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Federal Document Clearing House
Congressional Testimony
July 26, 2001, Thursday
SECTION: CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY
LENGTH: 2133 words
COMMITTEE:
SENATE ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES
HEADLINE: NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY
TESTIMONY-BY: NORA MEAD BROWNELL, COMMISSIONER
BODY: July 26, 2001
Testimony of Nora Mead
Brownell, Commissioner
before the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural
Resources
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
Good
morning. Thank you for opportunity to testify before you today on the various
energy restructuring legislation pending before your Committee. I strongly
believe that the goals of any new legislation involving energy restructuring
should be to facilitate the development of competitive regional energy markets
and the removal of any barriers, regulatory or otherwise, to the development of
such markets, while allowing the Commission to perform effective market
monitoring. We must also create a regulatory environment which ensures
reliability and investment in infrastructure. I want to applaud the efforts of
this Committee to grapple with the issues of transforming energy markets.
Balancing competing agendas and leading the charge for change is neither easy
nor neat. Many people wonder why we have to change at all, particularly after
events of the past year. We must remind ourselves that this country has enjoyed
a standard of living that is unparalleled precisely because it has been willing
to take risk, embrace change, and leverage its intellectual assets. It would be
a tragedy to ignore the opportunities created by the advances in technology that
have transformed so many other industries like communications and
transportation. Without a coherent, integrated national energy policy and its
associated legislative and administrative changes, we will disadvantage our
industries, our environment and our constituents. I urge us all to share a sense
of urgency to do what needs to be done to move forward. There are many ways to
address the issues of transforming markets. I will address some of the most
important.
The Public Utility Holding Company Act (PUHCA), enacted
during the Depression, and the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act
(
PURPA), enacted during the Carter Administration, are
impediments to restructuring that, in my opinion, should be repealed. Among
other things, PUHCA requires that utility holding companies that are required to
register (because they do not meet any one of the exemptions enumerated in the
statute) submit to heavy-handed regulation by the Securities and Exchange
Commission, including seeking permission for many activities that companies
engage in during the ordinary course of their business. PUHCA also subjects
holding companies to requirements that they operate an "integrated" and
contiguous system and does not adequately address the relatively new phenomenon
of "convergence" mergers between gas and electric utilities. While PUHCA was a
necessary reaction to abuses that existed a half-century ago, it has outgrown
its purposes, and equally important, no longer reflects the utility industry of
today, including the rapid rise of non-vertically integrated energy companies.
As just one example of PUHCA's perverse effects, because of the
provisions for foreign utilities, the statute causes foreign companies to buy
here and U.S. companies to invest overseas. Investment decisions should flow
from economics, not from an outdated statute.
PURPA
also needs repeal.
PURPA requires utilities to buy from
alternate energy sources at what are frequently quite high prices.
PURPA was enacted in response to a perceived need to reduce
dependence on oil for electric generation, and it was thought that this kind of
subsidy would help accomplish that result. Now, 22 years later, when a gas-fired
generator can be on- line in less than two years, and many advances are being
made in distributed generation,
PURPA's subsidies for certain
types of generation no longer is rational.
Having stated that I believe
that PUHCA and
PURPA should be repealed, I also believe that we
should listen to the concerns of those, like the rural CO-OPs, who are asking us
to replace the safeguards, however flawed, that these statutes were intended to
provide. It is a change in approach that I have in mind. Instead of relying on
heavy regulation, safeguards should be a product of a market oriented approach.
We must do everything possible to encourage advances in technologies,
particularly renewables, and investment in infrastructure in order to bring them
to market as quickly and efficiently as possible. We must also do everything
possible to promote transparency and uniform business rules in order to guard
against manipulation. We must do everything possible to enhance our market
monitoring and enforcement capabilities in order to react and remedy any market
abuse. Responses must swift and certain.
There are a number of ways to
accomplish this changed approach. I strongly support legislation affirming the
Commission's authority to require the formation of RTOs and to shape their
configuration according to the characteristics outlined in Order No. 2000.
Large, regional, independent RTOs can improve grid reliability by facilitating
transmission planning across a multi-state region, create better pricing
mechanisms such as eliminating "pancaking", improve efficiency through better
congestion management, and attract investment in infrastructure by facilitating
regional consensus on the need for construction. RTOs play an important role in
assuring reliability. I recognize that markets do have different characteristics
and I do not dismiss those differences. We must work collaboratively with the
stakeholders to determine where those differences are real and where they are
merely the basis for barriers to entry. Ultimately, however, large regional RTOs
must be formed in a timely manner.
I also strongly endorse creating
standardized interconnection rules and uniform business rules. Where rules are
standardized, there is less room for manipulation. I believe that all interstate
transmission facilities should be under one set of open access rules, including
the facilities owned and/or operated by municipals, cooperatives, the Tennessee
Valley Authority, and the federal power market administrations. These entities,
which together control approximately 1/3 of the nation's transmission grid,
currently enjoy non jurisdictional status. Placing all facilities under the same
set of rules will eliminate disparities in treatment that operate as
disincentives to open access, and better ensure seamless electricity markets.
