The story of the 107th Congress began with Republican Party control of both houses of Congress and the White House—all by the narrowest of margins—for the first time since 1954. Political winds shifted abruptly after Senator James Jeffords (I-VT) announced that he was leaving the Republican Party to become an Independent and would caucus with the Democrats. While the Senate reorganized under Democratic leadership, the House moved aggressively to pass the Bush Administration’s special interest driven energy plan over bitter environmental opposition. But then the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks turned America upside down and radically changed government priorities. The economic downturn, along with the corporate scandals that followed, also strongly impacted both congressional priorities and public sentiment. The second half of the 107th Congress reflects these sea changes in a focus on legislation relating to national security concerns and the war on terrorism. The stalled budget and appropriations process is both a result of growing concern over the economic downturn and of differing funding and policy priorities between the House and Senate leadership. The shift in legislative focus has also meant little movement on environmental legislation, as well as a stalemate over the widely divergent energy legislation passed by both houses. 

Farm Bill Since the Great Depression, the federal government has established farm policies that attempt to stabilize the financial risks of farming from factors such as drought and crop price fluctuations. Every four to six years, Congress debates and passes a Farm Bill, the single largest series of federal programs that affect American agriculture. Farming and ranching operations cover more than half the land in the 48 contiguous United States. Thus, farming has a major effect on the nation's air, water, wetlands and wildlife habitat. Over the past two decades, farm legislation began to incorporate conservation goals, such as the protection of wetlands and grasslands, in its mix of programs. These programs, such as the Conservation Reserve Program, have generally proven popular, and have been renewed and expanded in subsequent bills. They often serve to help smaller farmers and ranchers improve farming practices without financial sacrifice and keep land in the family. For this reason, farm conservation programs are supported both by environmental organizations and by groups advocating to preserve small family farms.  The debate over farm program renewal began in 2001, with the House rejecting an amendment to increase substantially funds for conservation programs (see the 2001 National Environmental Scorecard (pdf)). The House bill also raised the cap on crop subsidy payments to individual farmers to more than $600,000 from prior law, which allowed payments of up to $460,000. Statistics on subsidies under the previous farm bill, publicized with great effect by the Environmental Working Group during this farm debate, indicated that crop subsidies went disproportionately to large farmers: between 1996 and 2002, 45 percent of all such subsidies went to the largest 7 percent of farms. By contrast, the bill that the Senate passed in early 2002 capped payments to individuals at $275,000. In addition, Senator Paul Wellstone (D-MN) offered an amendment that would have prevented funds from the Environmental Quality Incentives Program from going to expand or build new factory animal farms (Senate vote 8).  Although Wellstone’s original amendment did not pass, a version of his factory farm subsidy limit was agreed to by the Senate—and subsequently removed by the conference committee on the bill. The House-Senate conference committee met in the spring, accompanied by intense lobbying and deal making among the many regional and economic interests. In the end, the conference tilted more toward the House bill, including a $360,000 subsidies cap and lower funding for conservation programs than was passed by the Senate. Small farm groups and environmental organizations had gained backing in the full House for the Senate approach, winning a motion to instruct the House conferees to accept the Senate’s subsidy caps and conservation funding levels in April (House vote 1). When the conference report reached the House floor with the higher subsidy caps these groups urged the full House of Representatives to reject the conference report and send it back to the committee to boost conservation spending and lower the subsidy caps. The effort to recommit the bill failed (House vote 2) and both houses subsequently sent the bill to President Bush, who signed it into law on May 13, 2002.

Finishing the Farm Bill
The Senate had begun consideration of the Farm Bill in December 2001 and returned to its bill early in the new year. Farm legislation, already passed by the House in 2001, is always an important election year issue for farm state members. Because of the bill’s budgetary magnitude and the now growing federal deficit, farm state senators were anxious to pass it before the Senate considered a new budget resolution that was based on new, and less favorable, economic forecasts than was last year’s budget. Several key votes on conservation funding and programs resulted in a Senate bill that was significantly different than the House-passed bill, and received guarded support from the environmental community (see box). However, these conservation gains largely disappeared in negotiations with the House and the conference report that passed both houses in May did not gain the support of environmentalists.

