Copyright 2001 eMediaMillWorks, Inc.
(f/k/a Federal
Document Clearing House, Inc.)
Federal Document Clearing House
Congressional Testimony
July 25, 2001, Wednesday
SECTION: CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY
LENGTH: 2732 words
COMMITTEE:
SENATE ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES
HEADLINE: NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY
TESTIMONY-BY: JAMES B. ROUSE, ON BEHALF OF
AFFILIATION: THE ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS RESOURCE COUNCIL
(ELCON)
BODY: JULY 25, 2001
STATEMENT OF
JAMES B. ROUSE
ON BEHALF OF THE ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS RESOURCE COUNCIL
(ELCON)
BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES
A HEARING ON LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS FOR ELECTRICITY RESTRUCTURING
Good morning, my name is James B. Rouse, associate director, energy
policy for Praxair, Inc. Praxair is a large industrial gases company, producing
atmospheric gases: oxygen, nitrogen, argon and rare gases; our process gases
include hydrogen, helium and carbon dioxide. For us, electricity is a raw
material, constituting up to 70% of our operating costs. We operate in some 44
countries and are the largest industrial gases producer in North and South
America. I am here today as chairman of the Electricity Consumers Resource
Council, or ELCON. ELCON, established in 1976, is the national association
representing large industrial users of electricity. ELCON's member companies
come from virtually every segment of the manufacturing community. ELCON's
members operate in a competitive, international environment and require an
adequate and reliable supply of electricity at competitive prices in a vibrant
interstate marketplace. Large users of electricity know very well that the
decisions made in this Committee and by Congress will have a direct impact on
their businesses' well being as well as business decisions. ELCON greatly
appreciates the opportunity to testify.
ELCON and its member companies
favor competition over regulation and have long advocated truly open and fully
competitive electricity markets, including retail access guaranteeing that all
consumers have the right to choose their supplier of electricity and electricity
services. We also believe that, just as is true for other energy products, a
large national or even international market with consistent rules and standards
is optimal for the sale and purchase of electricity. When it comes to
electricity, we are dealing with a commodity sold in interstate commerce. Our
existing electricity system clearly transcends state lines. We need a national
framework and a strong federal bill. Consumers should benefit from a large,
seamless interstate electricity market.
ELCON members continue to
support competition. However, we would assert that we do not have true
competition anywhere. Several states, in attempting to restructure, has simply
deregulated, or in some cases reregulated, existing monopolies. The failures to
date, and California is perhaps the most egregious but there are others,
represent failures of reregulation and failures of state legislative plans that
included too many political compromises. The experiences in California and
elsewhere cannot and should not be described as failures of competition.
The major concerns of ELCON members are nearly identical to those set
forth in the chairman's "White Paper on Electricity Legislation" issued July 20,
2001. As we identified those issues in testimony before this committee on April
20, 2000, they are the linked issues of Market Power, Repeal of the Public
Utility Holding Company Act (PUHCA), Reliability, and Transmission and
Grid Governance. The White Paper adds two other categories: (1) Regional
Planning and Siting; and (2) Market Transparency Rules. Customer choice and
retail access are wonderful goals, but they are worthless if the transmission
system, which will remain monopolistic for many years, does not allow for the
free and non- discriminatory movement of electricity from seller to buyer. Given
that owners of monopoly transmission facilities will still exercise market power
-- that is monopoly power -- I cannot emphasize too strongly that regulation is
needed to ensure that the owners of the transmission system do not use their
position to the detriment of real competition.
We concur with the White
Paper that FERC must have the authority and be required both to (1) promulgate
rules for the independent operation of the grid and (2) compel utilities to turn
over control of their transmission facilities to independent Regional
Transmission Organizations, or RTOs. Such rules should preserve the reliability
of the grid and encourage the sale and transportation of electricity from any
seller to any buyer in an open, competitively neutral, and nondiscriminatory
manner.
FERC's recent order of July 12 on the RTO issue is a major FERC
initiative. FERC, for the first time, has clearly set forth its policy that
there should be large, regional RTOs: One to comprise what is now the Western
Interconnect; and three that comprise the Eastern Interconnect. FERC has
established mediation dockets to bring the utilities together to establish RTOs
for the Northeast and Southeast. But we believe that utility membership in an
appropriate RTO should not be voluntary as provided for in Order 2000, but
mandatory, and that legislation should affirm FERC's authority to order
utilities to join regional transmission organizations. As an aside, in the last
Congress, the provisions of S 1273, offered by Chairman Bingaman, best addressed
the question of RTOs. It granted FERC the authority to oversee the creation of
an RTO and compel utilities to turn over control of their transmission
facilities. Senator Bingaman deserves special praise for being the first to
introduce this concept in his earlier legislation, and we are pleased he has
reintroduced that same idea in this Congress.
