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Federal Document Clearing House
Congressional Testimony
February 13, 2002 Wednesday
SECTION: CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY
LENGTH: 13464 words
COMMITTEE:
HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS
HEADLINE: FY2003
TRANSPORTATION BUDGET
TESTIMONY-BY: KENNETH M. MEAD,
INSPECTOR GENERAL
BODY: February 13, 2002
Department of Transportation Budget for Fiscal Year 2003 Statement of
The Honorable Kenneth M. Mead Inspector General U.S. Department of
Transportation
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for inviting us to testify today as the Subcommittee begins
its deliberations on the fiscal year (FY) 2003 appropriation for the Department
of Transportation (DOT). Much has happened since we met at the beginning of last
year's appropriations cycle. Last year, our testimony focused on aviation delays
and cancellations, airline customer service, and what seemed like aviation
gridlock. At that time, none of us could have imagined the events of September
11, 2001, and the challenges facing our nation today. Thus far, we in the Office
of Inspector General (OIG) have been impressed with the diligence and
aggressiveness with which the Department has moved forward to meet its new
responsibilities.
In today's statement, I would like to highlight some
of the most pressing transportation issues facing DOT. Not surprisingly, this
list begins with responding to September 11, 2001, but it also includes other
departmental issues that must remain on the front burner, including: supporting
the nation's aviation system, deciding the future of inter-city rail passenger
service, improving motor carrier and vehicle safety, balancing Coast Guard's
missions and budget requirements, and improving the Department's stewardship and
accountability over Federal funds. RESPONDING TO SEPTEMBER 11, 2001
Establishing the Transportation Security Administration to Increase
Aviation Security
The mission of creating a new Federal agency charged
with ensuring security across all modes of the U.S. transportation system is a
tremendously formidable task. Since passage of the Aviation and Transportation
Security Act (Act), a sea change has been set in motion - all with very short
timeframes.
Also, it is important to note that the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) is responsible for all aspects of transportation
security, not just aviation security. Currently all modes of transportation
(transit, rail, motor carriers, Coast Guard, etc.) are performing risk
assessments. In the months ahead, TSA will have to focus resources on addressing
security across all modes of transportation.
Since November, the OIG has
been conducting "undercover audits" of security performance at airports
nationwide, as requested by the President. We have seen that security has
progressively improved and is clearly tighter today than before September 11th.
However, there are still alarming lapses of security, and the process of
ensuring that these lapses do not recur is just one challenge that lies ahead.
Mr. Chairman, the next major milestone for TSA is less than 1 week away,
when the agency will assume control of all screener contracts. However, the two
most critical deadlines lie still further ahead:
- November 19th , when
TSA must ensure that there are enough Federal screeners, Federal law enforcement
officers, and Federal security managers in place to conduct the screening of
passengers and property at all commercial airports; and
- December 31ST,
when TSA must have a sufficient number of explosives detection systems in place
to screen all checked bags.
Today, I would like to discuss progress
towards these two deadlines.
Hiring and Training the TSA Workforce. The
next major challenge facing TSA is the hiring and training of a qualified
workforce. Recent estimates indicate that TSA will need to hire at least 40,000
employees, including over 30,000 screeners, an executive team, law enforcement
officers, Federal air marshals, and support personnel. TSA and the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) have expanded the Federal Air Marshal program for
both domestic and international flights. Law enforcement personnel from several
Federal agencies, including the OIG, have been selected and trained to augment
the Federal Air Marshal program until TSA can recruit and train the necessary
personnel.
As detailed in the next section, TSA does not yet know
precisely which explosives detection equipment it will use and where. More
screeners are needed to operate FAA-certified explosives detection systems (EDS)
in airport lobbies than to operate EDS machines integrated into the baggage
system. Using a combination of EDS and trace explosives detection devices to
screen checked baggage would require even more screeners. Until TSA determines
what equipment it will use and how many are needed at each airport, the number
of screeners required remains an open issue. TSA needs to resolve this issue and
is working to do so.
Airport screeners must now be U.S citizens. At
Washington Dulles International Airport, it is estimated that up to 80 percent
of the current screeners will not qualify for employment with TSA because they
are not U.S. citizens. Although we do not yet know the percentage nationally, a
significant number of the current screening workforce may not qualify for
screening positions with TSA. This will have a significant impact on how quickly
TSA can hire and train the needed screeners, and how quickly the agency can
assume screening at airports.
Screening Checked Baggage Through
Explosives Detection Equipment. Air carriers are now required to screen 100
percent of checked baggage using either an FAA-certified EDS or an alternative
method. Because there are limited EDS units currently available, carriers are
relying primarily on positive passenger bag match. Based on our observations on
January 18th and 21St at airports nationwide, we found high levels of compliance
and minimal disruption of air carrier operations. Positive passenger bag match
at the point of origin represents a significant achievement, especially in light
of the concerns air carriers have expressed over the years that it would be
either difficult or impractical to do.
However, positive passenger bag
match at the point of origin has limitations. The concern is with the small
percentage of connecting passengers who, for one reason or another, do not get
on their connecting flight, though their checked baggage continues to its final
destination. We have previously recommended that it would be advantageous to
TSA, the industry, and the traveling public to initiate a pilot program of
limited scope, perhaps 2 to 4 weeks at selected locations, to identify
logistical issues and determine whether positive passenger bag match on all
connecting flights is operationally feasible. The Under Secretary for
Transportation Security announced last week that the Department will conduct
such a pilot.
It is important to remember, however, that positive
passenger bag match does not guarantee against future attempts by suicidal
terrorists to blow up an aircraft, and it is not a permanent substitute for 100
percent EDS screening. This is why Congress has required, and the Department is
aggressively moving to ensure, that all checked baggage is screened through an
explosives detection system by December 31, 2002.
TSA is working toward
having sufficient explosives detection equipment in place by the December
deadline. Issues that need to be resolved include: (1) how many FAA-certified
EDS machines the industry is capable of producing in the next year; (2) whether
the required number of EDS machines can be installed in airport lobbies or
baggage systems while allowing the aviation industry to run with a reasonable
degree of efficiency; and (3) whether, given these exigencies, TSA will require
that all bags be checked through an FAA-certified EDS machine by December 2002
or will instead employ (perhaps just as an interim measure) some combination of
certified EDS machines and trace explosives detection equipment.
Interim
Approach May Be Needed. Currently, there is a gap between the number of
certified EDS machines needed to check all bags and the number of EDS machines
that manufacturers can produce. FAA estimates over 2,000 additional EDS machines
will need to be installed in over 400 airports nationwide over the next year.
The Department hired a consulting firm to review how TSA could meet the 100
percent baggage screening requirement by December 2002. The consultant recently
estimated that 2,990 machines were required to meet the 100 percent screening,
but estimated that manufacturers could produce only 2,260 EDS by yearend,
leaving a shortage of about 700 EDS machines.
There is also the question
of whether all airport lobbies or baggage handling systems can be reconfigured
to accommodate the EDS machines by the end of the year. It takes significantly
more time to reconfigure an airport baggage system to accommodate one or more
in-line EDS machines than to place an EDS in the airport lobby. However, there
is simply not the space to install all EDS machines in airport lobbies, and it
will take more staff hours to operate EDS machines located in lobbies rather
than integrated into the baggage handling system.
Given these factors,
TSA is likely to need an interim approach to meet the December deadline. Among
the specific strategies being considered are the integration of EDS machines
into the baggage system and, as an interim solution, use of a combination of
trace explosives detection and EDS machines installed in the lobby. Using this
method, approximately 1,800 EDS would be required. According to the consultants,
manufacturers could produce sufficient numbers of EDS and trace explosives
detection units to meet our needs.
Measuring TSA's Success in Improving
Aviation Security
Congress, the Administration, and the traveling public
all need to be able to gauge success in improving aviation security. We see
three logical sets of measures for the next year.
First, whether the
deadlines set in the Act will be met, two of which we have already described in
detail.
-February 17, 2002 - TSA to assume screening contracts from
airlines.
-November 19, 2002 - TSA must have a sufficient number of
screeners, Federal law enforcement officers, and Federal airport security
managers to screen all passengers and baggage.
