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Congressional Testimony
September 20, 2001, Thursday
SECTION: CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY
LENGTH: 2962 words
COMMITTEE:
HOUSE ENERGY AND COMMERCE
SUBCOMMITTEE: ENERGY AND AIR QUALITY
HEADLINE: NATIONAL ELECTRICITY POLICY
BILL-NO:
H.R. 1941 Retrieve Bill Tracking Report
Retrieve Full Text of Bill
TESTIMONY-BY:
LINDA K. BREATHITT, COMMISSIONER
AFFILIATION: FEDERAL
ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION
BODY: Prepared Witness
Testimony The Committee on Energy and Commerce W.J. "Billy" Tauzin, Chairman
National Electricity Policy: Federal Government Perspectives
Subcommittee on Energy and Air Quality
September 20, 2001
Linda K. Breathitt Commissioner Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Summary of Testimony
Much of FERC's emphasis in the near future
will be to complete the development of Regional Transmission Organizations
(RTOs) with clear responsibilities, independence, and sufficient scope. Any
departure from the voluntary approach to RTO formation the Commission undertook
in Order No. 2000 should be preceded by a formal notice and comment rulemaking
in order to give state commissions and other parties the opportunity to
participate more fully.
I believe the current voluntary reliability
system, which has been in place for over three decades, should be replaced with
one in which a self-regulated reliability organization, with oversight by the
Commission, enforces mandatory reliability standards. I also believe that
interconnection rules should be clarified to ensure that new sources of
generation are able to interconnect to the transmission system, and that we
carefully consider the associated costs. I support the repeal of the PUHCA,
conditioned upon the grant of enhanced authority to the Commission to address
market power problems, and assurance that both FERC and the states would have
greater access to the books and records of holding companies. I also support
repeal of the mandatory purchase requirements in Section 210 of the
PURPA, subject to new provisions that would remove
disincentives for renewable generation sources.
I fear that the goal of
a national grid may be unattainable absent legislation granting FERC a role in
transmission siting. I recommend that FERC be granted Federal eminent domain
authority over interstate lines in order to centralize planning, expansion, and
siting decisions.
FERC could improve its oversight capabilities with
clear authority to collect and publish transactional data, while protecting
proprietary information. I also recommend expansion of FERC's authority to
remedy violations of law.
Finally, in light of the tragic events of
September 11, 2001, the Commission has issued a Policy Statement to assure the
industry that we favor the recovery of costs associated with new procedures and
facilities to safeguard the electric transmission grid and gas and oil
pipelines. Under FERC's dam safety oversight authority, each jurisdictional
hydroelectric facility has in place an emergency action plan.
Testimony
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I appreciate this
opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission's (FERC) role in developing competitive wholesale power markets and
its role in ensuring the continuing development of our Nation's electric power
industry. As requested by the Subcommittee, my testimony addresses the following
issues: (1) significant changes in the electric power industry; (2) the Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 (PUHCA) and the Public Utility Regulatory
Policies Act of 1978 (
PURPA); (3) the status of Regional
Transmission Organization (RTO) formation; (4) FERC's role in the siting of
electric transmission facilities;
(5) FERC's role in overseeing
wholesale electricity markets; (6) FERC's refund authority; and (7) measures
undertaken to protect the integrity of the Nation's electric power
infrastructure. Where appropriate, my testimony includes comments on legislation
that I believe is needed to assist FERC in continuing the development of
competitive wholesale markets.
In 1996, with the issuance of Order Nos.
888 and 889, FERC established the foundation for competitive wholesale power
markets in the United States. With these rules, FERC ordered all
transmission-owning public utilities to file nondiscriminatory open-access
tariffs, thereby opening up interstate transmission. FERC's goal was to ensure
that customers have the benefits of competitively priced generation.
With the issuance of Order No. 2000 in December 1999, FERC continued its
effort to create open and fair competitive markets. Order No. 2000 focused on
the formation of Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs). The Commission
found that RTOs may eliminate undue discrimination in transmission services that
can occur when the operation of the transmission system remains in the control
of vertically-integrated utilities. The Commission also found that RTOs can
improve grid reliability, improve market performance, and facilitate
lighter-handed regulation. Much of FERC's emphasis in the near future will be to
complete the development of RTOs with clear responsibilities, independence, and
sufficient scope.
Since the Commission began promoting RTOs as a means
to remove barriers and impediments present in wholesale electricity markets, I
have been fully committed to the goal of RTO implementation. When the Commission
deliberated over how to attain the objective of RTO formation, we decided to
adopt an open collaborative process that relied on voluntary regional
participation. In a series of orders issued on July 12, 2001, the Commission
dramatically departed from the voluntary approach we pursued in Order No. 2000
by directing the formation of four specific RTOs for the United States,
excluding Texas.
