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Congressional Testimony
January 24, 2002 Thursday
SECTION: CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY
LENGTH: 10559 words
COMMITTEE:
SENATE COMMERCE, SCIENCE AND TRANSPORTATION
HEADLINE: CAFE STANDARDS
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TESTIMONY-BY:
JOAN CLAYBROOK, PRESIDENT
AFFILIATION: PUBLIC CITIZEN
BODY: Testimony of Joan Claybrook For Public
Citizen
Before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and
Transportation
January 24, 2002
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and
members of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, for the
opportunity to testify before you today on the safety implications of raising
fuel economy standards for the United States vehicle fleet. My
name is Joan Claybrook and I am the President of Public Citizen, a national
non-profit public interest organization with 150,000 members nationwide that
represents consumer interests through lobbying, litigation, regulatory
oversight, research and public education. Public Citizen has a long and
successful history of working to improve consumer health and safety. I am also
the former Administrator of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration,
where I issued the first U.S.
fuel economy standards in 1977.
I. INTRODUCTION
Increasing consumption of fuel and industry manipulation
of the CAFE system threaten our safety, security, and the environment
The Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) system that was instituted in
1975 is sorely in need of a Congressional upgrade. CAFE, which was crafted in
view of the vehicles and technology available at the time, was a smashing
success, raising average fuel economy performance for the entire fleet in the
U.S. 82 percent between 1978 and 1985.1 Its primary feature is a 27.5 miles per
gallon (mpg) standard for passenger automobiles, set by statute. There is no
minimum standard for light trucks, but the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA) is instructed by law to set a standard every year
according to what is "maximally feasible."
CAFE currently saves us 118
million gallons of gasoline every day and 913 million barrels of oil each year,
or about the total imported annually from the Persian Gulf. 2 it was a major
factor in breaking the stranglehold of the Organization of the Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) on oil prices and cutting rampant U.S. inflation in
the early 1980s. Since 1985, no major congressional initiative or agency action
has been taken to update CAFE standards to reflect current technology, shifting
vehicle use, or the need to address global warming and foreign oil dependency.
As SUVs have come to dominate our highways, the American public has recognized
that the program is outdated.
One obvious deficiency with the current
CAFE system is that it holds so-called "light trucks" - such as minivans,
pickups, and SUVs - to a lower
fuel economy standard than
passenger cars. This distinction may have been valid in 1975, as light trucks
were a small portion of the vehicle fleet and were generally used for farming
and commercial purposes. However, automakers have since turned this into a
loophole in CAFE, shifting their marketing and production of passenger vehicles
to push light trucks. At present, nearly 50 percent of personal vehicles sold
qualify as light trucks under the present system. 3 The bifurcation of the
standard has created huge problems with vehicle compatibility, resulting in
countless lost lives and injuries as not-so-light trucks crash with smaller
vehicles. This is also a problem that Congress must address.
The problem
of global warming is a key reason to improve fuel economy. Human emissions of
carbon dioxide through power plants and motor vehicles are the primary sources
of this problem, with U.S. motor vehicles generating 5 percent of total global
carbon dioxide emissions. 4 The American public recognizes that the future of
the earth is at stake when we discuss solutions to this problem, and wants
Congress to act to preserve the delicate balance of life on earth for our
grandchildren and beyond.
A consensus for change
Americans do
want Congress to require improvements in fuel economy, and consumers are willing
to pay for such improvements. A poll conducted in July 2001 for Public Citizen
by Lou Harris asked Americans whether they would be willing to pay 3 percent (or
about $ 900 on a $ 30,000-vehicle) more for their sport utility vehicles in
order to solve emissions problems stemming from their use, and 63 percent of
respondents answered yes. 5 In a separate Gallup poll a decade ago, 61 percent
of Americans favored increasing the fuel efficiency requirements to 40 miles per
gallon (mpg), even if it increased the price of cars. 6 Other Gallup polls
conducted over the years support this result. Ninety three percent of Americans
believe the United States should require cars to get better gas mileage to
reduce our dependence on foreign oil,7 and 61 percent believe that greater
conservation of energy supplies is an important piece of the solution to our
energy problems. 8 In the face of such strong and consistent public opinion over
the years favoring significant improvements in fuel economy, it would be
irresponsible for Congress not to act.
The automakers will not solve the
problem on their own. Recent statements, such as the promise by Ford to improve
the fuel economy of its SUVs by 25 percent, or the copycat claims made by
Daimler-Chrysler and General Motors, should not be interpreted as an industry
solution. Despite long being in the best position to improve the efficiency of
the vehicle fleet, automakers have long taken the opposite tack. Manufacturers
chose to spend dollars and earn profits in the SUV market segment, which lowers
safety for all Americans and reduces overall fuel economy, and to advertise
these vehicles' powerful engines and speed, making their claims of social
consciousness not credible.
The problems with SUVs are no secret to
their manufacturers. As reported by Keith Bradsher of The New York Times, Ford
Motor Company admitted in its "corporate citizenship" report in May 2000 that
sports utility vehicles, which generate much of the company's profits,
"contributed more than cars to global warming, emitted more smogcausing
pollution and endangered other motorists" and that the company faced an "awkward
situation" because "its most profitable products do not meet its goals for
social responsibility."9 However, Ford still has no plans to halt or reduce
production of its massive SUV, the Ford Excursion, which gets just 10 mpg in the
city and 13 mpg on the highway and weighs as much as two Jeep Grand Cherokees.
Congress must set fuel economy goals to be achieved and require manufacturers to
change the fuel economy performance of vehicles, or America will continue to
suffer the consequences of shortterm industry thinking and actions.
Missed opportunities
Twelve years ago, Senator Richard Bryan of
Nevada introduced legislation, the Motor Vehicle Fuel Efficiency Act of 1990,
that would have raised average fuel economy for the overall vehicle fleet by 40
percent. That legislation accrued 57 votes, not quite enough to defeat a
filibuster, and its failure has resulted in a downward trend in fleet fuel
economy performance. Had the bill passed, Americans would have saved billions of
dollars and today we would have a safer, more environmentally sustainable and
less costly vehicle fleet. Congress should seize the opportunity for action now,
and enact strong
fuel economy standards. 11. WHAT
SHOULD BE DONE ON FUEL ECONOMY
Close the "light truck loophole:" Count
all passenger vehicles under a single
fuel economy standard.
Phase light trucks into the CAFE program over time, by requiring that
manufacturers include an increasing percentage of their manufactured vehicles
when calculating their fleet average for passenger cars. Increase the maximum
weight covered under the standard to 10,0001bs.