-December 31, 2002 - TSA
must deploy a sufficient number of explosives detection systems to screen all
checked baggage.
Second, we propose the following metrics to measure
TSA's progress toward meeting those date-specific goals:
-number of
screeners hired;
-number of screeners that have completed training;
-number of airports with TSA employees performing screening;
-number of Federal airport security managers in place;
-number
and percentage of background checks completed;
-number and type of EDS
equipment deployed;
-number of airports ready to screen all checked
baggage; and
-EDS equipment usage.
A third set of measures would
address the bottom line issue of the extent and success of security coverage.
There are sensitive security metrics that would be more appropriate to discuss
in a closed session. Speaking in the broadest sense, however, these might
include the number of flights covered by air marshals and the results of
screener accuracy tests.
Funding the Transportation
Security Administration
There are tremendous budgetary challenges facing
TSA for this year and next, and it is increasingly clear that the cost of good
security will be substantially greater than most had anticipated. The cost
implications are both in terms of capital costs for equipment and operating
costs for personnel. Key drivers are the sheer number of Federal screeners,
Federal law enforcement officers, Federal security managers, and Federal air
marshals that will be needed, as well as the pace and type of EDS installation.
Total capital costs for the EDS equipment could range between $1.9
billion and $2.5 billion, depending on the type and mix of equipment used. This
does not include the cost to integrate EDS equipment at airports, which could
exceed $2.3 billion. In addition, estimated operating costs for FY 2002 could
range from $1.6 billion to $1.8 billion based on hiring, training, and deploying
a Federal workforce of over 40,000 employees by the November 19th deadline.
These will also include costs of assuming the existing contracts, which could be
a significant expense. All of these requirements are against a projected revenue
base for FY 2002 of between $2.0 billion and $2.4 billion. Clearly, a
supplemental appropriation will be needed.
For FY 2003, operating costs
for TSA's workforce could range between $2.7 billion and $3.3 billion, as the
agency experiences its first full year of salary costs. However, revenue from
the security fee and assessments from air carriers will not be sufficient for FY
2003. The security fee is estimated to generate only about $1.7 billion in FY
2003 and the Department estimates that assessments from the carriers will only
bring in around $700 million.
Given the pace of events since September
11th, it is understandable why there would be such substantial fluidity in the
budget numbers. Now, an immediate task for TSA is to move out with dispatch to
bring as much clarity as possible to its budgetary requirements for this year
and next. Credible budgetary requirements will help Congress and the
Administration resolve the questions of who will pay for what and in what
amount. Much confusion exists in these areas because there are many
funding sources - some of which are appropriated and some of
which are not. These include revenue from fees, direct appropriations, and
airline assessments, as well as changes to how airports can use grant money and
passenger facility charges.
Given the large budgetary requirements, it
is important that TSA have good cost controls. Vendors are very aware of the
immense amount of equipment that will be purchased. As TSA begins reviewing its
capital needs, vendors are lining up with a vast amount and array of equipment,
and TSA must sort through the claims and counter claims of vendors who believe
their technology is the best for meeting the established deadlines. Given the
large budgetary implications, it is imperative that TSA ensure that its
acquisition process is free from fraud, waste, and abuse.
Implementing
Computer Security
Finally, although this subject will not fall under the
TSA's purview, no discussion of security would be complete without a review of
the Department's computer security. DOT computer systems (including those
supporting air traffic control or monitoring trucks inspection results at the
border) are important to public safety and support the nation's economic health.
DOT needs to make substantial improvements in computer security.
Security over DOT's almost 550 mission-critical systems has been identified as a
material weakness and DOT's Government Information Security Reform Act (GISRA)
report was "disapproved" by OMB.
Despite some progress in the last year,
much remains to be done. As a priority matter, DOT must:
-enhance
network intrusion detection and incidents reporting procedures;
-
enforce and enhance security requirements for third-party network connections;
-identify major DOT systems requiring security certification reviews;
- develop guidance for estimating, tracking, and reporting system
security
funding; -reevaluate its identification of
Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD-63) critical assets as some systems may
have been inappropriately excluded; and
- complete proper background
checks on DOT employees and contractor personnel, and incorporate background
check requirements in contracts.
SUPPORTING THE NATION'S AVIATION SYSTEM
Being Positioned for When the Demand for Air Travel Rebounds
FAA
must be well-positioned when the demand for air travel returns through a
combination of new runways, better air traffic technology, airline scheduling
practices, and greater of use of airports other than hubs. FAA's best estimate
is that economic conditions and passenger demand will recover within 18 to 24
months. FAA projects that by 2004 passenger enplanements will return to
pre-September 11 levels.
Vital Statistics. At our August hearing last
year, we presented three charts illustrating how the delays and cancellations
had fallen during the first half of 2001 compared to those of the prior 2 years.
At that time, we reported that these reductions were due to various factors,
including better weather conditions, no significant labor disruptions, FAA and
airline efforts to improve communication and air traffic management, and
voluntary schedule adjustments by several of the major airlines. The slowing
economy, combined with September 11, however, only served to accelerate the
decline--as illustrated by the following three figures and related statistics.
-During 2001, 22 percent of flights scheduled by the 9 major airlines'
were delayed, canceled, or diverted, affecting an estimated 102 million
passengers. In comparison, 27 percent of scheduled flights in 2000 were
similarly impacted, affecting an estimated 163 million passengers.
-Arrival delays decreased nearly 27 percent (1,355,176 to 991,401)
between 2000 and 2001. While cancellations increased about 4 percent in 2001,
nearly half of all the cancelled flights (88,545) occurred in September.' If
September's figures are excluded from the calculation, cancellations would have
dropped 40 percent (176,952 to 105,782) for the remaining 11 months of the year.
-Not only were there fewer delays, but those occurring were shorter in
duration. Of those flights arriving late, the average delay was about 49 minutes
in 2001-a decline of over 3 minutes from the average in 2000.
-The
number of flights experiencing taxi-out times of 1 hour or more decreased over
30 percent (from 45,993 to 32,019) between 2000 and 2001. Flights with taxi-out
times of 2, 3, 4, and 5 hours decreased at even higher rates of 39, 53, 65, and
80 percent, respectively.
-Flights chronically delayed (30 minutes or
more) and/or canceled decreased 59 percent (from 242,803 to 98,613) between 2000
and 2001.3 Likewise, the number of unique flight numbers associated with these
chronically delayed and canceled flights decreased 29 percent (from 10,717 to
7,601).
-Against this backdrop of decreasing delays and cancellations,
consumer complaints also dropped. DOT Air Travel Consumer Report disclosed that
consumer complaints against the major air carriers decreased nearly 32 percent
(20,564 to 14,076) between 2000 and 2001.
-Scheduling data showed
significant decreases during the last 4 months of 2001:
-- BTS reported
a small increase of 0.5 percent in scheduled flights during the first 8 months
of 2001 over the prior year. In comparison, the last 4 months witnessed an
overall decrease of 14 percent.'
-- When breaking out schedule data by
airport, we found considerable differences, with many of the 30 largest airports
witnessing decreases greater than 14 percent, including: National (-44 percent),
Kennedy (-27 percent),Boston (- 27percent),LaGuardia (-24percent),and Los
Angeles (-23 percent).Those airports with the smallest decreases during the last
4 months of 2001 included: Las Vegas (-5 percent), Tampa (-5 percent), and
Baltimore (-7 percent).
-As a sign of the softening economy and the
impact of the September 11 terrorist attacks, we found that the number of vacant
seats has increased from last year. The average load factor (number of passenger
seats filled) was down during 2001 for all months except January-as illustrated
in the chart. Overall, the major airlines reported an average load factor of
70.3 percent in 2001-2.5 points lower than the overall average in 2000.
Moreover, as illustrated below, the number of business travelers (based
on revenue passenger miles) decreased significantly faster than leisure travel
during the first half of 2001, with large decreases in both categories after
September 11. Overall, the Air Transportation Association (ATA) reported that
leisure and business travel dropped approximately 6 and 21 percent,
respectively, in 2001. Preliminary passenger data from ATA indicate that January
2002 statistics show little or no improvement, with revenue passenger miles
still down approximately 14 percent from the year before.
