This stock options
targeted legislation, introduced by Senators Carl Levin (D-MI) and
John McCain (R-AZ) ties the amount of a company's corporate tax
deduction directly to the amount expensed on the company’s earnings
statement. The result for a company translates to the loss of its
corporate tax deduction, unless that company expenses the stock
option value on their earnings statement. This change in reporting
practice imposes a large tax increase on companies who issue
broad-based employee stock options.
Effects of the Levin/McCain Bill
In essence, the
Levin-McCain bill (S. 1940) uses a tax hammer to get companies to
change their accounting treatment of stock options. This is
ultimately damaging to the employee workforce who benefit from the
investment in the future value of their employer. The result would
likely mean the end of stock options, and the loss of a large
financial investment opportunity for company employees.
Why is the Levin/McCain Bill is Unnecessary?
Proponents of
S. 1940 argue that current accounting rules do not provide enough
information to investors about the cost of stock options to
companies.
However, current accounting and tax rules governing stock options
resolve this concern. A company may expense the stock option grants
on its earnings statement or comport with the Financial
Accounting Standards Board’s (FASB) requirement that companies
provide investors with detailed information in a footnote in their
financial statement showing the potential impact of the stock
options.
Shareholder advocates supported this approach because it very
much improved the information available to investors. Furthermore,
the information provided in the footnote clearly shows the effect
stock options have had on dilution of stock value and the net profit
of the company.
The Levin/McCain bill confuses current rules and proposes
that:
- companies should only be allowed to retain their corporate tax
deduction for stock options if they record stock options on their
earnings statement as an expense, and
- the amount of the corporate tax deduction should be tied to
the amount recorded as an expense on the company earnings
statement
Companies are unable to expense stock options as proposed in S.
1940 for two main reasons:
- No money has changed hands. When a company grants a
stock option to an employee, no money has changed hands. Rather,
the employee has a future right to purchase the company’s stock
and become an owner of the company. There is not a definite value
of the option at grant, and therefore it is very hard to report
that value on a company’s earnings statement at the time of grant.
- Employees may never exercise, or buy, the stock.
Employees may leave the company before the stock option vests, or
the stock value may have plummeted below the grant price and so
the employee will not likely exercise the option at a loss. If the
Levin/McCain bill passes, a company will be forced to charge an
expense to earnings, despite the unpredictability of the final
outcome of the stock option.
Current Rules are not Broken
The accounting and tax rules
governing stock options currently work. Defined briefly:
- At the time the employee is given or granted a stock option,
no money has changed hands but rather an employee merely has the
future right to buy the stock at a set price (the grant).
- When a stock option is exercised, the employee has
purchased the stock. The employee must pay income taxes on the
value of the stock appreciation since the time of grant.
- The employer likewise is entitled to an income tax deduction
in the amount that the employee is required to include as income.
The tax law treats the transaction as a bargain sale to an
employee and recognizes the employer could have sold the stock
option on the open market and received the market price.
- Because stock options are not compensation for past work, but
are rather an incentive for future performance, most companies
choose to report this information in the footnote disclosure.
(Compensation is recorded in the company’s earnings statement.)
Would enactment of the Levin-McCain bill, prevent the kind of
accounting irregularities presented in the Enron case?
No.
The bill confuses financial and tax accounting, and could result in
companies providing less information to investors.
Didn’t Enron somehow sidestep paying taxes because of the stock
options they issued?
Proponents of the Levin/McCain bill
complain that Enron reduced its tax liability by claiming $600
million in corporate tax deductions from the exercise by its
employees of stock options. Every corporate tax deduction from stock
option exercises is determined by the taxable income realized by the
employee. Employees pay tax at higher rates than corporations.
The tax paid by the employee more than offsets the deduction
claimed by the company, thereby enhancing tax receipts.
For more information, contact Caroline Hurley: