Copyright 2001 eMediaMillWorks, Inc.
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Federal Document Clearing House
Congressional Testimony
December 6, 2001, Thursday
SECTION: CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY
LENGTH: 6768 words
COMMITTEE:
SENATE COMMERCE, SCIENCE AND TRANSPORTATION
HEADLINE: FUEL ECONOMY STANDARDS
BILL-NO:
H.R. 4 Retrieve Bill Tracking Report
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TESTIMONY-BY:
DAVID FRIEDMAN, SENIOR ANALYST,
AFFILIATION: CLEAN
VEHICLES PROGRAM
BODY: DECEMBER 6, 2001
STATEMENT OF: DAVID FRIEDMAN
SENIOR ANALYST, CLEAN VEHICLES
PROGRAM
THE UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS BEFORE THE:
COMMITTEE
ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
Thank you Mr. Chairman and members of the committee for the opportunity
to testify before you today. My name is David Friedman and I am a Senior Analyst
in the Clean Vehicles Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists. UCS is a
nonprofit partnership of scientists and citizens that has been working at the
intersection of science and policy for over 30 years.
I am the lead
author of the report "Drilling in Detroit: Tapping Automaker Ingenuity to Build
Safe and Efficient Automobiles," in which we provide a comprehensive assessment
of both the technical and economic potential of achieving a safe and
fuel-efficient fleet of passenger vehicles. Prior to my time at UCS I have been
involved in several projects related to fuel economy, including modification of
a Ford Taurus to reach 65 mpg and various analysis and support in assessing fuel
economy potential in the early stages of the Partnership for a New Generation of
Vehicles. Today I would like to summarize some of the results from our fuel
economy study as well as comment on several parts of the recent National
Research Council (National Academy of Sciences) report on the "Effectiveness and
Impact of Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) Standards."
The
Importance of Fuel Economy
US drivers consumed 121 billion gallons of
gasoline in 2000 at a total cost of $
186 billion. This level of
consumption represents 40 percent of the oil products that the nation consumes.
This number places these vehicles at the heart of the growing debate over oil
supplies.
Today, US oil dependence is greater than it has ever been as
we import a record 10 million barrels of oil and petroleum products each day.
These imports represent over half of US oil product consumption, and as demand
increases the proportion of imports will rise. About 25% of this imported oil
comes form the politically unstable Middle East - for example in the year 2000
we imported 1.7 million barrels of oil per day from Saudi Arabia and another 0.6
million barrels per day from Iraq. The cost of imported oil exacts a toll on our
international balance of trade, as the United States currently sends about
$
200,000 overseas each minute to buy oil products and is
estimated to spend $
20 to $
40 billion per year
to defend oil resources in the Middle East.
In recent years, the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) has regained its ability to
substantially influence the price of oil throughout the world. OPEC's market
power can be expected to grow as its production approaches half of all world oil
output in the next two decades. In the United States, our dependence on imported
oil from OPEC and other foreign sources is expected to grow to 64%, making us
even more susceptible to supply shortages and rapid rises in world oil prices.
Historically oil price shocks and periods of inflation have coincided, resulting
in significant harm to the US economy and our balance of trade.
Transportation is also the source of roughly one-third of all the
heat-trapping gases (greenhouse gases) linked to global warming that are
released in the United States every year (EIA 2000a). Greenhouse-gas emissions
from the US transportation sector amount to more than most countries release
from all sources combined. The production, transportation, and use of gasoline
for cars and light trucks resulted in the emission of 1,450 tons of greenhouse
gases by the United States in 2000--over one-fifth of US global warming
emissions that year.
Cars and trucks are the second largest single
source of air pollution in the country, second only to electricity generation.
As tailpipe standards are tightened, pollutants from passenger vehicles are
falling to near the level of those produced in refining and distributing
gasoline. As a result, transportation's impact on air pollution will soon
approach an equal split between the tailpipe and the amount of fuel a vehicle
uses. In the case of toxic emissions, pollutants that may be linked to cancer,
the upstream emissions from fuel refining and distribution are the dominant
source. The production and distribution of gasoline is also linked to many other
negative environmental impacts including oil spills and groundwater pollution
Assuming current fuel use, the production and distribution of gasoline
alone results in the emission of 848,000 tons of smog- forming pollution and
392,000 tons of benzene-equivalent toxic emissions in the United States each
year.6 Reducing these numbers significantly through improvements in fuel economy
can mean great strides in protecting human health.