Set realistic but
appropriate goals for improvement: Raise total fleet fuel economy to 40 mpg over
ten years beginning with model year 2005, and setting targets to be met every
other year thereafter.
Tax the major offenders: Adjust the Gas Guzzler
tax with each increase in CAFE so that it affects all vehicles sold with fuel
economies 5 mpg or more below that model year's fleet-wide CAFE standard.
Require truth in testing: Require the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) to adjust its testing procedures m order to narrow the gap between
real-world fuel economy performance and tested performance to below a 10 percent
margin of error within 5 years of initiation of new CAFE standards and below a 5
percent margin of error by completion of the CAFE program in 2015. Testing
accuracy has eroded from 3 percent at the program's inception to 17 percent
today.
Get rid of bogus credits: Eliminate the dual-fuel credit program,
which extends CAFE credits for the production of dual-fuel vehicles, even though
gasoline is almost always used to power these vehicles.
Tighten
enforcement: Eliminate the "carryback" provisions in the CAFE credit system,
which encourages manipulation and missed targets by manufacturers. Allow states
to reward leaders: Clarify the preemption clause in current CAFE law to allow
states to enact "feebate" programs, which reward manufacturers and consumers for
fuel economy performance exceeding federal standards.
Allocate
meaningful funding for NHTSA research: Congress should immediately appropriate a
$ 5 million supplemental appropriation for NHTSA and 10 staff positions for
research, evaluation and rulemaking for
fuel economy standards
on cars and light trucks, in order to allow the agency to prepared for the
issuance of new standards. In its rulemaking, NHTSA made it clear that it did
not have the staff or funds to issue new light truck standards, as required by
law, this spring.
Solve safety problems by addressing safety: Require
NHTSA to set new safety standards in the areas of rollover crashworthiness
protection and limits on aggressivity. On rollover, Congress should require:
A dynamic roof crush standard;
Roof energy absorbing protection
to reduce injuries from contact with the roof,
Safety belt pretensioners
that are triggered in a rollover crash; Improved seat structure to keep
occupants in position during a roll;
Side impact head protection air
bags that are triggered in a rollover crash. On vehicle aggressivity, Congress
should require a crash safety standard to reduce the damage caused by light
truck-type vehicles in crashes with smaller vehicles by 30 percent compared with
model year 2000 vehicles.
111. THE REAL SAFETY PROBLEM
A. The
Myth of the Safety Tradeoff
Industry's claims that fuel economy measures
reduce safety are wrong
The auto industry has argued, time and again,
that raising
fuel economy standards will adversely impact
safety by causing the increased production of smaller vehicles or by reducing
vehicle weight. In fact, there is no evidence that establishes a clear
correlation between vehicle weight and increased fatalities - some heavier cars
are far more dangerous to both their occupants, and to others on the highway,
than are lighter ones. Across many measures of crashworthiness, the newest fuel
guzzlers - the SUVs - are the worst performers. What matters most for safety are
the crashworthiness protections and the compatibility that is designed and built
into vehicles, and these must be enhanced as critical parts of any comprehensive
highway safety and fuel economy program.
The use of the time-worn safety
canard by industry is a cynical attempt to frighten consumers and Congress in an
attempt to deflect new requirements, and appears most appallingly hypocritical
when we consider that industry has acted to obstruct safety improvements
whenever possible. Industry deploys a misleading safety "red herring" only
because it hopes that it will offer a modicum of political cover for its
unwillingness to act responsibly.
Public Citizen has a long record of
working for safer cars - most often in opposition to the powerful efforts of the
auto industry to squelch or resist them - the analysis we present today shows
that raising
fuel economy standards, if accompanied by
appropriate and reasonable safety measures, will not hurt highway safety and in
fact will even save lives by creating a more compatible vehicle fleet. It is
important to note that NHTSA administers both the safety and fuel economy
programs, so it can coordinate this work, as I did as NHTSA Administrator in the
1970s.
The following points will, I believe, put the industry's
hypocritical arguments to rest at
last.
Historically, the auto
industry and the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) are wrong that CAFE
standards reduced vehicle weight and endangered motorists
"[CAFE
standards] would require a Ford product line consisting of either all sub-Pinto
sized vehicles or some mix of vehicles ranging from a sub-sub-compact to perhaps
a Maverick. " - Ford Motor Company, 1974
Some members of the panel that
published the July 2001 NAS report on fuel economy
contend that raising
CAFE standards would increase the occupant fatalities in crashes due to a
connection between vehicle weight and fatality crash rates. As a strong NAS
panel dissent by David Greene and Maryann Keller and other critics have pointed
out, this conclusion is problematic because the panel was:
-Using
outmoded data on crashworthiness: The data used by NAS is from 1993 and before,
and therefore fails to account for recent advances in occupant protection from
new government standards, such as dynamic side impact protections, dual air
bags, and head injury protections. In holding crashworthiness constant, the
panel overlooked crucial, compensating safety improvements that are possible in
the areas of rollover and aggressivity, thus overstating the negative safety
effects. This oversight is particularly troubling given the high survivability
of rollover crashes and the panel's reliance on data from the study for NHTSA by
Kahane. Kahan hypothesized that the largest increase in fatalities by CAFE would
come from deaths in small vehicle rollover crashes, deaths which would be
avoidable with proper crash protections;
-Perpetuating cause-correlation
confusion in vehicle size and weight as factors: The changes in
fuel
economy standards will not result in a fleetwide, uniform reduction of
vehicle weights; postulating that a possible weight fatality correlation is not
the same as demonstrating that improving the average fuel economy of vehicles
will actually cause increased fatalities. In fact, history shows that weight
reductions will occur only in the largest vehicles, where it is most
cost-effective. Also, there was no attempt by the majority panel to account for
confounding factors such as vehicle size and driver characteristics;
-Overlooking harm from the light truck loophole: The panel ignored some
implications of the main study by Kahane that it prominently cited, which
suggested that proportional changes in both cars and trucks causing the down-
weighting of the entire vehicle feet would have zero safety impact, because
relative weight, rather than absolute weight, is the crucial factor. Kahane's
figures actually bear this out, although in drawing his conclusions Kahane
changed the weight of cars while keeping weights for light trucks and other
vehicles unaltered, and vice versa, producing confused results; -Understating
the risks of incompatibility: The panel overlooked the results from several
studies which suggest that disparities among vehicle weight are the cause of
devastating crashes, thus suggesting that instead of causing harm, any
convergence effect on vehicle weights from CAFE standards would actually yield
safety benefits.
