Copyright 2002 eMediaMillWorks, Inc.
(f/k/a Federal
Document Clearing House, Inc.)
Federal Document Clearing House
Congressional Testimony
February 13, 2002 Wednesday
SECTION: CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY
LENGTH: 3764 words
COMMITTEE:
HOUSE ENERGY AND COMMERCE
SUBCOMMITTEE: ENERGY AND AIR QUALITY
HEADLINE: IMPACT ON EURON BANKRUPTCY ON ENERGY MARKETS
TESTIMONY-BY: MR. RICHARD C. GREEN, CHAIRMAN
AFFILIATION: UTILICORP UNITED INC.
BODY: February 13, 2002
Statement by Mr.
Richard C. Green Chairman UtiliCorp United Inc.
The Committee on Energy
and Commerce
Thank you, Chairman Barton, Representative Boucher, and
members of the Sub-Committee. I appreciate the opportunity to testify on behalf
of the Electric Power Supply Association (EPSA) this afternoon. EPSA is the
national trade association representing competitive power suppliers, including
independent power producers, merchant generators and power marketers. EPSA
members provide reliable, competitively priced electricity from environmentally
responsible facilities in U.S. and global power markets. EPSA recognizes that
competition has brought many benefits to our customers, and seeks to continue
the delivery of benefits to customers as competitive markets continue to
develop. Based in Kansas City, UtiliCorp United Inc. is an international energy
and services company with customers and operations across the U.S. and in
Canada, Europe, New Zealand, and Australia. Our Aquila, Inc. subsidiary is one
of the largest wholesalers of electricity and natural gas and providers of risk
management services in North America, the United Kingdom and continental Europe.
UtiliCorp also owns traditional investor-owned utilities in mostly non-urban
areas of Missouri, Kansas, Colorado, Nebraska, Iowa, Michigan and Minnesota as
well as utilities in Australia, New Zealand and Canada. At September 30, 2001,
UtiliCorp had combined total assets of $11.9 billion and 12-month revenues of
$42.3 billion. UtiliCorp plans to adopt "Aquila"as its corporate name later in
this first quarter to more accurately reflect our increasing focus on our
wholesale energy and risk management business.
My great-grandfather,
Lemuel Green, started the predecessor to our first regulated utility in 1908.
What started as a small family business has grown substantially due to UtiliCorp
being in the forefront of change in the competitive global energy market place.
I have served as the CEO of UtiliCorp from 1985 through 2001, and the Chairman
since 1989. I also serve on the U.S. Department of Energy's Electricity Advisory
Board.
The Enron bankruptcy has shaken the confidence of government,
investors, employees and the capital markets. The tragedy delivered to Enron
employees, and shareholders, and the communities they served is terrible.
The Enron bankruptcy has raised questions about how the wholesale market
physically works, the trading of energy, the security of pensions for employees,
and corporate ethics. It is imperative that we all work together to answer these
questions.
Our knowledge of the energy markets and the facts reported to
date indicate that Enron failed due to questionable non-core business
investments and inadequate reporting practices of financial information to
investors, shareholders, and employees that dramatically reduced investor
confidence. Enron did not fail because it was in the energy marketing business.
The underlying business practices of Enron would have created the same result if
their core business had been real estate development, software products, or
sporting goods.
Despite the shock of the Enron bankruptcy, the energy
markets did not panic. The energy market---in terms of delivering power and gas
to customers in a reliable and efficient manner has continued without
interruption. The market was stable and customers were served without
interruptions. Enron was a significant competitor to Aquila's wholesale energy
and risk management business. At its peak, Enron was responsible for
approximately 20% of the trades in the energy market. Despite the loss of the
largest participant, liquidity was maintained and there were no significant
swings in prices or disruptions in the supply of gas or electricity. In this
regard, the energy industry did not miss a beat. The competitive wholesale
market continued to do business as usual.
The energy market,
particularly from the customer's point of view, remained stable---without
interruption of services because of the liquidity and stability provided by the
marketplace. When Enron's situation became apparent, other parties stepped in to
fill the void. The market offered choice and diversity. Cautiously, companies
began to adjust their positions and move business to alternative companies and
electronic trading platforms. It is a testament to the strength of the energy
markets, that in only a few short weeks, the industry could adjust to the
collapse of a significant player with little effect on the customer.