The effect our cars
and light trucks have on our economy, our oil use, and our environment is only
expected to get worse due to rising vehicle travel, a changing vehicle fleet,
the impacts of vehicle emissions and fuel use under actual driving conditions,
and stagnant
fuel economy standards. Together these factors
have led to a 24 mpg fleet average fuel economy in 2000, the lowest level in
over twenty years :
Rising Travel. There are now more vehicles in the
United States than people licensed to drive them. Combined with increasing
travel rates per vehicle, the number of miles that Americans are driving
continues to rise. Vehicle travel is expected to increase nearly 50% over the
next 20 years,8 a trend that will help drive up passenger vehicle fuel use.
Shifting Markets. SUVs and other light trucks are allowed to use one
third more fuel than cars under current CAFE requirements. This "Light Truck
Loophole" caused consumers to use about 20 billion more gallons of gasoline in
2000 and cost consumers about $
30 billion dollars more than if
the
fuel economy standards of light trucks was set to the same
as that of cars. The light truck market has risen from 19% to 46% since 1975 and
is expected to grow to at least 50% of the passenger vehicle market, driving
fuel economy lower in the coming years.
Real World Fuel Economy. Testing
for CAFE standards is based on a pair of simulated driving cycles established in
1975. At the time it was unclear if these cycles represented real world driving
conditions, but today it is quite clear that they do not. Estimates show that
real world fuel economy is about 17% below tested values and this shortfall is
expected to increase over the next two decades.
Stagnant
Fuel
Economy Standards: CAFE standards for cars and light trucks have not
changed in more than a decade. The original schedule called for an increase in
car fuel economy to 27.5 mpg by 1985. While this goal was delayed for a few
years, the standard has been at that level since 1990. The light truck standard
reached approximately today's level in the late 1980s while separate standards
existed for 2 and 4-wheel drive vehicles, and, like passenger cars, was stalled
for a short period until reaching today's 20.7 mpg requirement.
We
estimate that these factors, along with continued stagnant
fuel economy
standards, would lead to an increase in passenger vehicle fuel use over
the next two decades of 56 percent, to 189 billion gallons per year, by 2020.
The result would be fuel costs to consumers of $
260 billion
dollars at a gasoline price of $
1.40. Total oil demand would
rise from today's 20 million barrels per day to over 27 million barrels per day
by 2020, 64% of which would be imported form outside the US. In addition, annual
greenhouse gas emissions from the passenger vehicle sector would rise to 2,260
million tons of carbon dioxide equivalent while emission of 1,320,000 tons of
smog-forming pollutants and 612,000 tons of benzene-equivalent toxic emissions
would be produced in the United States each year.
Reforming Regulations
to Reduce the Impacts of Driving
The US is not locked into the
predictions noted above. A systematic approach to reducing fuel use would
address all of the key factors noted above: stagnant
fuel economy
standards, shifting markets, real world fuel economy, and rising
travel. Within this systematic approach, increasing
fuel economy
standards to 40 mpg by 2012 is the single most effective, fastest and
least expensive path to reducing our future dependence on oil.
Fuel Economy Standards The 2001 National
Research Council study has identified the CAFE standards enacted in 1975 as a
key factor in the near doubling of new passenger car fuel economy (15.8 mpg in
1975 rising to a peak of 28.5 in 1998) and the 50% increase in the fuel economy
of new light trucks (from 13.7 mpg in 1975 to toady's 20.7 mpg). In addition,
this study notes that CAFE standards have played a leading role in preventing
fuel economy levels from dropping as fuel prices declined in the 1990s. UCS
estimates that current fuel economy levels maintained by CAFE saved consumers
over $
90 billion in 2000. The NAS report estimates that in the
year 2000 alone, increased fuel economy reduced gasoline use by 43 billion
gallons, or about 2.8 million barrels of oil per day (UCS estimates the figure
to be about 60 billion gallons of gasoline, or 3.9 million barrels of oil per
day).
These savings put to rest concerns over the effectiveness of
improved fuel economy. While fuel use has risen by 30% since the CAFE law was
passed, this is primarily due to an increase in the amount of travel by
Americans each year - which would have resulted in an even large increase in
fuel use had vehicle fuel economy not improved.