Keeping
Capacity Enhancing Initiatives on Track. In the summer of 2001, FAA published
its Operational Evolution Plan for enhancing the capacity of the National
Airspace System. This new blue print was only 3 months old when the terrorists
struck on September 11. FAA intends to invest $11.5 billion in the plan
exclusive of the costs to provide air traffic services, new security
requirements, and build new runways, but the true cost of implementing the plan
is unknown.
The Operational Evolution Plan encompasses a range of
efforts to enhance capacity, including choke point/airspace redesign
initiatives, new procedures, and new technology. While choke point initiative
and new controller automated tools enhance the flow of air traffic, building new
runways provides the largest increases in capacity. Most of the 14 runway
projects included in the plan remain on schedule and were not affected by the
events of September 11. For example, Detroit's runway was completed as scheduled
in December 2001.
While none of the 14 runway projects have been
canceled, 2 airports have reported changes in their schedule (Minneapolis and
Houston) and 2 airports are reconsidering their plans (Dallas-Ft. Worth and
Charlotte). Minneapolis has made the most significant change by revising the
estimated completion date for its runway by a year, from 2003 to 2004. Because
Dallas-Ft. Worth airport officials have expressed so much uncertainty about
their runway configuration, FAA has removed Dallas-Ft. Worth from the
Operational Evolution Plan. Further, Atlanta airport officials told us that they
may slip the runway completion date from 2005 to 2006 due to problems with the
runway earthwork contract.
Airport officials also told us that other
adjustments to planned infrastructure projects may occur as emphasis is placed
on revamping airport terminals to accommodate new requirements for explosives
detection equipment to screen checked baggage. Given the challenges that
airports are facing, current schedules for completing major runways are
aggressive. It is therefore incumbent that FAA continues to closely monitor
these runways by both visiting airports to verify information, including those
airports that say they are on track, and reviewing project financial plans. The
following chart shows the status, cost, and challenges to timely completion for
each of the 14 runway projects as provided by FAA and the airports.
Managing FAA Acquisitions and Making Sound Business Decisions. FAA
spends almost $3 billion annually to modernize the National Airspace System. FAA
has made progress with a number of acquisitions, including Free Flight Phase 1,
which introduced new automated controller tools as well as new information
exchange systems that link FAA and airline operations centers.' However, cost
and schedule problems persist with major acquisitions, and several programs
require careful watching.
-The Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) has
a long history of cost increases, schedule slippages, and vexing technical
problems. The current cost estimate of $2.9 billion is under review. WARS was
originally estimated to cost $892 million and commence operations in 1998. FAA
now expects to have WARS operational in 2003 but this new satellite navigation
system will provide less precision approach capability than initially promised.
FAA must decide whether to stop WAAS development in 2003 or continue to refine
the technology to meet more demanding precision approach capability known as a
"Category I precision approach."' In a separate effort, FAA is pursuing the
Local Area Augmentation System specifically for precision approach capability
and expects to field a production system in 2004.
FAA expects to make a
decision this spring on how to proceed with WAAS. The benefits of WAAS have
shifted over time (FAA will no longer realize cost savings from phasing out
ground based systems) and general aviation users will be the principle
beneficiary of WAAS. Large commercial carriers who have equipped aircraft with
sophisticated avionics and/or flight management systems may find little benefit
in equipping with WAAS.
-FAA's Standard Terminal Automation Replacement
System (STARS) is already 4 years late and is now estimated that it will cost
$600 million over the original estimate of about $1 billion. STARS will provide
controllers in the terminal environment with color displays, processors, and
computer software at 166 FAA facilities. FAA has spent about $660 million on the
STARS program but has only two early display configuration systems in operation,
which provide new controller displays, but did not replace existing software.
The cost and schedule to complete full STARS remains at risk. Testing of
STARS continues to identify critical problems (trouble reports). Currently,
there are 523 open trouble reports, and the number of reports deemed "critical"
has remained relatively constant at about 175 between September 2001 and January
2002. This puts the installation for the first site in November 2002
(Philadelphia) at risk because all critical trouble reports must first be
corrected. Also, STARS is dependent on the new ASR-11 digital radar that has
experienced cost increases and schedule slips of its own. FAA has delayed a
decision to authorize full production for the ASR-11 radar from December 2001 to
November 2002 because of delays in resolving technical problems. Unless FAA
modifies its deployment strategy or purchases equipment to make existing analog
radars compatible with STARS, this will result in some STARS sites being
deployed before the new digital radar is in place. This further complicates an
already large, complex deployment that is scheduled to be complete by 2008.
-FAA and industry are pursuing Automatic Dependent Surveillance-
Broadcast', commonly referred to as "ADS-B", through the Safe Flight 21
initiative ($215 million). The Safe Flight 21 initiative is a limited deployment
with the bulk of development work being done in the Ohio River Valley and
Alaska. ADS-B is a key Free Flight technology and can help pilots land in bad
weather and, when coupled with cockpit moving map displays, can help prevent
accidents on runways. In essence, ADS-B can provide "a second set of eyes" in
the cockpit. To expedite the development of such new technologies, the Congress
provided $5 million for a pilot in Fiscal Year 2002 to integrate new GPS- based
technologies with controller displays and other systems. Considerable
controversy has focused on the data link and required radio frequency that will
be used to transmit ADS-B information to aircraft and controllers. FAA expects
to make a decision on these matters in March or April of this year. Reaching
closure on these issues is important because it will solidify technical
standards and facilitate the development and implementation of a new generation
of cockpit avionics. ADS-B has considerable promise for enhancing capacity as
well as safety and, in light of September 11, may offer some security features.
To obtain benefits, airspace users must invest in new avionics.
- The
Weather and Radar Processor (WARP) is expected to significantly improve the
weather information on controller displays by providing accurate color graphics
of weather on the same displays that controllers use to track aircraft, a
capability that does not exist today. Since 1995, the estimated cost of the
program has increased from $227.8 million to $276.8 million, or a 22 percent
increase. The current plan is to begin using WARP on controller displays at the
first site, the Dallas - Ft. Worth en route center, in July 2002, nearly a
3-year delay. Even with the cost increases and schedule delays, the current cost
baseline is not realistic and the schedule is at risk.
-The En Route
Automation Modernization (ERAM) program replaces the en route computer hardware
and software used to receive, process, and track high altitude air traffic (also
know as the Host computer system). The Host mainframe computer was replaced to
address Y2K and maintenance concerns but the software was not. ERAM is essential
to ensure the maintainability of the Host computer and accommodate Free Flight
technologies. FAA estimates the Host computer system will reach its end-of
-service life in 2008 and that it will take approximately 7 years for a
contractor to develop and deploy a replacement system. Costs are uncertain but
could exceed $1 billion. In June 2001, a General Services Administrative judge
upheld a contractor protest and ruled that FAA did not fully develop the program
requirements before announcing their intent to award a single source contract.
FAA intends to solicit vendor proposals by the end of February 2002. FAA needs
to defmitize plans and develop a clear-cut strategy for replacing the Host
computer hardware and software at the nation's en route air traffic control
facilities.
- FAA's Telecommunication Infrastructure (FTI) effort is
important because it replaces ground-to-ground owned and leased communications
networks. The FTI project was initially established to replace six FAA networks
with one integrated digital communications network to better support
modernization efforts with an estimated cost of $1.9 billion over 10 years. The
current cost estimate of $1.9 billion may not be reflective of all the costs
associated with the effort. In August 2001, we reported that the initial FTI
design would significantly increase air traffic control systems vulnerability to
unauthorized intrusion because critical systems would share the same network
with administrative (such as accounting) systems with direct connections to the
Internet. Based on our recommendations, FAA amended its FTI requirements in
December 2001 to replace air traffic control networks only. FAA is currently
evaluating revised proposals submitted by three vendor groups and now plans to
award a contract by June 2002.
- Safeguarding satellite-based systems
from intentional and unintentional interference. A key element in FAA's plans
for modernizing the National Airspace System is the use of satellite- based
systems for navigation, which include wide and local area augmentation systems.
FAA had believed that satellite-based systems (GPS/WAAS) with appropriate
augmentation could satisfy the required performance as the only navigation
system installed in an aircraft or the only service provided by FAA. This is no
longer the case.