In fact, the link between CAFE standards and reductions
in vehicle weight at the low end of the vehicle weight range simply does not
exist: while the heaviest vehicles were put on a diet and lost a thousand
pounds, the lightest vehicles today are considerably heavier than their pre-CAFE
counterparts. As was pointed out in the December 6, 2001, testimony of Clarence
Ditlow of the Center for Auto Safety, the original passage of CAFE standards did
not result in light cars becoming lighter or less safe. In fact, the Honda Civic
gained 800 pounds and went from failing NHTSA crash tests to receiving the best
possible rating for crashworthiness - 5 stars. Moreover, the Ford Pinto and
Chevrolet Chevette, notably unsafe vehicles, were replaced by the safer models
of the Ford Escort and Chevrolet Nova. 11
Looking at the CAFE-weight
relationship more broadly, as fleet fuel economy increased over time, vehicle
weights did not move in any one direction. In 1975, cars weighing less than
2,500 pounds made up 10.8 percent of the new-car fleet, but only 2.6 percent in
2000. By contrast, cars in the over 4,500 pound weight class made up 50 percent
of the new-car fleet in 1975 but only 0.9 percent in 2000. These data show that
CAFE standards did not cause a uniform reduction in vehicle weight at the light
vehicle level (although CAFE may have caused a reduction in average weight, as
more cars were built in the 2,500-4,500 pound category). 12 Because automakers
could get proportionally more fuel savings from reducing the weight of the
heaviest class of cars, those were the first targets for fuel economy
improvements, and production numbers for cars in the lightest class actually
decreased.
Any improvement in the CAFE standards made today will likely
have a similarly small impact on the weight or production levels of the smallest
cars. It is not cost-effective to reduce their weights by very much, given the
limited fuel economy improvement from doing so and the relatively higher cost of
vehicle redesign.
Major improvements in fuel economy are possible using
currently available technology without any reduction in safety protection
A Department of Energy (DOE) study found that 85 percent of the fuel
economy gains made following the 1975 CAFE law were from improvements in vehicle
technology rather than weight reduction. 13 The evidence strongly suggests that
similar technological leaps are currently available or just around the corner,
and that the recent stagnation and even backsliding in overall fuel economy is a
trend that must be stopped.
The Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS)
pointed out in a report released in 2001 that today's vehicles could become more
fuel efficient at a price that would easily be made up in savings on fuel costs,
and the necessary changes would have no negative impact on safety. Technologies
currently used in portions of today's fleet, if adopted fleetwide, could make
vehicles more streamlined, less fuel intensive, and more efficient. A partial
list of these technologies includes the following:
Aerodynamic
improvements - reducing vehicle drag by reducing their profiles;
Rolling
resistance improvements - changing tread designs and rubber quality on tires;
-Safety enhancing mass reduction - increasing the use of plastics,
aluminum and high strength steel;
Accessory load reduction - using more
energy efficient electric accessories that draw less power from the battery;
Variable valve control engines - used in Honda VTEC engine, allowing
valves to be adjusted for better engine performance;
Stoichiometric burn
gasoline direct injection engines - introducing fuel directly to the engine
cylinder;
-Integrated starter generators - allowing engines to turn off
rather than idling when the car is not in use;
-5- and 6- speed
automatic transmissions - increasing opportunities for engines to run at their
efficiency "sweet spot;"
is Mesnikoff.
Claybrook 12
-5-speed motorized gearshift transmissions - mimics the performance of a
manual with the ease of an automatic;
-Optimized shift schedules - using
electronics and sensors to improve automatic transmission performance;
-Continuously variable transmissions - providing complete control over
the relationship between engine speed and vehicle speed. la
The UCS has
not limited their research to the hypothetical realm. With technologies
currently used in mass production by at least one company, and basing their
design on the current Ford Explorer, the UCS designed a new vehicle that
increased the real world fuel economy of the Explorer by 50 percent while
improving zero to sixty performance by 1.7 seconds and saving 4 percent ( $
1,577 in gasoline costs) over the lifetime cost of the unimproved vehicle (See
Table 1). Adding technologies currently entering the market to their design,
they were able to improve fuel economy by 75 percent, creating a vehicle that
would test at 34.1 mpg and save 6 percent ($ 2,163) over the lifetime cost. Is
Table 1: Union of Concerned Scientists' Greener SUV
Ford's
Explorer currently fails to meet the very modest 20.7 mpg CAFE standard for
light trucks, getting just 19 mpg. With the improvements implemented by the UCS
using currently available technology, the same vehicle surpassed the current 27
mpg CAFE standard for passenger cars. Given the challenge of a higher CAFE
standard to meet, auto manufacturers, with their considerably larger resources,
could certainly far surpass the 34.1 mpg performance achieved by UCS within a
ten year time-frame.
As a final point, it is clear both historically and
legally that the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act, like the
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, is technology- forcing. It
requires the Secretary of DOT to set the "maximum feasible" standard while
considering, among other factors, the energy needs of the nation 16 Any
sensitive consideration of our energy needs would lead one to conclude that
reducing our dependency on foreign oil is a high national priority.
B.
The Real Story on Safety
Vehicle size and design, not weight, are the
critical factors for safety
None of the research that attempts to
establish the industry argument has thus far sufficiently isolated the
confounded effects of vehicle size and vehicle weight in terms of safety
implications for occupants or other motorists. Even the landmark study by
Charles Kahane for NHTSA did not isolate the different implications of shifts in
vehicle size and weight, 17 a problem which the recent NAS study literally
glosses over in their attribution of overblown fatality figures to CAFE.
However, vehicle size, design and relative crashworthiness are the
crucial factors in safety outcomes, for several reasons. While increases in
weight irrefutably export an externality of threat to other motorists, increases
in size and improvements in design and crashworthiness have the potential to
save lives, both as net impacts and for the drivers of larger vehicles. Vehicle
size, as distinct from weight, is pertinent to safety, and confounds the
analysis of fuel economy effects for several reasons. Larger vehicles provide
additional room for occupants' torsos and limbs to avoid contact with the area
of crash impact, and there is space to design the vehicle frames of large
vehicles to better absorb crash forces, so that occupants' bodies do not.
The real solution to CAFE may be to emphasize the use of innovative and
lightweight crash materials, such as those employed in the Research Safety
Vehicle designed by Don Friedman of Minicars for NHTSA in the 1970s. For another
example, while the UCS in the above experiment involving the retrofitted
Explorer did remove weight from the vehicle to improve fuel economy, the size of
the vehicle and all of its safety features were left intact.
