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Copyright 2001 Federal News Service, Inc.  
Federal News Service

May 3, 2001, Thursday

SECTION: PREPARED TESTIMONY

LENGTH: 5707 words

HEADLINE: PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOEL DARMSTADTER RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE
 
BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY
 
SUBJECT - THE ROLE OF RENEWABLE RESOURCES IN U.S. ELECTRICITY GENERATION EXPERIENCE AND PROSPECTS

BODY:
The use of fossil energy is by far the largest source of human-induced CO2 emissions in the United States and worldwide. This fact has stimulated interest in the development and deployment of lower- emitting renewable energy resources, or "renewables" (see Box 1). The United States has been developing and advancing renewable energy technologies for more than 20 years to ease problems--actual and anticipated--that arise from the use of fossil fuels. Nevertheless, the penetration of renewables remains minuscule, and many technological, economic, and regulatory uncertainties still persist in U.S. renewable energy markets.

In this paper, I focus on nonhydro renewable energy resources for generating electric power. Unless otherwise indicated, by renewables I refer to wind, photovoltaic and thermal solar, biomass, and geothermal sources. A broader definition would also include agricultural residues, municipal and industrial wastes, and other combustible materials. As customarily used, the term "renewables"--which implies the possibility of replenishment of what is taken from the relevant resource stock--is more convenient than precise. Thus, geothermal resources are, strictly speaking, exhaustible because a given site may lose useful heat after a number of years of extraction.

I consider three aspects of renewables. First, I concentrate on the use of renewables in electricity generation, where an expanded role for renewables probably has greatest promise for CO2 displacement over the medium term. Second, I largely consider developments in the United States, whose experience with and potential for renewables use in the electric power sector parallel the situation in numerous other industrial economies. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, my discussion is conditioned by the view that the role and prospects of renewable energy can be sensibly assessed only within an economic setting that considers a range of competing energy technologies and sources, both renewable and conventional. An electron is an electron, whether produced by a wind turbine or coal-based steam generator. What matter most are three issues: actual and expected market realities (that is, cost and price), the extent to which the market captures or masks imperfections brought on by environmental externalities and other distortions, and the role of public policy in promoting socially beneficial outcomes.

**********

Box 1 -- CO2 Emissions from Renewable Energy Sources

Subject to three provisos, one can intuitively, and for the most part legitimately, view CO2 emissions from the use of renewable energy as inconsequential. First, it takes energy to produce energy-using capital stock--a coal-burning power plant or a photoelectric array. This aspect is unlikely to alter the balance of advantage of renewables over conventional energy from a CO2 standpoint, but it needs to be recognized.

Second, the production of renewable energy inputs itself may involve fossil fuel emissions. For example, carbon emissions associated with a possible "hydrogen economy"--such as the use of hydrogen as the basis of automotive fuel cells - would be negligible only to the extent that fossil fuels play little role in the production of hydrogen. It would not be the case if fossil-based electricity were used in the electrolytic extraction of hydrogen from seawater.

The third and probably most important proviso has to do with the use of biomass as an energy source. Combustion of biomass, largely in the form of wood and wood wastes, has accounted for a bit more than 3% of total U.S. energy consumption in recent years. Such combustion releases CO2 at a rate (carbon release relative to the heat content of the fuel) that is even greater--by around 15%--than that of coal. To the extent that such release is matched by new and equal biomass growth, then biomass fuel use is an effective CO2-mitigating option. As long as statistical treatment is internally consistent, it might not make much difference whether CO2 emissions from biomass combustion are shown as nil on the assumption of being netted out by equal photosynthetic uptake or whether the estimated releases are part of (gross) nationwide emissions, with the assumed or estimated uptake separately shown as a component of total sequestered CO2. The least satisfactory--and unnecessarily confusing--way of handling the matter is that provided by the IPCC's Working Group II (see Data Sources). In one table, the use of biomass in a power plant is illustrated by indicating zero emissions (Table 19-2); elsewhere, an emission factor for wood is given as approximately 28 metric tons of carbon/1 billion Btu (Box B-2). I prefer the second of the two measurement options, particularly given increasing interest in present and prospective interrelationships among deforestation, afforestation, reforestation, and productive use of biomass combustion worldwide. These interrelationships are especially important to consider in a context of potential competition between biomass products (crops and forest products) and fuels markets. But for now, on the assumption of reabsorption and no net change in the overall carbon budget, the statistical practice by the Energy Information Administration is to treat U.S. CO2 emissions biomass fuels as 0 (rather than, for example, adding their 75 million tons to total U.S. CO2 emissions of approximately 1,500 million tons in 1996 to reflect gross emissions from combustion of all fuels).