While satellite-based systems are becoming commonplace
in all modes of transportation, they are susceptible to unintentional and
intentional interference. The recent Volpe report on GPS vulnerability
underscores the fact that satellite-based systems cannot serve as "sole means"
systems as envisioned'. This affects not only aviation but also maritime,
highway, and railroad efforts to harness GPS. The Department
needs to continue risk mitigation efforts, rationalize its approach to back-up
systems, and leverage the Department of Defense's work to develop anti jamming
technology.
Overarching Factors That Will Affect FAA's Performance. A
common thread that runs through many FAA reform efforts is to bring more
accountability to the agency with respect to delivering air traffic
modernization projects on time and within budget, providing more efficient
services, and controlling costs. In the spring of 2000, the Wendell H. Ford
Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21St Century established a Management
Advisory Council (with a subcommittee to oversee air traffic services) and a
Chief Operating Officer.
It has been 2 years now since the legislation,
and a Management Advisory Council and an Air Traffic Control Subcommittee have
been established. However, as of February 11, 2002, a Chief Operating Officer,
responsible for negotiating a performance agreement with the FAA Administrator,
has not been appointed and the Administrator's term expires this summer.
One essential part of a Performance-Based Organization is a cost
accounting system. Developing an effective cost accounting system is a
significant undertaking, and FAA is making good progress. To date, FAA
implemented the cost accounting system for its largest line of business, Air
Traffic Services. The complete cost accounting system, which FAA estimates will
cost $39 million, should be ready sometime after January 2003. However, for the
cost accounting system to be credible, FAA also needs an effective labor
distribution system.
To its credit, FAA has deployed a system called
Cru-X that it plans to use to account for and distribute its Air Traffic
Services line of business labor costs. However, we identified a serious internal
control flaw in the Cru-X system FAA intends to use to track about $3 billion of
its labor costs. Cru-X allows employees to override its internal clock and
record any work arrival and departure time they want. FAA recognized and agreed
that Cru-X has a management control weakness concerning sign-in and sign-out
procedures. However, FAA has not yet implemented the necessary changes. FAA must
have credible cost accounting and labor distribution systems to properly manage
its programs, to know the real cost of the services it provides, and to identify
areas where costs can be lowered without adversely impacting service.
The Impact of Falling Aviation Trust Fund Revenues
Since the
attacks of September 11, the aviation community has seen a dramatic reduction in
air travel. This has resulted in steep declines in airline revenues and a sharp
reduction in the amount of tax revenues available to fund FAA and its programs.
The decline in revenue, combined with requirements of AIR 21, will have
implications to both the uncommitted balance of the Trust Fund and the amount of
General Fund contributions that will be needed to fund FAA's operating costs.
Reductions in the Trust Fund's Uncommitted Balance. AIR 21 requires that
all revenue and interest deposited in the Trust Fund each year be spent on FAA
and airport needs. This amount is based on revenue estimates included in the
President's budget submission, which is delivered to Congress 7 months prior to
the beginning of the fiscal year. For FY 2002, the President's budget estimated
revenue at $12.2 billion, which Congress appropriated in accordance with AIR 21
requirements. However, since September 11, expected Trust Fund revenues have
dropped from $12.2 billion to $9.8 billion - $2.4 billion less or 20 percent
below original projections. In addition, as a result of September 11, Congress
authorized supplemental appropriations of an additional $600 million from the
Trust Fund in response to increased security needs.
The FY 2002
appropriations and the subsequent supplemental appropriations are now committed
against a significantly reduced revenue stream. This will result in a
substantial draw down of the Trust Fund's uncommitted balance. As shown in the
following chart, we estimate that the uncommitted balance in the Trust Fund
could drop from $7.3 billion at the beginning of FY 2002 to about $4.3 billion
by the end of FY 2002 - a $3 billion decrease.
Increased
Funding Requirements from the General Fund. The steep decline
in Trust Fund revenues combined with AIR 21 requirements will have significant
implications for FAA's operations
funding. AIR 21 requires
FAA's Airport Improvement Program (AIP) and Facilities and Equipment (F&E)
accounts to be funded at the authorized levels before allocating any Trust Fund
revenue to FAA's Operations account.
If Congress follows AIR 21
requirements for FY 2003 and funds the AIP and F&E accounts at the
authorized levels, there will be significantly less Trust Fund revenue available
to fund FAA's operations than in prior years. As a result, FAA's General Fund
requirements for FY 2003 may triple over General Fund requirements in FY 2002.
As shown in the following chart, the amount of
funding required
from the General Fund to support FAA's operations could increase from $1.1
billion this year to over $3.7 billion in FY 2003.
The increased General
Fund requirements could have significant implications for FAA's budget. The need
for FAA to control its operating costs is now even more critical than in the
past. FAA's operating budget, which is 73 percent payroll costs, has increased
over the past 5 years at a significant rate. As shown in the graph on the
following page, FAA's operations costs have increased from $5.5 billion in 1998
to $7.6 billion in FY 2003.
Much of the increase in operating costs have
been driven by collective bargaining agreements negotiated under FAA's personnel
reform legislation. For example, the 1998 agreement with the National Air
Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA), which created the new pay system for
controllers, was a significant cost driver requiring nearly $1 billion in
additional
funding over its 5-year life. Although the agreement
contained workplace changes intended to offset escalated salary costs, FAA was
unable to demonstrate any discernible productivity gains or cost savings
associated with those changes. In FY 2003, the current agreement will expire,
and FAA and NATCA will have to enter into negotiations over a new agreement
Ensuring that Aviation Safety Remains a Top Priority
While the
focus of attention since September 11 has been on aviation security, FAA and the
airline industry must ensure that aviation safety remains a top priority. During
the past year, FAA has taken steps to strengthen its efforts to reduce runway
incursions and operational errors, and in-fact, runway incursions are down, but
further actions are needed to reduce the safety risk. Further steps must also be
taken to strengthen FAA's oversight of airline operations and maintenance
practices.
Reducing the Number of Runway Incursions and Operational
Errors. This past year, FAA continued to focus on reducing runway incursions,
incidents on the runway that can have very serious consequences. FAA established
a system to categorize each runway incursion by one of four levels of accident
risk to focus on reducing the most serious incursions. (The top two categories
are those incursions that barely avoid an accident.) FAA's full-time regional
runway safety managers, appointed in October 2000, conducted approximately 100
safety evaluations of runways at specific airports. These initiatives are steps
in the right direction.
After a record high of 431 in calendar year
2000, the number of runway incursions decreased to 381 in 2001. The most severe
incursions, those that barely avoided a collision, decreased from 67 in 2000 to
52 in 2001. While the numbers this past year have been encouraging, much of the
decrease occurred after September 11 when air traffic levels, especially in
general aviation, declined.
FAA needs to continue its actions to reduce
runway incursions, which are still occurring at an average of more than one a
day. This past year, FAA began commissioning the Airport Movement Area Safety
System (AMASS) to alert controllers of potential collisions at the largest
airports. FAA has been developing AMASS since 1991.As of January 31, FAA
commissioned 99 systems at 8 airports, and plans to commission systems at the
remaining 26 airports by the end of 2003.
To ensure that runway
incursions continue to decrease, when operations return to pre-September 11
levels, FAA needs to strengthen program accountability and expedite technologies
to help pilots prevent runway incursions. FAA agreed with our recommendation
made last June to strengthen program accountability and plans to implement a new
oversight process by the end of June to ensure that various organizations
complete runway incursion initiatives on time. FAA has not made a decision on
our recommendation to expedite technologies such as the incockpit moving map
displays and Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast that have the most
potential for reducing runway incursions.
To reduce operational errors
that occur mostly in mid-air, FAA took action as recommended in our December
2000 report to improve its focus and oversight efforts to reduce operational
errors. For example, in April 2001, together with NATCA, FAA implemented a
procedure to identify the severity, or collision hazard, of each operational
error. The purpose of this procedure was to focus resources on preventing the
most severe errors and to take action based on the severity of these incidents.
FAA also established a full time position to oversee regional efforts to reduce
operational errors and issued guidance to improve regional operational error
reduction plans.
