Copyright 2001 eMediaMillWorks, Inc.
(f/k/a Federal
Document Clearing House, Inc.)
Federal Document Clearing House
Congressional Testimony
June 28, 2001, Thursday
SECTION: CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY
LENGTH: 3235 words
COMMITTEE:
SENATE GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
HEADLINE:
ELECTRICITY RESTRUCTURING VS. RELIABILITY
TESTIMONY-BY:
KEVIN A. KELLY, DIRECTOR OF THE DIVISION OF POLICY INNOVATION AND COMMUNICATION
WITHIN THE
AFFILIATION: FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY
COMMISSION
BODY: June 28, 2001
Testimony of
Kevin A. Kelly Director of the Division of Policy Innovation and
Communication within the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Before the
Committee on Governmental Affairs United States Senate
Mr. Chairman and
Members of the Committee:
Good morning. My name is Kevin A. Kelly and I
am the Director of the Division of Policy Innovation and Communication within
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's Office of Markets, Tariffs and Rates.
I am appearing here today as a Commission staff witness, and I do not speak for
the Commission itself or for any individual Commissioner.
Thank you for
the opportunity to speak today on how the reliability of electric service is
being affected by the industry's restructuring, and the Commission's role in
ensuring the reliability of service. Restructuring is bringing many new
participants into the electric business, changing the roles of traditional
participants, increasing the number of wholesale power transactions, as well as
increasing the distances over which power transactions take place. These changes
place new stresses on the transmission system and raise questions about whether
today's industry, as it is currently structured, will provide the additional
generation and transmission investment needed for reliable electric service for
our nation. The Commission's fundamental role in the electric utility industry
is to regulate public utilities with respect to the sale of electric energy at
wholesale in interstate commerce and the transmission of electric energy in
interstate commerce. The Commission's role, thus, is to serve essentially as an
economic regulator. With certain exceptions, the Commission does not regulate
the service provided by municipal utilities, most electric power cooperatives,
federal power marketing administrations and the Tennessee Valley Authority.
In layman's terms, "electric reliability" simply is a measure of how
often a customer's electric power supply is unexpectedly interrupted. For most
customers, reliability means that the lights come on when they flip a switch.
For some customers today, however, reliability may also refer to whether there
are power interruptions for a tiny fraction of a second (which most of us would
not notice but a computer would), whether the electric current maintains a
frequency of 60 cycles per second so the electric clocks keep good time, or
whether the voltage remains at the right level so that voltage-sensitive
equipment operates properly.
Since the electric power industry began,
reliability has been primarily the responsibility of the customer's local
utility. To ensure reliability, the utility must have access to three things:
generators to create electric power; high voltage transmission facilities to
move that power economically over long distances; and lower voltage distribution
lines to deliver the power to customers in a local area. Power systems engineers
distinguish two facets of reliability: adequacy, which means having enough of
these facilities to avoid interruptions; and security, which means operating
them within safe limits and in a coordinated manner to avoid interruptions.
Almost all the power interruptions of the typical customer are due to
distribution system outages. These occur when, for example, a tree falls on a
neighborhood power line or a digger cuts an underground electric cable. Although
common, distribution outages affect only a small area. Transmission problems, on
the other hand, can affect a large area, covering many states in rare cases.
These may be caused by such problems as a lightning strike or an ice storm
disabling one or more transmission lines. Generation adequacy has been, until
recently, the least frequent cause of reliability problems in the United States.
Utilities have been accountable to state utility commissions or other
local regulators for reliable service. A typical state will keep statistics on
distribution system interruptions in various neighborhoods, inspect the
transmission system rights-of-way for unsafe tree growth near power lines, and
set requirements for "reserve" generation capability to cover unexpected demand
growth and unexpected outages of power plants. State or local regulators also
exercise the authority of eminent domain and have siting authority for new
generation, transmission, and distribution facilities needed to maintain an
adequate power system.
A major blackout affecting several states in the
Northeast in 1965 was caused by poor and uncoordinated transmission system
operating practices. President Johnson directed our agency's predecessor, the
Federal Power Commission (FPC), to investigate and report on this power failure.
The FPC issued its report in December 1965, in which it stated:
When the
Federal Power Act was passed in 1935, no specific provision was made for
jurisdiction over reliability of service for bulk power supply from interstate
grids, the focus of the Act being rather on accounting and rate regulation.
Presumably the reason was that service reliability was regarded as a problem for
the states. Insofar as service by distribution systems is concerned this is
still valid, but the enormous development of interstate power networks in the
last thirty years requires a reevaluation of the governmental responsibility for
continuity of the service supplied by them, since it is impossible for a single
state effectively to regulate the service from an interstate pool or grid.
Northeast Power Failure, A Report to the President by the Federal Power
Commission, p. 45 (Dec. 6, 1965).
Also as a response to this power
failure, the industry formed the North American Electric Reliability Council
(NERC). NERC is a voluntary membership organization that sets rules primarily
for transmission security in the lower 48 states, almost all of southern Canada,
and the northern part of the Baja peninsula in Mexico. More detailed rules are
prescribed by ten regional reliability councils, which are affiliated with NERC.
