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Federal Document Clearing House
Congressional Testimony
September 20, 2001, Thursday
SECTION: CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY
LENGTH: 2171 words
COMMITTEE:
HOUSE ENERGY AND COMMERCE
SUBCOMMITTEE: ENERGY AND AIR QUALITY
HEADLINE: NATIONAL ELECTRICITY POLICY
TESTIMONY-BY: NORA MEAD-BROWNELL, COMMISSIONER
AFFILIATION: FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION
BODY: Prepared Witness Testimony The Committee on
Energy and Commerce W.J. "Billy" Tauzin, Chairman
National Electricity
Policy: Federal Government Perspectives
Subcommittee on Energy and Air
Quality
September 20, 2001
Nora Mead-Brownell Commissioner
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Summary of Testimony
The
nation's energy policy is at a critical juncture. One necessary step in
transforming electricity markets is the development of Regional Transmission
Organizations (RTOs). Large, independent RTOs can improve grid reliability,
create better pricing mechanisms, improve efficiency, and attract investment in
infrastructure. Moreover, the development of large RTOs can enhance the security
of the electric grid.
We also need to develop uniform business rules for
all interstate transmission facilities, including the facilities owned and/or
operated by municipals, cooperatives, the TVA, and the federal power market
administrations. We must revise the way in which transmission facilities are
sited, giving the Commission siting authority over interstate transmission
comparable to the interstate natural gas pipeline siting authority in Section 7
of the Natural Gas Act. Finally, the Commission must have an expanded market
monitoring and an effective enforcement program. As part of a continuous process
of review and evaluation, I also believe that some consideration should be given
to the need for periodic operational audits of our energy providers and the
organizational structures to assess, among other things, reliability, safety,
security and communication protocols.
Testimony
Mr. Chairman and
Members of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for the opportunity to share my
thoughts on the direction that our nation's electric restructuring policy should
take. Over the past 10 days, I, like most Americans, have reassessed what is
important in life, as an individual, an American, and a public servant. One
thing that is obviously important is that we carefully consider the security of
the nation's electric grid. I am eager to work with you and my colleagues to
take every appropriate step to ensure that our energy infrastructure remains
free from hideous acts of sabotage like those we witnessed last week.
Our energy production and delivery systems are among the best in the
world and their safety and security are vital to our continued economic growth
and development. We are proud of our energy industry's planning, communication
and response in this crisis. Three days after the attacks on the World Trade
Towers and the Pentagon, the Commission issued a Statement of Policy that
provides the energy industry with regulatory assurance on energy infrastructure
reliability and security matters. Specifically, the Commission has assured cost
recovery for prudently incurred expenditures that electric, gas and oil
companies incur to adopt new procedures, update existing procedures and install
facilities to upgrade the safety of their electric power transmission grid and
gas and oil systems. I believe that our action is a good, responsive measure. It
reassures the industry to undertake what is necessary and prudent. The
Commission will continue to encourage jurisdictional entities to be proactive
when it comes to securing the nation's electric grid.
I also believe
that the time is ripe for participants in the energy industry (including
government) to review their response plans. The energy industry has evolved and
is much more complex. As part of a continuous process of review and evaluation
of crisis management and response, I think some consideration should be given to
the need for periodic operational audits of our energy providers and the
organizational structures which manage them to assess, among other things,
reliability, safety, security and communication protocols.
While we must
take steps to protect the security of our nation's energy infrastructure, we
must also get on with the other business of planning for the future, so that the
forces of terror are not allowed a greater toll than they have already taken
from this country. This nation's energy policy is at a critical juncture. Fear
of change must not deter us from finishing the job of transforming an outdated,
inefficient electricity industry into the economically competitive,
technologically vibrant marketplace that American consumers deserve.
One
necessary step in transforming electricity markets is the development of
Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs). Large, independent RTOs can improve
grid reliability by facilitating transmission planning across a multi-state
region, create better pricing mechanisms such as eliminating "pancaking",
improve efficiency through better congestion management, and attract investment
in infrastructure by facilitating regional consensus on the need for
construction. Moreover, the development of large RTOs can enhance the security
of the electrical grid.
Every crisis management expert that I have ever
consulted identifies a number of essential ingredients for a successful response
to a crisis:
Accurate, timely communication
standardized and
predictable protocols and response mechanisms
contingency planning
back-up and redundancy features and
the ability to identify and
isolate vulnerabilities all serve as core features of crisis management.
Critical to the execution of any management plan is that all affected
players know the plan, forward and back. It should be second nature; often there
is no time to consult the play book. I believe that a large, fully functioning
RTO is positioned to be a critical link in crisis management and ensuring
reliability.
With large RTOs there will be a centralized chain of
command and standardized processes. We also expect that RTOs would tend to have
modern, forward looking control systems that generally exceed the capabilities
of smaller systems. As a result, inefficiencies of non-standardized protocols
and operation of the grid are reduced. There are no surprises. Emergency
situations are better addressed from this efficiency of response. An RTO has the
ability to ascertain and communicate system status and response plans more
quickly than 20 or so control area operators. This is, I believe, what every
crisis manager looks for. To this end, I believe that large RTOs are in a
position to be flexible to accommodate security needs (a single control area
operator may not be required).