As shown on the following chart, operational errors
continued to increase, with almost 1,200 incidents in FY 2001. FAA did not meet
its FY 2001 goal for reducing operational errors to 5 per 1 million operations,
which was 812. Even with the decline in air traffic since September 11,
operational errors continue to increase. During the first 4 months of FY 2002,
there were 351 operational errors, exceeding the 341 errors that occurred during
the same period in FY 2001.
To reverse the upward trend in operational
errors, FAA must continue to strengthen its national oversight of those
facilities and regions that do not show progress in reducing operational errors
and establish a method to measure the effectiveness of initiatives implemented
to reduce these incidents.
FAA must also address this committee's
direction in the FY 2002 Appropriations Bill to stop reducing the number of air
traffic control supervisors and expanding the Controller-in-Charge (CIC)
Program. In 2001, FAA reduced 115 air traffic control supervisor positions
through attrition by using the expanded CIC Program. The committee's position
was that further expansion of the CIC Program and a reduction in supervisors was
not appropriate given the number of runway incursions and operational errors. In
addition, the committee was concerned about FAA's lack of action to address our
October 2000 memorandum which stated that FAA was by-passing its own CIC
selection requirements and making the CIC Program an entitlement, rather than
ensuring that only the most qualified controllers are selected as CICs. In 2001,
FAA evaluated the CIC Program at 27 facilities and found that 19, or 70 percent,
had designated 100 percent of the air traffic controllers as CICs. These 19
facilities included large air traffic control towers, such as Atlanta
Hartsfield, Dallas-Fort Worth, Washington Dulles, and Miami International.
Strengthening FAA's Safety Inspection Programs. The United States
operates one of the safest aviation systems in the world, and industry and FAA
rely on a series of overlapping controls to ensure this level of safety is
maintained. Recently, we performed separate reviews of FAA's oversight for
ensuring that carriers monitor their own aircraft maintenance practices,
referred to as Continuing Analysis and Surveillance Systems (CASS), and FAA's
progress in implementing its Air Transportation Oversight System (ATOS). ATOS is
FAA's new approach to monitoring air carrier maintenance and operational safety
practices.
Ensuring aircraft are properly maintained is the
responsibility of the air carriers. Since 1964, FAA has required air carriers to
have a CASS to serve as a selfcorrecting system carriers can use to track
maintenance activities and problems. The CASS requirement provides FAA with a
way to hold carriers accountable for evaluating their own maintenance procedures
to identify and correct trends that could lead to an accident.
However,
FAA has not consistently and thoroughly monitored CASS effectiveness as part of
its oversight. FAA discovered CASS problems at 10 major commercial air carriers
through special inspections that had not been identified through its routine
inspection process. In reviewing FAA's routine oversight process, we found that
FAA did not emphasize CASS. CASS inspections were not comprehensive or routinely
conducted. For example, FAA's CASS oversight at some air carriers consisted of
merely attending monthly maintenance meetings. In other instances, CASS
deficiencies identified during FAA's routine surveillance were never corrected.
At one carrier, maintenance deficiencies identified in July 1998 were not
corrected and were identified again in FAA's July 2000 special inspection at the
air carrier. In October 2001, FAA again cited the carrier for maintenance
deficiencies. The problems identified by FAA, but not corrected by the carrier,
included using improper aircraft parts and repair procedures.
In
December 2001, we recommended that FAA conduct comprehensive, annual CASS
inspections and develop a follow-up system to ensure that identified
deficiencies are corrected. We also recommended that FAA provide inspectors with
appropriate CASS training and guidance.
As FAA works to make
improvements in its CASS oversight, it also must continue to complete and refine
its overall air carrier inspection system, known as ATOS. While CASS is the
system air carriers use to monitor the effectiveness of their own aircraft
maintenance programs, ATOS is the system FAA uses to oversee all aspects of an
air carrier's operations, including their CASS.
FAA introduced ATOS in
October 1998, as its new system for providing oversight of air carrier
operations. When fully implemented, ATOS should allow FAA to more effectively
use its inspector resources. Instead of random inspection activities focused
only on identifying compliance with regulations, ATOS will rely on analysis of
data collected during inspections to focus inspection activities on areas within
the carriers' operations that pose the greatest safety risks. However, 3 years
after FAA initiated ATOS, the new system is not completed at any of the 10 major
air carriers and much work remains to implement the system. In addition, ATOS
has not been expanded to the remaining passenger air carriers.
FAA also
must better prepare its inspector workforce to conduct ATOS inspections and must
refine methods for inspectors to collect and record inspection results. When
interviewed, 71 percent of inspectors said they had not had adequate training
and 83 percent of the lead inspectors said the ATOS data were not adequate.
Analysis of inspection data is a critical element of the system; yet, FAA is
still working to refine the data collection and analysis process. Without this
valuable element, FAA cannot successfully target its inspections to areas of the
greatest safety risks. For example, numerous deficiencies found at Alaska
Airlines during a special inspection conducted after the January 2000 crash of
Alaska Airlines Flight 261 had not been identified and corrected through the
ATOS system. The special inspection, conducted in April 2000, disclosed improper
maintenance practices, inadequate controls to ensure that aircraft parts were
tested to proper standards, and ineffective quality control and quality
assurance programs.
Within the last year, FAA has taken steps to address
problems in ATOS and has made incremental progress, such as hiring staff to
analyze ATOS data. However, to get the system operating as intended, FAA must
complete implementation of the new system, provide critical inspector training,
improve national oversight of the ATOS program, and must fully integrate ATOS
into its oversight of the remaining air carriers. We will be reporting more on
ATOS in the next few weeks.
DECIDING THE FUTURE STRUCTURE AND
FUNDING OF INTER-CITY PASSENGER RAIL (AMTRAK)
Since
December 1997, Amtrak has operated under a Federal mandate to eliminate its need
for Federal operating assistance by December 2, 2002. Amtrak has not succeeded
in implementing enduring financial improvements of the magnitude necessary to
attain and sustain self-sufficiency in and beyond 2003. Since receiving its
mandate, Amtrak's passenger revenues and ridership have shown marked growth,
rising 26.1 percent and 11.4 percent, respectively. However, expense growth has
more than kept pace, so that for every $1 Amtrak realized in additional revenue,
cash expenses increased by $1.05. Interest expenses related to borrowing will
account for $225 million of Amtrak's total expenses by 2005, a growth of over
400 percent since 1995 when interest expenses totaled $43 million.
Amtrak's operating loss in 2001 of $1.1 billion was $129 million higher
than the 2000 loss and the largest in Amtrak's history. Amtrak's cash losses,
which are the basis for measuring Amtrak's progress towards self-sufficiency,
were $585 million in 2001. This was $24 million worse than Amtrak's cash loss in
1998, the first year of Amtrak's self-sufficiency mandate. By 2003, Amtrak must
reduce its cash losses by more than ,$300 million in order to meet its deadline
for achieving selfsufficiency. There simply is not sufficient time left for
Amtrak to develop, implement, and realize results from meaningful and
sustainable improvement plans. At this point in time, Amtrak will face a
formidable challenge in 2002 just managing its cash resources - be they from
operating revenues or Federal subsidies - to make ends meet without further
borrowing. In the coming year, Congress will be faced with multi-billion dollar
decisions regarding the future of Amtrak.
Our assessment of Amtrak's
2001 Strategic Business Plan" predicted that Amtrak's cash losses in 2003 will
be $511 million, which is $263 million greater than it would need to be for
Amtrak to meet its self-sufficiency mandate. In the past year, Amtrak sought to
compensate for cash shortfalls through a variety of means, including mortgaging
portions of one of its most valuable assets, Penn Station - New York. It would
be possible for Amtrak to pursue additional transactions of this nature in the
coming year and meet the letter of the selfsufficiency law. Amtrak could also
take other draconian measures, such as widespread employee or service cuts. Both
strategies are questionable. While Amtrak would technically meet the letter of
the law, the victory would be hollow. Not only would Amtrak's financial position
be unsustainable - Amtrak's assets are finite - but more importantly, the
cannibalization of the railroad's assets would compromise the future of our
intercity passenger rail network, regardless of who provides rail service. Such
actions would also constrain options available to the Congress and the
Administration as they deliberate Amtrak's future and the future of intercity
passenger rail.