Energy trading volume moved seamlessly--demonstrating the market
diversity---from EnronOnLine, Enron's proprietary electronic trading platform,
to other open many-to-many electronic trading platforms owned by a group of
shareholders such as the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE), in which my company
has a minority ownership interest. Total volumes on ICE increased by 65% from
October to November 2001. During that time as well, the number of ICE users
increased by 30%. Specifically, ICE saw an increased volume of gas and power
trades for next-day as a result of the need to replace Enron volumes. Formerly
EnronOnLine provided much of this market liquidity. The ability to move to other
trading platforms did not destabilize the energy market. In fact, "choice"
promoted stability.
As a result of the Enron collapse, questions have
been raised about the use of derivatives and accounting disclosures of
derivatives. I urge members to distinguish between derivatives themselves and
these accounting disclosures. Derivatives, as financial instruments, first
evolved in the 1850s after the railroads and telegraph communications developed
on a widespread basis. With available transportation to move agricultural
products a long distance and the advent of telegraph communication, farmers
could sell their crops while they were in transit or before the crops were
harvested. The derivative tool, when used as a hedging instrument, removed
exposure to fluctuating prices from the farmer's income. As noted by the
acclaimed historian, Alfred Chandler, "the standardizing and systemizing of
marketing procedures carried out by the exchanges transformed methods of
financing and reduced the costs of movement of American crops." The use of
derivatives evolved well beyond agriculture to numerous industries such as
metals, banking- --for exchange rate fluctuations, and energy.
The use
of derivatives helped to stabilize the markets after Enron's collapse.
Derivatives are financial tools, reflecting the underlying value of the
commodity, that allocate risk and promote liquidity. I would agree with Energy
Secretary Abraham's remarks, recently appearing in The Washington Post, that the
pioneering work in energy trading, particularly derivatives, played a central
role in providing market liquidity and risk allocation during the Enron
collapse.
I would also agree with the National Association of Regulatory
Utility Commissioners' (NARUC's) recent comments on derivatives. NARUC adopted a
resolution, passed by their Board of Directors in July 2001 that "recognizes the
important use of financial and physical mechanisms to reduce electricity and
natural gas market volatility". The NARUC resolution states that that these
financial instruments are a "component of a comprehensive energy procurement
program." Furthermore, NARUC states "that the Board of Directors of NARUC, urges
each State Commission to explore and examine the potential benefits to consumers
and distribution utilities of using financial and physical mechanisms to hedge
against market volatility in wholesale electric and gas markets."
Derivatives are important to consumers and to regulated utilities in
providing price stability. Furthermore, derivatives can be customized
specifically to the purchaser's unique circumstances and needs. I would point
out the following examples of customized derivative products that Aquila
provides to help our customers, such as regulated utilities or businesses,
control their risks and lower the costs to their customers.
Example #1
Example from Summer 2001): Sacramento, California's municipal utility (SMUD),
pays close attention to weather forecasts. During droughts, because there is no
water to go through the dam, Sacramento gets less of its electricity from
hydroelectric dams and must pay higher prices for power on the short term, open
market. To ease the pain of buying high-cost power during droughts, the
municipal utility entered into a five- year derivative contract with Aquila. The
Sacramento utility receives replacement power or cash to purchase replacement
power from Aquila when measured rainfall is below a certain level. In this way,
SMUD cushions the risk of a budget hit due to lower- than-expected rainfall.
This allows the Sacramento utility to protect its customers from rate increases
to cover the costs of purchasing last minute power at high prices on the open
market when such hydroelectric generators cannot operate.
Example #2 -
Production of aluminum is a very energy-intensive business. One aluminum
producer traditionally obtained its electricity from the hydroelectric
facilities it owned at a nearby river. As a result, it used to schedule aluminum
production based on projection of that river's spring flows. In essence, their
ability to produce efficiently hinged on sufficient snowmelt and rainfall to
fill the hydro dams.
Today, Aquila supplies that smelter with all of its
energy, so production can be based on raw material market conditions---not
weather and rainfall. In exchange for the purchased derivative, customized
specifically for this plant in this location, we maximize the use of energy from
company's dams on the river. Of course, if the manufacturing company requires
more electricity than those dams can supply, we obtain it from regional markets
and other power plants at a predetermined price. This derivative "cushions the
risk"for the manufacturer and its production schedule. It allows the
manufacturer to be more competitive in the global market.
