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Federal Document Clearing House
Congressional Testimony
December 12, 2001, Wednesday
SECTION: CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY
LENGTH: 6115 words
COMMITTEE:
HOUSE ENERGY AND COMMERCE
SUBCOMMITTEE: ENERGY AND AIR QUALITY
HEADLINE: ELECTRICITY TRANSMISSION
TESTIMONY-BY: PAT WOOD, III, CHAIRMAN
AFFILIATION: FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION
BODY: The Honorable Patrick Wood Chairman Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission
Summary of Testimony
The electric
utility industry continues to move toward the goal endorsed in the 1992 Energy
Policy Act of a competitive wholesale electricity market. However, the
uncertainty of the lengthy transition is harming infrastructure investment and
reliability and raising Americans' electricity bills unnecessarily. It is time
to finish the job.
Successful completion of the transition requires a
balancing of short-term and long-term considerations. In the short-term, we must
ensure that the transmission grid is operated more efficiently and fairly, and
is expanded when appropriate. Regional transmission organizations (RTOs) are the
key here, and the Commission is aggressively encouraging formation of large,
well-structured RTOs. To help, Congress should allow the Commission to require
RTOs where it finds RTOs to be in the public interest. We also must eliminate
unnecessary barriers and delays to the entry of new generation. The Commission
is working to standardize procedures and agreements for interconnecting new
generation, to help new players and technologies get on-line faster.
We
must facilitate the development of more market-based demand reduction programs.
FERC and the state commissions have taken steps to foster such programs, and
must work together to elicit the full potential of demand reduction
efficiencies.
And we must take steps to ensure that the type of market
problems experienced in California do not recur there or elsewhere. The
Commission is working with industry participants to design balanced, effective
market rules that treat all market players fairly and provide clarity and
certainty across all wholesale electric markets. Next year we will begin a
generic proceeding to identify the best tools for identifying generation market
power and, in the meantime, we have already improved our analytical method for
determining whether a generator may have market power.
Taking these
steps will give investors the certainty they need to make long-term commitments
to new electrical infrastructure, ultimately allowing us to achieve the kind of
competitive wholesale markets envisioned by the 1992 Energy Policy Act. And the
infrastructure choices will be dictated by the market, not by government.
While the Commission is moving ahead aggressively, additional
legislation will help us achieve Congress' goal of effective wholesale
competition faster. Thus, I support the Commission- related provisions of
Chairman Barton's proposed legislation, but with certain modifications discussed
below.
Testimony
I. Introduction
Mr. Chairman and
Members of the Subcommittee:
Good afternoon. Thank you for the
opportunity to speak today on the Chairman's proposed legislation, H.R. 3406, to
restructure the electric utility industry to full, effective wholesale
competition. This industry has changed substantially in the years since Congress
enacted the Energy Policy Act of 1992, moving closer to the Congressional goal
of a competitive wholesale electricity market. However, the transition is not
complete. Infrastructure investment suffers from the uncertainty of this long
transition. Reliability is being tested and customers are being deprived of the
financial savings and other benefits of a competitive marketplace. It is time to
finish the job.
Today, I will describe briefly the significant actions
taken by the Commission in recent months to do just that, and the efforts
planned by the Commission in the future. I will identify those areas in which
legislation could facilitate the Commission's efforts. Finally, I will discuss
other significant aspects of the Chairman's proposed legislation and suggest
certain modifications to the legislation.
My key point today is that
successful completion of the industry's transition requires a balancing of
short-term and long- term considerations. In the short term, we must take steps
to ensure that the transmission grid is operated more efficiently and fairly,
and is expanded when appropriate. We must eliminate unnecessary barriers to
entry of new generation, big or small. We must facilitate the development of
more market-based demand reduction programs. And we must take steps to ensure
that the type of market problems experienced in California do not recur there or
elsewhere by establishing clear, fair, balanced market rules. Taking these steps
in the short term will give investors the certainty they need to make long-term
commitments to new electrical infrastructure. Over the long term, this
commitment to sound infrastructure and sound market rules ultimately will allow
us to achieve the kind of competitive wholesale markets envisioned by the Energy
Policy Act - with choices dictated by the market, not by government.
