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Congressional Testimony
July 17, 2001, Tuesday
SECTION: CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY
LENGTH: 2100 words
COMMITTEE:
SENATE AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION AND FORESTRY
HEADLINE: 2002
FARM BILL
TESTIMONY-BY: MR. ART JAEGER, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR,
AFFILIATION: CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA
BODY: July 17, 2001
STATEMENT OF
MR. ART JAEGER ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA
ON BEHALF OF THE COALITION FOR SUGAR REFORM
Senate Committee on
Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry
Mr. Chairman, my name is Art
Jaeger. I'm pleased to be here today on behalf of the Consumer Federation of
America and the Coalition for Sugar Reform. CFA is a non-profit association of
approximately 285 pro-consumer organizations, most of them national, state and
local advocacy organizations and consumer- owned nonprofit cooperatives, such as
credit unions and housing co-ops. CFA was founded in 1968 to advance the
consumer interest through advocacy and education. CFA is a member of the
Coalition for Sugar Reform. This coalition includes trade associations that
represent food companies, grocery manufacturers and others who use sugar, as
well as the companies that refine cane sugar. The coalition's members also
include taxpayer advocacy groups, consumer organizations like CFA and
environmental groups.
I would like to explain why our coalition is
opposed to the sugar program - not to sugar producers, but to the sugar program.
I make this distinction because the sugar program is not only harming the
interests of our coalition, but it is not serving growers well either. I do not
claim that growers would solve these problems they same way we would. Indeed, I
will explain why we must strongly oppose some of their suggestions.
Nevertheless, sometimes common problems create common opportunities for
cooperation.
The sugar program is not like most other farm programs. It
does not have to be so different, but it is. Instead of direct, transparent
assistance to farmers, the sugar program distorts prices through import quotas
and a price guarantee that is twice world levels.
When Congress wrote
the last
farm bill, advocates of the sugar program argued that
the program was run at no net cost to taxpayers. They argued that it worked, and
that it benefited producers.
The committee needs to understand that much
has changed since 1996. Domestic production rose almost 25% in the subsequent
three years and will still be 15% higher than 1996 this year despite lower
prices. By contrast, imports have fallen 40%. Imports are not the problem. The
problem is that our high sugar price supports have led to a surplus of sugar.
Unlike 1996, the sugar market is not balanced, it is unbalanced. In
1996, the government owned no sugar. By contrast, the government acquired over 1
million tons of sugar last year. USDA entered the market during the spring to
purchase sugar in the hope of shoring up prices - a hope that turned out to be
vain. Then USDA acquired much more surplus sugar through forfeitures under the
price support program. The federal government is spending over $1 million a
month to store this sugar.
At the same time it was acquiring sugar, USDA
paid growers - using some of the same sugar - to plow under their crops. More
recently, USDA has said it will use up to 100,000 tons of taxpayer-owned sugar
to subsidize ethanol plants. This sugar will be sold at a fraction of the price
USDA could receive if it simply sold the same sugar into the open market, as it
is allowed to do by law.
None of this had happened in 1996. Not only had
there been no recent large-scale forfeitures of sugar, there was no great
likelihood of forfeitures in the future. Again, the situation is different
today. Not only have there been forfeitures, there may well be more - fewer this
year than last, perhaps, but still at a substantial cost to taxpayers. Reported
prices for refined beet sugar are less than forfeiture-equivalent levels today,
so later in the year it is quite possible that taxpayers will again be given the
gift of sugar they do not want to own.
That will come at a cost, and
this is another way the world has changed. In 1996, the sugar program did not
result in a net outlay of taxpayer dollars, at least directly (although it did
and does make federal nutrition programs more costly and less effective). But in
2000, taxpayers spent $465 million to buy sugar. Both CBO and USDA project
levels of surplus that will lead to additional taxpayer costs down the road.
USDA's long-term baseline projects sugar stocks rising to as much as three times
normal levels, with taxpayers owning the biggest part of the surplus.
Finally, the sugar program's effect on employment today is more evident
than was the case in 1996. The problems of the cane refining industry are stark.
Of the refineries that were operating when the current program began in the
early 1980s, about half have closed, taking over 3,000 good manufacturing jobs
with them. The refining industry has been devastated in the past year by the
collapse of refining margins, so that the largest refiner is now in bankruptcy.
Recently, Chicago's candy industry has been threatened by plant closings
that are the direct result, among other factors, of the spread between U.S. and
world sugar prices. American candy manufacturers must pay double what their
competitors pay for sugar. Increasingly, they find it difficult to remain
competitive in this kind of environment. They are being subjected to what is, in
effect, a tax from which their competitors are exempt.
Mayor Richard
Daley of Chicago has spoken eloquently about this problem. He has been joined by
both the business and labor communities in Chicago. Prominent Chicago-area
members of
Congress such as Danny Davis and Bobby Rush have likewise
denounced the sugar program.
As long as the sugar program distorts
trade, problems like these will grow. It may be Chicago today, but it will be
other cities and communities tomorrow.
These are only some of the ways
in which 2001 is different from 1996. But it is extremely important that the
committee recognize these differences. Even if you thought the current sugar
program was workable in 1996 - and of course, we did not - you should come to a
different conclusion today.