I dissented on this aspect of the July 12 orders. My
concern was that this decision on RTO formation departed from the basic
philosophies embodied in Order No. 2000, and that any such action should be
preceded by a formal notice-and-comment rulemaking. This path would allow the
Commission to make a reasoned decision informed by the views of all interested
parties - most importantly, state commissions.
Apart from the departure
from the voluntary nature of Order No. 2000, I have further concerns with July
12 orders' determinations regarding RTO scope and timing. I certainly favor the
development of large RTOs reflecting natural markets. I am not, however,
convinced that four RTOs would meet the noble goals of Order No. 2000 any better
than six or seven -- or even eight -- RTOs of sufficient size. In addition, I
believe that the Commission's July 12 decisions demonstrate little regard for
the status and timing of RTO formation efforts in various regions of the
country. The process of merging markets as RTOs are formed is revealing itself
to be a highly technical and complex endeavor. It is my view that the Commission
should recognize this in developing realistic expectations.
I also felt
it necessary at the time to comment on the majority's assertion that forming
larger RTOs will result in lower wholesale prices, and do so now. This is a
laudable goal, and as such, I embrace it. However, the promise of lower
wholesale electricity prices is one that I, as a federal official, am not
willing to make to consumers at this time. Competitive markets should produce
lower prices; but we have not yet reached that level of market development.
Consequently, I have urged my colleagues to be more circumspect in promising
lower prices. Consumers and ratepayers of electricity are going through a trying
time at present. We need to be honest and up front as to the benefits and, yes,
sometimes the struggles, of moving toward competition.
Of utmost
importance in the development of competitive energy markets is reliability. I
believe that the voluntary reliability system, which has been in place for over
three decades, should be replaced with one in which a self-regulated independent
reliability organization, with oversight by the Commission, establishes and
enforces mandatory reliability standards. I would support legislation which
authorizes a system for assuring the reliability of the electric grid that: (1)
is mandatory, (2) requires sanctions and penalties for failure to comply with
reliability rules, and (3) is subject to federal oversight. In my view, such a
change in the manner in which the reliability of the interconnected grid is
overseen and managed is required in order to ensure a competitive bulk power
market. I would wholeheartedly support the establishment of a self-regulated
independent reliability organization, with oversight by the Commission.
I believe that interconnection rules should be clarified in order to
ensure that new sources of generation are able to interconnect to the
transmission system. FERC has stated its intent to evaluate in the near future
the importance of standardizing interconnection policies and procedures in a
generic proceeding. I fully support such standardization. A related issue is who
should bear the costs of new interconnections and upgrades. These pricing
decisions need to be made carefully and with consideration of the multiple
factors at issue. Any changes in cost responsibility for interconnections should
be accomplished through a formal rulemaking, where all affected parties have an
opportunity to express their views.
There has been significant
discussion among industry participants concerning the conditional repeal of both
PUHCA and the mandatory purchase requirements of
PURPA. If
PUHCA is repealed, I urge that such repeal be conditioned upon the grant of
enhanced authority to the Commission to address market power problems, and
assurance that both the Commission and the states would have greater access to
the books and records of holding companies. I also support repeal of the
mandatory purchase requirement in Section 210 of
PURPA, subject
to new provisions that would remove disincentives for renewable generation
sources.
Another issue that arises in the context of FERC's goal to
encourage competition in wholesale electric markets is the Commission's role in
the siting of transmission facilities. I fear that the goal of a national grid
may be unattainable absent a new approach to transmission planning, expansion,
and siting. Currently, under the Federal Power Act, the Commission has no role
in the permitting and siting of new transmission facilities. I believe that
shortages of transmission are no longer just single state issues; instead, these
shortages have become interstate commerce issues that must be addressed by the
federal government.
There have been proposals to use federal eminent
domain as a backstop to a cooperative, regionally-based approach to transmission
and siting issues. In essence, FERC would be granted eminent domain authority,
which we, in turn, would be allowed to cede to regional regulatory compacts. My
primary concern with this approach is that it could result in costly and
inefficient duplication of processes, records, and efforts by the various
decisional authorities involved in transmission siting. As we have seen with the
Commission's hydropower licensing program, for example, it is very difficult to
build speed into a process over which several entities exercise jurisdiction.
While the Commission has made great progress in streamlining cumbersome
processes in this regard, I would caution the Subcommittee about initiating a
new regime for transmission siting that could easily be mired in bureaucratic
wrangling.