I must emphasize that it is imperative that we place all transmission,
whether related to unbundled wholesale, unbundled retail, or bundled retail
transactions, under one set of non- discriminatory open access rules. Our
experience since the issuance of Order No. 888 indicates that it is no longer
necessary to segregate the transmission for native load. Having all transmission
under one set of rules will eliminate a patchwork of state rules regulating
"retail transmission" and better ensure a properly functioning and transparent
transmission grid. We must ensure, however, that we do not interfere with state
oversight of retail and consumer responsibilities.
I believe that the
Commission must be given ultimate authority over the siting of transmission
facilities. At the time that the Federal Power Act was enacted, it was
appropriate to defer to the individual states for siting transmission facilities
within their borders. Times have changed, however, and today, there have been
major technological advances in transmission that have created interstate
superhighways. State-by-state siting of such transmission superhighways is an
anachronism that impedes transmission investment and slows transmission
construction. It is possible for one state to veto a desperately needed
transmission project. The best solution to this dilemma is through an interstate
regional compact or properly functioning RTO, with significant input of the
states, to be the first stop for siting approval. However, at some point, it may
be necessary for the Commission to make the final determination. Therefore, I
would suggest that the Commission act as a backstop. In other words, grant the
Commission siting authority over interstate transmission comparable to the
interstate natural gas pipeline siting authority in Section 7 of the Natural Gas
Act after we have determined "need" on the basis of an evidentiary record. This
is one way in which interstate transmission expansion can keep pace with
generation.
A final piece to the puzzle is the market monitoring and
enforcement capabilities. The Commission's "tool kit" must be strengthened to
facilitate the Commission's expanded role in monitoring for, and mitigating,
market power abuse. I believe that the Commission needs to develop and expand
its market monitoring expertise. The Commission can tap the existing expertise
of other federal agencies, and perhaps even private organizations, that are
experienced in market monitoring. It can also seek consultants with expertise in
electronic trading and market simulation. In either case, it comes down to
funding. As the markets we regulate change, we must be prepared to change our
regulatory tools. The Commission should be given sufficient funding to ensure
that it can hire, train, and retain personnel skilled in market monitoring and
market power mitigation or buy expertise on a short-term basis as needed.
Legislative solutions must be coupled with the Commission's ability to acquire
the necessary talent that can implement its new responsibilities.
I am
also of the opinion that market monitoring should not solely be the Commission's
responsibility. We should involve the states in a serious discussion of whether
combined state and federal action is necessary when market power abuses are
occurring in both retail and wholesale markets. It should involve the RTOs. I
intend to explore such creative approaches as the development of regional
oversight committees, which work with existing regional coordination councils or
other similar entities, including state regulators, to better assist the
development of workably competitive markets. We should explore the development a
coordinated system whereby we share standardized information thereby reducing
both the administrative and cost burden on the respective agencies and
stakeholders. We must leverage our resources in concert with the states,
particularly with regard to information sharing. Further, we must be certain we
are asking the right questions. We must clear about what constitutes market
power. We must understand the changing nature of the transactions (e.g., on-line
trading). We must use the information effectively.
I believe that the
Commission must have timely and reliable data and information to have an
effective market monitoring program. There are many different players in the
energy markets, many that have not traditionally been subject to our
jurisdiction. A significant amount of relevant information about the operation
of markets is in the possession of these entities. At times, there has been a
reluctance to cooperate and provide the necessary information. It may be
appropriate to clarify that the Commission has the authority to seek the
information necessary to perform its statutory responsibilities from either
jurisdictional or non jurisdictional sources. Transparency is impossible without
the involvement of all market participants.
Naturally, the necessary
companion to market monitoring is enforcement. There has historically been a
reluctance to apply traditional antitrust doctrine, including penalties, to
electric and gas markets, since they were not competitive markets, but were
subject to pervasive regulation and sanctioned monopoly structures. That should
no longer be the case as we move further and further down the path to
de-regulation and restructuring. The enabling statutes the Securities and
Exchange Commission and the Federal Communications Commission provide for a
range of enforcement measures, such as civil penalties, which I believe may be
appropriate for the Commission. I would suggest consideration of a significant
civil penalty to indicate to market participants that we take violations of the
Federal Power Act and Natural Gas Act seriously, and are prepared to remedy such
violations above and beyond our refund authority, which is statutorily limited.
We must also act swiftly and with certainty to respond to market abuses. Markets
are fragile and prolonged problems will destroy the market and the confidence of
consumers.
The work that you have done is quite extensive and I could
probably expound forever, but I believe these are some of the most important.
Thank you for asking for my input on these critical issues. I stand ready to
assist your Committee in your deliberative process. I again thank the Committee
for this opportunity to testify.
LOAD-DATE:
July 31, 2001