Honda has
emphasized this point in a letter sent December 19, 2001, to the Committee,
which I urge Members to closely read. In the letter, Honda demonstrates that
many of its most fuel efficient vehicles are extremely good performers on safety
as well, thereby answering the misleading arguments put forward by Ford at a
prior hearing December 6.
C. The SUV Safety Myth
Many factors
affect safety, creating hazards for drivers of SUVs
The prevailing
concept of the connection between light trucks and safety is wrong. Light trucks
are more dangerous to other drivers than their passenger car counterparts, but
are not necessarily any more safe for their own occupants. The Chevrolet Blazer,
for example, has a per million vehicle year driver death rate that is more than
three times higher than the Honda Civic's death rate. 18 The chart of driver
death rates compiled by the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety is proof that
crashworthiness and crash survival vary widely within vehicle classes. Other
research by David Greene, a dissenter on the NAS panel, has pointed out that
there is no correlation between vehicle weight for passenger cars, for example,
and a car's crashworthiness crash test ratings in the New Car Assessment Program
administered by NHTSA.19
Another insight from Greene is that SUVs and
heavier vehicles may face particular safety obstacles, including longer braking
distances on both wet and dry pavement. 20 Ford has admitted that many drivers
of SUVs alarm company engineers by failing to adjust their driving habits to the
different handling characteristics of SUVs, including a propensity to rollover
in emergency maneuvers. Ford has thus begun contracting with a national driving
school to teach special safety skills to drivers of their SUVs.21 Because Ford's
own marketing data show that drivers behind the wheel of an SUV operate under a
false impression of enhanced safety and drive more aggressively than they
otherwise would, accounting for such differences in the safety data used to
study the implications of fuel economy is crucial. The NAS majority and Kahane
were unable to do so.
SUVs have a high propensity to roll over and poor
crashworthiness for rollovers
The 2001 Blazer received only one star on
NHTSA's rollover resistance rating system, while the 2001 Toyota Corrola, a
small car, received a high score of four stars, and the midsized Chrysler
Sebring received five stars. 22 Based on these ratings, the Blazer is four times
or more as likely to roll over in an emergency maneuver than is the Sebring.
Sixty percent of deaths in light trucks (vans, pick-ups and sports utility
vehicles) occur in rollover crashes 23 The good news is that rollover crashes
are among the most survivable type of crash.
The Ford Explorer is a case
in point for lessons in the importance of crashworthiness.24 Post-hoc accounting
showed that while tread separations for the Firestone tire used on Explorers
were extraordinarily common, most of the fatalities which occurred following a
tread separation were directly attributable to a rollover of the
vehicle.Subsequent tests of the Explorer's rollover crashworthiness undertaken
in preparation for litigation by safety expert and engineer Don Friedman show
that the Explorer was equipped with an extremely flimsy roof which is incapable
of bearing up under the weight of the rolling vehicle after the windshield is
broken. Because a vehicle's windshield typically shatters after one roll, the
Explorer's occupants were basically left unprotected from roof crush injuries,
which are often devastating or fatal.
To address this safety problem,
then, improvements are needed not only to the vehicle's tire and rollover
propensity, but also to its roof strength and rollover crashworthiness in
general. The point is that the human suffering caused by a failure to design a
safe vehicle was entirely unnecessary given the survivability of rollover
crashes. The high cost to Ford's economic well-being and reputation for safety
that were caused by over 200 fatalities and 700 serious injuries appears
particularly unfortunate when we consider that most of them could have been
avoided by a safer design.
The NAS majority reached its conclusion by
holding vehicle fatalities constant, ignoring the lifesaving possibility
contained in measures such as rollover protections. But the main data relied on
by the NAS, the 1997 Kahane study, found that single vehicle rollover crashes
involving the greater number of small cars predicted to enter the highway under
CAFE were the swing factor in producing net increases in fatalities. As we argue
below, however, to fix this problem we should, as a policy matter, address
rollover crashworthiness first, last and foremost. In so doing, we can wipe out
the auto industry argument that fuel economy threatens safety.
D.
Solving the Rollover Problem
The need for rollover crashworthiness
standards
The auto industry should begin their campaign for safety by
addressing vehicle rollover. Rollovers now kill more than 10,000 people each
year, a sum that is fully one-third of all vehicle deaths, yet the causes of
death in such a crash are largely preventable. The forces exerted in a rollover
crash are small, less than 10 mph in many cases. Like professional race car
drivers that survive such crashes, if vehicle occupants are sufficiently
protected from the hazards of a rollover crash they can escape death or serious
injury.
The auto industry has been so laggard over the years, causing
thousands of needless deaths and injuries, that federal motor vehicle
crashworthiness standards are needed. One of the primary elements of protecting
occupants in a rollover crash is a roof that is resistant to crushing as the
vehicle rolls. Currently, roof crush standards do not adequately measure the way
a roof is likely to respond in a real world rollover crash because:
The
test used by NHTSA is static rather than dynamic
The force measured for
passage is less than that actually experienced in a rollover
The
windshield, which breaks on the first roll in an actual crash, is left in place
for the test and supplies about one-third of the measured strength of the roof
in the test NHTSA uses
With protections, rollovers are highly survivable
crashes with low gravitational forces.
The following measures will
provide basic occupant protection:
A dynamic roof crush standard, which
measures roof crush without the windshield in place;
Safety belt
pretensioners which trigger in a rollover crash;
Improved seat structure
to keep occupants in position during a roll, including seat belt anchors on the
seat structure;
Side impact head protection air bags which are triggered
in a rollover crash and reduce the ejection of occupants;
Roof injury
protection to protect occupants in the event of contact with the roof structure
Improved door locks and hinges to keep doors from becoming ejection
portals in a rollover.
E. Improving Compatibility and Reducing
Fatalities from Aggressive Vehicles
Fixing CAFE to reduce fatalities
The current structure of CAFE contributes to highway deaths not because
vehicles are too light, but because of the dual standard created for cars and
light trucks, including SUVs. The current system of CAFE standards pretends that
there are two vehicle fleets: cars, which must meet a statutorily required 27.5
mpg standard, and "light trucks" and their progeny which meet the 20.7 mpg
standard set by NHTSA. The safety consequences of the bifurcation of the
standard have been disastrous as manufacturers have marketed heavier and heavier
SUVs as family vehicles.
The erosion of CAFE will continue as
manufacturers keep ramping up SUV size to produce truly massive passenger
vehicles in the absence of new
fuel economy standards. For just
the latest example, in February 2001, DaimlerChrysler announced that the company
would be marketing a new mega-vehicle, named the "Unimog," that will be 20 feet
long and nearly two feet wider than a typical car, weigh 12,5001bs., and get 10
mpg on diesel fuel.