Savings of same
magnitude as seen in the past can be achieved in the future if
fuel
economy standards are again increased. UCS analysis has shown that
cost-effective technologies for near-term and longer-term improvements in
vehicle efficiency exist today. If these technologies are used to increase fuel
economy over the next 20 years, our passenger vehicle oil use could be turned
around (i.e. we could stop the growth in fuel use and even turn back the clock
to 1990 levels if standards are raised sufficiently), the amount of money
consumers spend on gasoline could be substantially reduced, and the impact our
driving has on the environment could be cut in half. Below is a short list of
conventional technologies that have already been developed by automakers that
could significantly increase the fuel economy of today's cars and light trucks,
many of which are already in some cars today.
Estimates from a study
released by the American Council for an Energy Efficient Economy, by DeCicco et.
al., indicate that a combination of these technologies, along with mass
reductions targeted at the heaviest vehicles, can produce a fleet of cars and
trucks that averages over 40 miles per gallon. The table below shows the costs
and net savings associated with these improvements in fuel economy. The result
is an increase in fuel economy of over 70% and a net saving to the average
consumer of over $
2,000. Increasing
fuel economy
standards results in a win- win situation where consumers and the
environment are both better off. In this case,
fuel economy
standards result in a net cost of carbon dioxide reduction of
-$
49/ton of carbon dioxide avoided, in other words, consumers
are paid to reduce their impacts on the environment while at the same time we
are reducing our oil dependence.
We have compared the UCS/ACEEE fuel
economy results with those from the recent National Research Council report and
we find that the costs and improvements in fuel economy are very similar. Using
the results from NRC Path 3 technologies (NRC 2001, page 3- 24) we estimate that
a fleet fuel economy of 33 to 47 mpg could be reached at a retail price increase
of about $
1,700 to $
3,800 per vehicle. This
compares favorably to UCS/ACEEE estimates of a fleet fuel economy of 36-49 mpg
at retail price increase of about $
1,200 to
$
3,900. (Friedman et. al, pages 84-87) In both cases, consumers
would be saving thousands of dollars at the gas pump. In most cases, this would
be more than enough to pay for the cost of the fuel economy improvements,
resulting in a net savings to consumers.
The figure to the right shows
the results of the NAS work for Path 2 and Path 3 technologies as well as
comparable UCS and ACEEE analyses. The combination of both the UCS and the NRC
results indicate that it is clearly feasible to reach a fleet average fuel
economy of 40 mpg. We feel that such a standard could be phased in over 10
years, while the NRC analysis shows that similar fuel economy levels could be
achieved within 10-15 years if weight reduction is not prominently used to reach
improved fuel economy. In less than 10 years, both the NAS and UCS results agree
that a fleet average of close to 35 mpg is technically feasible and cost
effective.
The benefits to reaching a 40-mpg fleet by 2012 are quite
significant. By 2012, we would have accumulated savings of 125 billion gallons
of gasoline, this is about one full year's worth of gasoline and is 25 times the
savings sought though the House energy bill, H.R. 4. In that same year, we would
be saving about 1.9 million barrels of oil per day. This is more than the 1.7
million barrels per day we imported form Saudi Arabia last year and over three
times the amount of oil we imported from Iraq. Consumers would also see
significant benefits, with the US economy seeing net savings of 12.6 billion
dollars in 2012 alone. On top of these financial benefits, over 40,000 new jobs
would be created in the auto industry and close to 70,000 would be created in
the US economy as a whole. In the end, increasing the average fuel economy of
cars and trucks would both aid us in reducing our dependence on oil and help
stimulate the economy.
Before the 40-mpg standards are phased in, UCS
analysis indicates that average light truck fuel economy could be raised well
above today's 20.7 mpg standard to that of cars (28.1 mpg) for about
$
670 in mass production. This increase in fuel economy could be
achieved within 5 years using technologies available in cars today. By 2010,
this increase in fuel economy would save 35 to 40 billion gallons of gasoline,
more than seven times the meager savings offered in the existing House Energy
Bill, H.R. 4. The overall benefit to consumers would be $
7
billion dollars per year in 2010 alone and would be accompanied by significant
reductions in greenhouse gas, toxic, and smog forming pollutants.
