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Federal Document Clearing House
Congressional Testimony
January 24, 2002 Thursday
SECTION: CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY
LENGTH: 2186 words
COMMITTEE:
SENATE COMMERCE, SCIENCE AND TRANSPORTATION
HEADLINE: CAFE STANDARDS
TESTIMONY-BY: ADRIAN K. LUND, CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER
AFFILIATION: INSURANCE INSTITUTE FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY
BODY: January 24, 2002
Statement of Adrian
K. Lund, Chief Operating Officer Insurance Institute For Highway Safety
before the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
The Insurance Institute for Highway Safety is a nonprofit
research and communications organization that identifies ways to reduce motor
vehicle crashes and crash losses. I am the Institute's chief operating officer,
and I am here to discuss the important relationships between vehicle fuel
economy and safety. The Institute is particularly concerned that mandatory
increases in fuel economy could increase the risk of serious injury in crashes
or, at the very least, reduce the societal benefits of future vehicle safety
improvements. This concern is based on the inherent physical relationships
between vehicle mass, fuel consumption, and safety. Larger, heavier vehicles
consume more fuel to travel the same distance as smaller, lighter cars. At the
same time the larger, heavier vehicles protect their occupants better in the
event of a crash. This is true in both single- and multiple-vehicle crashes.
Reductions in vehicle size and weight can improve fuel economy but only at the
cost of reduced occupant protection. Simultaneous improvements in safety
technology to protect occupants can hide or offset the safety costs of
downweighting, but the basic fact remains that, for a given level of safety
technology, heavier vehicles afford greater protection than lighter vehicles. No
safety technology can be added to lighter vehicles that will offset their
inherent disadvantages in protecting occupants in crashes. The protective
effects of mass are independent of, and additive to, other safety factors.
This relationship is described in much greater detail in the recent
report by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) Committee to Review the
Effectiveness and Impact of Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) Standards,
July 31, 2001. I was a member of that committee, and the Institute largely
agrees with the report's majority position on safety, so I will not repeat the
details. I will instead focus on the primary implications of the report:
-Any regulatory action that increases the sale of small, lightweight
vehicles, whether cars or light-duty trucks, will increase injury risk in
crashes.
-This inherent relationship does not preclude the improvement
of fuel economy without adverse safety consequences.
-As currently
structured, CAFE standards provide an incentive for the sale of the smallest,
lightest vehicles.
-Alternative CAFE structures that index fuel economy
requirements to vehicle weight can mitigate or even reverse the negative safety
implications of increased fuel economy requirements.
Before elaborating
on these points, we first need to review the relationship between vehicle mass
and motor vehicle crash injury risk. In Figure 1, we see the risk of occupant
crash fatality per vehicle on the road for 1990-96 model cars, sport utility
vehicles (SUVs), and pickups during 1991-97, the most recent year for which the
Institute has conducted these analyses. (Note: In contrast to the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), the Institute classifies
minivans, which typically are built on modified car platforms, as cars rather
than trucks.) For each of these vehicle types, the risk of occupant death
increases as vehicle weight decreases. The risk of fatal injury per registered
vehicle is about twice as high for the lightest cars compared with the heaviest
ones. Similar relationships occur for SUVs and pickups, although the typical SUV
or pickup has a higher fatality risk than the typical car of similar weight.
This is largely due to the increased risk of single-vehicle crashes,
particularly rollover crashes, among light-duty trucks. So what we see from this
figure is the basic protective effect of vehicle size and weight. We also see a
diminishing protective effect as vehicle weight approaches 3,500 to 4,000
pounds.
This protective effect of vehicle weight is not the full story.
Many crashes involve more than one vehicle, and in multiple- vehicle crashes
vehicle weight can increase the risk of injury in other vehicles at the same
time it limits the risk to its own occupants. Figure 2 shows the number of
occupant fatalities that occurred in other vehicles that collided with 1990-96
models during 1991-97, per registered 1990-96 vehicle. What we see from this
figure is that the risk of fatality in other vehicles increases with increasing
vehicle weight.
From a societal perspective, the effect of vehicle
weight includes both of these effects - the protective benefits for a vehicle's
own occupants plus the increased risk to other road users. In Figure 3, the
total number of crash deaths involving 1990-96 models during 1991-97 is shown by
vehicle weight. These fatality counts include pedestrians and cyclists but
exclude deaths in crashes involving three or more vehicles, which are relatively
few and in which the implications of vehicle weight would be difficult to
isolate. This figure illustrates that, from a societal view, increasing vehicle
weight to about 3,500 or 4,000 pounds reduces total fatality risk. Beyond about
4,000 pounds, increasing vehicle weight results in a net increase in fatalities,
as the risk to other road users more than offsets the increased occupant
protection afforded by the additional weight.
To put this another way,
Figure 3 illustrates that reducing the weight of midsize cars or small SUVs will
increase the total fatality risk. However, reducing the weight of the heaviest
SUVs and pickups could result in a net societal safety benefit. So some vehicle
downweighting need not result in a net safety cost if it involves the heaviest
vehicles.
Besides downweighting the heaviest vehicles, there are other
ways to increase fuel economy without negative safety consequences. The NAS
committee's report notes the existence of technology that could increase fuel
efficiency and achieve large increases in fuel economy without reducing vehicle
weights or altering current vehicle performance. However, nothing about the
current CAFE structure encourages manufacturers to achieve fuel economy by
reducing the weight of their largest vehicles or by installing expensive
technology. In fact, CAFE is structured so that increasing the production of
small, lightweight, and fuel economical - but less safe - vehicles can offset
the production of large, heavy vehicles, which offer manufacturers much greater
opportunity for profit.