My recommendation would be for FERC to be granted federal
eminent domain authority similar to the authority the Commission exercises with
respect to the siting of interstate natural gas pipelines under the Natural Gas
Act. The Commission could build into its implementation of such legislation
procedures to ensure cooperation by the states and regional input. I believe
this more centralized approach is necessary from an efficiency standpoint, and
will result in less bureaucracy and more timely decisions for transmission
providers and consumers. Furthermore, I am not advocating that the Commission
should have siting authority for electric distribution lines or power plants. I
believe state governments are best positioned to make those determinations.
I also have a concern that there is not sufficient investment in
transmission facilities. In my opinion, the transmission system is not keeping
pace with the growing demand in the bulk power market. The difficulty associated
with siting is one reason for this. Others are that the industry is increasingly
unwilling to make transmission-related investments given the uncertainties that
exist in an industry still in the midst of restructuring, as well as the risk of
earning inadequate returns on new transmission investments. The Commission must
do its part to ensure that its transmission pricing policies incorporate an
allowance for reasonable returns on investments. Independent transmission
companies as well as merchant transmission companies need certainty to develop
their plans.
In order to provide effective oversight of wholesale
electricity markets, FERC is preparing itself to operate in today's fast- paced
commercial environment. A critical element of market oversight is the
availability of market information is a usable format. There is clearly a
relationship between strong market transparency rules and effective regulation.
I strongly believe that transparency acts as an effective deterrent to market
power by allowing regulators and the public to monitor the marketplace for
abuses. The lack of accurate, timely, and easily accessed pricing information
can impede competition and liquidity; and for that reason, I have supported many
FERC initiatives aimed at expanding the range of publicly available
transactional information. With a view toward legislative action, I recommend
that FERC and the Energy Information Administration be granted clear authority
to collect and publish appropriate transactional data, while protecting
proprietary information. These goals are not inconsistent with one another.
The Subcommittee has asked for comment on the authority of the
Commission to remedy violations of law. I believe that it would be helpful for
the Commission to have some additional authority to prevent the exercise of
market power. In my comments to H.R. 1941, "The Electric Refund Fairness Act of
2001," I indicated my support for legislation that would expand the refund
authority set forth in section 206(b) of the Federal Power Act. I did, however,
emphasize that, in addition to the objective of protecting consumers, I believe
it is important for regulators to seek to minimize uncertainty of energy
transactions. For example, I would not advocate granting the Commission
authority to reopen and order refunds on past transactions. That said, I would
welcome legislation amending the FPA to allow the Commission to order refunds as
of the date formal notice of a complaint is issued. All interested persons would
be on notice that transactions are the subject of complaint or investigation,
and that rates may change and refunds may be ordered as a result. Customers
would have the added protection of an earlier refund effective date. I would
also advocate lengthening the refund effective period beyond the current fifteen
months; I have suggested twenty months after the refund effective date would be
appropriate. Both goals of protection and certainty would be met under this
framework.
In addition, I believe an amendment to the FPA to give the
Commission authority to assess penalties, in addition to refunds and interest,
could act as a powerful deterrent against the abuse of market power. However, I
believe that, in the interest of certainty, a statutory upper limit to any such
penalties should be included. Further, I would suggest that any limits on new
penalty authority should be high enough to be effective and withstand the
passage of time.
Finally, in light of the tragic events of September 11,
2001, the Subcommittee has asked for comment on the security of the Nation's
energy infrastructures. FERC's role in the security of the energy transportation
and supply infrastructure is very limited. However, the Commission's dam safety
program extends to every jurisdictional hydroelectric facility, and each has in
place an emergency action plan. In the event of emergency, these plans trigger
procedures designed to minimize the impact of a breach on downstream property
and homeowners. While jurisdictional pipelines and transmission owners are
subject to certain reporting requirements, FERC does not have the authority to
prescribe or monitor pipeline and electric transmission security. However, our
staff is in contact with pipeline and transmission companies, many of which are
operating under heightened security procedures.
The Commission's
regulatory purview is largely economic; and in this regard, we recognize that
the entities under FERC's jurisdiction may incur extraordinary expenses as a
result of the terrorist attacks that have taken place. In particular, electric,
gas, and oil companies have begun to adopt new procedures and install new
facilities to further safeguard the electric power transmission grid and gas and
oil pipeline systems. The costs of such additional security measures remain
unclear. In order to reduce the uncertainty about company's ability to recover
expenses, the Commission issued a Statement of Policy on September 14, 2001, to
assure the industry that our policy favors recovery of such costs.
In
closing, I emphasize that comprehensive federal electric legislation is needed
to address important and unresolved issues in the restructuring of the electric
industry. The Commission must have sufficient authority to advance its goals of
achieving fair, open and competitive bulk power markets. Current impediments to
the development of such markets must be removed as quickly as possible so that
the intended benefits of restructuring for the American consumer ultimately may
be realized.
LOAD-DATE: September 21, 2001