Some argue that the short-term steps envisioned by the Commission will
chill infrastructure investments, not encourage them. I disagree. People will
not invest in generation where they believe transmission owners will operate the
grid unfairly, delay interconnections of new generation or fail to expand the
grid as needed. Similarly, markets characterized by a pattern of extreme price
turmoil and the risk of further governmental restrictions will not provide the
certainty needed by investors. The short- term steps described below will
encourage the future stability of the markets, reduce or eliminate the risk of
crisis-driven governmental interventions and, thus, give investors the
confidence to commit billions of dollars to building the infrastructure our
nation needs.
II. Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs)
Electric power markets are regional in nature. For that reason, the
Commission has been promoting the formation and development of a small number of
RTOs. These institutions, once formed, will assure reliable minute-by-minute
grid operations, optimize fair use of the "electric highway" by all users, plan
for the future transmission needs of the region and help long-term supply stay
ahead of long-term demand.
Two years ago, the Commission decided to move
forward with RTO formation on a voluntary basis. Although that has been a more
tortuous path than originally intended, it is drawing to a close with utilities
in all regions of the country coalescing around organizations of appropriate
scope, governance and configuration. But if any party challenges this progress
in courts, then Congress should make clear its intent that these organizations
are its preference. This will save the industry years in the courts, ensure
customers get the billions of dollars of savings that a competitive power market
can deliver during that time, and most importantly, rebuild to secure and
reliable levels a bedrock industry that has suffered inadequate investment in
the past decade.
Recently, the Commission clarified its policies and
plans on RTOs. In an order issued last month, the Commission indicated that it
intends to complete the RTO effort on two parallel tracks. The first track will
be to resolve issues on scope and governance in pending cases; the second track
will be a rulemaking to standardize the market design for public utilities, to
be implemented by RTOs. The Commission has also begun forming state-federal
regional panels as a structured forum for constructive dialogue with state
commissions on RTO development. We hope to expand these panels in the future to
discuss other joint concerns. The Commission is updating cost-benefit studies on
RTOs (with input on the analysis from a diverse panel of state commissioners)
and will establish in future orders the timelines for continuing RTO progress in
each region. We expect to address the RTO structure in the large Midwestern
region of the country at our December meeting.
In establishing the
characteristics and functions of RTOs and the procedures for obtaining
Commission approval of an RTO, the Commission relies on sections 205 and 206 of
the Federal Power Act. These sections are the Commission's fundamental authority
for ensuring that the rates, terms and conditions of transmission in interstate
commerce by public utilities are just, reasonable and not unduly discriminatory
or preferential. In addition, the Commission has relied on its authority under
section 203 of the Federal Power Act to review proposed transfers of operational
control over jurisdictional transmission facilities. While some may question the
Commission's as-yet-unexercised authority to require the formation of RTOs,
there is no legitimate debate about the Commission's authority to oversee
voluntarily-formed RTOs.
I strongly support the formation of RTOs. RTOs
will provide significant benefits to electric utility customers across our
Nation. I believe the best legislative approach at this time would be for
Congress to adopt a provision permitting the Commission to require RTOs where it
finds such RTOs to be in the public interest. This simple step would avoid
problems that could arise if Congress codifies extensive and cumbersome
procedures for formation of RTOs and detailed standards for those RTOs; it also
would allow the Commission to adapt the RTO procedures and standards
appropriately over time, as circumstances change.
Section 202 of the
Chairman's proposed legislation would codify more prescriptive procedures.
Section 202 would require all "transmitting utilities" (a term that includes
both investor- owned utilities and public power/electric power cooperative
utilities) to participate in an RTO. A utility not in a Commission-approved RTO
upon enactment of the bill must submit an application to form or join an RTO. If
the Commission finds the application does not meet the standards specified in
the bill, the Commission, in consultation with affected State authorities, must
propose modifications. The Commission cannot mandate formation of, or
participation in, an RTO except under these provisions. If an applicant asks,
the Commission must hold an evidentiary hearing on the proposed modifications.