Recent changes in the electric power business tend to leave more matters
affecting reliability outside the exclusive control of the local utility.
Electricity trading patterns are becoming increasingly regional and reliability
is now more likely to be affected by the actions of parties that may be several
states away. This means that it is more important than ever to have clear
reliability rules that are observed by everyone. Unfortunately, NERC lacks
authority to enforce its rules. Because changes in the industry increased both
the incentive for, and frequency of, NERC rule violations, NERC now advocates
making transmission reliability oversight a government function so that
interstate and international reliability rules can be enforced uniformly.
(NERC's proposal would not address generation and distribution issues.)
The Commission has no statutory authority to promulgate and enforce a
set of mandatory reliability standards. The Federal Power Act contains only
limited authorities on reliability. Under FPA section 202(c), for example,
whenever the Department of Energy determines that an "emergency exists by reason
of a sudden increase in the demand for electric energy, or a shortage of
electric energy or of facilities for the generation or transmission of electric
energy . . . or other causes," it has authority to order "temporary connections
of facilities and such generation, delivery, interchange or transmission of
electric energy as in its judgment will best meet the emergency and serve the
public interest." The Department of Energy exercised this authority several
months ago in ordering emergency sales of power to California.
Under
sections 205 and 206, the Commission must ensure that all rates, terms and
conditions of jurisdictional service (including "practices" affecting such
services) are just, reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or preferential.
These sections generally have been construed as governing the commercial aspects
of service, instead of the reliability aspects. However, there is no bright line
between "commercial practices" and "reliability practices."
Indeed, the
Commission has acknowledged that reliability issues may sometimes fall within
its ratemaking jurisdiction. In Green Mountain Power Corp., 59 FERC - 61,213
(1992), the utility filed new transmission rates, and customers intervened and
asserted that they were subject to rolling blackouts and voltage reductions. The
customers asked the Commission to condition its acceptance of the transmission
rates on Green Mountain's commitment to upgrade or construct new facilities. The
Commission ruled that the reliability issues could be fully addressed in the
section 205 proceeding as an issue of whether rates should be adjusted to
reflect the quality of service. The Commission said, "reliability concerns of
this type, implicating the firmness of contractually agreed-upon service and the
possibility of undue discrimination, 'bear upon the reasonableness of rates
under a contract which is subject to the Commission's jurisdiction.'" (Quoting
North Carolina Electric Membership Corp. v. Virginia Electric and Power Co., 52
FERC - 61,298 (1990)).
Similarly, in New York State Reliability Council,
90 FERC - 61,313 (2000), the NYSRC submitted a filing to reduce a generation
adequacy measure, called the installed capacity requirement, for the New York
Control Area from 22 percent to 18 percent. Commission approval of such a
reliability standard was required by a previously-filed agreement between the
NYSRC and the New York ISO. The Commission accepted the reduced installed
capacity requirement, stating that certain reliability provisions may affect the
rates, terms and conditions of jurisdictional transmission and power sales
services within the Commission's exclusive jurisdiction. On the merits of the
change, however, the Commission found only that the change "does not appear to
have an adverse effect on matters within our exclusive jurisdiction."
Finally, in Village of Freeport v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York,
Inc., 87 FERC - 61,301 (1999), the Commission set for hearing a complaint
alleging numerous outages of firm transmission service. In doing so, the
Commission defined the issue as whether the utility had "followed good utility
practice in providing the firm service required by the [Commission's] pro forma
tariff and provided not unduly discriminatory electric transmission service to
Freeport, and if it has not, what remedies are appropriate."
In short,
FPA sections 205 and 206 require the Commission to consider reliability issues
only in limited circumstances. In setting rates within the zone of
reasonableness, the Commission may consider the adequacy of service. Even in
those cases, however, the Commission is not deciding whether a particular
reliability standard is acceptable per se but whether the rates, terms and
conditions of jurisdictional service associated with that standard are just,
reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or preferential from a commercial
perspective.
The remaining authorities granted to the Commission in the
area of reliability are very limited. For example, under FPA section 207, if the
Commission finds, upon complaint by a State commission, that "any interstate
service of any public utility is inadequate or insufficient, the Commission
shall determine the proper, adequate or sufficient service to be furnished," and
fix the same by order, rule or regulation. The Commission cannot exercise this
authority except upon complaint by a State commission.
The Public
Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 also provides limited authority on
reliability. For example, under
PURPA section 205, the
Commission can exempt electric utilities from state laws that prevent voluntary
coordination of facilities and resources. Under
PURPA section
209(b), the Department of Energy, in consultation with the Commission, may ask
the reliability councils or other persons (including federal agencies) to
examine and report on reliability issues. Under
PURPA section
209(c), the Department of Energy, in consultation with the Commission, and after
public comment, may recommend reliability standards to the electric utility
industry, including standards with respect to equipment, operating procedures
and training of personnel.