Shifting Markets
The NRC report (page 5-11) identifies "economic
incentives for manufacturers to assure that their vehicles are classified as
trucks. . .." These are the "light truck loophole" and the "gas-guzzler tax".
The fact that the
fuel economy standard for light trucks is set
at 20.7 mpg, lower than the 27.5 mpg for cars, means that automakers have to
spend less money on the fuel economy of trucks. The resulting lower price
combined with the current strong demand for light trucks means that automakers
can make more money from light trucks and therefore have an incentive to
classify more vehicles as light trucks. In addition, the gas- guzzler tax, which
applies to cars below 22.5 mpg, does not apply to light trucks, creating yet a
further incentive to make sure vehicles are classified as light trucks.
Together with lower tailpipe emissions and safety standards, these
loopholes have and will continue to enable the sales of more vehicles with lower
fuel economy, increasing fuel use and air pollution. The tailpipe air pollution
loophole for light trucks will be phased out by 2009 under EPA's Tier 2
regulations. The vast majority of these "light trucks" are no longer used for
commercial purposes and are instead used as passenger vehicles. The NRC report
(page 5-10 and page 5-11) indicates that "The car/truck distinction has been
stretched well beyond the original purpose." and that redefining the car/truck
classification or reducing economic incentives for manufacturers to define their
vehicles as trucks could alleviate the problems.
Since the existing
loophole no longer serves its intended purpose and is enabling increased fuel
use and increased costs to consumers, the light truck loophole in CAFE should be
closed by 2007 as a first step in fleet-wide increases to
fuel economy
standards. Once this is done, all cars and light trucks can be
classified as passenger vehicles and the gas-guzzler tax can be applied to all
such passenger vehicles.
Real World Fuel Economy
Given that
current data shows real world fuel economy to be 17% lower than CAFE certified
fuel economy, CAFE reform should also include a shift in fuel economy
measurement towards more realistic driving cycles. This has been pursued for
emissions through the incorporation of the SC03 and US06 driving cycles. The
SC03 cycle includes the use of air conditioning, which is not included in
standard CAFE testing. The US06 driving cycle is more akin to modern urban
driving with harder accelerations and higher speeds. Incorporating these driving
cycles or some other measure to ensure "truth in testing" could serve to provide
a more certain increase in fuel economy.
Rising Travel
The
increase in total vehicle miles traveled in the US, due partly to increases in
individual travel, cannot be addressed by increased
fuel economy
standards.11 One determinant of the amount of individual travel is the
cost of gasoline. Increasing gasoline taxes or instituting a tax on the amount
of carbon in a fuel (to account for global warming effects associated with the
emissions of carbon from burning the fuel) would likely result in some decrease
in daily travel. Estimates are that a 100 percent increase in the cost of
gasoline would result in about a 10 to 20 percent reduction in the amount each
vehicle travels (Greene et. al., 1999), though estimates of this value vary
widely. Significant increases in the price of gasoline alone, or smaller
increases along with increases in the CAFE standards, would result in a
reduction in gasoline use - however, a reform option that relies on large
increases in gasoline costs would face substantial political obstacles.
To put this into perspective, if we consider an increase in fleet fuel
economy to 40 mpg, accounting for a rebound effect, fuel use would be reduced by
about 40% compared to today. Long term elasticity fuel use price elasticity
estimates range from -0.5 to -0.9 12 , indicating that a gasoline price increase
of 44% to 80% would be required above today's values. Assuming last year's
average of $
1.54 per gallon, this translates into a
$
0.68 to a$
1.23 per gallon tax. However, this
assumes a baseline fuel economy at today's level, which is influenced by
existing CAFE standards. If we add in the tax that would be required today if
CAFE did not exist, estimated at $
1.12 per gallon 13 , the
total increase could be as much as $
1.80 to
$
2.35 per gallon. That would have required bringing 2000
gasoline prices up to as much as $
3.89 per gallon.
Safety
I will discuss the topic of safety and fuel economy
further in a moment, however, I would like to address some key reforms that can
take place under CAFE to improve vehicle safety. The key issue that can be
addressed through CAFE is the danger that the "not-so-light" light truck class
imposes on other drivers. Because these trucks are heavy, stiff and have high
bumpers, they represent a greater risk to car drivers, pedestrians, bicycle and
motorcyclists.