Subsequently, the utility has a right to seek appellate review, during which
time the Commission's order is stayed. If the court finds the Commission's
decision is supported by a preponderance of the evidence, the court must uphold
the Commission's decision. Otherwise, the Commission must order the utility to
participate in its proposed RTO without modification.
If Congress
decides to proceed with the more elaborate process laid out in Section 202, I
have specific concerns about aspects of the provision. First, I do not support
giving a single RTO applicant the unilateral right to require an "evidentiary"
(trial- type) hearing instead of "paper" hearings. While evidentiary hearings
may be appropriate in certain cases, most cases can be fairly resolved much more
quickly based on paper submissions and non-trial type procedures. Further,
because the provision requires a "stay" of a Commission RTO order pending court
review, and a Commission order likely would address one application filed on
behalf of all the participants in the region, this provision could allow a
single applicant to stall the creation of an RTO and an effective wholesale
market for many years, raising costs for other applicants and all regional
electricity consumers. Formation of workable wholesale markets will be more
likely and swift without these provisions.
Second, I do not support the
requirement for a "preponderance" of the evidence instead of "substantial"
evidence supporting the Commission's decisions. The "substantial evidence" test
has been the basis for court review under the Federal Power Act since 1935, and
I see no reason why a different standard is now needed for this one category of
cases.
Third, I see no reason for the provision resembling "baseball-
type" arbitration, under which the Commission either must prevail in court or
accept without modification the utility's proposal. Judicial review of
Commission decisions sometimes yields a remand to the Commission for a fuller
explanation or more fact-finding, and I see no reason to preclude that option
here. In general, having RTO formation dependent upon only transmission-owning
applicants, rather than all wholesale market players, leads to a less balanced
and robust marketplace. A successful wholesale market model must have strong
stakeholder participation and oversight at its core.
Section 202 also
specifies the standards for RTOs. These standards are drawn partly from the
Commission's Order No. 2000. While it might be appropriate to codify some
general standards (such as the basic independence requirement), other standards
and the details of implemention are not appropriate to legislate. As market
circumstances and structures change, and as the Commission gains experience with
market behavior, the Commission needs the flexibility to adapt its rules over
time to ensure that markets remain robust and customers' interests are
safeguarded; a rigid, legislative codification of standards could preclude this
flexibility.
If Congress does codify such standards, certain elements of
section 202's standards raise other concerns. For example, the bill requires a
proposed RTO to have "sufficient generation within the RTO's boundaries to serve
the load within such boundaries." While I agree that this is desirable,
exceptions may be appropriate in certain circumstances, and section 202 should
allow exceptions deemed appropriate by the Commission.
The bill allows
each public utility in an RTO to file "original or amended rates concerning
transmission service on such utility's facilities." This is contrary to the
Commission's requirement in Order No. 2000 that the RTO have the exclusive right
to make rate filings related to the rates, terms and conditions of transmission
services it provides to transmission customers in the region. While the
Commission found that transmission owners have the right to file to recover from
the RTO their own revenue requirements, it also found that it would be contrary
to the basic RTO independence requirement if transmission owners could control
the RTO's rate filings.
I note that section 3 of the bill would define a
"market participant" as "any entity that generates, sells, or aggregates
electric power (other than State-ordered transition or default service) that is
transmitted on the transmission system operated by a regional transmission
organization." As above, I do not believe Congress should legislate a definition
of "market participant," since such a definition may need to be changed over
time as we gain experience with market behavior and new types of market
institutions and activities (for instance, it excludes energy service companies
that could aggregate demand and "negawatts" and offer price-responsive demand
opportunities in wholesale and retail electric markets). Further, with respect
to the specific definition in section 3, I disagree with the provision on
State-ordered transition or default service. This provision appears to assume
that, unlike other market participants, utilities providing such services are
economically indifferent to the grid's operation because their profits or growth
potential will not depend on the cost of their power supplies. Depending on the
terms under which they provide this service, however, utilities may have the
same economic incentive as other market participants to benefit from grid
operations that provide them preferential access to low cost supplies.