Operating Losses Are A Small Part of the Problem - Focus
Should Be On Capital Requirements
The debate over Amtrak has primarily
focused on its inability to eliminate the need for Federal operating subsidies.
It is important to keep sight of the fact that even if Amtrak were to succeed in
becoming operationally self-sufficient, it would still rely heavily on the
Federal Government for
funding of its capital needs. The
Northeast Corridor has a backlog of needs to bring it to a state of good repair
that Amtrak has recently estimated to cost about $5 billion. Moreover,
continuing Federal capital support is needed which Amtrak currently estimates
will cost between $1 billion and $1.5 billion annually.
Two weeks ago,
Amtrak announced plans to defer $175 million in capital improvements and reduce
operating expenses by $110 million in order to conserve cash resources in 2002.
These short- term actions are a measured response to an unsustainable situation;
however, further deferring of capital improvements on a system that is rapidly
approaching capital starvation is a cause for serious concern. Amtrak also
outlined its request for $1.2 billion in Federal appropriations for FY 2003.
Nearly three quarters of the request is needed for capital projects. Amtrak
stated that appropriations below that amount would result in the elimination of
long-distance service as early as October 2002.
Performance Trends
Amtrak's systemwide ridership grew 19.3 percent between 1996 and 2001,
rising from 19.7 million to 23.5 million. Systemwide passenger revenue grew 44
percent between 1995 and 2001. The revenue growth trend that began in 1995 has
brought Amtrak to the highest passenger revenue levels in its history. The chart
on the following page illustrates growth in passenger revenue and ridership
since 1991.
However, expense growth has also kept pace. Between 2000 and
2001, Amtrak's expenses, including depreciation, grew 9.8 percent, or a total of
$294 million. While Amtrak's single largest expense category is labor, which
accounted for 50 percent of Amtrak's total 2001 expenses, Amtrak has also
experienced a significant increase in interest expenses related to borrowing.
The interest expenses primarily relate to externally financed purchases of new
equipment, including the Acela trainsets and high-horsepower locomotives in the
Northeast Corridor. The chart below illustrates growth in interest expense since
1993 and projected growth through 2005
Since 1991, total operating
expenses have grown about $1.2 billion, from $2.1 billion to $3.3 billion,
representing an increase of 57 percent. In the same time period, total revenues
grew by about $850 million. Continued expense growth coupled with
lower-than-projected revenue growth has resulted in operating losses that have
continued to increase since Amtrak's mandate was established in 1997 and have
reached historic levels. The chart below illustrates growth in Amtrak's
operating and cash losses since 1990.
Amtrak's authorization expires in
2002 and the debate has begun on the future of intercity passenger rail in the
United States and Amtrak's role within it. During the course of the debate, a
number of issues will need to be addressed, including whether or not a linked
national system of intercity passenger rail is desirable, the operating
subsidies that would likely be needed to sustain such a system, the capital
investment requirements associated with the resulting rail network, and the
appropriate source or sources of any operating or capital subsidies. Factors
other than Amtrak's financial performance should be considered during these
discussions, including the role Amtrak has played since September 11 in
providing an alternative to airline travel.
IMPROVING MOTOR CARRIER AND
VEHICLE SAFETY
In 2000, over 5,000 fatalities resulted from crashes
involving large trucks and over 36,000 fatalities resulted from motor vehicle
crashes not involving large trucks - on average, someone was killed every 13
minutes. The Department set strategic goals to reduce fatalities and it now
faces three major challenges in achieving its safety goals: (1) ensuring motor
carrier safety at the U.S.-Mexico border, (2) tightening controls over the
Commercial Driver's Licenses (CDLs) Program and preventing fraudulent issuance,
and (3) implementing the Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability, and
Documentation (TREAD) Act provisions to improve detection of motor vehicle
safety defects.
Ensuring Motor Carrier Safety at the U.S. Mexico Border
During FY 2001, the Department made improvements in its inspection
presence and controls at the U.S.-Mexico border, but over the next few months,
it must place 80 Federal inspectors at the border and obtain sufficient space
and facilities at each commercial crossing to conduct inspections and put
vehicles out- of-service. The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
(FMCSA) reports the out-of-service rate for Mexican trucks inspected at the
border declined from 44 percent in 1997 to 36 percent in FY 2001 as the number
of inspections performed increased. The Department developed a strategy and
timeline for implementing the safety elements needed to open the U.S.-Mexico
border to commercial trucking. The key to effectiveness of the safety strategy
will be in its execution.
The FY 2002 Appropriations Act charges the OIG
with determining whether safety elements are in place and reporting our findings
to the Secretary within 180 days of the December 18, 2001 enactment. The
Secretary is to address the Inspector General's findings on the mandated
requirements and certify in writing that the opening of the border does not pose
an unacceptable safety risk. We are proceeding with our assessment by deploying
staff to each of the 27 commercial border crossings and developing a baseline on
the status of the mandated requirements.
Tightening Controls Over the
CDL Program and Preventing Fraudulent Issuance of CDLs
The OIG is very
concerned about fraud in the testing and licensing of commercial drivers -- it
is a significant problem that has compromised
highway safety
and raises questions about the integrity of the processes and the quality of
commercial drivers. Criminal investigations by the OIG and other law enforcement
agencies have identified criminal activity dealing with CDLs in 15 states since
1998. Moreover, fraud in one state affects the Nation as shown by the largest
Federal investigation of CDL improprieties---Operation Safe Road.
OIG
investigators, FBI agents, and other Federal and state law enforcement personnel
carried out Operation Safe Road. Investigators identified over 200 drivers who
may have obtained fraudulent licenses in Illinois and who then transferred their
licenses to 20 other states. Another 692 suspect drivers from Florida
transferred licenses to 32 other states. As of December 2001, 39 individuals
were convicted as a result of Operation Safe Road. Those convicted include state
government officials and employees at state and third-party-testing facilities
that accepted "pay offs" in exchange for CDLs. For example, in Illinois a state
employee was convicted for accepting at least $120,000 in bribes.
Federal standards, which provide a framework for state CDL programs and
set parameters for FMCSA oversight, must be strengthened. Federal standards do
not currently require CDL applicants to demonstrate they are legally present in
the United States or to show proof of state residency, nor do the Federal
standards require the states to verify Social Security information from a CDL
applicant. Current standards also permit the use of foreign languages in the
administration of the CDL tests and variations exist in this area across the
states. Consistent standards across the nation would discourage license shopping
across the states. FMCSA recognizes the need for stronger standards and has
taken steps to improve its oversight of the states, but more should be done to
expand the scope of FMCSA's reviews and to follow-up to ensure that sanctions
are used if states fail to take corrective actions when problems are identified.
Implementing TREAD Act Provisions to Improve Detection of Motor Vehicle
Safety Defects
Congress responded to the Firestone tire recall by
passing the TREAD Act to establish early warning reporting requirements for
manufacturers so that the National
Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA) Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is aware of
potential defects as soon as possible. NFITSA faces several challenges in
implementing the TREAD Act and improving its ability to identify potential
safety defects.
In a January 2002 audit report on NHTSA" we addressed
the following issues:
-NHTSA must successfully complete the remaining 12
of the 15 rulemakings required by the TREAD Act, most importantly the early
warning reporting requirements rule, which is at the heart of the TREAD Act. The
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking was issued on December 21, 2001 and the final rule
has a statutory deadline for issuance of June 2002.Several of the 12 remaining
rulemakings are complex and controversial and have statutory deadlines ranging
from November 1, 2001 to November 1, 2002. Currently, NHTSA is late in issuing a
rulemaking related to Tire Pressure Warning Devices. By statute, NHTSA was to
have issued a final rule requiring a warning system in new vehicles to indicate
when a tire is significantly under-inflated by November 1, 2001. NHTSA must
adhere to the established rulemaking milestone dates and work with the Office of
Management and Budget when its review is required.
- ODI's current
processes for using and analyzing data to identify potential defects and decide
that potential defects should be investigated are in need of major improvements.