A Budget Impasse
As a general rule, an early legislative priority for Congress is its budget for the following fiscal year; however, in 2002 the growing federal deficit made this a painful process. The House passed a stringent budget resolution in March that would have resulted in major cuts in domestic spending, but the Senate was unable to come to agreement on a budget. As a result, the Appropriations Committees were forced to begin their work on funding for the federal government in fiscal year 2003 without spending guidelines. 

The Senate Turns to Energy
In March 2002, after reaching a stalemate on the budget, the Senate took up its energy legislation. Throughout the previous fall, the Senate Democratic leadership repelled several efforts by Senator Frank Murkowski (R-AK), the Senate’s foremost proponent of Arctic drilling, and Senator James Inhofe (R-OK) to attach the House-passed energy bill to unrelated legislation on the Senate floor in their push to link energy policy to national security concerns. Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle (D-SD) promised to bring an energy bill to the floor at the earliest opportunity in 2002.

Senator Daschle chose, however, to use a leadership prerogative to take a bill drafted by Energy and Natural Resources Chairman Jeff Bingaman (D-NM) directly to the floor, bypassing committee. Substantively, the bill was much more favorable to environmental community priorities than was the House-passed bill or the Bush administration’s energy plan. The Senate bill did not include provisions to develop oil on the coastal plain of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge in Alaska. It included a provision drafted by Senators John Kerry (D-MA) and Ernest Hollings (D-SC) that would have raised Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards for cars and light trucks to 36 mpg by 2013. The tax provisions, crafted by Finance Chairman Max Baucus (D-MT), struck a more conservation-oriented balance between tax incentives for energy conservation, alternative fuels and traditional energy production, where the House bill tilted primarily toward traditional producers such as coal, oil and nuclear energy.

Fuel Economy
The 2002 energy debate marked a turning point in the fight to increase fuel economy standards for cars and light trucks, as the issue became the subject of extensive debate on the Senate floor. Senators Carl Levin (D-MI) and Christopher Bond (R-MO) offered an amendment to remove the Kerry-Hollings CAFE provision and replace it with a weak directive to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration to develop a standard. Despite strong environmental opposition, the Levin-Bond proposal passed with support from the administration, the automobile manufacturers and the United Auto Workers (Senate vote 2). A second surprise amendment from Senator Zell Miller (D-GA) exempting all pickup trucks from any increase in fuel economy requirements also passed (Senate vote 3). Late in the floor debate on the energy bill, Senators Tom Carper (D-DE) and Arlen Specter (R-PA) brought up yet another fuel economy amendment, this one requiring that the Department of Transportation implement standards to save 1 million barrels of oil per day by 2015. This amendment also failed to pass, but with more senators supporting higher fuel economy standards than in either of the previous votes (Senate vote 4).

Renewable Energy
Another issue that received extensive floor debate early in the energy fight was renewable energy. The original energy bill contained a relatively modest proposal to require that ten percent of electricity come from renewable sources by 2020. Senator James Jeffords (I-VT) attempted to raise the bar by adding a requirement that 20 percent come from renewable sources by 2020 (Senate vote 5). Although the Jeffords amendment was defeated, several attempts to remove or restrict the 10 percent requirement, led by Senator Jon Kyl (R-AZ), were also soundly defeated (Senate vote 6) and the requirement remained in the bill.

Drilling in the Arctic
In early April 2002, the Senate returned to an energy debate that had now consumed far more of the Senate’s floor time than anyone had predicted. Majority Leader Daschle threatened to move cloture and bring the debate to a close. With drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge as the largest remaining unresolved issue, and with Senators John Kerry and Joseph Lieberman (D-CT) continuing to threaten a filibuster of any drilling amendment, the Alaskans responded with a risky tactical gambit. Senator Stevens (R-AK) proposed an amendment that would use revenue generated by oil leases in the Arctic to fund pensions for retired steelworkers from bankrupt or troubled steel companies in an attempt to woo Democratic senators from steel-producing states. 