In addition, the RTO may serve as a
central point for information. Accurate, timely information is critical to the
assessment of the situation. Concerns that the Commission's goals of transparent
market information and our OASIS system reveal too much information are
misplaced. Information posted on OASIS does not include operating data, status
of generation, or operational characteristics of transmission lines. Much of the
information we seek to make publicly available is information necessary for the
growth of markets; and is not sensitive information regarding energy management
systems.
In sum, RTOs play an important role in assuring reliability.
Congress should affirm FERC's authority to require the formation of RTOs and it
should do so now.
In addition to the formation of RTOs, we must take
other steps if we are to transform the electricity industry. The Public Utility
Holding Company Act (PUHCA) was necessary to address abuses that existed a
half-century ago. However, that statute has not only outlived its usefulness, it
is actually thwarting needed development of our electricity resources by
subjecting registered utility holding companies to heavy-handed regulation of
ordinary business activities and to outdated requirements that they operate
"integrated" and contiguous systems. One of PUHCA's perverse effects is that it
causes foreign companies to buy here and U.S. companies to invest overseas. For
a myriad of reasons, PUHCA should be repealed.
The Public Utility
Regulatory Policies Act (
PURPA) also needs repeal.
PURPA was enacted out of concern over dependence on oil for
electric generation. Now, 22 years later, a gas-fired generator can be on-line
in less than two years, and many advances are being made in distributed
generation. Therefore,
PURPA's subsidies for certain types of
generation are no longer appropriate and more importantly stifle the nation's
economy.
I also believe that changes in tax laws must be considered to
allow companies to effectively restructure and transform themselves and to
attract new investment.
We also need to develop uniform business rules.
Where rules are standardized, there is less room for manipulation. I believe
that all interstate transmission facilities should be under one set of open
access rules, including the facilities owned and/or operated by municipals,
cooperatives, the Tennessee Valley Authority, and the federal power market
administrations and regardless of whether they are used for unbundled wholesale,
unbundled retail, or bundled retail transactions. I also believe that we should
develop standardized generation interconnection policies. Having all
transmission under one set of rules will ensure a properly functioning and
transparent transmission grid. It will reduce transaction costs, improve
efficiency, and allow for competition. GISB successfully accomplished this goal
in the gas industry and is poised to do so in the electric industry.
Furthermore, we must revise the way in which transmission facilities are
sited. State-by-state siting of such transmission superhighways is an
anachronism that impedes transmission investment and slows transmission
construction. An RTO, or regional structure, with significant input of the
states, should be the first stop for siting approval. However, at some point, it
may be necessary for the Commission to make the final determination. Therefore,
I suggest that the Commission act as a backstop and be given siting authority
over interstate transmission comparable to the interstate natural gas pipeline
siting authority in Section 7 of the Natural Gas Act.
Finally, the
Commission must have an expanded role in monitoring for, and mitigating, market
power abuse. The Commission must hire, train, and re-train personnel skilled in
market monitoring and market power mitigation or buy expertise on a short-term
basis, as needed. We must seek out experts to assist us in our new role. We must
also act swiftly and with certainty to respond to market abuses. Markets are
fragile and prolonged problems will destroy the market and the confidence of
consumers. Therefore, I believe strengthening the Commission's market monitoring
and enforcement capabilities must be a top priority. As markets change, market
monitoring and enforcement capabilities become an even more critical piece of
the regulatory puzzle. Effective market monitoring also includes modeling for
the future, so we can more effectively anticipate where investment in
infrastructure is needed.
Let me offer a few suggestions that may help
the Commission develop an effective market monitoring and enforcement program.
There are many different players in the energy markets, many that have not
traditionally been subject to our jurisdiction. A significant amount of relevant
information about the operation of markets is in the possession of these
entities. At times, there has been a reluctance to cooperate and provide the
necessary information. It may be appropriate to clarify that the Commission has
the authority to seek the information necessary to perform its statutory
responsibilities from either jurisdictional or non- jurisdictional sources. With
regard to the Commission's enforcement capability, the enabling statutes of the
Securities and Exchange Commission and the Federal Communications Commission
provide for a range of enforcement measures, such as civil penalties. I believe
that providing the Commission with similar authority would send a powerful
message to electricity market participants that we take violations of the
Federal Power Act just as seriously.
The list of tasks for you in
Congress and for us at the Commission is long but it is critical that we move
forward. The cost to our country grows each day. Lack of investment in
infrastructure (new transmission investment represents an average growth rate of
less than one-half of one percent per year over the next decade), delays in the
development and introduction of new technologies, uncertainty in and lack of
confidence from capital markets impacts companies' values and thwarts
transition. We need clarity and resolution. At the Commission we are working on
a business plan - - a blue print for the future. Our plan sets forth an
aggressive set of actions to resolve the uncertainties of the marketplace. We
are committed to delivering to America's consumers the promise of an efficient,
reliable, innovative energy future.
I hope that this information is
useful to you. If I can be of further assistance, please do not hesitate to
contact me.
LOAD-DATE: September 21, 2001