If Congress does legislate a definition, a better approach to defining
"market participant" is the definition adopted by the Commission in Order No.
2000, which includes:
(i) Any entity that, either directly or through an
affiliate, sells or brokers electric energy, or provides ancillary services to
the Regional Transmission Organization, unless the Commission finds that the
entity does not have economic or commercial interests that would be
significantly affected by the Regional Transmission Organization's actions or
decisions; and
(ii) Any other entity that the Commission finds has
economic or commercial interests that would be significantly affected by the
Regional Transmission Organization's actions or decisions.
18 CFR 35.34
(b)(2) (2001). This approach is more flexible than the bill's assumption that
providers of State-ordered transition or default service always lack economic or
commercial interests that would be significantly affected by the RTO's actions
or decisions.
Finally, three other provisions raise concerns. First, the
legislation would require the Commission to accept a cost/benefit analysis
submitted by an applicant to support its proposed scope and configuration,
unless the Commission finds the scope and configuration does not meet the
statutory requirements by a preponderance of the evidence. Cost-benefit analyses
are easily susceptible to manipulation of assumptions and data to achieve a
desired result, so any analysis should be tested and verified rather than
automatically accepted. Second, the standard for the Commission's findings
should be "substantial evidence," not a preponderance. Third, the legislation
would preclude the Commission from requiring any change to the governance or
scope of an RTO finally approved without condition before the law's enactment.
This provision would prevent the Commission from responding to changed
circumstances warranting modifications in the RTO's governance or scope.
III. Interconnections
The current lack of standardized
interconnection agreements and procedures means that every new generator can be
forced to expend time and money negotiating the terms and conditions of an
interconnection arrangement, before it can have any certainty about its ability
to deliver power to the grid. This uncertainty is a significant barrier to entry
for new generation.
To remedy this problem, on October 25, 2001, the
Commission issued an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANOPR) requesting
comments on a standardized generator interconnection agreement and procedures.
The ANOPR strongly encouraged interested parties to pursue consensus on the
issues and presented a model that was used successfully in Texas as a strawman
to facilitate the process. Parties must file this Friday a document describing
the consensus views and any remaining disagreements; any additional comments are
due by December 21, 2001. I understand that industry is reaching consensus on
many issues in the ANOPR process but that they may request a brief extension of
time to complete their negotiations. I assure you that I will be receptive to a
brief extension if it is evident that progress is being achieved toward a
consensual resolution of these issues.
The Commission expects to use the
outcome of the ANOPR as the starting point for a rulemaking to standardize
interconnection protocols. This rulemaking will clarify and simplify the
procedures for interconnecting new generation, thus promoting competition and
benefiting customers.
The Commission has held that interconnection is a
component of transmission service. Thus, the Commission's authority to
standardize interconnection protocols derives from sections 205 and 206 of the
Federal Power Act, under which the Commission oversees the rates, terms and
conditions of jurisdictional transmission service.
Section 101 of the
Chairman's proposed legislation establishes requirements for interconnections
with distribution or transmission facilities. Section 101 addresses the
generator's right to interconnect and its duty to pay interconnection costs, the
availability of backup power and the rates, terms and conditions for such power.
The Commission is required to promulgate the technical standards for
interconnections. The Commission is also required to establish the process and
procedures for interconnection with transmission facilities. A transmitting
utility or regional transmission organization is exempted from the
Commission-established process and procedures upon showing that "substantially
comparable interconnection procedures and agreements have previously been filed
with and approved by the Commission for interconnection with that entity." But
this exemption provision would nullify the benefits of standardization by
forcing the Commission and utilities to litigate over which "substantially
comparable" non-standard provisions are acceptable and exempt from the standard,
and keep non-standard agreements in place for years.
As stated above,
standardization of rules and procedures for interconnecting all new generation
and expansions of existing generation is a good policy, both for traditional
power plants and for small-scale distributed generation. This is a high priority
goal for the Commission. Standardization will help minimize the costs and
barriers to entry for new and expanded generation, which is critical to a robust
competitive marketplace and the realization of lower electricity costs for end
users.