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A Word on Renewable Energy Worldwide

Although my principal focus is on the United States, it may be helpful to put things into a global perspective. (Quantitative observations are based on references listed under Data Sources at the end of the paper.) In terms of energy consumption in the aggregate (not only resources going into electric power generation), the 7% of the worldwide total accounted for by renewables in 1995 was of some significance; it was almost identical to the nuclear energy share. In poorer regions of the world, the percentage was markedly higher. In Africa, for example, renewables (dominated by wood and other biomass) contributed 37% of total energy. But far from reflecting a productive and sustainable role for renewables in the contemporary and prospective energy scene, such numbers in fact signify something quite different in desperately poor parts of the world: the need to gather energy, through foraging and other means (contributing to a loss of soil fertility in the process), to meet the most basic survival requirements of cooking and heating. The statistics constitute an artifice in a related respect, one which gives an altogether distorted picture of renewable energy use in the African example. As a metric, the British thermal units (Btus) contained in a lump of coal may be comparable to the Btus contained in a cubic meter of firewood. But because the latter is typically burned with incomparably worse efficiency, its effective importance recedes greatly. In the electric power sector, the focus of my discussion, statistics are probably somewhat more meaningful, because the mere fact of renewables serving as an input into power generation implies a more sophisticated technological application than, say, their use in open fireplaces in rural households.

In any case, it turns out that only about 1% of worldwide electric generation is based on nonhydro renewable resources. Around 80% of such generation occurs in North America and Western Europe. In developing economies, whose share is essentially nil, the use of renewables for electricity production seems to be limited to a few opportune circumstances, such as the exploitation of bagasse (agricultural waste) as a boiler fuel on sugar plantations. Probably for that reason, renewables account for approximately 3% of Brazil's electric generation. For now, therefore, the rational exploitation of renewable energy poses entirely different challenges for developing and developed countries.

The Prevailing Role of Renewables in U.S. Electricity Generation

Table 1 provides a broad perspective on how renewables fit into the present fuel and power picture in the United States. It is immediately apparent that the magnitude of renewable energy is negligible on the national level. Few nonhydro renewables figure in electric power generation. And outside the electric power sector, the balance of renewables use is concentrated in industrial biomass utilization--much of it undoubtedly in the form of wastes in wood processing and in pulp and paper mills. Nor is this picture likely to change appreciably over the next several decades, at least if the analysis of the U.S. Department of Energy's Energy Information Administration is to be believed. Specifically, conventional hydro power generation is projected to decline a bit (at a rate of 0.3%/year), whereas all other renewables in the aggregate are projected to grow by around 2% per year--a very small rate of increase, considering the low absolute values from which growth proceeds.

Table 1. Role of Renewable Resources in U.S. Energy Consumption and Production, 1997.

Electric generation (quads) 4.35 Conventional hydro 3.60 Geothermal 0.43 Municipal solid waste 0.23 Biomass 0.04 Solar (thermal and PV), wind 0.05 Nonelectric consuming sectors (quads) 2.57 Residential wood 0.60 Industrial biomass 1.84/a Industrial hydro 0.03 Ethanol in transportation 0.10 Total renewable resources (quads) 6.92/b Share of U.S. energy production 9.5% Share of U.S. energy consumption 7.4% Nonhydro renewable resources (quads) 3.32 Share of U.S. energy production 4.5% Share of U.S. energy consumption 3.5% Share of electricity generation 2.2%

Note: 1 quad = 1 quadrillion (10/15) Btu. Source: U.S. DOE (Department of Energy). 1998. Annual Energy Outlook 1999. December. Washington, DC: U.S. DOE, Energy Information Administration, Tables A1, AI 8, and 8.14.

a About one-fifth of this figure can be attributed to on-site electric generation at wood-processing facilities.

b This figure excludes about 0.04 quads in nonmarket residential and commercial applications.

U.S. Policies toward Renewables

Over the past quarter of a century, several public policies have been introduced in support of renewable energy. Rather than providing an exhaustive account of these measures, I will mention and illustrate four principal ways in which the federal government has sought, or is seeking, to promote the development and use of renewables: various kinds of research and development (R&D) support, the role of the 1978 Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act, the use of other financial incentives, and the prospective role of a "renewable portfolio standard"

Although federal policies have dominated, states have presented some significant initiatives as well. A 1998 report from the Energy Information Administration (see Suggested Reading) provides additional information about renewables programs. In the discussion that follows, I will not try to assess--if, indeed, an approximate quantitative assessment is as yet possible--how these policies have shaped energy markets.