Figure 4 illustrates this. It shows the
distribution of 1999 model cars by weight and fuel economy (in gallons per 100
miles traveled). It also shows the mandated CAFE standard of 27.5 miles per
gallon (the horizontal line at 3.64 gallons per 100 miles). For a manufacturer,
CAFE is computed by taking the difference between each vehicle's fuel economy
and the required level and averaging across the various vehicles. Note that any
manufacturer with a heavy model that consumes fuel much above the required level
(vehicle A in Figure 4, for example) can satisfy CAFE by also producing small,
lightweight, and fuel economical models (like vehicle B). Because there usually
is much more profit to be made from larger, heavier, feature-laden vehicles,
this aspect of CAFE can be detrimental to safety by providing an incentive to
develop and sell small, less protective vehicles. The danger is twofold - the
number of small, lightweight vehicles on the road increases and, because those
vehicles permit manufacturers to increase production of large, heavy vehicles,
the overall incompatibility of the passenger vehicle fleet increases.
Essentially, the sale of the lightweight vehicles permits the sale of the heavy
vehicles that pose the greatest danger to the occupants in the lightweight
vehicles.
As the NAS committee reported, CAFE need not be structured in
this manner. The standards could promote fuel economy and safety, if the fuel
economy requirements were indexed to vehicle weight. Figure 5, which appears in
the NAS report labeled "Enhanced CAFE Targets," shows the fuel economy of all
passenger vehicles in 1999, and a single CAFE requirement is plotted for cars
and light trucks. The idea is that fuel economy requirements would increase as
vehicles become lighter. Thus, there would be no incentive to downweight the
lightest vehicles because their fuel economy requirements would simply increase.
Increased sales of such lightweight vehicles could not be used to offset the
fuel requirements of heavier vehicles.
To further enhance the safety
effect of modifying the current CAFE structure, the NAS committee considered
that the sliding fuel economy requirement could end at around 4,000 pounds.
Above this, the societal consequence of increasing vehicle weight appears to be
negative as vehicle aggressivity effects outweigh occupant protection effects.
By holding all vehicles above this weight to a common value (shown here as the
current fuel economy level for light trucks), there would be an incentive for
manufacturers to reduce the weights, and therefore the aggressivity, of the
heaviest vehicles. The Institute believes strongly that NHTSA should investigate
this enhanced CAFE structure and, if its initial promise is confirmed, it should
be seriously considered as an alternative to the current CAFE structure.
The Institute is concerned that current efforts to increase the fuel
economy of the U.S. vehicle fleet could result in more deaths and injuries in
crashes. However, the Institute does not view improved fuel economy and safety
as inherently incompatible goals. The chief problem is that the current CAFE
structure encourages the sale of small, lightweight, and less protective
vehicles in order to permit the sale of large, heavy vehicles. Although the
heavy vehicles are more protective of their occupants, the additional protective
effect of weight diminishes at greater weights while the aggressive effect
increases. Thus, simply ratcheting up current CAFE requirements for cars or
light- duty trucks would be expected to increase motor vehicle fatality risk by
increasing the sales of lightweight cars and trucks.
The NAS committee
identified a number of vehicle and engine technologies that could increase fuel
economy without downweighting or losing vehicle performance characteristics. But
these technologies come at a cost, and nothing in the current CAFE structure
encourages manufacturers to adopt fuel efficiency strategies as opposed to the
potentially cheaper and less safe strategy of downweighting. In contrast,
incentives do exist to add weight-increasing features to large, profitable
vehicles while subtracting features and weight from small, cheap vehicles. The
risk is compounded by the likelihood that younger, riskier drivers who cannot
afford the protection of the heavier vehicles will drive the small, cheap
vehicles.
Congress should be guided by history as it considers this
issue. The first
fuel economy standards were imposed in the
1970s after the oil crisis. In response, new technologies were introduced, but a
large proportion of the resulting improvements in fuel economy came from vehicle
weight reductions. Cars in 1993 were, on average, 700 pounds lighter and
light-duty trucks were 300 pounds lighter than in 1976. NHTSA has estimated that
in 1993 each 100-pound decrease in car weight was associated with a 1.13 percent
increase in fatality risk in crashes. This suggests, as the NAS report
concludes, that if car drivers in 1993 had chosen vehicles as heavy as those in
1976, there would have been fewer sales of the lightest vehicles and more sales
of the heavier ones. This would have meant 2,100 fewer fatalities in crashes.
The NHTSA analysis also indicates that, because light-duty trucks were 300
pounds lighter in 1993, there were 100 fewer fatalities in truck crashes. This
effect of truck weight reduction occurs because light-duty trucks, on average,
are heavier than most other passenger vehicles and the aggressive effect of
additional mass outweighs the protective effect.
Simply ratcheting up
fuel economy requirements within the current CAFE structure could cause a repeat
of this negative effect. Although the technology exists to improve fuel economy
without downweighting the smallest, lightest vehicles, economic forces may argue
against the adoption of such technology. Certainly, the current CAFE structure
does nothing to prevent the increased sale of small, lightweight, and less safe
cars and light trucks. The Institute understands that Congress may decide that
current world events as well as environmental concerns require improved fuel
economy as part of the U.S. response. However, we urge Congress to direct NHTSA
to consider new CAFE structuring that could improve both fuel economy and
safety. Such consideration is necessary to ensure that the fuel economy
improvements that might save lives in the distant future do not result in
vehicle downsizing and downweighting that surely will result in needless
fatalities in the near future.
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January 24, 2002