As written, Section 101 may be overly prescriptive and impede the
Commission's ability to adapt its approach as the industry changes over time. A
more general approach may be preferable. If the current approach is retained, I
suggest another change in Section 101, pertaining to the right to backup power
for generators interconnecting with distribution facilities unless the local
distribution utility allows open access to its facilities. In this context, open
access is defined as access "that is not unduly discriminatory or preferential."
However, the Commission found in establishing wholesale open access to public
utilities' transmission facilities that the lack of a published tariff of rates,
terms and conditions was a significant obstacle to service. The Commission
required public utilities to provide open access transmission service by tariff.
Accordingly, I believe a local distribution utility must offer open access
service by tariff before it can be relieved of its duty to provide backup power.
IV. Test for Generation Market Power
Since beginning to grant
market-based rates (rate deregulation) to public utilities in the 1980s, the
Commission primarily focused on the applicant and employed a "hub-and-spoke"
analysis to determine whether an individual entity and its affiliates have
generation market power. In a hub-and-spoke analysis the applicant computes its
market share of generation in a particular market. While the Commission did not
use a "bright line" test, it looked to a benchmark for generation market power
of whether a seller had a market share of 20 percent or less in each market.
In public deliberations shortly after I joined the Commission this
summer, which were informed in part by our experiences in California, my
colleagues and I questioned the usefulness of the hub-and-spoke test as a tool
to identify the potential for the exercise of harmful market power. After
reviewing the issue over the summer, the Commission instructed our staff at an
Open Meeting on September 26th to refine the hub-and-spoke test on an interim
basis for future applications and for current certificate holders' three-year
updates, while contemplating a rulemaking to address the issue on a more
permanent basis.
The revised test, the Supply Margin Assessment (SMA),
improves upon the hub-and-spoke in two critical ways. First, unlike the
hub-and-spoke, the SMA excludes from the analysis of the relevant market those
sellers who are physically precluded from participating in that market by
transmission constraints. Second, instead of deriving an overall market share,
the SMA determines whether any part of a seller's capacity is "pivotal," i.e.,
must be used to meet the market's peak demand. For example, if peak demand in a
market is 100 megawatts, total capacity in the market (including the
applicant's) is 120 megawatts and the applicant owns 60 of the 120 megawatts,
the seller's capacity is pivotal because at least 40 megawatts of the seller's
capacity is needed to meet peak demand. By contrast, a seller with only 15
megawatts would not be pivotal because peak demand in the market could be met
fully by other suppliers.
A company that fails the SMA screen is subject
to mitigation to ensure that the company does not exercise market power by
withholding its capacity from the market. Under this mitigation, the company
must offer for sale, a day in advance, any short-term capacity which is not
already committed for sale or use by the company. The price for any such sales
is based on a "split-the- savings" approach which divides the economic benefits
of the transaction equally between the seller and buyer. This test is
administratively preferable to the more intensive cost-of-service based
calculation traditionally used, for example, to set retail rates in regulated
states. The company must also post offers to sell long-term energy products (in
addition to the daily products noted above).
This mitigation is
carefully tailored to apply only to the extent necessary. For example,
mitigation applies only in the specific market where the utility has market
power, and the utility (and its affiliates) are still allowed to sell at
market-based rates in any areas where they do not possess market power. The
mitigation applies only to capacity that is not committed a day in advance
("spot" sales), and does not affect a utility's authorization to sell its
capacity under long-term contracts. Finally, the SMA does not apply to sales in
an RTO or an Independent System Operator (ISO) with Commission-approved market
monitoring and mitigation.
The Commission soon will initiate a generic
proceeding to consider long-term changes to its analysis for generation market
power. In the meantime, the SMA and its carefully-crafted mitigation are a
substantial improvement on the prior approach, while continuing to allow sellers
to compete freely in markets where they lack generation market power. I would
note that the interim SMA market power screen is subject to rehearing, and the
Commission will consider carefully any requests for rehearing.