R&D Support

For various reasons--excessive risks, long time horizons, limits to capturing the returns from successful outcomes, nonmarketability of external benefits--industry is commonly believed to underinvest in basic science and technology. Therefore, a federal role to augment private efforts in advancing basic science and technology is widely accepted. In the case of renewable energy, that role largely involves R&D activities conducted at or supported by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and its national laboratories, principally, the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) in Colorado. The U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) reported in 1999 that for the 20-year period 1978-98, $10.3 billion (in current prices) was thus disbursed (see Suggested Reading). Solar photovoltaics were the leading beneficiaries of this program. Over the 20-year period, photovoltaics received about $2 billion and wind power $1 billion. During fiscal year 1999, the respective funding was $72 million and $35 million. In both cases, the GAO sees program objectives having gradually shifted away from fundamental research to enhanced market opportunities, both domestic and international. As just one example of a recent wind power initiative, DOE's Turbine Verification Program has provided for cost-sharing with utilities to facilitate the development and deployment of wind turbines.

In critical comments on the GAO analysis (included in the GAO report), DOE questioned GAO's characterization of a programmatic shift emphasizing market potentials. Whether GAO or DOE is more on the mark in this dispute, a chastening point does perhaps emerge. Programs whose start-up rationale puts major stress on precommercialization challenges--basic science, research, and early developmental barriers--may, subtly or not, slide over into terrain dominated by sales prospects. Perhaps unfortunately, the labels "research" and "development" are broad enough to allow such slippage.

PURPA

The federal Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) of 1978 was one major instrument that encouraged a shift away from conventional energy to renewables. Under this statute, utilities were mandated to purchase power from nonutility producers at prices that were supposed to represent the "avoided cost" that utilities would otherwise have had to pay to produce power using conventional resources such as petroleum. Because numerous beneficiaries of this policy lacked technical expertise in alternative energy production (renewables and certain other innovative categories) and because the calculation of avoided cost was frequently quixotic, PURPA is widely judged to have fallen far short of its objectives. Contracts for utility purchases under PURPA will soon begin to run out, but transactions in 1995 still occurred at prices which, for renewables as a whole, were 150% above the national average electric generation cost of around 3.5 cents/kWh (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. U.S. Electric Utility Average Price of Renewable Electric Power Purchased from Nonutility Facilities, by Energy Source, 1995. (Image not transmittable)

Note: Values are given in cents per kilowatt-hour. Source: U.S. DOE (Department of Energy). 1999. Renewable Energy: Issues and Trends 1998. March. Washington, DC: U.S. DOE, Energy Information Administration, Fig. 11.

Other Financial Assistance Overlapping with PURPA, and continuing to the present, the federal government has provided significant direct financial benefits to renewable energy producers. Both solar photovoltaics and wind power benefit from investment tax credits, and under the Tax Reform Act of 1986, wind power was accorded a depreciation life of 5 years--much shorter than the depreciation life of conventional power supply investments. One provision of the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (extended in 1999) provides an inflation-adjusted 1.5 cents/kWh production tax credit for wind power plants. By 1999, this credit had increased to 1.7 cents/kWh.

Renewable Portfolio Standard

In the context of the deregulated electricity market that is presently emerging in the United States, a policy position developed by the Clinton administration during 1999 embodies provisions for a so-called renewable portfolio standard (RPS). Its goal is to ensure that some minimum percentage of generation originate with nonhydro renewable energy sources, regardless of whether or not it is justified by private market forces. An RPS target for 2010 calls for 7.5% of electricity sales to be based on renewable energy resources. (Separately, bills introduced in Congress call for RPS shares ranging from 4% to 20%.) If the RPS is implemented as presently conceived, the means envisaged for meeting the 7.5% target represent a much more economically efficient route to stimulating renewables-based electricity than PURPA does. That is because RPS incorporates a tradable permit system that encourages renewable power production to take place in the most cost-effective location. In addition, it would impose a ceiling on the increment to overall electric power costs that result from the mandate.

By means of various subsidies as well as surcharges on electric bills to consumers who are willing to pay a premium to ensure the presence of"green" power in their electricity mix, several states have introduced renewable minima of their own. It is too early to judge the success of such efforts. One element of uncertainty is that even if these measures result in new investments in renewables generation, it is possible that existing facilities may be prematurely retired due to competitive pressures.

