. More specifically, many researchers came to believe that
welfare served to reduce marriage and thereby increase nonmarital child bearing.
In 1996 Congress and President Clinton decided to radically change the
direction of the nation's welfare system and embarked on the new path of
mandatory work complimented by the generous income supplements provided through
the work support system.
But major problems with the Food Stamp program
are greatly detracting from the effectiveness of the work support system.
Unfortunately, well over half the families that leave welfare do not retain the
food stamp benefits for which they are qualified, thereby reducing their income
by $2,000 or $3,000 in most cases. Recent research by Sheila Zedlewski and her
colleagues at the Urban Institute, based on interviews of random samples of U.S.
households in 1997 and 1999, shows that only slightly over 40 percent of
families that leave welfare and have incomes below 130 percent of poverty (about
$19,000 in 2001) actually received food stamps in either year. Moreover, the
Zedlewski study found that a major reason families gave for leaving the Food
Stamp program even though they were still eligible for benefits was that there
were "administrative problems" in maintaining their eligibility. Even worse,
Zedlewski found that the percentage of parents who cited administrative problems
as the reason they didn't receive Food Stamps nearly doubled between 1997 and
1999.
What are the administrative problems that make the Food Stamp
program so difficult for eligible families to join? For the sake of emphasizing
a point, let me exaggerate, but only slightly, by stating that in the TANF
program, states are penalized if they don't put people to work. In the Food
Stamp program, states are penalized if they do put people to work. It would be
difficult to imagine two programs that are more incompatible than TANF and Food
Stamps.
The major cause of the incompatibility is that TANF is a block
grant that allows states almost complete flexibility in administration. By
contrast, Food Stamps is an open-ended entitlement program that carefully
defines through federal statute and regulation who is eligible, how resources
are to be treated, how earnings and other income are to be treated, and how a
host of other details are to be handled by states as they administer the
program. TANF gives states a blank slate on which to develop their own rules and
regulations; Food Stamps gives states an encyclopedia of federal rules and
regulations that must be followed.
And hanging over all the federal Food
Stamp rules and regulations is the federal Quality Control (QC) system. The QC
system, of course, is necessary because Food Stamp benefits are paid for
entirely by federal funds but states administer the program. If there were not
some mechanism to hold states accountable for their administrative accuracy,
there could be substantial waste in the program - and big increases in federal
spending. However, the problem arises because, as the Center on Budget and
Policy Priorities (2000) has shown, in virtually every state Food Stamp cases
that include a worker have higher error rates than cases in which no one works.
The reason for this difference is clear enough. Especially among low-income
families, there are frequent changes in earnings because low-income workers
experience frequent changes in hours and even jobs. Thus, it is very difficult
for states to know about, let alone keep track of, these frequent changes in
earnings. As a result, state Food Stamp calculations for working families are
often based on outdated information and are therefore in error. These errors are
detected by the Quality Control program and often result in fines against the
state.
Based on the above analysis, it seems clear that the Food Stamp
program has a serious problem that the Committee should carefully examine and
try to solve. Mothers who have left welfare and are responsible both for rearing
their children and earning most of their family's income are a very worthy
group. Unless I misread the poll results, American taxpayers want to help poor
and low- income families that are working full time. That is why Congress has
developed such a remarkable work support system that provides generous benefits
(around $70 billion in 1999) to poor and low- income working families. But now
we are confronted with the clear fact that over half the eligible families
leaving welfare do not receive Food Stamps, one of the most important and
valuable work support benefits. Much of the problem stems from the fact that
Food Stamp administration by states is micromanaged from the federal level.
I will leave it to other witnesses, especially those representing
administrators who conduct the Food Stamp program at the state level, to provide
specific details of how the program's administrative problems could be solved.
However, I would like to suggest the general outlines of a set of reforms that I
recommend the Committee consider carefully. First, it seems obvious that there
are three rather distinct populations in the Food Stamp program: the disabled,
the elderly, and the non-elderly able- bodied. By contrast with the disabled and
elderly, the able- bodied are expected to work. But if they do work, states are
faced with the difficulties, reviewed above, involved in correctly calculating
benefits. Thus, states should be permitted to apply a different quality control
program to workers, leaving those who don't work subject to the current system.
The Food Stamp statutes should set a minimal set of conditions that states must
meet to establish a separate program for workers and the Food and Nutrition
Service should have little discretion in granting the separate program.
Second, this separate system should provide states with the option to
grant families leaving welfare for work with a Food Stamp benefit that is based
on their starting salary and is fixed for at least six months. Subsequently, the
state would be responsible for verifying income only at six-month intervals. The
quality control program would hold states accountable for obtaining the correct
earnings at the beginning of each six-month period and for computing the Food
Stamp benefit correctly based on earnings and other characteristics of each case
only at that time. States would be allowed to develop their own methods of
obtaining earnings information. If a recipient's income changes during the six
month hold-harmless intervals, states would not be held accountable for
recalculating the benefit amount based on these income variations. States would,
however, be held accountable for verifying income every six months and for
making accurate benefit adjustments based on the new income information or other
change in circumstances. The recipient would have the right to apply for benefit
recalculation at any time.