Light trucks, particularly SUVs, are very dangerous
for other drivers on the highway
Study after study shows that heavier
vehicles, and especially SUVs, are a threat to other drivers in vehicles they
hit, especially in their heaviest and most aggressive versions. A 1998 report by
Hans Joksch for the Department of Transportation (DOT) showed: 1) that the risks
imposed by heavier cars on lighter car occupants outweigh the safety benefits to
the heavier car occupant across the entire vehicle f eet on the highway and 2)
that greater variability in the distribution of weights increases fatalities 26
A paper by Alexandra Kuchar of the DOT's Volpe Institute concluded that shifting
the fleet from cars to light trucks - at each increment of the shift - increases
serious injuries and fatalities, partly because of the greater stiffness of
light trucks.
Despite the perception that light trucks are safer for the
occupant, total highway safety is made worse by the presence and weight of these
vehicles. Over 11,000 light truck-type vehicle occupants were killed in crashes
in 1999, and crashes involving light trucks killed another 4,896 people, for a
ratio of .44 non- truck occupant fatalities for every 1 occupant fatality. This
should be contrasted with passenger cars, which killed just .08 nonoccupants in
crashes for each passenger car occupant killed .28 The NAS report last year
concluded that a reduction in the mass of the light truck fleet would result in
a net reduction in the number of fatalities on our highways, because the
reduced- mass light trucks would kill fewer of the occupants of the vehicles
into which they crash.
All the research points to conclusions that are
precisely the opposite of the myths promoted by manufacturers about CAFE and
safety. As David Greene has argued, the risk to other drivers posed by SUVs and
other larger vehicles is a way of "exporting" risk as a market externality that
should be corrected by government action. Given the high societal costs of
automobile crashes, the increased fatalities and injuries that result are costs
that all of us bear. Closing the light truck loophole and new requirements under
CAFE would likely have the happy consequence, as did those passed in 1975, of
increasing the number of mid-sized vehicles in the fleet and bringing about
greater convergence in vehicle weight across the fleet.
F. The Need for
Aggressivity Standards
Sports utility vehicles now constitute 50 percent
of new vehicle sales, yet SUVs are almost three times as likely as cars to kill
the other driver in a collision. The scope of the problem is well- known. Even
some manufacturers, such as Toyota, Nissan and Renault, have called for
regulations to make all passenger vehicles more compatible in crashes.30 In a
corporate report, Ford has admitted that SUVs are an anti-social vehicle type,
and this is certainly the case from a vehicle dynamics standpoint.
Light
trucks tend to have higher bumpers and structures, which can override the body
of a smaller car and fail to engage the crash protections built into both
vehicles. Light trucks are also typically built with stiffer frames that fail to
absorb crash forces, causing damage to other vehicles as well as their own
occupants. Finally, most light trucks are substantially heavier than passenger
cars, thus exerting more mass in a crash with a lighter vehicle.
NHTSA
has begun studying the problem of vehicle aggressivity, and their results have
suggested some major areas for improvement. Vehicle aggressivity, as presently
understood, relates generally to three factors: vehicle weight, structural
stiffness of the vehicle, and height of center of force. This last factor shows
the importance of vehicle design factors - the height of a vehicle's "center of
force" reflects the design distribution of its mass and is a primary indicator
of the amount of damage that will be inflicted on another vehicle during a
collision. 31
All things being equal, a heavy vehicle will be more
aggressive than a lighter one. When weight is controlled for, however, other
factors relating to vehicle design become important. Small pick- ups and
mid-sized cars have approximately the same curb weight (3,000 lbs.), yet a NHTSA
study found that small pick-ups caused roughly 50 percent more fatalities to
occupants of other vehicles than did mid-sized cars on a per-vehicle basis. 32
NHTSA should be directed to issue an aggressivity reduction standard as
a top priority given the rapidly increasing population of light trucks mixing
with cars on our highways. By raising CAFE standards, Congress would encourage
automakers to take weight out of the aggressive vehicles at the high end of the
fleet weight range - saving both fuel and human life. By requiring NHTSA to
issue standards that reduce the likelihood of struck driver death in an
accident, Congress can dramatically reduce the harm caused by our largest
vehicles.
G. Believe What Industry Does, Not What It Says
The
industry's solicitude for safety in the context of the fuel economy debate is
disingenuous and should not mislead Congress or the public
The concern
for safety expressed by automakers in the fuel economy debate is a red herring.
Historically, the auto industry has protested one safety requirement after
another for 35 years, using Congress, the courts and its administrative access
to avoid costs associated with vehicle redesign while the safety of the public
suffers. Among many other battles over safety measures, the industry:
-Fought efforts to place seat belts and shoulder harnesses in all
vehicles;
-Remained silent in the debate over raising the speed limit -
increased speeds in states which raised their speed limits cause over 500 deaths
per year; 34
-Fought mandatory air bags on cost grounds;
-Fought
side impact and fuel system standards;
-Currently is battling to prevent
effective dynamic rollover tests and an improved roof crush standard;
-And now are also fighting new requirements for a dashboard tire
pressure monitoring system on cost grounds, which saves fuel economy and
improves safety.
In addition, it is well documented that the industry
resisted any attempt by NHTSA to publish rollover resistance ratings for years,
until the Ford/Firestone disaster forced them to back away from their public
opposition to ratings. 35 The cumulative death toll from these delays and the
continuing battles far exceeds even the industry's claims about the so-called
risks resulting from
fuel economy standards. As another
one example of industry relentlessness in pursuit of profit, I cite the epic
struggle over air bags. With the exception of General Motors in the early 1970's
under its president Ed Cole and Mercedes in the 1980's, the manufacturers
generally opposed a federal standard requiring air bags from 1969 until it
finally took effect in 1988. In 1983, the Supreme Court ruled that the Reagan
administration had improperly revoked the rule. Justice White, writing for the
Court, stated that the industry had waged "war" on air bag regulation and that
NHTSA's regulatory actions under the Safety Act could be "technology forcing:"
The automobile industry has opted for the passive belt over the airbag,
but surely it is not enough that the regulated industry has eschewed a given
safety device. For nearly a decade, the automobile industry waged the regulatory
equivalent of war against the airbag and lost - the inflatable restraint was
proven sufficiently effective. Now the automobile industry has decided to employ
a seatbelt system which will not meet the safety objectives of Standard 208.
