This document provides background information and summarizes the debate over stock option expensing. The links to the left will lead you to public documents that we have found.
           Employees holding 
    stock options are given the right to purchase shares in their company at a 
    fixed price at some later date. For example, if an employee of Worldwide Widgets 
    is given the option to buy 1,000 shares of company stock at $30 a share three 
    years in the future, he or she will profit if the price at that time exceeds 
    $30. If the stock price is at $50 at that date, they can purchase the stock 
    at the $20 discount or cash them in for the $20 per share profit. In this 
    hypothetical example, cashing them in would yield a nice $20,000 bonus on 
    top of one's regular salary (1000 shares times the $20 difference in the current 
    price of $50 and the strike price of $30). If Worldwide Widgets is doing poorly 
    three years out and the stock price has dropped below the $30 strike price, 
    the options are worthless. Since the employee does not have to put any money 
    down while the option period is underway, there is no actual out-of-pocket 
    loss if the stock price is "below water" when the option period 
    ends.
  
           Stock options 
    are a common part of compensation packages for business executives. They became 
    increasingly common during the high tech boom of the 1990's. Many Internet 
    and high tech start up companies used options as a large part of their compensation 
    packages, not just for executives but for a broad range of employees. This 
    enabled them to hold down salary expenses early on before they launched their 
    products and produced a revenue stream. Options are also a way of keeping 
    valued employees from jumping ship and going to a competitor. Individuals 
    with options who quit before the options can be exercised, leave those options 
    behind.
  
           Stock options 
    became controversial after the accounting scandals emerged at companies like 
    Enron and Worldcom. Stock prices at both companies got wildly inflated by 
    dishonest accounting. Looking broadly at the high tech sector, some wondered 
    if the stock price bubble was partly a function of generous options. Executives 
    had an enormous stake in pushing their stock price higher, which would be 
    good for the company in a number of ways but also good for them personally 
    because it would enhance the value of their options. Another aspect of the 
    controversy over options was that companies typically did not list options 
    as an expense on their balance sheets. This may seem to be a rather arcane 
    accounting issue but it goes to the heart of the policy question. Companies 
    that don't list options as a current expense make their balance sheets look 
    stronger because this potential expense is not included as a debit. A lobbyist 
    for a computer company defended this practice by arguing that "when [our 
    company] grants stock options there is no cost to us, no real cost at that 
    time." Defenders also argue that there is no way of valuing an option. 
    Said one defender, "can you find a value in the present time for options 
    that aren't tradable on the market?"
  
           Critics of current 
    stock option practices scoff at such defenses. Paraphrasing a newspaper op-ed 
    by the respected investment guru Warren Buffett, one congressional aide told 
    us, "If options aren't a form of compensation, what are they? If compensation 
    isn't an expense, what is it?" Moreover, economists have developed means 
    of calculating the value of stock options. Finally, in the wake of the controversy 
    some large Fortune 500 companies chose voluntarily to start expense options, 
    lending support to the idea that options can be fairly priced in current dollars.
  
           In 2001 senators 
    Carl Levin (D-MI) and John McCain (R-AZ) introduced legislation to require 
    that options be expensed. They were not trying to terminate options; there 
    is widespread agreement that options can be useful in certain circumstances. 
    Neither political party seemed to have an interest in the issue as it is complex 
    and elicits little public interest. Since companies back in their districts 
    and states were asking them not to support the legislation, most legislators 
    were happy just to ignore the Levin-McCain bill and watch it die a quiet death 
    as the accounting debacles at Enron and other companies moved off the political 
    stage.