Why the Poor Showing for Renewables?

Despite the optimism regarding the emergence of renewables dating from the energymarket upheavals of the 1970s, and notwithstanding considerable policy support over the years, the reality, as noted, is sobering. It is evident from Table 1 that nearly 30 years later, renewable energy systems have not succeeded in emerging as a significant factor in the country's electricity infrastructure. Does this mean that renewable technologies have been such a great disappointment that continuing public policy support is misguided? To answer in the affirmative may be too casual a dismissal of an exceedingly complex matter. Evaluation of the available evidence indicates that renewable technologies have lived up to several significant expectations and public policy goals.

Several RFF colleagues and I recently analyzed what went right and what went wrong in the evolution of renewable energy inputs into U.S. electric power generation over the past quarter century (see the work of Burtraw and of McVeigh and others in Suggested Reading). We evaluated five technologies used to generate electricity: solar photovoltaics, solar thermal, geothermal, wind, and biomass. A principal aim of our study was to see how the actual performance of renewable energy technologies in the 1990s compared with specific goals of cost reduction and market expansion of earlier projections. Many groups (both analytically oriented and unabashedly proactive) that wrote in the 1970s and '80s had judged these goals to be attainable with the help of accommodating public policies.

In general, market penetration has been markedly lower than expected. However, the cost of renewable technologies has also been lower than projected--in several cases, significantly lower, even when compared with what seemed initially to be the optimistic forecasts of renewable energy advocates. Of course, with time, forecasts for the 1990s began to approach observed trends. Still, whereas 1980s wind power projections of generation costs a decade hence assumed roughly a 64% decline, to reach a level of 5.7 cents/kWh by 1995, costs actually declined by an estimated 67% to a level of approximately 5.2 cents/kWh. (Here and in the paragraphs that follow, costs are expressed in constant 1995 prices.) By contrast, although the volume of wind-generated electricity did show steadily rising absolute numbers in the course of the 1990s (from an almost zero level in the 1980s), it remained an inconsequential part of the nation's electricity system. Only at the end of the 1990s and in 2000 have we seen signs of some meaningful momentum in wind power capacity expansion.

One can argue about which of the two measures (market penetration or cost) has greater relevance in evaluating the performance of renewable energy resource programs. To the extent that public-sector support was particularly driven by the need for and pursuit of cost reductions, the cost outcome seemed to us particularly important. Indeed, the cost outcome seems quite remarkable, because renewable technologies have not attracted large-scale investment and production that can contribute to technological development or economies of scale in production, as many people anticipated when forming their cost projections. Evidently, the characteristics of several renewable energy systems--high capital intensity, uncertainty about interconnections with the electric grid, variability in availability (the intermittency of wind, sunlight, and biomass wastes)--that have frequently been viewed as major barriers to economic viability have not precluded significant reductions in the reported cost of producing power. The failure of renewables to emerge more prominently in the nation's energy portfolio is intimately linked to the concurrent decline in the cost of conventional generation. Consider that in 1984, the Energy Information Administration projected nationwide electric generation costs to rise from 6.1 cents/kWh in 1983 to 6.4 cents/kWh in 1995; in fact, they declined to 3.6 cents/kWh. That 41% decline, though less percentagewise than what was achieved by wind power, nonetheless preserved a sufficiently large margin of advantage--3.6 cents/kWh rs. 5.2 cents/kWh--for conventional over wind power as to foreclose more than a minute niche for the latter.

Several factors have contributed to keeping the cost of generation from conventional technologies low. They include developments in energy supply markets (notably, the emergence of a more competitive world oil market and productivity improvements in oil exploration and coal production); the successful deregulation of natural gas, oil pipelines, and railroads (the last a major factor in reducing the cost of coal shipping); technological progress in conventional generation itself (such as combined-cycle gas turbine systems); and the ongoing restructuring of the electricity industry. Although changes in the regulation, technology, and market structure of fossil fuels have thus been mostly beneficial for electricity consumers, they have hindered the development of technologies for renewable energy resources that have had to compete in this changing environment. Supporters of renewables have had to fix their sights on what has so far been a steadily receding target. As noted, nationwide electric generating costs of around 3.5 cents/kWh in the mid-1990s constituted a formidable target for even new renewables installations to meet, let alone for electricity based on renewable energy resources surviving from the distortions of the PURPA pricing regime. The inflated costs utilities found themselves having to pay as late as 1995 for such renewables-generated power are shown in Figure 1. All told, renewables have had to overcome something of a loser's image amid the favorable trends in conventional energy and electricity markets and the policy milieu that smoothed the path for those trends.