Yucca Mountain  Nuclear power was a big winner in the Congress of 2002. First, both the House and Senate voted to extend the terms of the 1957 Price-Anderson Act, the law that limits the liability of the owners of nuclear power plants in the case of accidents. Without such an exemption from the liability faced by other businesses and individuals, nuclear power advocates say they would be unable to afford insurance or even to obtain it. Environmental organizations and groups that fight excessive federal spending argue that Price-Anderson is a subsidy of unknown but potentially gargantuan size that disguises the true cost of nuclear energy relative to conservation and alternative fuels. The reauthorization was included by the Senate in its energy bill (Senate vote 13), which has not yet emerged from conference.   The second big win for the industry was passage of legislation to begin the process of building a permanent disposal and storage site for 77,000 tons of the nation’s nuclear waste. Nuclear advocates often claim that nuclear energy is a clean fuel: it does not pollute the air or generate greenhouse gases like utilities that burn coal or oil. But undermining the “clean fuel” argument is the impact of the radioactive waste that is generated by every nuclear power plant. Because this waste remains radioactive for thousands of years, its long term storage has become a major policy issue.   Congress has grappled with the issue of finding a permanent waste storage site for more than 20 years. The site must be stable from an environmental and public health perspective. Areas with large populations not only mean larger public health dangers, but greater political muscle to resist siting.   Nuclear proponents have long had their eye on Yucca Mountain, Nevada. Aside from the area’s low population, federal ownership, and history of nuclear testing, Yucca Mountain advocates claim that its arid climate reduces the risk of flood, erosion and seepage and that it is geologically stable. Opponents, including Nevada’s elected officials, disagree vehemently, producing numerous studies questioning the location’s long-term safety. They also point out that waste must be shipped by road and rail across the country to Yucca Mountain, endangering communities in 44 states along the way. They argue that politics is pushing the decision, that Nevada’s small population and few representatives in Congress are more important to decisionmakers than an honest appraisal of the site.   On February 15, 2002, President Bush accepted the recommendation of Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham and officially named Yucca Mountain as the long-term waste storage site, which triggered a formal licensing phase. When Nevada Governor Kenny Guinn (R) submitted his veto on April 9th it triggered a 90-day deadline for Congress to override the veto.   Proponents of Yucca Mountain have long had a strong majority in the House of Representatives, and the full House quickly voted to override Nevada’s veto of the project. In July, despite the opposition of both Nevada senators and the influence of Majority Whip Harry Reid, the resolution went to the Senate floor. The key debate and vote was on the motion to proceed to the resolution, normally a parliamentary formality. When the motion to proceed passed 60-39, opponents knew they had lost and did not call for a recorded vote on the resolution itself, which passed by voice vote.   Nevada and other Yucca Mountain opponents are not out of options, but the hard-fought Congressional process appears ended. “Now the process moves to the federal courts, where the playing field is level and Nevada’s factual, scientific arguments will be heard by impartial judges,” said Governor Guinn.

On April 16th, the Arctic amendments came to the floor. The underlying amendment, offered by Senators Murkowski, Breaux (D-LA) and Stevens, paralleled the 2001 House bill (see the 2001 National Environmental Scorecard (pdf)) with minor changes. Senator Stevens also offered his amendment to fund steelworker pensions from the oil revenues.

Democratic leaders then filed cloture petitions, a procedure required to cut off debate and bring the amendments to a vote. Unless the senators voted to end debate, the threatened filibuster could go on indefinitely and there would be no vote on either of the amendments. The first cloture vote, on the Stevens steel amendment, was overwhelmingly against, with all senators opposed to developing the Coastal Plain voting against cloture and several conservatives, opposed to the steel bailout, joining them. Stevens withdrew his amendment and the cloture vote that followed on the Murkowski-Breaux-Stevens proposal to drill in the refuge also failed by a significant margin (Senate vote 1).