This is a fact that seems to be agreed upon by the entire
NRC/NAS panel in their recent report (both the majority opinion and the dissent
opinion point to reductions in fatalities from decreasing the size of light
trucks). While we do not agree with the magnitude of the life savings in the
report, we believe the direction is correct - we feel the magnitude is actually
larger - and therefore can accept them for demonstrative purposes. The clear
message is that any policy that creates an incentive for light trucks to get
lighter will save lives. Closing the light truck loophole would create such an
incentive and would therefore provide an increase in safety.
An
additional measure to achieve similar ends is the addition of means for
controlling the "Crash Aggressivity (CRAGG) index" as introduced in the House
Energy Committee. This is an index that evaluates the stiffness, structure
height, and mass of a striking vehicle. Use of the CRAGG index would highlight
the safety hazards of light trucks which are very stiff, high and heavy.
Regulated reductions in the fleet-wide CRAGG index could produce an opportunity
for the Senate to save lives.
Commentary on the National Academy of
Science/National Research Council Report
The following are brief
comments on some of the key sections of the NAS/NRC fuel economy panel report.
This is not intended to be an exhaustive analysis and critique of the report,
but instead highlights issues of key concern to UCS.
Rational for
Regulation of Fuel Economy
The NAS/NRC panel report provides clear
justification of the value of regulating fuel economy. In their first
recommendation it is stated that, "Because of concerns about greenhouse gas
emissions and the level of oil imports, it is appropriate for the federal
government to ensure fuel economy levels beyond those expected to result from
market forces alone." (page 6-6) . UCS firmly agrees with this statement. Based
on our assessment of the available technologies and the impacts of their use, we
believe that a near term goal of closing the light truck loophole by making
light truck
fuel economy standards the same as cars by 2007
provides significant net benefits to society. In the longer term, we believe
that a goal of 40 mpg by the middle of the next decade is both technically
achievable and also provides significant net benefits to society through
consumer savings at the gas pump, reduced oil use, reduced global warming and
other pollutant emissions, and reductions in highway fatalities.
Fuel
Economy Assessment
Overall, UCS analyses agree with the general results
for potential fuel economy improvements and associated costs using what the
NAS/NRC terms existing and emerging technologies. Under some specific
comparisons, UCS estimates of fuel economy are somewhat higher than those of the
NAS/NRC. One key reason for this is that our estimates are based on detailed
vehicle modeling that ensures inclusion of the synergistic effects between
technologies that the NAS/NRC menu approach can miss. Another key reason for the
difference is that in our analysis we rely more heavily on safety enhancing
weight reductions for the light truck class, which enables higher levels of fuel
economy to be reached at lower costs.
One significant exclusion from the
NAS/NRC analysis is an evaluation of the consumer savings of improved fuel
economy. The panel chose a potentially misleading name for their summary
analysis. This analysis was termed a "break-even fuel economy analysis for
14-year payback". This might seem to imply that the savings on gasoline costs is
just equal to the added cost of the fuel economy improvements, resulting in no
net savings. In fact, as described in their report on page 4-4, this analysis
looks at the point where the marginal savings on gasoline is equal to the
marginal cost of fuel economy improvements. In other words, the analysis sought
to find the point where the last dollar spent on improving fuel economy saved
exactly one more dollar on gasoline cost over the vehicle lifetime. This is a
classic economic analysis that is more appropriately termed an "economically
efficient analysis" and actually finds the point where the net savings over the
life of the vehicle is at its maximum. Thus, the analysis performed by the
NAS/NRC panel theoretically identifies the fuel economy levels where consumers
save the most money. In public testimony, the NAS panel has noted that this is
the case and has attempted to clarify the issue (I believe the NAS has submitted
such a clarification to this committee). I have included an attachment to this
testimony, which shows the NAS/NRC report Table 4-2 but also includes the
savings that would accrue from these vehicles.
I have performed an
additional analysis using the results for the Path 3 technologies as identified
in the NAS/NRC report on page 3- 24. The results for the average cost/average
fuel economy level in Path 3 are presented below assuming a discount rate of 5%
(this discount rate corresponds to an 8% new car loan, corrected for inflation).