Example #3 -
Aquila has customized a derivative product called Guaranteed Bill for the
customers of a Midwestern regulated utility. Guaranteed Bill is marketed to its
residential customers by the local utility. The service offers customers a fixed
monthly bill for natural gas. It is designed to put the retail customer in
control and allows the individual to fix his/her energy costs. Historically, a
customer trying to control costs was limited to a level payment plan which
offers no insulation from weather or commodity price fluctuations, only the
averaging of monthly payments over the course of the agreement. With Guaranteed
Bill there is no end-of-agreement "settle up"payment due at the termination of
the agreement. Aquila provides the utility with a weather hedge and a fixed
commodity price allowing the utility to provide its customers true price
certainty.
A further illustration of the increasing recognition of the
importance of derivatives is Aquila's teaming with The World Bank and the
International Finance Corporation (IFC) to launch a global weather risk facility
that will sell weather derivatives to companies in emerging markets. This
initiative of the World Bank and the IFC has grown out of the multilateral
agencies' plans to broker weather derivatives to boost agricultural yields in
North Africa.
It is imperative that the value and utility of derivatives
themselves not be confused with questionable accounting practices and
questionable financial reporting. It is imperative that companies reports
provide accurate and transparent information concerning their actions and
financial health of companies.
I understand the concerns of Congress and
the other regulatory agencies such as the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), and the Commodity
Futures Trade Commission (CFTC) in considering and examining the energy industry
issues and accounting and pension issues affecting all industries catapulted
into the spotlight by the Enron collapse. The Enron actions have understandably
raised questions about the necessary protections required for shareholders and
employees.
Congress should look at several issues that will help restore
their confidence in the energy industry as well as other industries in order to
ensure that employees and investors are protected.
(1) The inability of
Enron employees to diversify their retirement portfolios as the stock price of
Enron declined having high concentration of Enron stock ownership within their
portfolios must be examined and corrected. Legislation that addresses these
employee concerns and allows employees at any time to diversify is needed.
(2) The standards for disclosure of special purpose entities (SPEs) and
off-balance sheet financing need examination and correction. I believe that the
SEC has the proper authority to make these changes that will provide for
appropriate disclosure of such entities. Investors should have confidence that
such entities are adequately being disclosed.
(3) The standards required
for the oversight of external auditing needs examination and resolution.
Currently, the accounting industry would be characterized as self-policing. The
SEC has the authority to require the independent oversight of audit procedures
and standards. Investors should have confidence that there is an independent
oversight function. Such an independent oversight body could also review audit
failures and should have subpoena power.
Aquila has made and will make
every effort for full and open disclosures within the energy industry. Just
recently, Aquila executives conducted a seminar for Wall Street and investment
analysts about accounting methods. I believe that it is crucial that we educate
these groups and others about the accounting methods and practices applicable to
our industry. Our disclosure practices and communication of our financial
information are not like Enron, and we find ourselves in the position of having
to explain that very clearly.
Lack of confidence by the capital markets
in the energy industry has been raised as a result of the Enron collapse. Rating
agencies have raised the credit standard for generators and traders. There have
been steep declines in stock values. There is a new appetite for a stronger
capital ratio reflecting greater equity value and less debt.
This shift
in the capital structure will force many energy companies to reduce debt and to
scale back investments in new gas processing, development of storage facilities
and pipelines, and generation plants. The result could be a shortage of
generation in the long-term.
Since 1990, the competitive power supply
industry has accounted for more that half of all the power generation capacity
brought online in this country, and we expect this percentage to increase as
competitive wholesale markets continue. The loss of confidence by the capital
markets in the wake of Enron's demise will likely result in a reluctance to
invest in the critical infrastructure for our energy supply and delivery.
Congress can help to encourage confidence and to encourage the capital markets
to invest in much-needed energy infrastructure by passing legislation to
continue to make markets more efficient.
Briefly, I would commend the
Bush Administration, Chairman Bingaman, Chairman Tauzin, Congressman Barton, and
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), as well as many others, for
their various proposals for new legislation that encourage a further efficient
marketplace in which consumers will benefit.
The energy areas in which I
would submit that you take action include: existing federal legislative reform,
the standardized interconnection to the power grid, and the formation of
regional transmission organizations.
Federal Legislative Reform: While
PURPA in 1978 opened a new path for independent power companies
to create wholesale generating capacity outside traditional utility regulation,
the independent power generation industry is now mature and robust. Moreover,
subsequent law enacted by Congress in 1992 effectively deregulated the creation
of wholesale generating capacity. If
PURPA is repealed
prospectively as part of a comprehensive federal electricity bill, there must be
explicit recognition and preservation of existing
PURPA
contracts as negotiated in good faith. I also endorse efforts to guarantee the
recovery of
PURPA contract costs as appropriate federal policy.