Is the persistence of the renewables-nonrenewables cost gap perhaps even understated when one considers the subsidies accorded the former? It is a fair question but not easily answered. Nonrenewables, after all, also receive a number of financial benefits. Nevertheless, a deeper probing of the extent to which certain tax and accounting benefits may distort cost comparisons between renewables-based and conventional generation would be a welcome contribution to the economic analysis of renewable energy.

Other countries have hardly fared much better than the United States in the extent of electricity market penetration by renewables (see IEA in Suggested Reading). A few heavily forested places (for example, Austria and the Nordic countries) have had some success exploiting fuelwood resources--aided, in some cases, by extremely favorable tax treatment and other subsidies. Denmark is developing a notable presence in wind energy. (It clearly helps when the wind resource and electricity load centers are close enough to each other to avoid costly transmission costs.) But, as in the United States, competition has not been kind to investment in renewables projects. And not surprisingly, competitive realities and policy dilemmas that face the United States are precisely those that arise when impediments to renewables are considered elsewhere.

Should Renewables Command a Premium Price?

Although the high avoided cost formulas under PURPA and some other financial inducements may have distorted the evolution of a more robust renewables sector, the notion that green power may deserve a price premium over conventional power rates is not thereby repudiated. Energy sources should trade in markets at prices that reflect both their private and social costs.

There is as well a fairly common view that energy produced by various renewable systems imposes fewer of these social (external) costs than fossil-fired facilities--keeping in mind, however, that the latter have by now been compelled to internalize to a significant degree the cost of pollution abatement. The question for public policy intended to level the playing field is by how much various fossil sources should be penalized for their remaining externalities. This could be achieved through regulatory surcharges on fossil fuel use or, far less efficiently, through enhanced subsidies for renewables in recognition of their more benign environmental impact.

Quantifying external damages is complicated and controversial; the fact that many environmental impacts vary by location and the distorting nature of tax rates are just two of many complications. Some estimates from a study conducted several years ago by researchers at RFF, along with specialists in the European Community and the U.S. Department of Energy, are instructive. (See the report by Krupnick and Burtraw in Suggested Reading). The purpose was to monetize environmental damage throughout the entire fuel cycle, from resource extraction to final use. Coal was found to impose greater social costs than biomass (the only renewable resource covered in the analysis). The difference was reckoned at about 7 mills/kWh (that is, 0.7 cents/kWh) in the study. However, more than 90% of the differential (about 6.4 mills/kWh) is attributable to imputed values--however crude---of the impact of increased global warming from fossil fuel use. This imputed value is on the order of $18/ton of carbon emitted to the atmosphere, well within the range of plausible values derived from existing assessments of global warming risks. Nonetheless, these kinds of calculations are controversial.

Even if one accepts the estimated externality figures just discussed, the implied superiority of biomass over coal from an environmental costing perspective is far below the cost differential between these two fuels that prevails under current market conditions, as discussed earlier. Even a government subsidy equal to twice that difference, such as the 1.5 cents/kWh tax credit to wind power, does not bring renewables appreciably within the competitive range of conventional energy systems.

Whether a 1.5 cents/kWh tax credit or any other subsidy to renewables is a defensible estimate of externalities brought about by conventional energy systems should not blind us to the inherent defects of second-best ways of righting environmental wrongs. A system that held fossil fuel combustion fully accountable for its externalities would be more efficient in avoiding a proliferation of subsidies (hidden and explicit) and thus a waste of resources. It would also stem the political temptation to magnify externalities as a means of supporting one's favorite alternate energy system (see Box 2).

Concluding Comments

All projections are conditional and inherently uncertain. One of the less uncertain ones, however, is that--in support of economic growth, particularly in developing parts of the world-the demand for electricity will increase substantially for many years to come. Several references included under Data Sources at the end of the paper show a continued worldwide rate of increase ranging between 2% and 3% annually for much of the first half of the new century. (See, for example, the cited studies by the Electric Power Research Institute, International Energy Agency, and U.S. DOE International Energy Outlook.)