Here we see that consumers are saving between $
360 and
$
2,500 above the cost of the fuel economy improvements for
different vehicles. The average fleet fuel economy is 39.8 mpg with an average
cost of $
2,765. UCS estimates predict a higher fuel economy at
this cost, however, the NAS/NRC results still demonstrate the ability to save
money while achieving a fleet- wide average fuel economy of 40 mpg. Thus, when
using a discount rate of 5%, NAS/NRC numbers show that the cost of a 40 mpg
fleet will pay for itself over a vehicle's life, even saving consumers nearly
$
1,000.
One final issue related to the fuel economy
assessments in the NAS/NRC report is the inclusion of their calculated
externality values. The panel identifies the externalities associated with the
oil market and the environmental impacts of gasoline use valued at
$
0.26 per gallon of gasoline. While we feel that this value is
low, even this amount would show a net increase in savings to society from
improved
fuel economy standards. For example, in the average
Path 3 example above, the societal savings of a 40- mpg fleet fuel economy would
be $
1,573 per vehicle and would vary between
$
775 and $
3500, depending on the vehicle.
Safety
We disagree strongly with the majority of the assertions
made by the majority panel regarding vehicle safety and fuel economy
improvements. The key to making a vehicle safe is in its design. Proper design
techniques, use of powerful computing resources and high strength materials
enable designers to reduce the weight of vehicles while simultaneously including
efficient crush space to absorb the impact in a crash and therefore reduce the
forces experienced by the vehicle occupants. Existing crash data does not
provide the ability to differentiate between vehicle weight, physical
dimensions, and vehicle design and therefore statistical analysis based on this
data cannot evaluate the direct relationship between changes and weight and
changes in vehicle safety.
On the other hand, we agree generally with
the findings of the panel minority in the dissent chapter on safety and note
that significantly more analysis would need to be done before adequate
quantification of the impacts on fuel economy changes on safety could be
produced.
In addition to the key problems raised in the dissent chapter,
I would like to point out at least one conspicuous assertion that was made in
the safety analysis. One of the key reasons why we reject the use of past data
to assess current and future safety impacts of weight reduction is that vehicle
technology is changing over time. On page 2-27 of the NAS/NRC report, an
assertion is made that "the ratio of fatality risk in the smallest vehicles of a
given type compared to the largest remained relatively similar." However, this
ratio is never presented to the reader. Calculating this ratio for the data in
the NAS/NRC
All of the data above, other than the last columns labeled
"% change in ratio over time" are the original data from the NAS/NRC report. The
added columns above indicate that the ratio of fatalities in the smallest
vehicles to the largest ones in each class changed during each 10 year period,
with these changes being as high as a 64% increase for SUVs and a 40% decrease
for pickups. Clearly the ratios did not remain either relatively similar over
time, or among the classes. Even without the existing disagreements relative to
the past safety data, this seriously threatens the validity of using the data to
predict current or future safety impacts. Further eroding their analysis is the
fact that the type of vehicles in the fleet have changed drastically over time.
The figure below shows how the weight distribution of cars has changed since
CAFE was first passed. The key feature that stands out is that we used to have a
lot of cars of many different weights with an overall high average weight. Now
we have a lower overall average weight and the weight distribution is less
spread out. This means that changing the weight of today's vehicles has a much
different effect than it would have in 1975 or even 1990 and therefore past data
simply cannot be used to predict current safety performance.
This issue
of changing safety relationships over time brings to the fore another important
issue, that of improved safety technology. Some of the differences above are
likely attributable to improvements in the design of the vehicles as well as
incorporation of improved safety technologies and/or better use of existing
technologies. In our report, we have estimated the potential reductions in
fatalities from simply increasing seat belt use from today's 70% up to 90% and
found that 6,000 to 10,000 lives could be saved through increased seatbelt use.
Improved safety belt design could save an additional 3,000 to 5,000 lives, for a
total of 15,000 lives saved by safety belts alone. These potential life saving
methods completely outweigh any negative safety impacts associated with
weight/size reduction even if the majority analysis is accepted.
As
noted above, however, we do not agree with the majority analysis. In our report,
we demonstrate that it is the disparity in weight that is the key influence on
safety and that influence is a negative one - the more you mix heavy and light
vehicles, the less safe the highways will be. This fact is accentuated by the
presence of light trucks that are heavy, stiff and have high bumpers. These
three factors combine to make these vehicles very aggressive in crashes.