This hardly constitutes cause to revoke the standard itself. Indeed, the Motor
Vehicle Safety Act was necessary because the industry was not sufficiently
responsive to safety concerns. The Act intended that safety standards not depend
on current technology and could be "technology forcing" in the sense of inducing
the development of superior safety design. 36
Industry advertising sells
speed and demonstrates a lack of concern for safety
Fuel economy levels,
like our larger economy, are in recession. Despite their potential for
tremendous impact on our environment and safety, more fuel efficient vehicles
may never come to market unless Congress acts. Why? Because automakers have
chosen to focus on the production of generation after generation of larger and
powerful, faster vehicles, despite their knowledge that these are just the
vehicle features which increase fatalities._
Recent motor vehicle
television ads have begun to once again resemble the "speed ads" of the early
1990s, which persisted until safety advocates shamed the auto industry into a
temporary ceasefire. The Insurance Institute for Highway Safety has pointed out
the marketing strategy that accompanies this approach, citing commercials that
"either ignore safety or undermine it by obscuring the fact that driving fast or
aggressively increases motorists' crash risk. ,37 While automakers build ever
faster and more powerful vehicles, they waste the opportunity and resources to
make passenger vehicles that are safe and socially responsible.
IV.
FIXING THE CAFE SYSTEM WILL SAVE BOTH LIVES AND FUEL
A. The existing
structure of the CAFE system should be used to produce more fuel economy gains
Despite the manufacturers' outcry about technological limitations when
CAFE was initially introduced as part of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act
in 1975, fuel economy performance rose substantially in the seven years after
the legislation took effect. Manufacturers retooled their engines and
drivetrains, adjusted the mixture of their fleets, took advantage of unused
technological advances, and resized or eliminated their most fuel- thirsty
vehicles to produce cars that were more socially responsible. This period of
change, and the exciting directions in which it took the auto industry, were
summed up in a 1977 speech made by Robert B. Alexander, then Vice President of
the Car Product Development Group at Ford. His response to the challenges of
posed by the new
fuel economy standards and emissions standards
of that period was to declare the era "the age of the engineer - and I, for one,
couldn't be happier."38
Even some in the auto industry agree that the
CAFE system has been effective in meeting its goals. In his testimony of
December 6, 2001, Bernard Robertson, Senior Vice President of Engineering
Technologies and Regulatory Affairs for DaimlerChrysler stated that "the
industry achieved significant gains during the past twenty-five years" and said
that alternatives to the CAFE system are "either politically unacceptable or
have significant 'unknowns' or problems." Jaime Auffenberg, chairman of the
American International Auto Dealers Association recently said that "we are going
to have to find ways to improve fuel efficiency ...I think there's opportunity
to improve CAFE numbers, and we need to be responsible and address them."39
While some in the industry may quibble about the specifics of the CAFE system,
none of them has advocated a viable replacement.
Because of CAFE
requirements, the United States has saved 3 billion barrels of oil a day and
saved consumers more than $ 20 billion each year. At the same time, we have
avoided sending billions of dollars overseas to pay for oil, and prevented the
release of tons of greenhouse carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. The program,
however, has stagnated and must be updated to account for technological changes,
energy concerns and environmental imperatives. While Public Citizen does not
recommend significant changes in the overall structure of the system, a few
critical modifications must be made.
B. Close the light truck loophole
As currently structured, the CAFE system has separate targets for cars
and light trucks. The standard for cars, set by statute, is 27.5 mpg. The
standard for light trucks, which NHTSA is responsible for adjusting each year to
account for improvements in what is the maximum feasible, is set at 20.7 mpg and
has not been adjusted for 7 years. Since 1994, appropriations riders have
prevented NHTSA from expending any funds to adjust of the standard, a provision
secured by the auto industry that has detrimentally affected safety, gasoline
expenditures, and our environment.
As a result, NHTSA has had no money
for staff research on CAFE. Moreover, the Gas Guzzler tax, which penalizes
manufacturers for selling vehicles that fall extremely far below the CAFE
standard, shockingly only applies to cars as it is currently drafted, and
provides a weak penalty that today is out-of-date. One CAFE standard and one Gas
Guzzler tax system should be applied to all light duty passenger vehicles in a
manufacturer's fleet.
In 1975, when the distinction between light trucks
and passenger cars was adopted and favored by the auto industry, light trucks
accounted for just 20 percent of the vehicle fleet, and were largely used for
off-road and commercial purposes. Light trucks were also not redesigned as
frequently and often used older technologies. Thus, Congress felt it could not
anticipate the minimum mpg numbers for these vehicles and asked NHTSA to set the
standard by regulation.
However, a separate standard makes no sense in a
world where SUVs carry millions of Americans back and forth to work each day.
SUVs and other light trucks are simply not used as Congress anticipated in 1975,
and there is no basis for maintaining their status as a special part of the
vehicle fleet. Moreover, many manufacturers have introduced crossover models
built on a car chassis but have a truck body or other features, and are
therefore counted under the truck CAFE standard. One particularly egregious
example of this is Chrysler's PT Cruiser, which is counted as a truck for CAFE
purposes simply because the back seats are removable and it has a hatchback
trunk. The PT Cruiser cannot be used off-road due to its low (6.5") ground
clearance, has a towing capacity of only 1,000 lbs., and lacks 4-wheel drive.
Yet the current CAFE system counts it as a light truck, raising Chrysler's
overall truck fleet fuel economy average and enabling the production of other
extremely inefficient vehicles. The ability of manufacturers to play this game
of "light truck" qualification makes the higher CAFE standard for cars far less
meaningful.
In addition, the safety implications of the two fleet split
are obvious to anyone who has ever stared up at the massive grill, high bumper,
and heavy, stiff body of one of the largest SUVs. Two standards means two fleets
- one of which is hazardous to the other. By closing the "light truck loophole,"
which has become big enough to drive the 19-foot Ford Excursion through,
Congress would force manufacturers to reduce the size and aggressivity of their
largest vehicles, rendering them less of a hazard to other drivers and improving
fleetwide fuel economy.
NHTSA just issued its rulemaking on the light
truck standard (Docket No. NHTSA-200111048) for 2004 and announced their plans
to leave the 20.7 mpg standard unchanged. The agency explains in its rulemaking
that the Congressional appropriations riders which froze adjustment of this
standard from 1995 to 2001 left NHTSA unable "to lay the factual or analytical
foundation necessary to develop a proposed standard other than the one at 20.7
mpg."41 This embarrassing situation must be corrected by the same Congress that
imposed it on NHTSA every year since 1994.
Closing the light-truck
loophole will require a phase-in of some sort, so as not to cause undue
disruption in the auto industry by allowing adequate planning lead time for
design adjustments. Manufacturers should be required to count an additional 20
percent of their vehicles under a combined standard every two years, until all
of their vehicle fleet is counted under a single standard after 10 years.