ELCON has been an active
participant in the NERC process and supported the consensus language on
reliability contained in S. 2071 last year on the condition that it be
considered as part of a comprehensive bill and not on a stand-alone basis. This
position is based on sound policy. While we recognize the need to establish a
new, statutorily authorized self-regulating reliability organization, such
action will barely begin to address reliability. Legislation to reduce the
potential for reliability problems must do more than simply provide
accreditation to a new oversight body. It must establish a framework for
appropriately-sized regional transmission organizations, it must guarantee
non-discriminatory access to the grid, and it must clarify the current
uncertainty about federal and state jurisdiction over transmission. Moreover, it
cannot give new market regulating authority to those who now have, directly or
indirectly, substantial market power. We concur that legislation should require
sanctions and penalties for failure to comply with rules developed by a new
electric reliability organization and that the entire framework is subject to
federal oversight. ELCON is continuing to work with various stakeholders in an
effort to develop new language. It is becoming increasingly clear that the
"consensus" language approved in February 1999 is too complicated, too
prescriptive, and too long. There have been several new proposals put forth even
in the last few weeks that offer improved ways to establish a new electric
reliability organization.
Market power is a subject of intense recent
interest, growing out of the wildly fluctuating rates and volatile supply
situation in the West. Market power arises from several sources. Where there is
an imbalance in supply and demand, market power is often held by a few producers
who can demand higher rates during periods of shortage. Where there is
transmission congestion, the owner and operator of the grid can favor his own
generation affiliate in denying access to competitive sources. Where the
integrated system favors the native load utility over competing generators, new
entrants are discouraged. Where an artificial power exchange is created for
nonmarket purposes, true competition is thwarted.
Markets will
eventually be workably competitive when there is an adequate generation supply
in all sections of the country and where that supply can move freely over a
transmission system under control and supervision of large RTOs. Transmission
rates, terms and conditions will be set by the RTOs and administered by the
RTOs, subject to FERC oversight. Any market operated by an RTO or on behalf of
an RTO should be subject to an independent market surveillance function to
monitor such markets for potential design flaws, gaming behavior and the
exercise of vertical, horizontal or localized market power. This includes
markets for transmission services, ancillary services and power exchanges
The White Paper posits that legislation should require the Commission to
take into account the impact of "demand response mechanisms" on rates. ELCON has
proposed that FERC add a Ninth Function for Customer Load Response (CLR)
curtailment service (in addition to the Eight Functions set forth in Order
2000). This would require that markets for CLR be integrated with other FERC
real-time markets. This would also ensure that such markets are reasonably
standardized in each RTO. Participation in the CLR market should be voluntary
and open to any customer.
Regional Planning and Siting for new
transmission capacity poses a challenge for policymakers. ELCON believes that
Congress should delegate to FERC the same authorities under the Federal Power
Act with respect to the siting of interstate transmission facilities as FERC is
currently authorized under the Natural Gas Act with respect to interstate
natural gas pipelines. ELCON agrees that a regionally based approach to
transmission planning, planning and siting is desirable. However, the RTOs,
rather than some new regional regulatory compact, should be delegated with that
responsibility, or as the White Paper states, FERC should "cede such authority
to appropriately constituted regional entities," which should be RTOs. They
would also establish and monitor regional reserve requirements, maintenance and
market monitoring functions noted above.
Besides the ongoing operation
of the grid, RTOs should play a major role in the planning of new and upgraded
transmission facilities, as required under Order 2000, but which authority would
need be augmented and reaffirmed in legislation. Regulated transmission
providers are entitled to a reasonable opportunity to recover all costs
associated with their prudently incurred investments, plus a return on those
investments that are deemed used and useful. Working through RTO processes,
transmission providers will be assured that all needed expansions and upgrades
will be fully compensated according to FERC rules.
Market Transparency
Rules are integral to the successful operation of a workably competitive market.