Analysis by Joksch et. al. indicates that in a front end collision,
light trucks produce an increase in fatality risk by a factor of 3 to 5.6 when
striking a car compared to a car striking a car. In front-driver-side collisions
light trucks pose risk factor 2 to 4.5 times that of a car when striking another
car on the driver-side. Further demonstrating the risks imposed by light trucks,
recent analyses done by Ross and Wenzel shows that the top four selling cars in
1995-98 impose less of a risk in 2- vehicle crashes on other vehicles on the
road than do SUVs and pickup trucks. For vehicles 2 to 5-years old, there were
79% more deaths per vehicle caused by the SUVs than by cars and more than four
times as many deaths caused by pickups than by cars . Correcting for the
influence of age does not significantly alter these effects.
Even more
important are the findings by Ross and Wenzel that the risk of death in all
crashes to the person driving one of the four best selling cars is lower than
the same risk associated with driving one of the four best selling light trucks
which are all heavier than the cars. These results indicate that for modern
vehicle designs with their associated size and weight, not only are the most
popular cars less dangerous to others on the road, they are also safer for the
driver compared to the top selling light trucks.
The NAS/NRC panel
findings agree that reducing the weight and historically associated
characteristics of light trucks could reduce the fatalities on our highways,
however, in most of their fuel economy assessments they did not include weight
reductions. In Path 3 where they did include some weight reduction, it was only
5% and was only in 3 of the 10 vehicles investigated, thus providing a very
small benefit to safety. Our analysis indicates that a 10% weight reduction
along with streamlining and an efficient variable valve controlled engine would
enable light trucks to have the same
fuel economy standard as
cars. As indicated by Green and Keller, this would conservatively have saved 176
lives in 1993. Reaching higher fuel economy levels could require a 20-30 percent
reduction in weight, implying a fatality reduction of 352 to 528. We feel that
if more accurate assessments of the negative impacts of today's aggressive light
trucks were developed, these fatality reductions would be further increased,
especially since they can be achieved using high strength materials that
maintain occupant safety while reducing aggressivity.
Weight Based
Standards
The NAS/NRC report presents an altered
fuel economy
standard system termed E-CAFE, for Enhanced CAFE. A summary of the key
impacts of this system is as follows:
The weight based system creates
incentives to add weight to smaller vehicles.
As a result, this system
creates a disincentive to adopt one of the most cost-effective fuel economy
strategies (weight reductions) for many vehicles, one which PNGV has been
working on for years.
The weight based system also does not guarantee a
specific fuel economy level and market shifts could still keep fuel economy on
the decline.
The NAS/NRC panel only provided an example of how the
standards should be set. Evaluating and comparing the different impacts of
various forms of the standard would be very complicated and leads to significant
difficulty in setting fuel economy levels.
This system is predicated on
a
fuel economy standard that is based on a vehicle's weight.
The heavier the vehicle the lower the required fuel economy, up to a weight cap,
above which the
fuel economy standard becomes constant (i.e.
independent of weight as we have today). The cap creates an incentive for the
heaviest vehicles to shed weight, which we agree seems like a positive step as
it would improve overall vehicle safety, however it is, in essence, not very
different from simply modifying the current flat light duty truck standard. The
only difference is that some of the lightest trucks would not be included, they
would instead be replaced by the heaviest cars.
For the vehicles below a
weight cap (4,000 pounds in their example), there is no mathematical advantage
to adding or reducing weight. As a result automakers have no incentive to make
the vehicles near the cap somewhat lighter and therefore safer for the overall
fleet. Further, automakers actually have an incentive to increase the weight of
the vehicles below the cap thus creating a very large loophole similar to the
current light truck loophole. This incentive is not created by the proposed
standard, but instead by the existing market forces. Automakers can make larger
profits on heavier vehicles today, therefore, there is an inherent financial
incentive to increase sales of the heavier vehicles that are more profitable, as
we have seen with SUVs. This shift in sales would increase the overall size and
weight of the fleet at no penalty to a company's ability to meet the weight
based
fuel economy standards because the standards drop as the
vehicle becomes heavier. Therefore, economic pressures turn the weight neutral
slope into an incentive to increase weight, likely producing a fleet of vehicles
that all move towards the 4000 lb. mark set in the NAS/NRC example, with an
overall reduction in fleet fuel economy. A fleet that minimizes the variations
in weight is good for overall safety, however, the cap set in the standard would
effectively become an imposed fleet weight. Lower fleet weights could be just as
safe, if not safer and would produce larger oil savings. A flat average 40 mpg
standard across all car and light truck classes would instead encourage the
heaviest vehicles to get lighter and therefore create a fleet that is both safer
and more efficient.