C. Other Important Changes to CAFE Are Justified and Necessary
Fleet fuel economy should be raised to 40 mpg over ten years, starting
in model year (MY) 2005
At the same time as light trucks are being
phased into the vehicle fleet, Congress should set targets to increase overall
fleet fuel economy. Model year 2001 total fleet fuel economy is just 24.5 mpg, a
6.5 percent decline from the high of 26.2 mpg achieved in 1987. Manufacturers
were able to improve fleet fuel economy by 80 percent from 1978 to 1987, and
they have had 15 years to develop new technologies that could achieve a similar
improvement given enough lead time and appropriate penalties for failing to
comply with the standard. While manufacturers may argue that the opportunities
for technological improvement are exhausted, the work of the UCS explained above
and the emergence of the hybrid engine prove these arguments wrong.
The
NAS report did not advocate any fleetwide fuel economy number as the appropriate
one, but its Path 2 and 3 calculations and assumptions suggest that a fleetwide
fuel economy of 37 mpg by 2015 is achievable using only conventional gas
engines. 42 Their original report estimated much higher achievable mileages, but
they revised these estimates downward after receiving pressure from the auto
industry in two waves, once before the official publication of the report, and
in another round after the auto industry privately appealed to the NAS and a
subsequent public hearing. 43 The NAS also failed to account in their estimates
for the potential of hybrid engines to raise fleetwide fuel economy.
Moreover, the NAS analysis did not project what was possible over the
long run or cost-effective from an environmental or societal viewpoint, and
instead focused only. on what was next-dollar "efficient" in narrow,
consumer-defined economic terms. Many vehicles that were considerably more fuel
efficient than those considered optimal by the NAS panel would still be cheaper,
over the life of the vehicle, than the vehicles in today's fleet they would
replace. 4 Phasing in a new fleet fuel economy of 40 mpg would save an estimated
2 million barrels a day by 2012, or more oil than we currently import from both
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. America would take a giant step toward untying our
hands on foreign policy and enriching our environmental future by implementing
this standard.
Testing procedures must be made more accurate
When CAFE was first implemented in 1978, the testing procedures used by
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) predicted real world fuel economy
performance within a margin of 3 percent. Currently, the tests predict
performance within a 17 percent margin of error. 45 This is unacceptable. The
overstated values that emerge from these tests are used to calculate a
manufacturer's fleetwide fuel economy to determine whether or not they are
meeting the CAFE target. Congress should require the EPA to issue a rulemaking
that adjusts its testing procedures in order to narrow the gap between realworld
fuel economy performance and tested performance to below a 10 percent margin of
error within five years after the initiation of new CAFE standards, and below a
5 percent margin of error after 10 years. Adjusting these procedures would
improve real world fuel economy, because companies would be performing to the
standard, rather than to 83 percent of the requirement. It would also give
Americans an accurate yardstick by which to judge our progress against our fuel
reduction goals.
End the dual fuel credit program
The duel fuel
credit program is an embarrassing waste of taxpayer dollars and is a prime
example of corporate welfare. It should be eliminated. Under this program,
manufacturers are rewarded for building vehicles that could theoretically run on
an alternative fuel (including, but not limited to, ethanol and other alcohol-
based fuels), though only 1 percent of the miles driven in these vehicles are
ever powered by such a fuel.46 Consequently, manufacturers are able to build
vehicles that emit more carbon dioxide than they otherwise would, simply by
making cheap modifications to their engines that subsequently go unutilized. The
result: US gasoline consumption increased by 473 million gallons in 2000 because
of this program. 47 The cost of building an infrastructure to support
alternative fuels would far outstrip the tiny benefits in emissions reduction we
could achieve through its use.
Tellingly, H.R. 4, introduced by Billy
Tauzin (R-LA), which extends the dual-fuel credit program, also extends by four
years the deadline by which the Secretary of Transportation must report on the
effectiveness of the program. 48 No manufacturer even attempted to offer a
reasonable defense of this program in their testimony of December 6t', 2001,
suggesting that even its beneficiaries understand they are getting something for
nothing. The NAS condemned the program as having had "a negative effect on fuel
economy."49
Eliminate the carryback provision in the CAFE credits system
Today, if a manufacturer fails to meet its CAFE requirement, it can
submit a plan for improving vehicle fleet efficiency in three future years and
then earn credits in those years that will negate the earlier year's
delinquency. This loophole, the so- called "carryback" provision, invites abuse
and dishonesty by the manufacturers by effectively delaying the deadline by
which they must meet their fuel economy targets. Consequently, domestic
manufacturers never pay any fines, and it is difficult to tell from year to year
which companies are actually in compliance. In fact, no member of the Big Three
domestic manufacturer group has ever paid a fine under the CAFE system, though
foreign manufacturers have paid fines of as much as $ 26 million.
In
order to simplify this system, Congress should amend 49 USC 32903(a)(1) to
eliminate the carryback provisions. Retaining the "carryforward" provisions at
49 USC 32903(a)(2) is desirable. These provisions allow manufacturers to apply
credits earned in the present year to any of the three following years,
rewarding them for exceeding their mandated CAFE performance.
The
preemption provision in the CAFE regulations should be clarified so it does not
preclude state-run 'feebate "programs
There is some evidence, as
expressed in the NAS report, that a feebate program, wherein manufacturers (and
consumers) are rewarded for selling cars that are more fuel efficient than CAFE
requires, would produce benefits beyond a straightforward CAFE system. While
Public Citizen does not advocate implementing this program on a national level
due to the large number of unknowns involved, we believe there is enough
potential merit in such a system that states should be allowed to experiment
with it. Currently, the preemption clause at 49 USC 32919 rules out this
possibility, thereby preventing useful experimentation. Congress should pass
language that specifically excludes these programs from preemption, so long as
the program only rewards manufacturers for selling vehicles with tested fuel
economies at or above the applicable CAFE standard in the year they are
manufactured.
V. REAPING THE BENEFITS OF SOLID ENERGY, SAFETY AND
ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING
Improving fuel economy benefits the American
economy in both the short and long run
Automobile manufacturers have
argued that improving fuel economy will cripple their ability to do business by
preventing them from giving the customer what she wants. They argue, further,
that because the automobile industry is so critical to the health of the
American economy it would be destructive to the economy as a whole if Congress
were to prescribe new
fuel economy standards. Their conclusion
shortchanges their own talented engineers and runs contrary to economic history.
Reducing dependence on oil will protect our economic stability and
growth
Unstable oil and gas prices destabilize the American economy.