Third, states should be given much more
flexibility in determining the value of an automobile a family can have and
still qualify for Food Stamps. The current limit of $4,650 is far too low,
especially now that so many single mothers are working. As the members of this
Committee can well understand, reliable transportation is an absolute necessity
for a working family. Thus, families should be allowed to have a vehicle worth
more than the current limitation. Again, I would trust the wisdom of the
Committee to establish the correct approach to setting the vehicle limit, but at
a minimum the new provision should allow states to use the same vehicle test
they establish under their TANF program.
Finally, the Federal government
needs greater assurance that states are fully informing low-income families,
especially those leaving welfare, of their right to continue receiving Food
Stamps as long as their income is less than 130 percent of the poverty level.
This issue can probably be handled at the Administrative level without any
statutory changes. However, the Committee should be vigorous in informing the
Food and Nutrition Service that state outreach is essential and that the
Committee will carefully monitor the performance of the Food and Nutrition
Service in providing leadership to ensure that states are conducting aggressive
programs to help recipients leaving the TANF program maintain their eligibility
for Food Stamps.
During the closing days of the Clinton Administration,
the Food and Nutrition Service took regulatory action to establish policies
similar to the ones outlined above. Although I am in complete agreement with the
substance of these regulations, there are at least two reasons the Committee
should deal with these important issues in statute. First, at least in my view,
the magnitude of these issues is sufficient to require that they be spelled out
in statutes rather than regulation. No Administration, Republican or Democratic,
should be allowed to exercise the discretion exhibited by these regulations.
Congress must jealously protect its right to legislate. The line between
regulating and legislating is inherently somewhat gray, but these regulations
seem to cross the boundary of appropriate regulation.
Second, states are
reporting difficulty in getting both the Food and Nutrition Service and the
Office of Management and Budget to approve their plans to improve administration
of the Food Stamp program. In creating the TANF block grant program, Congress
included provisions that gave the Secretary of Health and Human Services minimal
discretion in approving state plans to create their own TANF programs. The
dramatic success states have had in reforming their welfare programs shows
beyond any reasonable doubt that states deserved the confidence Congress showed
in giving them such flexibility. In similar fashion, it seems reasonable to give
states much greater flexibility to design and implement their own Food Stamp
program for working families. This is especially the case because the Quality
Control system, revised along the lines suggested above, will ensure
accountability. If anything, more flexibility for states requires even greater
accountability for outcomes.
Finally, it seems likely that if the
Committee created legislation along the lines outlined here, the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) would attach some cost to the legislation. In this regard, I
would like to call to the Committee's attention the truly surprising level of
savings in the Food Stamp program over the past several years. The Food Stamp
reforms initially designed by the Agriculture Committee in 1996 were estimated
by CBO to save $23 billion between 1997 and 2002. Net of these savings, CBO
estimated in 1996 that Food Stamp spending over the period 1997 to 2002 would
total $190.1 billion. However, if we compare the 1996 projection with actual
spending in the years 1997 to 2000 and projected spending for 2001 and 2002 from
the most recent CBO baseline, it appears that only $120.1 billion will actually
be spent. In other words, it now appears that the Federal government will
realize about $70 billion in additional savings from the Food Stamp program
(Figure 3).
Of course, under CBO rules, the Committee cannot claim any
of these savings. Even so, there is no question that a major part of this $70
billion is attributable directly to welfare reform because so many more mothers
left welfare than expected and the number of these families who did not receive
Food Stamps is unexpectedly large. Thus, members of this Committee can justify
the additional spending that will result from the types of changes recommended
in my testimony on the grounds that the Food Stamp program has spent so much
less money than expected for five consecutive years. Saving government money is
not always a good thing.
By way of summary, the Food Stamp program, in
part because of the Quality Control system, is failing large numbers of poor and
low- income working families that are eligible for Food Stamps but are not
receiving them. In the typical case of a single mother with two children earning
$10,000, the mother qualifies for about $2,000 in Food Stamps. This amount of
money would make a tremendous difference in the living standard of this mother
and her children. Moreover, if all or nearly all the working families qualifying
for Food Stamps were to actually receive the benefit, child poverty would
decline substantially. States could reach many more of these families if they
were allowed to reform the administrative rules of the portion of the Food Stamp
program that provides benefits to working families. If the Committee helps
states achieve the flexibility needed to coordinate the Food Stamp and TANF
programs, hundreds of thousands of poor and low-income families are going to
have their standard of living substantially improved. There are very few actions
Congress could take that would have such an immediate and substantial impact in
reducing child poverty.
LOAD-DATE: July 23,
2001