While proprietary information on commodity pricing will continue to receive the
protection it deserves, market participants need real-time information on the
regulated services, including transmission capacity, ancillary services and line
loading. This will be necessary for buyers, sellers, grid operators and
regulators to assure that markets are indeed workably competitive on a
continuing basis. Short-term operational planning and long-term capacity
planning are both well-served by adequate information, furnished by both the
Energy Information Administration and also by an expected plethora of commercial
entities who are already vying for customers in anticipating of the opening of
markets.
The White Paper also addresses other "Other Provisions."
Regarding the repeal of PUHCA, we first emphasize that PUHCA is the only federal
consumer protection statute for electric utility customers. We believe that, if
PUHCA is repealed, we need clear authority vested in FERC to prohibit any
potential anti- competitive practices involving regulated utilities and
unregulated affiliates. Rules are needed to address the operational unbundling
of generation, transmission, system control, marketing and local distribution
functions. State and Federal regulators must have complete access to all books
and records of all regulated entities and entities owned or controlled by
regulated entities. In addition, we argue that, optimally, PUHCA repeal not be
effective until all states have retail access or until competition on a
nation-wide basis is otherwise achieved.
The White Paper calls for
repeal of the mandatory purchase requirements of the Public Utility Regulatory
Policies Act (or
PURPA) of 1978. Many ELCON members cogenerate
and sell electricity to utilities as Qualifying Facilities (or QFs) pursuant to
PURPA. Despite its bad press, as long as consumers are held
captive to monopoly utilities,
PURPA is an essential law. It
has produced a broader, more efficient base of electricity generation. Due to
PURPA, electricity capacity was added in smaller increments,
thus not burdening users with paying for generators that proved to be much
larger than necessary. And entrepreneurs with private non-regulated capital
funded generation.
That having been said, the "mandatory purchase"
provisions of
PURPA are an anachronism in a truly competitive
market and should be recognized as such. With regard to existing
PURPA contracts, be they at market or above today's market, no
one is suggesting that such contracts be rescinded. Existing
PURPA contracts are and should be a non-issue. The impact of
repealing the mandatory purchase provisions of
PURPA on a
prospective basis is virtually non-existent. The number of new, uneconomic
PURPA-based contracts being signed today based on the often
above market "avoided cost" formula is close to nil. In addition, the
much-maligned avoided cost principle is not to blame. If properly implemented,
it harms no one. Some states, for their own reasons, set avoided cost at
artificially high levels. Again, this is no longer the case.
I hasten to
add, however, that even without the use of these mandatory purchase
requirements,
the majority of new capacity being brought on line is from
non- utility generation and that has been the case over several years.
PURPA has succeeded in demonstrating that electricity can be
generated by non-utility sources in an efficient, reliable, and environmentally
favorable manner. Some 25 years ago utilities vehemently disputed what is now
fact.
While the mandatory purchase provisions are no longer necessary in
a truly competitive electricity market, it is important to note that
PURPA and Section 210 are much more than simply mandatory
purchase requirements, including its requirements that utilities interconnect
with cogenerators. However, I cannot overemphasize the importance of a federal
guarantee for back-up power at just and reasonable rates in states that remain
non- competitive. Without such a guarantee, cogenerators would be captive to
unregulated monopolies that could charge what they wish, and the cogenerators
would have no alternative. In states without real customer choice, retaining the
federal guarantee for back-up power now in
PURPA is essential
if there is to be any investment in cogeneration capacity.
Over the past
three decades, the growth of electricity-dependent businesses and industry has
been remarkable. In just the past five years, we have seen demand far outstrip
supply in many regions. While the economy has become ever more electricity
dependent, our infrastructure, market mechanisms and regulations have not kept
pace. We need strong, but not excessive, federal regulatory authority to
guarantee that electricity is available throughout the nation on a
nondiscriminatory basis. It is up to this Committee and other oversight bodies
to ensure that such regulation is not over-reaching, that it is encouraging and
not hindering true competition.
In conclusion, ELCON and its member
companies favor a strong federal bill so that all electricity consumers can
enjoy the benefits of competition. California notwithstanding, competition is
coming. But the reality is that we face a long transition period before we get
there. Truly comprehensive Federal legislation is needed to achieve workably
competitive electricity markets. States will continue to have an important role,
but that role does not extend to the regulation of interstate commerce. And
electricity is clearly interstate commerce. That is why this Committee and this
Congress must enact strong, comprehensive federal legislation. ELCON stands
ready as it has for a quarter century to represent its members, to engage the
debate, to propose policy alternatives and to participate in a momentous shift
in the provision of an essential service, electricity.
LOAD-DATE: July 26, 2001