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Congressional Testimony
February 13, 2002 Wednesday
SECTION: CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY
LENGTH: 1924 words
COMMITTEE:
HOUSE ENERGY AND COMMERCE
SUBCOMMITTEE: ENERGY AND AIR QUALITY
HEADLINE: IMPACT ON EURON BANKRUPTCY ON ENERGY MARKETS
BILL-NO:
H.R. 3406 Retrieve Bill Tracking Report
Retrieve Full Text of Bill
H.R. 4 Retrieve Bill Tracking Report
Retrieve Full Text of Bill
TESTIMONY-BY:
MR. DAVID OWENS, EXECUTIVE VICE- PRESIDENT
AFFILIATION:
EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE
BODY: Statement by Mr.
David Owens Executive Vice- President Edison Electric Institute
The
Committee on Energy and Commerce
February 13, 2002
Mr. Chairman
and Members of the Subcommittee:
My name is David K. Owens, Executive
Vice President of the Edison Electric Institute (EEI). EEI is the association of
U.S. shareholder-owned electric utilities and industry affiliates and associates
worldwide. We are pleased to have the opportunity to testify before the
Subcommittee on the effects of the Enron bankruptcy on the functioning of energy
markets.
Enron was reported to be the 7th largest company in the nation
and often had been cited among the "most admired and innovative companies." Its
sudden bankruptcy has shaken the confidence of the nation's investors and
devastated Enron's own employees, many of whom have lost their jobs and their
retirement savings. This bankruptcy has raised substantial questions that the
Energy and Commerce Committee, other congressional committees and government
agencies are properly investigating. Investors must have confidence in the
corporations whose stock they own. This requires the fair, accurate and
transparent presentation and disclosure of financial information. Enron
obviously did not meet this fundamental standard. The circumstances of Enron's
demise, while not yet fully known, certainly require a reevaluation of our
approaches to auditing standards, financial reporting and disclosure for all
companies, no matter what industry they operate in.
DID ENRON'S
BANKRUPTCY HAVE ANY IMPACT ON ENERGY MARKETS?
Fortunately, Enron's
bankruptcy did not have any immediate harmful impact on electricity consumers.
Nevertheless, it is affecting energy companies and future developments in the
energy industry in many ways.
First, the good news. As FERC Chairman
Wood testified on January 29 before the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural
Resources, despite the fact that Enron was the nation's largest marketer of gas
and electricity, Enron's collapse has had little or no impact on the supply or
price of electricity. There was no disruption of service to electric customers.
The lights stayed on. Prices remained steady.
It appears that
electricity traders, including those at Enron, worked hard to unwind various
deals involving Enron and to find other parties to complete such transactions.
Enron and many other market participants often used a standardized electricity
trading contract, voluntarily developed by traders, buyers and sellers under the
auspices of EEI, which simplified the process of responding to Enron's financial
collapse. The contract provided uniformity in the terms and conditions of
electric trading transactions, and contained detailed default and credit
provisions which enabled parties to protect themselves if the party they were
trading with (the counterparty) suddenly lacked creditworthiness. See "Using the
EEI-NEM Master Power Contract to Manage Power Marketing Risks," 21 Energy Law
Journal, 269 (2000).
Chairman Wood's testimony to the Senate Energy
Committee contains data showing that daily power prices for electricity, which
are often extremely volatile, had no unusual peaks during the fall of 2001.
Electricity trading markets have proven to be robust and efficient, allowing
others to step in to fill the void left by Enron.
In addition, Enron's
bankruptcy does not appear to have harmed the retail customers of Portland
General Electric Company, an Enron division which provides electricity to retail
consumers in Oregon. Roy Hemmingway, Chairman of the Oregon Public Utility
Commission, confirmed this in his testimony to the Senate Energy Committee on
February 6.
I understand that Mr. McCollough, who appears with me today,
has testified recently that Enron's bankruptcy was followed by a 30% decline in
West Coast forward prices and suggested that Enron used its "market dominance"
to "set" forward prices. I do not know whether declines were as significant as
Mr. McCollough indicates or if they were the result of manipulation by Enron.
It is plausible that prices declined with Enron's bankruptcy because
other sellers tried to dispose of power at one time that they had originally
sold to Enron. Other factors that might have contributed to the decline in
electricity prices include the sluggish economy, warmer than normal weather and
falling natural gas prices. Whatever really happened, the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission will investigate these allegations, as it should.
In other respects, Enron's demise does appear to be having important
impacts on energy markets.
Many energy companies reported losses
resulting from Enron's bankruptcy.
Wall Street is asking more questions
about financial practices and tightening credit standards, particularly for
energy companies.
Accounting and reporting practices are being
scrutinized and reevaluated.
Corporate Board members and officers are
reviewing their roles and responsibilities.
The stock prices of many
energy companies have declined significantly. Credit rating agencies have
downgraded some energy companies and are re-evaluating others. All of which
makes it more difficult and costly to raise capital to make needed investments
in our nation's energy supply infrastucture.