Apart
from these efforts, the Commission recently proposed a new condition on its
authorization of market-based rates for electricity producers. Under this
proposal, a seller would be subject to refunds or other appropriate remedies if
it engages in anti-competitive behavior or exercises market power. This
condition would be triggered only when the seller engages in inappropriate
conduct, not when market problems are caused by poor market rules or other
generic dysfunctions. The Commission adopted a similar condition to help address
the market problems in California and the Western United States, and is now
proposing to extend the condition to public utilities elsewhere. The Commission
is receiving public comments on this proposal and will fully consider the
comments before making a final decision.
V. Reliability
Section
301 of the Chairman's proposed legislation provides for Commission certification
of an electric reliability organization (ERO) to develop and enforce reliability
standards applicable to all users, owners and operators of the bulk power
system. The bill specifies the criteria for the ERO. The ERO would be required
to file its proposed reliability standards with the Commission, and the
Commission would need to act on those proposals within specified time periods.
The ERO and the Commission would have to rebuttably presume that a proposal from
a regional entity for a reliability standard applicable on an
interconnection-wide basis is just, reasonable, not unduly discriminatory or
preferential and in the public interest. The ERO would have authority to enforce
its standards, subject to Commission review.
Section 301's approach to
reliability is a step in the right direction. Although I have not seen problems
with the current voluntary process, parties inform me that federal legislation
is needed to ensure the enforceability of the reliability standards. While some
technical clarifications or modifications to the proposed language might be
useful, as a general matter section 301 takes a reasonable and efficient
approach to this problem.
VI. Transmission Jurisdiction
A. Open
Access
"Separate but equal" transmission is inherently unequal.
Transmission of electric power is interstate commerce and should be fairly
recognized as such. And all users of transmission service should be treated
equally, provided they pay for it. One need look no further than Chairman
Barton's home state to observe the positive impact that having clear rules from
a single regulator has had on needed investment and expansion of the grid.
Section 201 of the Chairman's proposed legislation would allow the
Commission to require all public utilities and transmitting utilities to offer
open access transmission services. In recent years, open access transmission
services by public utilities have increased competition in wholesale power
markets significantly. Extending this requirement to the large portion of the
grid owned or operated by transmitting utilities that are not public utilities
will further increase competition. I believe this can be done in a manner that
respects the historic independence of certain public power utilities while
ensuring that a consistent approach is applied to all users of the interstate
grid, to further wholesale electric competition and benefit all electricity
customers.
I support Section 201 but suggest minor changes. First, for
reasons explained above, section 201 should be clarified to provide that the
Commission can require open access transmission services by tariff, and can
require such tariffs to be on file with the Commission so that potential
transmission customers have available for public inspection, in a centralized
place (the Commission), all open access services being offered and the rates,
terms and conditions of such services.
Second, section 201 would require
the Commission to ensure that the rates charged for open access services by a
transmitting utility other than a public utility are comparable to the rates the
utility charges itself. The Commission would be given authority to review and
remand the rates for revision where necessary, but would not have the authority
to modify the rates directly. The Commission could be given the authority to
modify the rates where necessary, to prevent any delay in the establishment of
rates in compliance with section 201.
B. Stranded Costs
Section
201 also would require the Commission to authorize recovery of wholesale
stranded costs caused by a "municipalization," and specifies precisely how the
Commission should determine the "reasonable expectation period" for purposes of
calculating the stranded costs. I am concerned about the latter provision, and
believe that the calculation of stranded costs should be left to the
Commission's discretion based on all relevant circumstances in a particular
case. The Federal Power Act does not prescribe how to calculate stranded costs
except in requiring that rates must be just, reasonable and not unduly
discriminatory or preferential. This statutory approach should not be changed.
C. Transmission Siting
Section 402 would allow the Commission to
authorize construction or modification of transmission facilities if it makes
each of three findings: (1) the relevant State lacks authority to approve the
action, has withheld or delayed approval for more than a year or has conditioned
its approval such that the action is economically infeasible; (2) the facilities
being authorized will be used for transmission of electric energy in interstate
commerce; and (3) the action is consistent with the public interest, as proposed
or conditioned.