Each of the three major oil price spikes of the last 30 years (1973-74, 1979-80,
and 1990-91) was followed by an economic recession in the United States. Because
so much of our oil must be imported, we are at the mercy of OPEC and foreign
governments should they choose to act to rapidly raise oil prices as they did
two years ago. Our economy, as it is currently structured, requires the
importation of over $ 100 billion dollars of crude oil and petroleum products
each year, which accounts for 29 percent of our trade deficit and totals $ 378
for every man, woman, and child in the U.S.51 American spending on gasoline
consumption - $ 186 billion dollars in 2000 - renders consumers vulnerable to
sudden price spikes over which they have no control.52
The economic cost
of U.S. oil dependence over the past 30 years has been estimated at $ 7 trillion
dollars of present value 53 - an amount approximately equal to the combined 2000
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of France, the United Kingdom, Germany and India.
54 if we were to reduce our use of oil substantially, this wealth would remain
within the United States and we would have greater control over economic growth.
Economic health and environmental health are closely linked
The
long-run economic health of the United States depends on the stability of our
climate. Our contributions to global warming through vehicle use are
substantial. Vehicle carbon dioxide emissions account for nearly a quarter of
total U.S. emissions, and are a whopping 5 percent of the global total. The
catastrophic environmental effects of continued warming have been well
documented - I will cite just a few. If our carbon dioxide use continues
unabated, we can expect:
-Epidemics of tropical diseases like malaria
and encephalitis in the United States;
-Extreme heat waves that will
kill hundreds and devastate agriculture;
-Uncontrolled flooding of our
coastal cities;
-Extreme weather patterns, resulting in massive property
damage and insurance costs. 55
We must treat global warming as a threat
to our long-term security and wealth. The actions we can take now to reduce
emissions will have positive impacts for generations to come.
Weak
fuel economy standards hamper U.S. competitiveness
While some foreign auto manufacturers invested considerable money and
human capital and built safe, affordable, fuel-efficient vehicles of all sizes,
domestic auto manufacturers secured appropriations riders barring increases in
fuel economy for the last seven years. By stifling fuel economy improvements,
U.S. manufacturers looked to Congress to protect them from competing, rather
than using their resources to build socially responsible vehicles.
Each
year that goes by without an increase in CAFE standards represents another year
of backsliding by the Big Three. As just one manifestation of this trend, Honda
and Toyota released vehicles powered by hybrid engines in the United States in
1999 and 2000 respectively, while Detroit (led by Ford) will not release its
first hybrid vehicle until 2003.56 If U.S. auto companies are to remain
competitive, they must have the blinders of environmental and economic reality
removed and join the rest of the globe in producing fuel efficient and safe
vehicles.
Beware the auto industry tactic of promoting future "SuperCars
" to avoid new CAFE standards now
The Bush Administration recently
announced that it plans to abandon the Clinton initiated Partnership for a New
Generation of Vehicles (PNGV) program, on which $ 1.5 billion was spent over 8
years. This program was the excuse for failing to increase fuel economy in the
early Clinton years. Now, in league with the auto industry, President Bush is
vowing to commit large sums of federal money, spaced out over a decade, to
research fuel-cell powered automobiles, for another long-term project that will,
it is hoped by industry, supplant feasible
fuel economy
standards today.
Fuel cell cars would theoretically produce no
carbon dioxide emissions from the exhaust system of the car (though
manufacturing their fuel would still require upstream emissions). While fuel
cells hold tremendous potential for improving the environmental impact of
America's vehicle fleet, the timing and political impact of this recent
announcement should be understood as yet another industry delay tactic.
Although the PNGV program was flawed, there is little evidence that
these flaws are being corrected in the proposed design for the proposed Bush
administration fuel cell program, so this new program may also have limited
impact on advances in the vehicle fleet. Similar risks attend this new program
as plagued the old: the PNGV program was overly controlled by the auto industry
itself; it shut innovative suppliers out of the process; it focused on long-term
goals rather than achievable improvements; it relied on competitors sharing
research with one another, inherently limiting its usefulness; and it failed to
set any mid- point goals so that the program could be evaluated. It is not
coincidental that President Bush is scuttling the program just two years before
its only goal (an 80-mpg passenger vehicle) was to have been achieved.
The recently announced program to fund fuel cell research is based on
the same premises as the PNGV program. The proposed program will do nothing to
improve fuel economy in the short run, and may do very little to improve it in
the long run. Mass production of fuel cell powered vehicles is many years away.
58 There are a number of technical hurdles that must be cleared before fuel
cells are powerful, safe, and compact enough to be used in passenger vehicles.
There is also a strong possibility that this program will be dominated by the
manufacturers and their interests in the way that the PNGV program was, and
therefore fail to make much material progress. Most importantly, without a
federal mandate for the auto industry to improve fuel economy, there is no
guarantee that manufacturers will implement any of the developed technology.
This program is clearly not a substitute for raising CAFE requirements, although
its long-term research potential is certainly important.
In many ways,
the car of the future was built in 1978
If automakers truly cared about
producing socially responsible vehicles they need look no further than the
Research Safety Vehicle (RSV), designed and assembled between 1975 and 1978, for
ideas on how to improve both safety and fuel economy. The RSV was built in the
late 1970s under a NHTSA contract with Don Friedman, a former GM engineer who
won a competition for the contract against much larger companies. The finished
vehicle weighed 2,4501bs., got 32 miles to the gallon in 1978, and safely
protected its occupant in crash tests. 59 The vehicle was able to protect its
occupants in a full frontal barrier impact at 50 miles per hour (mph), and in
side impact and rollover crashes at 40 mph, without significant risk of occupant
injury. Current statements from Friedman indicate that, if equipped with the
hybrid engine technology currently being used in the Honda Insight, this vehicle
would achieve a fuel economy today of between 50 and 60 Mpg.
VI.CONCLUSION: UPGRADING FUEL ECONOMY IS A WIN-WIN FOR CONGRESS, PUBLIC
SAFETY AND THE ECONOMY
At this moment, Congress has an historic
opportunity to require a more socially responsible vehicle. Public opinion
strongly supports higher fuel efficiency, and our environment, national, and
economic security demand it. Improvements in fuel economy, vehicle rollover
crashworthiness, and reductions in vehicle aggressivity will save both gas and
human life. Congress should jump at this win-win opportunity with a definitive
schedule for the phase-in of vehicle
fuel economy standards up
to 40 mpg for a combined fleet of cars and trucks.
Thank you so much for
the opportunity to speak with you today. I look forward answering any questions
you may have.
LOAD-DATE: January 28, 2002