ODI's current procedures do not provide a methodology for analyzing complaints
and there are no specific processes or procedures for opening investigations. We
found several instances where ODI's decision to open or not open an
investigation was not consistent with the seriousness or frequency of the
complaint. Over a 22- month period, from February 199'7 to November 1998, ODI
received 23 complaints alleging exhaust leakage in a specific 1993 minivan with
some complainants reporting headaches, nausea, and dizziness. Although ODI's
Defects Analysis Division recommended an investigation, an investigation was not
opened.
ODI's Chief of Defects and Recall Information Analysis told us
that a defect trend was not supported and that it was highly unlikely that
exhaust fumes leaking into the cabin would cause the reported complaints of
sickness. However, since the manufacturer issued three technical service
bulletins over 2 1/2 years and ODI received multiple complaints on this problem,
we questioned why an investigation was not opened.
NHTSA must develop
new processes for analyzing defects and for opening cases, and incorporate into
these processes a peer review panel and process to help ensure that data used to
identify potential defects are comprehensively and thoroughly analyzed and
investigations are opened and prioritized in a consistent manner.
-
ODI's current defect information system is seriously flawed and its project with
Volpe National Transportation Systems Center to replace it with a new defect
information system by Fall 2002 is significantly at risk of not meeting quality,
cost, and schedule goals. The success of the TREAD Act will ultimately rise or
fall on the quality and usefulness of a new information system and ODI's ability
to identify potential defects. NHTSA must obtain the services of an independent
entity to validate and verify that the new defect information system will meet
NHTSA's needs and reduce development risk. This independent assessment could
help spot problems before they result in major cost increases and schedule
slippages.
The NHTSA Administrator agreed with our recommendations to:
(1) Report to the Secretary and begin reporting to Congress the
milestone dates, budget estimates, and actions required to complete the TREAD
Act rulemakings/actions, and ODI's new information system.
(2) Establish
a peer review panel and process to ensure investigations are opened and
prioritized in a consistent manner.
(3) Obtain the services of an
independent entity to validate and verify the contractor's progress in
developing ODI's new information system.
BALANCING COAST GUARD'S MISSION
AND BUDGET REQUIREMENTS
The Coast Guard is seeking a significant
increase in its budget to be able to deal with an expanded security mission,
perform its other major missions, and proceed with an extraordinary set of
important major acquisitions. The budget will increase from $5.7 billion in FY
2002 to $7.3 billion in FY 2003. There are currently a number of uncertainties
about Coast Guard mission requirements, how it will execute major acquisition
projects, and control costs. Coast Guard needs an effective cost accounting
system that meets Federal accounting standards to provide a basis for accurately
measuring the costs of specific activities and making decisions about where to
apply resources.
There are three areas where uncertainties need to be
addressed.
The Budget Request for FY 2003
Coast Guard is seeking
an increase of $1.6 billion for FY 2003. The largest portion of the increase is
$736 million for a required payment to Coast Guard's military retirement fund.
Two other categories, Operating Expenses (up by $733 million) and Acquisitions
(up by $92 million) account for most of the remaining increase. The increase in
Coast Guard's operating capacity is not as large as it appears. About one-half
of the operating fund increase will pay for entitlements and other inflationary
adjustments and not add to operating capacity. The other half of the increase
will fund the operation of new assets, such as seagoing buoy tenders and coastal
patrol boats, continue increased security operations begun after September 11,
and fund new security operations.
Immediately after September 11, Coast
Guard devoted 58 percent of its resources to port safety and security, while
deployment to other core missions fell. For FY 2003, Coast Guard plans to
dedicate 27 percent of its resources to port safety and security programs. This
is roughly twice the amount (14 percent) that Coast Guard planned to dedicate to
these missions for FY 2001 prior to September 11. The amount of resources
devoted to drug interdiction and fisheries enforcement is expected to decrease
in FY 2003. Coast Guard views its FY 2003 budget request as the initial phase of
a 3-year plan to enhance its homeland security missions while still conducting
other diverse missions that remain national priorities. It is not clear to us if
Coast Guard plans to request additional increases in FYs 2004 and 2005 to
support this plan.
The Search and Rescue Program
Last year we
reported that the readiness of the Coast Guard's small boat station search and
rescue program was declining because it did not have sufficient numbers of
qualified personnel, a formal training program for key staff, and equipment that
was up to standards. Coast Guard developed a strategic plan to improve
readiness, and the Congress provided $14.5 million for FY 2002 for added search
and rescue program personnel and equipment. We have been directed to audit and
certify that the $14.5 million supplements and does not supplant Coast Guard's
FY 2001 level of effort in this area. The FY 2003 budget proposal seeks $22
million to follow through on search and rescue program enhancements, such as
adding crew members to the 47-foot motor life boats, and procuring small and
medium search and rescue boats.
Small boat stations are also playing a
key role in port security activities since September 11. More than half of all
station hours are devoted to port security, and operating tempo has increased
significantly. Given the emphasis on security missions, it is unclear whether
Coast Guard has implemented its plan to address the search and rescue program
deficiencies we identified. As part of our audit to certify the use of FY 2002
funds, we will determine the status of Coast Guard's efforts to address
deficiencies identified in our prior audit report.
Major Acquisition
Projects
The FY 2003 budget seeks $590 million for Coast Guard's two
largest acquisition projects: the Deepwater Capability Project and the National
Distress System Modernization Projects. Both projects are critical to improving
Coast Guard's operations, but both also have significant uncertainties that the
Committee should expect to be resolved this fiscal year.
Deepwater. This
is the second year that the Congress is being asked to appropriate procurement
funding for the Deepwater project without a detailed cost and
schedule estimate. If the Congress appropriates the $500 million Coast Guard is
seeking for 2003, Coast Guard will have $800 million available for the
procurement phase of the project. Given the approach that Coast Guard is using
on this project, reliable estimates that describe exactly what assets will be
modernized or replaced, at what cost, when that will occur, and when
funding will be required, will have to await selection of a
contractor later this year. The selection is currently scheduled for the third
quarter of FY 2002.
Another area of uncertainty is how long the project
will take to complete. Although Coast Guard originally thought this would be a
20 year project, the request for proposal states that the performance period for
the contract could be up to 30 years. It is not clear to us whether this means
that (1) previously planned annual
funding levels will remain
the same and result in increased cost, or (2) the planned annual
funding levels will be spread out and reduce the level of
funding required each year.
National Distress System.
Coast Guard has increased its estimate for the NDS project - the 911 system for
mariners in distress - from $320 million to $580 million, and it is seeking $90
million in the FY 2003 budget to begin procurement. If the Congress appropriates
the $90 million Coast Guard is seeking for 2003, it will have $125 million
available for the procurement phase of the project. The current system has many
deficiencies including more than 88 communication coverage gaps, totaling 21,490
square nautical miles along the U.S. coastline where Coast Guard cannot hear
mariners or its own rescue boats. The revised system will provide a significant
improvement over the existing system.
However, we are concerned that
Coast Guard reduced or eliminated capabilities that it initially considered
essential. This occurred because Coast Guard reduced performance specifications
after contractors estimated that a system meeting Coast Guard requirements would
cost more than $1 billion. As a result, the revised system will still contain
gaps in communications coverage. Because this acquisition is being handled in
the same manner as Deepwater, the number, size, and location of the gaps will
not be known until a contractor's system is selected. Also, the specified time
allowed to restore critical functions, if the system becomes unavailable, has
been increased from 6 to 24 hours. We have recommended that Coast Guard develop
an acquisition plan that includes cost and schedule estimates for upgrading the
system to provide capabilities that were eliminated or reduced.
STEWARDSHIP AND ACCOUNTABILITY OVER FEDERAL FUNDS
Implementing
Financial Accounting and Cost Accounting Systems
With an FY 2002 budget
of $64 billion and total assets over $87 billion, it is extremely important that
DOT properly manage its resources and maintain adequate fiscal controls. To
obtain and sustain a clean audit opinion on its annual financial statements, DOT
needs to implement a departmentwide state-of-the-art financial management and
accounting system that provides accurate and timely financial data, complies
with Federal accounting standards, and produces data for the financial
statements. To date, seven of DOT's smaller agencies have implemented the new
financial system, called Delphi. Also, OIG found significant deficiencies with
Delphi that warranted immediate attention and delay of the implementation
schedule. DOT is working hard to correct these deficiencies and plans to have
all internal agencies on Delphi by January 2003 at a cost of about $80 million.