Many companies have delayed
investments in generation capacity and some are selling assets, raising the
possibility of tight supply markets when economic growth picks up.
Many
of these actions are understandable responses to the concerns of investors,
customers and the public.
In addition, the circumstances of Enron's
bankruptcy have raised specific questions about the effect of accounting for
forward trades in electricity. A forward trade is a transaction for delivery of
electricity at some future time. Selling electricity for future delivery is
essential for efficient operation of electric markets. The California experience
demonstrated the problems of relying too much upon the spot market for
electricity and confirmed the importance, for stable electricity prices, of
having a portfolio of long and short-term electricity contracts.
Where
there is a transparent liquid market for longer-term commodity contracts,
mark-to-market accounting is used to recognize and disclose the financial impact
of such transactions. However, where forward markets are not as liquid and
prices are not as transparent, there are greater uncertainties as to the proper
market valuation and accounting for such transactions. Thus, the absence of
transparent market prices could raise concerns about improper manipulation of
anticipated prices that could distort financial reporting and disclosure.
Questions have been raised regarding Enron's accounting for the income from such
transactions and its treatment of the risks and valuation of the underlying
trades.
In a related vein, questions have been raised whether the
exemption of forward energy trades from CFTC regulation contributed to Enron's
problems by giving it a greater opportunity to take advantage of illiquid
markets.
Information from investigations of Enron will be helpful in
addressing these questions.
ARE THERE ANY LEGISLATIVE ENERGY-RELATED
RECOMMENDATIONS THAT RESULT FROM ENRON'S COLLAPSE?
Enron's collapse
suggests the need for many reforms and changes that affect all publicly-owned
companies. Such changes must be much broader in application than just the energy
industry. We are pleased that Congress is looking into these issues, although
many reforms can and should be accomplished without legislation.
Depending upon what else we learn about the circumstances at Enron,
right now it appears that the "energy" area of greatest concern is the
transparency of financial reporting and disclosure in thinly traded electricity
markets. The ultimate cure for this is to initiate measures to promote more
liquid trading markets. In the electricity context, this would involve enhancing
our transmission infrastructure, moving toward standardized power markets with
efficient transmission pricing, facilitating independent regional transmission
organizations and establishing more liquid "hubs" for the delivery and trading
of power.
FERC is taking the lead in addressing many of these issues.
However, legislation is also needed in areas where FERC cannot act.
H.R.
3406, together with the tax provisions of H.R.4 already passed by the House,
contain many needed electricity provisions to achieve the goal of a more robust,
competitive wholesale market and to promote market liquidity. The tax provisions
of H.R. 4 remove disincentives to transferring transmission assets to RTOs for
both privately-owned companies and public power entities. This will facilitate
the voluntary formation of large regional RTOs without federal mandates. (While
many electric companies disagree with aspects of FERC's current RTO policy and
the RTO mandate language in H.R. 3406, there is broad support for development of
robust, large regional RTOs.)
The transmission siting and incentive rate
provisions of H.R. 3406 would facilitate investment in and construction of
needed new transmission facilities. The standard market design initiative being
conducted by FERC would achieve greater liquidity in electric markets. And the
reliability provisions of H.R. 3406 would help assure the continued reliability
of the grid.
In addition, FERC must have the same level of authority
over all transmission owners, no matter what type of entity owns transmission
facilities, if we are to attain the consistency needed for transparent liquid
markets. While H.R. 3406 moves in the direction of granting FERC some increased
authority over the 25% of the transmission network that governmental and
cooperative utilities own, it is too timid. FERC should have the same level of
regulatory authority over all transmission providers no matter what their
ownership form.
The provisions of the Public Utility Holding Company Act
(PUHCA) and the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (
PURPA)
are incompatible with the current move to competitive wholesale markets.
PURPA assumes we are still operating under the old vertically
integrated monopoly paradigm, not with open access transmission and a
competitive wholesale market comprised of hundreds of active participants.
Prospective repeal of
PURPA's mandatory purchase obligation is
needed to eliminate future distortions in energy markets.
PUHCA's
commitment to vertically integrated utilities is directly contrary to FERC's
goals of a decentralized, competitive wholesale generation market and large
regional transmission organizations that are completely independent of power
generators and retail electric sellers. PUHCA precludes investment from non-
electric companies, interferes with establishment of large regional transmission
companies and promotes concentration of generation, not dispersion. A better
approach, contained in H.R. 3406, is to assure strong access to books and
records for all state commissions and FERC, recognizing that our responses to
Enron's situation will lead to improved financial reporting and disclosure
approaches for all public companies.
Finally, Congress needs more
information on the role of commodities-type regulation for energy forward
markets and perhaps should hold hearings on this topic.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before this
Subcommittee to address the energy market ramifications of Enron's bankruptcy
and would be pleased to respond to your questions.
LOAD-DATE: February 19, 2002