The Final Days of Debate
With most of the contentious issues resolved, a cloture petition for the energy bill passed easily, restricting remaining debate and amendments. Amendments on the environmental impacts of hydropower (Senate vote 15), the inclusion of municipal solid waste incineration as a renewable energy source (Senate vote 10), energy efficiency standards for air conditioners and heat pumps (Senate vote 7), and manufacturer liability for the public health and environmental impacts of renewable fuels (Senate vote 11) consumed little floor time but further weakened the energy bill. On April 25, after seven weeks of debate and thirty-six roll calls, the Energy Policy Act of 2002 was approved 88-11.

The Senate bill has since remained mired in conference with the House, whose 2001 bill diverges widely from the Senate’s. Signing an energy bill continues to be a top priority for the President. However, as the House and Senate recessed for the November elections, the negotiations remained stalled.

Enron and Campaign Finance
In early spring, a growing number of corporate scandals, beginning with the collapse of Enron, brought new life to the debate over the financing of political campaigns and political parties. Congressional investigations of Enron’s financial scandals also exposed its history of political influence built on massive “soft money” campaign contributions to both political parties. Legislation banning soft money (see the 2001 National Environmental Scorecard (pdf)), stalled previously in the House, was taken up and passed in February. In late March, Majority Leader Daschle temporarily set the energy bill aside to pass the final Shays-Meehan-McCain-Feingold bill. The President signed the bill in March; it will take effect after the November 2002 elections.

Administration Priorities and the Congressional Agenda
With split party control of the Congress and no filibuster-proof majority in the Senate, even anti-environment priorities pushed by the administration ended in stalemate this year. A Department of Defense push to gain new “national security” exemptions from key environmental and public health laws, while partially successful in the House (House vote 3), was rejected by the Senate. Conference negotiations over the Defense bill were not yet complete at press time. The Bush administration’s push to exempt some types of information concerning environmental and public health hazards from public disclosure laws such as the Freedom of Information Act as part of its efforts to establish the Department of Homeland Security succeeded in the House (House vote 7). The Senate’s bill took a more measured approach to the disclosure issue but had not yet passed at press time.

Exceptions to this stalemate included the long fought issue of nuclear waste disposal (see box). After years of stalemate, President Bush designated Yucca Mountain, Nevada as the long-term storage site for radioactive waste from the nation’s nuclear energy plants. When the governor of Nevada vetoed the site, a congressional process was triggered leading to a significant environmental setback when both houses passed resolutions to override the veto (House vote 6; Senate vote 12).

The administration also continued its push for “Fast Track” authority to negotiate trade agreements. An attempt by Senator John Kerry (D-MA) to amend the Fast Track bill to better protect U.S. environmental laws from trade challenges by foreign investors failed to pass, and the Senate passed its bill in May 2002. After a relatively brief conference, the bill passed the House in July (House vote 8) by a narrow margin, and the Senate in early August (Senate vote 16).

An Appropriations Standoff
Both the House and Senate began to move appropriations bills for the 2003 fiscal year on schedule in late spring. However, due to the inability of the House and Senate to come to agreement on a budget, the process quickly reached an impasse over funding priorities that escalated as the end of fiscal year 2002 approached in September. In a change from recent years, when priority environmental issues, such as the standard for arsenic in drinking water, were debated through votes on appropriations bills, this year saw few such floor fights. The exception was House consideration of the bill to fund the Department of Interior, which included debates over drilling off of the California coast (House vote 4) and farming leases in Oregon wildlife refuges (House vote 5). As the elections approached, only two of the 13 appropriations bills had passed both houses. The House and Senate passed continuing resolutions at 2002 funding levels to keep the government running while they returned home to campaign.

Outlook
2002 was a year of unfinished business. In the weeks leading up to the elections, the impasse between House and Senate deepened. The Senate’s Democratic leadership continued to push for changes to the Homeland Security legislation, for higher funding levels for key federal programs, and for its energy bill over that passed by the Republican-led House. Following a month of little legislative progress, both houses passed resolutions in mid-October to fund the government through the elections and made plans to return for a lame duck session—and to continue working towards final resolution of their many unresolved issues.