The processors and growers who support the
current program have proposed changes. We respect them and we respect their
views. But we disagree with them profoundly.
Their proposal is to
increase the sugar price support both directly and indirectly. The direct
increase would be achieved through a "rebalancing" of the sugar loan rate. The
indirect increase would be achieved by getting rid of the forfeiture penalty.
This penalty, now assessed on processors who forfeit sugar, operates to reduce
government costs and to reduce - by one cent per pound - the price at which a
rational processor would forfeit sugar. Abolishing it would have the opposite
effect, and would be tantamount to raising the support price by one cent.
Let's remember the problem: too much domestic sugar production, up more
than 15% under the current price support. How can we imagine that the solution
to that problem is a higher price support that will induce still more
production? Even after the past year of lower-than-normal U.S. prices, harvested
sugar cane acres for 2001 are forecast to rise 5%, or 24,000 acres. What do we
think will happen if price supports are even higher?
The growers and
processors propose marketing allotments as a solution. But such a policy is no
solution at all. Congress wisely repealed allotments in 1996, along with
production controls for almost all other commodities. If allotments achieved
their stated purpose, they would make the problems of Chicago candy workers even
worse by widening the spread between U.S. and world prices. As we move toward an
open sweetener market with Mexico under the North American Free Trade Agreement
- an open market that will occur within the likely lifetime of the
farm
bill you are writing now - marketing allotments will simply lock U.S.
producers into a declining share of their own market. That is not a wise
decision for Congress to make.
I have dwelled on those factors that have
changed since 1996. They do not exhaust the list of problems with today's sugar
program. Consider only a few others:
The sugar program hurts the
environment. In Florida alone, almost half a million acres just south of Lake
Okeechobee are used for sugarcane production. The 2 million tons of raw sugar
produced there - one-quarter of all U.S. sugar production - greatly contributed
to the degradation of the Everglades. Congress has begun a multi-billion-dollar,
20-year Everglades cleanup effort. But as long as the sugar program encourages
more sugar cane production in Florida, our environmental efforts will be less
effective than they could be.
The sugar program raises consumer and user
costs. We can argue endlessly about consumer prices, but the fact is that
objective studies of the sugar program show that it costs consumers and users
from hundreds of millions to almost $2 billion each year. The General Accounting
Office and the International Trade Commission are not on the payroll of sugar
users.
The sugar program frustrates our international trade policies.
The clearest example is the ongoing harm to corn refiners and producers from the
sweetener disputes with Mexico. Our negotiators' desire to placate the domestic
sugar industry has frustrated their efforts to get better access for HFCS into
the Mexican market. The sugar program has been cited by our hemispheric trade
partners, particularly Brazil, as an obstacle to the Free Trade Area of the
Americas. And the sugar program complicates our negotiators' job of expanding
market access and ending non-tariff trade barriers in the WTO for U.S. export
commodities like beef, pork, corn, wheat and soybeans.
This
farm
bill should reform the sugar program. It should not tinker around the
edges but make genuine change.
Reform can take a variety of forms. We
believe certain principles should govern our sugar policies. We also believe
these principles should be used to evaluate any legislation considered by the
committee. All the principles have one overriding theme: We should give greater
sway to market forces than current policy allows.
First, policies should
allow the market to operate in such a manner that supplies are adequate and
balanced. This means that shorting the market through production controls should
be off the table, and market signals should be transmitted to all producing
regions so that an imbalance of beet sugar relative to cane sugar can be
avoided. In turn, market balance will allow a return to viability for the cane
refining industry.
Second, our market needs to become more open to world
supplies. In recent years, as I have already pointed out, we have gone in the
other direction, cutting imports by 40%. Reversing this trend is vital to
accommodating our present and future trade obligations, and to encouraging
expanded market access worldwide for our competitive export commodities, whether
pork, soybeans, corn or beef.
Third, our policies should not provide
incentives for overproduction. The current support system has clearly encouraged
more domestic production than the market needed. We must change that. The
operation and role of the support price, the loan program, the tariff rate quota
and the forfeiture penalty all need to be analyzed in this context.
Fourth, market prices must be better able to fluctuate with supply and
demand. Too often in recent years, price movements have been the result of
abrupt and arbitrary government policy changes, excess supplies induced by
government programs, the abrupt removal of those supplies from market channels,
and similar factors. Whatever policies Congress may choose to address the
difficulties of some producers, those policies should permit the price mechanism
to operate with greater market-responsiveness than is the case today.
We
strongly support H.R. 2081, which 53 bipartisan Members of Congress have
introduced, as a genuine reform of sugar policy. That bill does not exhaust the
possibilities for crafting genuine reform, which could take a variety of shapes,
but the legislation has garnered the support of Members from a range of regions
and ideologies and has the backing of our coalition.
Whatever decisions
this committee ultimately makes, I ask you to remember three things. First,
things have changed since 1996, and not for the better. Second, the current
sugar program is no longer helping the people it is designed to help and it is
hurting many other people from all walks of life. Third, real reform must bring
more market orientation to this outdated, counterproductive, unsustainable
program.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
LOAD-DATE: July 17, 2001