However, such cost recovery must be explicitly related to the honoring of
existing contracts. Moreover, the existing QF ownership restrictions in
PURPA have outlived their usefulness. They are an artificial
and outdated restriction on the transfer of ownership of QF facilities. These
restrictions lead utilities that want to acquire QFs to resort to the use of
complex, temporary, corporate shells or trusts to dilute the utility ownership
below 50%. The artifices are expensive, cumbersome, and serve no apparent useful
public policy.
Standardized Interconnection: The power transmission grid
has been compared to the national highway system in terms of its importance to
our economic infrastructure. The highway system, along with protections to
promote interstate commerce, has allowed a flow of benefits between regions. The
national power grid requires standardization to promote the flow of power
between regions as the national highway systems supports the flow of goods and
services.
I endorse a clarification and standardization of
interconnection rules for new sources of power generation. I cannot
overemphasize how important this issue is for investment and construction of new
generation. For companies interested in expanding electric generation
capacity---critical to affordable power rates throughout the country, the
physical interconnection of the generation plant to the power grid has become
too often the "choke point"for project development.
Ad hoc
interconnection standards create uncertainty, extensive delays and unexpected or
unfair costs for developers. Legislation needs to affirm the right of new
generation to interconnect on a non-discriminatory basis to transmission
facilities, provide a clear avenue for the federal review of interconnection
policies, and establish a timely remedy, if necessary, for any abuse. Access to
the transmission grid should be uniform just as entrance and exit ramps are
uniform throughout the interstate highway system.
RTOs: Congress should
affirm FERC's authority to order utilities and other entities that own
transmission assets to join a FERC approved Regional Transmission Organizations
(RTOs) in order to realize a truly open and competitive transmission grid. I am
supportive of FERC's directive to organize large, regional RTOs to reflect the
way power flows. Independence in operation and market monitoring are crucial for
the achievement of the open access initiated by Order 888.
The nation's
transmission system is in need of upgrades and new investment to take economic
advantage of available and most advantageously priced generation supply. I
support market-like incentives to encourage new transmission builds in place of
cost- based ROE. Pricing for transmission should preclude "pancaking"(multiple
charges as power flows from one transmission system to the next) which can
increase costs to customers due to excessive transmission charges for the
delivery of power supply. Each user of the transmission grid must be required to
take service under a single open access transmission tariff. The information
system that guides the reservation and pricing and rules of transmission access
should be standardized to increase transparency, reduce costs, and level the
playing field.
Congress should reaffirm FERC's authority to set and
enforce a clear deadline for all utilities and other transmission owning
entities to join Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs).
The
continued support of Congress and FERC is necessary to re- establish confidence,
to foster the creation of new technologies, to attract the necessary capital for
infrastructure and to ensure a robust marketplace for the future. This will
result in the reliable, affordable supply of energy.
While all companies
are naturally concerned about creating shareholder value, companies must
demonstrate equal concern and diligence for monitoring the human capital within
their organizations. A foundation principle of our company is that the best
companies are those where its people are rooted in a common understanding of
expectations, and share in the ownership of the company. Furthermore, when
business values and codes of conduct are integrated into performance management
and business processes, they serve as a system of checks and balances as these
values are upheld in practice. We all must make every effort to provide
transparent information that facilitates the understanding of our financial
actions and their results----which earns and maintains investor confidence.
Four important stakeholders that are vital to the company's long- term
success ultimately evaluate a company's success: employees, customers,
communities and shareholders. Employees vote their confidence in the company by
taking advantage of ownership opportunities, referring friends for employment,
and advancing their career within the company. Customers show confidence in our
ability to provide superior energy solutions by selecting us over others in the
marketplace. Communities cast their votes of confidence by providing us with
operational franchises, purchasing our services, and partnering with us on vital
economic development initiatives. The value of corporate citizenship must first
be demonstrated in the very communities in which we live and work. Finally,
shareholders demonstrate confidence by investing in our company.
The
UtiliCorp/Aquila culture identifies values that are the foundation for success.
We have also recognized that by effectively executing compliance with these
values, the company is creating discipline and durability to deliver performance
to our stakeholder groups.
The Enron collapse is tragic for employees,
their communities, and their shareholders. . Enron failed, not the energy
market. We must all work together to re-establish and restore confidence so that
customers will continue to benefit.
Thank you for the invitation to
appear before your Committee. I will be happy to answer any questions you may
have.
LOAD-DATE: February 19, 2002