A FERC backstop such as this may well be the best
decision, but there are others that could work. Since these siting issues are
largely regional, the RTO could be the backstop instead of FERC. This keeps the
relevant determinations of need, environmental issues and landowner concerns
closer to the affected citizens. Or, it may be enough to simply require states
to make final decisions (pro or con) within a fixed time-frame. Some states
specifically require that a transmission line approval by that state be shown to
provide direct benefits to the citizens of that state. This sort of provision
may make it difficult for a state to approve routing of a line that has
significant regional benefits but not specific local benefits.
VII.
Other Issues
A. Investigations, Refunds and Penalties
Section
702 of the proposed bill expands section 206 of the Federal Power Act to allow
the Commission to order refunds not only by public utilities but also by other
entities that provide transmission service or power to a public utility. Section
703 expands the criminal penalties authorized under section 316 of the Federal
Power Act. Section 703 also broadens section 316A of the Federal Power Act so
that civil penalties are authorized for violations of any provision under Part
II of the Federal Power Act, instead of only sections 211, 212, 213 or 214.
These provisions are helpful changes to the Federal Power Act. The
recent problems in wholesale markets in California and the Western United States
demonstrated the need for such changes.
B. PUHCA
Sections
111-125 of the Chairman's proposed legislation repeal the Public Utility Holding
Company Act of 1935 (PUHCA) and replace it with increased access by the
Commission and state regulators to certain books and records. This is
appropriate. PUHCA was enacted primarily to undo harms caused by certain holding
company structures that no longer exist. In the 65 years since PUHCA was
enacted, utility regulation has increased substantially under the Federal Power
Act (including oversight of corporate restructurings such as electric utility
mergers, discussed below), federal securities laws and state laws, all of which
ensure that customers are fully protected.
C.
PURPA
Sections 131-134 of the Chairman's proposed legislation repeal
prospectively the mandatory purchase obligation in the Public Utility Regulatory
Policies Act of 1978 (
PURPA). As indicated in the bill's
proposed findings,
PURPA's "forced sale" requirement is no
longer necessary to promote competition, in light of the availability of open
access transmission, and more often serves to distort competitive outcomes.
Thus, I agree that Congress should repeal
PURPA but
"grandfather" existing
PURPA contracts. To provide a smoother
transition for parties which made investments under the expectations created by
PURPA, it may be appropriate to limit its repeal to those
states where all generation entities have the ability to sell their output to
the widest possible range of customers.
D. Mergers
Section 141
would repeal section 203 of the Federal Power Act, the authority under which the
Commission reviews proposed mergers and other dispositions of public utility
facilities. This provision may not be in the public interest. The Commission
deals with the electric utility industry on a daily basis and much more closely
than the federal antitrust agencies. Thus, the Commission is better able to
identify and remedy any harmful effects of mergers and other dispositions. Our
efforts do not duplicate those actually being performed today by other merger
reviewing agencies. The Commission has used its section 203 authority as
intended by Congress to ensure that mergers and other dispositions are
consistent with the public interest. Also, in recent years, the Commission has
acted quickly on merger applications, almost always within 90 days after
receiving public comments on a proposed merger.
In addition, it may be a
good idea to clarify the Commission's authority to review mergers involving only
generation facilities and mergers of holding companies with electric utility
subsidiaries. The increasing amount of competition in power generation markets
makes this more than an academic question. But, to be fair, there are other,
less blunt tools that the Commission has to address generation market power.
VIII. Conclusion
The electric utility industry has come far
since the enactment of the 1992 Energy Policy Act. The Commission is moving
ahead aggressively to achieve that legislation's vision of fully competitive
wholesale markets. Additional legislation will help us get there faster. I
support the Commission-related provisions of Chairman Barton's proposed
legislation, with the modifications described above. This legislation will help
all electric customers realize greater benefits from wholesale competition.
LOAD-DATE: December 13, 2001