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Box 2 - The Ethanol Charade

Although my primary focus in this chapter is the role of renewable energy resources in electricity production, it is worth noting how a rationale for promotion and financial support of renewables-- reminiscent of support for other energy resources in earlier times--an bring about an uneasy blend of policies and politics. A good example in the United States is a federal motor fuels sales tax exemption for producers of grain-based ethanol that works out to approximately $16 per barrel of oil equivalent. (The ethanol is designed to be blended with motor gasoline to produce "gasohol," the use of which is believed warranted seasonally in certain polluted areas.) No one who has observed this ultra-generous support program unfold and endure over the years has any illusions about its nature as anything but a political girl to grain processors and the U.S. agricultural constituency. I mention this as a reminder that noble sentiments on promoting clean energy may mask motives that are neither clean nor economically justified by any stretch of the imagination.

President Bill Clinton's Executive Order of August 12, 1999, created a cabinet-level body charged with supporting a greatly expanded effort to promote biofuels. In official remarks made then, the President stated, "I am setting a goal of tripling America's use of bioenergy and biobased products by 2010. That would generate as much as $20 billion a year in new income for farmers and rural communities while reducing greenhouse gas emissions by as much as 100 million tons a year--the equivalent of taking more than 70 million cars off the road." The initiative may reflect a genuine determination to pursue a sound and sustained research and development and demonstration program in renewable energy. But it is too early to say whether, once again, it is farm policy---or politics--masquerading as energy policy. **********

Whatever else it may portend, this increase should be somewhat encouraging news for renewables: a growing electricity market, facilitation of scale economies, and movement up the learning curve are necessary if insufficient conditions for greater penetration of renewables. Depending on the extent of policies implemented to limit fossil fuel use out of concern over climate change and the possibility of rising costs of petroleum (a source of anxiety in some quarters), the attractiveness and viability of renewables may be strengthened.

But progress on the part of more traditional energy systems is sure to parallel further development of renewables, and there is no reason to expect that dynamic state of affairs to flag in the future. (On this point, see the views of Bradley under Suggested Reading.) Thus, for example, even as the size and technology of wind turbines improve and their costs decline, other systems aren't standing still. Efficient combined-cycle gas turbines seem rapidly to be becoming the configuration of choice in new utility plants. Fuel cells, other distributed systems of power supply, the emergence of advanced (and publicly acceptable) nuclear technology (even if presently unlikely), and across-the-board realizable improvements in energy efficiency are all possibilities to be reckoned with. Each could be a prospective competitor to power systems based on renewable energy sources.

What emerges from these final thoughts is an argument for retaining a reasonably wide range of options in our electricity and energy portfolio. The role of government is not only to help overcome market failures but also to ensure some degree of efficacy in its programmatic agenda, including injection of the broad public interest in its supportive activities. Policies should be sought that are more economically efficient and less politically influenced than the system of outright renewable subsidies that has prevailed in recent years. The nature of those policies is still being debated. For example, the introduction of an RPS into the nation's electricity mix would be more cost-effective than current and previous policies, but it would still be a forcing measure that may only loosely reflect the externality benefits of avoided fossil energy.

Prudently targeted programs in long-term R&D represent an important complementary strategy. Defending its proposed 6-year (constant dollar) doubling of federal R&D support for renewable energy, the 1997 PCAST study (see Suggested Reading) indicated that such an increase makes sense in light of the rapid rate of cost reduction achieved in recent years for a number of renewable energy technologies, the good prospects for further gains, and the substantial positive contributions these technologies could make to improving environmental quality, reducing the risk of climate change, controlling oil-import growth, and promoting sustainable economic development in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Opportunities exist for important advances in wind-electric systems, photovoltaics, solarthermal energy systems, biomass-energy technologies for fuel and electricity, geothermal energy, and a range of hydrogen-producing and hydrogen-using technologies including fuel cells ...

(T)he increased support for these renewable-energy technologies would focus on areas where the expected short-term returns to industry are insufficient to stimulate as much R&D as the public benefits warrant.

As of mid-2000, congressional deliberations pointed to a level of funding for renewable energy resources in fiscal year 2000-01 of around $440 million, nearly a 20% increase (in current dollars) over a year earlier. Whether consciously or fortuitously, the congressional path seems to embrace, and perhaps even leapfrog, the path recommended by PCAST. R&D funding levels apart, what deserves continued close attention is the extent to which environmental externalities and societal risks associated with energy production and use elude private-market transactions. Where they do, it would be surprising if the needed public sector initiatives seeking economically efficient correctives did not include a consequential role for renewables.

END

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