The next concern is that, even if we ignore the
first issue, the exact fleet fuel economy under this method is quite uncertain.
As we have seen with the rise in light truck sales eroding fuel economy, a
potential rise in vehicle weights could produce a net drop in fuel economy, even
with the example 4000 pound limit. Further, the uncertainties of the political
process create the risk for an even higher limit passing, which could further
erode fuel economy levels.
Dual-fuel Vehicle Credits
The NAS/NRC
panel, in their fifth recommendation on page 6-6 suggests the elimination of the
dual-fuel vehicle credit system. UCS agrees that this system has not functioned
as intended and automakers have received credit for their vehicles using
alternative fuels they have never consumed. One solution is to eliminate these
credits as suggested by the NAS/NRC panel, which we would find acceptable.
Another alternative is to tie the amount of credit received by the automakers to
the actual amount of each alternative fuel used in the previous year. Such a
system would ensure that extra fuel economy credit is only given to the degree
that the sales of these vehicles enhances the actual use of alternative fuels
and would thus preserve the intent of the credit without the current pitfalls.
Availability of Higher Fuel Economy Vehicles
One assertion made
by in the NAS/NRC report that is often put forward by automakers is that,
"consumers already have a wide variety of opportunities if they are interested
in better gas mileage." (page 1-3) While it is strictly true that there are a
number of models on the US market that achieve more than 30 mpg, all of them
force the consumer to give up some feature or some amount of performance to
obtain the improved fuel economy. They cannot, however, accept in a very few
cases, elect to pay more for a vehicle with the same features and performance,
but with higher fuel economy.
The result is that consumers do not truly
have a choice to express a desire for improved fuel economy, all else being
equal.
Our analysis and that done by the NAS/NRC panel indicate that the
fuel economy of passenger vehicles can be increased while maintaining the size,
performance and the various features consumers expect.
Our analysis also
indicates that consumers can purchase these vehicles without sacrificing and
likely increasing overall crash safety. These improvements in fuel economy do
come at a cost, but were these vehicles to be offered, consumers would have a
true choice of getting all they expect from a car or light truck today, but with
higher fuel economy and the associated net savings.
Conclusion
Raising
fuel economy standards is the fastest, least
expensive and most effective thing Congress can do to reduce our future
dependence on oil. The oil savings associated with reaching an average fuel
economy of 40 mpg by 2012 for all new cars and light trucks would be 1.9 million
barrels per day in that year alone - this is four times the expected peak output
from the Arctic Refuge at today's oil prices and over three times the oil we
imported from Iraq last year (and more than we imported from Saudi Arabia). The
cumulative oil savings would be about 3 billion barrels of oil or 125 billion
gallons of gasoline. That means that in 10 years we would save almost as much
oil as is recoverable at today's oil prices from the whole Arctic Refuge in its
50-60 year lifetime. That is also 25 times the oil savings called for in the
House energy bill, H.R. 4. At the same time we are significantly cutting our oil
dependence, consumers are saving 12.6 billion dollars in 2012 and close to 100
billion dollars per year by 2015, while the auto industry will see a growth of
over 40,000 jobs in the US.
We feel that between our work, the most
recent NAS/NRC fuel economy study as well as a wealth of other literature
available today, it is clear that the technology exists to cost effectively
increase fuel economy with resulting benefits to oil use, consumers and the
environment. These significant improvements in fuel economy can be achieved with
existing technology, enabling us to achieve progress in fuel economy in the near
term as we watch the market for hybrid electric and fuel cell vehicles grow.
We can see both near and longer term increases in fuel economy and these
increases can be accompanied by the same safety, comfort and performance
consumers expect today and could even improve the overall safety of America's
highways if the light truck loophole is closed.
Thank you for the
opportunity to testify before the Committee today. I would be happy to answer
any questions you may have.
LOAD-DATE: December
7, 2001