    
 
Two events
occurred in January that will heavily influence world efforts to
come to grips with global climate change. On January 20, George Bush
was inaugurated as president of the United States. Two days later,
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) released
Climate Change 2001: The Scientific Basis. The IPCC report — the
third in a series that started in 1990 — paints a sobering picture
of a world already seeing the first impacts of a changing climate.
It predicts that unless greenhouse-gas emissions are greatly
reduced, the average global temperature will rise from 2.5 to 10.4
degrees Fahrenheit (1.4° to 5.8°C) over the next century. The top of
this range is as much warming as has occurred since the end of the
last ice age.
Despite the
IPCC's dramatic findings, President Bush on March 13 cited the
"incomplete state of scientific knowledge of the causes of, and
solutions to, global climate change" as one of the reasons for
reversing his campaign pledge to set mandatory limits on power plant
emissions of carbon dioxide, the main heat-trapping gas. In the same
statement, he said "I oppose the Kyoto Protocol because it exempts
80 percent of the world, including major population centers such as
China and India, from compliance and would cause serious harm to the
US economy."
Since taking
office, President Bush has given priority to domestic energy policy,
hoping to take advantage of the California electricity crisis and
the spike in natural gas prices to open the Arctic National Wildlife
Refuge to oil and gas drilling, among other things. Neither the
president nor the head of his energy policy task force, Vice
President Dick Cheney, seem to recognize that energy policy is
climate policy. The administration's energy proposals could well end
up increasing US emissions of carbon dioxide.
Despite his
concerns about Kyoto, the president is under significant pressure
not to abandon the international negotiating process. Our European
allies view global warming as a key geopolitical issue. If the
administration adopts a "just say no" stance, that could have
serious implications for other US priorities, such as national
missile defense and continued trade liberalization. In addition,
many US business leaders want to preserve the flexibility elements
the United States won in the Kyoto treaty. Among these are emissions
trading, credits for forest and agricultural activities that absorb
carbon dioxide, and investment in emissions reductions in developing
countries as an alternative to action at home. These provisions
might not be agreed to again if the United States attempts to
jettison Kyoto and start the whole negotiating process over again.
Finally, opinion research shows that public awareness of global
warming continues to grow, along with a desire for US leadership on
the issue.
Next Steps on Kyoto
The
administration faces some choices before this summer's climate
negotiations. It could stick with the president's current position
that developing countries must take on binding targets before the
United States does anything. This would challenge the principle in
the 1992 Rio climate treaty (which the president's father
negotiated and
the Senate ratified) that given the "common but differentiated
responsibilities and respective capabilities" of industrialized and
developing countries, the industrialized countries "should take the
lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof."
It would create a deadlock in the negotiations, increasing the
chances that Europe, Japan, and other countries would decide to
implement the Kyoto treaty without the United States. Should enough
countries ratify the treaty for it to enter into force,
multinational companies that would prefer unified international
regulations could put pressure on the United States to
join.
Or the Bush
negotiators could start where the Clinton team left off in the
Hague. They might, for example, seek a few more concessions from the
Europeans in return for improved prospects for Senate ratification
of a treaty submitted by a Republican president. If the concessions
do not undermine the treaty's environmental integrity, this is the
most favorable outcome that could be expected.
A more cynical
strategy would be for the Bush team to propose concessions they know
the Europeans and other countries won't (and shouldn't) accept, with
the intent not of reaching a deal, but of shifting blame for the
breakdown in the negotiations. A variant of this scenario would be
for the United States to appear to engage in negotiations, but only
to run out the clock. The trick would be to put off agreement
without so angering the Europeans and others that they decide to go
ahead without us.
Mixed Signals Here at Home
The Bush
administration's likely approach to domestic global warming policy
is more evident. Since energy is a front-burner issue, the
administration is likely to put forward a comprehensive energy bill
in May. It will probably contain many of the elements as legislation
introduced by Senate Energy Committee Chair Frank Murkowski (R-AK)
on February 26, which the White House termed "a good
start."
The Murkowski
bill is an energy industry wish list, increasing already massive
federal subsidies to the coal, oil, gas, and nuclear industries;
weakening Clean Air Act standards for coal-fired power plants; and
opening sensitive public lands to oil and gas drilling. The bill
also contains provisions to encourage energy efficiency and
renewable energy, but these are far less aggressive in scope. For
example, it does not mention increasing fuel economy standards for
cars and light trucks, which is the real key to reducing oil
consumption.
While the
details of the president's FY 2002 budget proposals had not been
released at the time this article was written, they are likely to
include substantial cuts in the Department of Energy's research and
development programs for renewable energy and energy efficiency.
Given the track record of these programs in commercializing
technologies that have already saved consumers billions of dollars
while reducing pollution, this would be a penny-wise, pound-foolish
approach.
On the other
hand, the Bush administration is likely to support tax incentives
for renewable energy, energy efficiency, and advanced vehicle
technologies. Although important, these will have a fairly modest
impact on greenhouse gas emissions.
During the
campaign, President Bush endorsed mandatory limits on power plant
emissions of carbon dioxide as part of a "four-pollutant approach"
that would also limit mercury emissions and tighten standards for
sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides. But as noted above, just two
months after taking office, he reversed himself and dropped carbon
dioxide from the list.
Bipartisan
bills have been introduced in the House and Senate to regulate all
four pollutants, and pressure for action will continue to build,
including from many electric utilities seeking long-term regulatory
certainty. The president's new found opposition makes the prospects
for such legislation tougher in the short term.
It's likely to
be several months before the administration's real strategy on
global warming becomes clear. But the early signs are not promising.
Working with our allies in the environmental, business, and
religious communities, UCS will continue to push for completion of
Kyoto Protocol rules this year and for meaningful domestic action,
particularly to reduce emissions from power plants and
cars.
Alden Meyer
is UCS's director of government relations.
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