The paucity of federal authority to address
reliability issues, and increasing concern about the shortcomings of the
traditional voluntary approach to reliability issues, have led some in the
industry to seek other approaches. For example, one approach that has been
pursued is enforcing reliability standards through contracts. Public utilities
may voluntarily include reliability- related provisions in contracts or tariffs
filed with the Commission because they affect or relate to the rates, terms and
conditions of jurisdictional service. If reliability provisions in
Commission-jurisdictional contracts are accepted and on file with the
Commission, the Commission can enforce the reliability- related provisions
against public utility parties to the contracts. Enforcement of such provisions
against non-public utility parties (e.g., municipal utilities, most electric
power cooperatives and federal power marketing administrations) may have to be
pursued in the appropriate state court or other forum by the public utility
parties to the contracts.
A system of such contractual arrangements has
been established by utilities in the Western Systems Coordinating Council, the
regional reliability council for the Western United States. When the contracts
were filed, the Commission offered no opinion on the technical adequacy of the
WSCC standards, but did approve them as consistent with the "just and
reasonable" standard of the Federal Power Act. Specifically, the Commission
stated that:
we do not intend to assume the role the regional
reliability groups have traditionally performed in developing reliability
criteria. Instead, we will consider such criteria only to the extent needed to
fulfill our traditional role of ensuring that rates, terms and conditions of
jurisdictional service, as distinct from reliability criteria, satisfy FPA
requirements.
Western Systems Coordinating Council, 87 FERC 61,060 at
61,234 (1999) (citing Central and South West Services, Inc., Opinion No. 332, 48
FERC 61,197 at 61,733 n.24, order on reh'g, Opinion No. 332-A, 49 FERC - 61,118
(1989)).
The effectiveness of the WSCC arrangement and the Commission's
ability to enforce it have not been fully tested. But, a voluntary contractual
regime is not the simplest or most effective means of establishing and
adequately enforcing reliability standards. It depends solely on the willingness
of public utilities to make voluntary filings, and even then, it may not capture
all electric facilities in a region because many of those facilities may be
controlled by utilities that are not subject to the Commission's jurisdiction
under sections 205 and 206 of the FPA. Reliability is at risk to the extent that
not all market participants are covered by the same requirements.
Another approach to ensuring reliability is enacting federal
legislation. This year, on May 17, the Administration released its National
Energy Policy Report. The Report recommends that the President direct the
Secretary of Energy to work with the Commission to improve the reliability of
the interstate transmission system and to develop legislation providing for
enforcement by a self-regulatory organization subject to the Commission's
oversight.
I believe a legislative approach is preferable to the
contractual approach discussed above. I take no position, however, on whether
the legislation should be based on NERC's proposal or any other version of
reliability legislation.
The Commission's potential role in overseeing
the establishment of a bulk power reliability organization and standards would
not infringe or compromise the ability of states to ensure the reliability of
electric distribution systems on behalf of retail customers. Reliability
standards are now, and would continue to be, developed by market participants
through regional and national self-regulating organizations. Local and regional
protocols should continue to be developed and agreed to at the regional level.
Reliability protocols that states rely on should be coordinated with regional
organizations that represent other parts of the interconnected grid. The primary
effect of legislation on reliability would be to make the rules enforceable. Any
such legislation should contain avenues for appeal or review of rules by
parties, including states, who believe that the rules need to be amended or
changed to better protect the reliability of their service or who feel that the
rules are unjust, unreasonable or unduly discriminatory.
Congress should
understand, however, that mandatory reliability rules alone are not enough to
ensure the reliability of the grid. For example, the Commission has encouraged
the formation of regional transmission organizations (RTOs), to overcome the
inefficiencies of the highly balkanized way in which the interstate transmission
grid is now operated. In adopting its Order No. 2000 rule on RTOs, the
Commission set out at length the need for an RTO to ensure reliability in each
region. The needs include coordinated operation and maintenance of
interconnected transmission systems, improved determination of transmission
system throughput capability, and unified regional planning of necessary grid
additions. In Order No. 2000, the Commission stated in particular that an RTO
must have the authority to ensure the short-term reliability of the regional
grid and must be responsible for planning, and for directing or arranging,
necessary transmission expansions and upgrades that will enable it to provide
efficient and reliable transmission service.
We also must have adequate
generating resources. For example, a current issue is whether those who sell
power to retail customers must have a specified percentage of generation
reserves. Also, as the Commission required in its Order No. 888, all public
utility transmission providers must offer ancillary services to their
transmission customers. These include, e.g., spinning and non- spinning
generation reserves.
We also need to find ways to encourage and
facilitate the construction of new transmission facilities. Market rules must
elicit sufficient investment in new transmission facilities. For example, to
provide transmission owners with an incentive to meet the needs of transmission
users, the Commission could adopt performance-based rates reflecting the
reliability of a transmission owner's service. The Commission already has
authority to adopt such rate mechanisms under section 205 of the Federal Power
Act.
In closing, the restructuring of the electric power industry makes
necessary a careful consideration of the tools for ensuring the reliability of
electric service. The Commission has only limited authority to address
reliability, and the need for new approaches is clear. Federal transmission
reliability legislation is one such approach, but alone is not sufficient. The
nation must also develop regional transmission organizations for reliable grid
operation and must develop its generation and transmission infrastructure.
LOAD-DATE: July 2, 2001