However, it is not clear to us that this date will be met.
The
development of a cost accounting system for DOT is important because Operating
Administrations like FAA, Coast Guard, and the new Transportation Security
Administration need good cost accounting information to be able to improve
operations and make informed management decisions. FAA has made good progress on
its cost accounting system during the past year. However, problems with Delphi
implementation are leading to delays in implementing the cost accounting systems
in FAA. FAA, TSA, and DOT as a whole must have a credible cost accounting system
to properly manage their programs, to know the real cost of services they
provide, and to identify areas where costs can be lowered without adversely
impacting service.
Improving Contract Oversight
DOT and FAA
oversight of cost-reimbursable contracts totaling about $4 billion annually is
seriously inadequate. This vulnerability is particularly significant since FAA
alone awarded about 800 cost-reimbursable contracts totaling $3.4 billion in FY
2001. We found that (1) FAA cost-reimbursable contracts totaling about $2
billion did not have the required incurred-cost audits, (2) about 1,800 DOT
contracts totaling about $6 billion have been completed for between 3 and 12
years but were not closed timely, (3) contracting officers did not always have
the documents to determine appropriate payments, and (4) contract files
frequently did not include evidence that contractors' accounting systems were
adequate. FAA's oversight of cost-reimbursable contracts is particularly
inadequate. OIG paid for audits by the Defense Contract Audit Agency until 1996
when Congress transferred the financial responsibilities to DOT agencies.
Completed audits for DOT dropped from 468 in 1995 to a low of 53 in FY 1997. At
the direction of the Subcommittee in FY 2000, the number of audits has begun to
rise and totaled 169 in 2001. Although independent audits are increasing, these
high-risk cost-reimbursable contracts need more audit scrutiny.
Enhancing Stewardship of Transportation Infrastructure Projects
In April 2001,Secretary Mineta told congressional committees that one of
his priorities is to ensure that the traveling public receives what it pays for
and that major transportation projects are managed wisely and appropriately. He
said "if the project calls for concrete and it's a 10 sack job, we at DOT are
going to be sure we don't end up with a 7 sack job." The Secretary added that
DOT needs to strengthen mechanisms to prevent and detect fraud, waste, and
abuse.
TEA-21 provided
funding of $218 billion for
highway and transit over six years. This represents an annual
investment of about $30 billion for
highway and $7 billion for
transit--an increase of about 40 to 50 percent over prior investment levels.
FHWA recently identified 60 mega-projects--generally those projects costing over
$1 billion--which are either active or planned to start in the next few years at
an estimated cost of about $118 billion. As infrastructure investments increase,
the need for effective stewardship and oversight becomes more important. The
following is a list of large active mega-projects.
Top
Highway Mega Projects by Dollar Value
Project Cost
Project Name(Billions)
Central Artery/Ted Williams Tunnel - Boston,
Massachusetts$14.6
Interstate 64/Hampton Roads Third Crossing - Hampton,
Virginia$4.4
Central Texas Turnpike - Austin, Texas$3.2
Interstate 80/San Francisco Oakland Bay Bridge (East Span)$2.6
Alameda Corridor - Southern California$2.4
Woodrow Wilson Bridge
- District of Columbia, Maryland, Virginia$2.4
Denver Southeast Corridor
(
Highway portion - I-25/1-225)$1.7
Miami Intermodal
Center$1.4
Interstate 4/Interstate 275, Tampa, Florida$1.4
New
Mississippi River Bridge, St. Louis, Missouri $1.1
Interstate 10/Katy
Freeway - Houston, Texas$1.1
State Route 30/Interstate 210 - Los
Angeles, California$1.0
Interstate 94/East-West Corridor - Milwaukee,
Wisconsin$1.0
Springfield Interchange - Alexandria, Virginia$0.7
Top Transit MegaProjects by Dollar Value
Project Name Project
Cost (Billions)
San Juan Tren Urbano Rail Transit$2.2 Central Link Light
Rail - Seattle, Washington (suspended) $2.1 Bay Area Rapid Transit Extension to
San Francisco Airport $1.5 Los Angeles Metro Rail Red Line$1.3 New Jersey
Transit Hudson-Bergen (MOS-2) $1.2 Hudson- Bergen Light Rail Transit (MOS-1)
$1.0 Houston Regional Bus$1.0 Denver Southeast Corridor (Transit portion) $0.9
Minneapolis Hiawatha Corridor Light Rail $0.7 South Boston Piers Transit Way$0.6
Dallas North-Central Light Rail Extension$0.5
Our work in this area has
included in-depth reviews of several including the:
-$2.1 billion
Central Link Light Rail System in Seattle, Washington;
-$2.2 billion
Tren Urbano Transit System in San Juan, Puerto Rico;
-$1.6 billion
Interstate 15 in Salt Lake City, Utah;
-$1.0 billion Hudson-Bergen Light
Rail Transit in New Jersey;
- $2.4 billion Alameda Corridor in southern
California;
-$2.4 billion Woodrow Wilson Bridge in Maryland and
Virginia; and
-$14.6 billion Central Artery Tunnel in Boston,
Massachusetts.
mega-projects,
Some Signs of Increased Oversight.
This past year, we have begun to see signs of improvement in FTA and FHWA's
stewardship and accountability over major projects. These improvements are
evident in a number of states as well. Both FTA and FHWA have issued guidance on
the form and content of project financial statements. Although FTA can clearly
do more, it is also clearly further along than FHWA. FTA has established
mechanism to review large projects and has not been reluctant to act when
problems have been detected. FHWA has begun to address stewardship through its
policy on project financial statements, but its oversight efforts are not as
institutionalized as FTA. We would like to see a strong initiative involving
both agencies that aims to proactively strengthen stewardship and oversight
processes.
Infrastructure Grant Oversight Needs Further Strengthening.
Despite this progress, our work also found significant areas in FTA and FHWA
that need further improvement.
-Preventing and detecting fraud. Between
FYs 1999 and 2001:
-indictments increased 225 percent, from 12 in 1999
to 39 in 2001;
-convictions increased 117 percent, from 12 in 1999 to 26
in 2001; and
-monetary recoveries increased 173 percent, from $15.8
million in 1999 to $43.2 million in 2001.
-Ensuring that disciplined
project management tools are applied. To make project finance
plans
truly useful to DOT management, FTA and FHWA must:
-Ensure that finance
plans are prepared in accordance with FTA and FHWA guidance. The agencies must
ensure grant recipients submit plans with the required cost and schedule
estimates, and information on
funding sources and cash flows
that are needed for effective oversight.
- Independently verify the data
in project finance plans and other project reports. This is an important
safeguard to ensure project managers are providing a fair and accurate
accounting of their project's performance.
-Identifying and
disseminating best practices. One potential best practice we identified is
periodically reviewing idle obligations and transferring those funds to other
projects. Most
highway programs under TEA-21 allow the states
to use excess funds from one project on other valid projects. This flexibility,
however, does not apply to statutorily earmarked projects. Our September 2001
report on FHWA inactive obligations identified 25,000 inactive obligations,
totaling about $2.6 billion. We sampled $670 million of transactions and found
that $238 million (about 36 percent) could be made available to other TEA-21
projects or returned to the Treasury Department. The states agreed that these
funds were not needed on current projects. We believe an aggressive review by
FHWA, the states, and DOT of the remaining $1.9 billion of idle obligations
would identify significant additional funds.
This may also be a way to
offset some of the effects of the negative Revenue Aligned Budget Authority
(RABA) provision affecting the
Highway Trust Fund in FY 2003.
In TEA-21, Congress directed that disbursements from the trust fund be adjusted
annually to reflect actual receipts. A strong economy resulted in greater than
expected receipts and the disbursement of those additional funds to the states
from 1998 through 2002. In 2003, receipts into the trust fund are expected to be
lower than TEA-21 projections, which will result in a reduction to
apportionments of nearly $9 billion. Whether or not the Congress acts to
mitigate the impact of declining
funding, scrubbing the idle
obligations for money that can be switched to other projects would help offset
some portion of this crunch.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my testimony.
Thank you again for inviting me to testify before the Subcommittee today, I look
forward to answering your questions.
LOAD-DATE:
February 15, 2002