Copyright 2001 FDCHeMedia, Inc. All Rights Reserved. Federal Document Clearing House Congressional
Testimony
September 25, 2001, Tuesday
SECTION: CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY
LENGTH: 4747 words
COMMITTEE:HOUSE TRANSPORTATION
SUBCOMMITTEE:
AVIATION
HEADLINE: AIRPORT SECURITY
TESTIMONY-BY: CAPTAIN DUANE WOERTH, PRESIDENT
AFFILIATION: AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION,
INTERNATIONAL
BODY: STATEMENT OF
CAPTAIN DUANE WOERTH PRESIDENT AIR LINE PILOTS
ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL
BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON
AVIATION COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUTURE U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ON AVIATION SECURITY
SEPTEMBER 25,
2001
Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the
Committee. My name is Duane Woerth and I am the President of the Air Line Pilots
Association, International. ALPA represents 67,000 airline pilots who fly for 47
airlines in the U.S. and Canada. I am also a member of the Executive Council of
the AFL-CIO.
It is an honor to be able to speak to you
today, but I sincerely wish that I could do so under more pleasant
circumstances. Before last Tuesday, most of us could not have imagined the
possibility of the horror that occurred on that day.
Our hearts, thoughts and prayers are with the families and friends of
those killed as a result of the four separate aircraft hijackings. We have lost
pilots and flight attendants from our ranks who, though gone, will never be
forgotten. The survivors of the Attack on America, as it has been called, must
now work diligently to ensure that our beloved country, and its airline
industry, are protected from further acts of terrorism.
One of the lessons of this tragedy has been that the nation truly does
rely upon the aviation industry as the "wings" of our economy. Without a strong
airline industry, our economy is in serious peril. With that thought in mind, I
want to inform you that we are striving to do all that we can to help the
industry get back into the air and we urge the Administration and Congress to do
likewise. I am certainly proud to inform you that union pilots and flight
attendants demonstrated a "can do" spirit and a willingness to return to work
shortly after the events of the 11 'h in order to get the aviation system
running again.
General Comments
Prior to the events of last Tuesday, the aviation security community
was generally opposed to the concept of adopting a "fortress" mentality to
protect our airlines and airports. The use of tall security fences, highly
visible armed police officers roaming the airport terminal, hand searches of
bags, interviewers asking probing questions of passengers, and other such
measures were thought to be incompatible with commercial aviation in a free
society.
It is probably safe to say that the entire
aviation industry, including most in the government, traveling public, airlines,
airports, and perhaps, even crewmembers, enjoyed a false sense of security
before September 11th. I suspect that many of us believed that, although flawed,
our security system was generally doing the job that it was intended to do.
Unfortunately, that mind set may well have been at the root of what enabled the
19 terrorists to perform their acts of unspeakable devastation on an
unsuspecting and innocent public.
If, in fact, there
has ever been a false sense of security, it most certainly no longer exists. We
must replace that false sense of security with a genuine sense of security, by
instituting the most advanced civil aviation security system in the world.
The security improvements that I am here to recommend to
you today range from the simple, inexpensive and quickly achieved to the
difficult, expensive and longer term. We believe that if the government, working
with us and the rest of the aviation industry, will act on them forthrightly, we
will some day be able to tell our children and grandchildren that we turned
tragedy into triumph.
Several years ago, ALPA embarked
on a campaign entitled One Level of Safety. That effort, as you probably know,
was highly successful in bringing to the attention of the traveling public,
elected officials and the aviation industry the need for significant safety
improvements to small airline aircraft operations. As a result of those efforts,
smaller airline aircraft now meet the same, or equivalent, standards of the
largest aircraft in the fleet.
This week, we must
embark upon a new mission to achieve one level of security throughout the
airline industry. The security in place last week was, by design, of differing
levels. The rationale behind those disparate levels of security was that the
threat posed to small aircraft was thought to be less than that posed to large
aircraft. The dangers associated with operating at small airports were thought
to be less than the risks germane to large airports. The hazards posed by
service personnel carrying items around the screening checkpoint were,
curiously, thought to be of less concern than those associated with uniformed
crewmembers going to their aircraft. For the most part, we even felt that the
threat to domestic flights was less than the threat to international flights.
And we believed that the threats to cargo aircraft were minimal. These
assumptions have been proved wrong.
We now know that
those assumptions must be discarded so that we can get about the work of
preventing any further acts of aircraft piracy and other acts of malice. It is
now clear that any size aircraft flying from any size airport, international or
domestic, can be used as a human-guided weapon. Accordingly, we believe that in
order to create a truly secure aviation system, we must start with the principle
that the traveling public and aircraft crewmembers need one level of security,
no matter where they fly to or from and regardless of the size of aircraft in
which they travel, or whether it carries passengers or cargo. The remainder of
our comments should be understood in that light.
Last
week's horrific acts of violence were perpetrated, as we now know, against a
nation despised by certain Islamic terrorists. The weapon of choice, namely, an
airline aircraft loaded with fuel and passengers, was viewed as a handy resource
aimed at destroying our nation's economic viability and wracking the American
people with fear. I am sure that you will agree with me that the terrorists will
accomplish neither objective. But, it should be recognized by all that airline
security must be viewed as a component of national security from this day
forward. It is no longer feasible to expect that the airlines alone can protect
the industry that gives wings to the rest of the national economy. While we are
not suggesting that airlines be excused from all costs associated with securing
their aircraft or the facilities that they occupy, we are saying that the
federal budget must share in the costs of defending this national resource.
We call upon the Administration and Congress to ensure
that the funding necessary for fortifying our airlines and airports be made
available so that we can boost the public's confidence in returning to the
skies. Our economy needs a healthy airline industry and enhancing security
immediately will be essential to achieving that goal.
A
New Aviation Security Blueprint
In the early 1970's,
pilots took a strong, solitary stand against hijackings by demanding that the
government mandate security screening of passengers. We were not successful in
persuading the government to provide that protection, despite literally dozens
of hijackings in prior years, until late 1972, when two separate incidents
resulted in two woundings and one death.
Thirty years
later, we find that we must take another strong stand. The aviation security
system, as constructed today, must be completely overhauled in order to (1)
address the new risks that could harm us and (2) bolster the confidence of the
traveling public that it is safe to fly again. We are promoting a new security
"blueprint" which we believe will accomplish both of these goals.
Near-Term Actions
Aviation
security must be dramatically improved, and it must begin not next month or next
year, but today. It must happen now to limit the amount of damage being done
each day to the health of the airlines and our national economy. As mentioned
previously, the federal government should provide the funding for these
"defense-related" expenditures to avoid further harm to an already weakened
industry.
Following are the near-term actions that we
are pursuing, for which we request your support and assistance. As used herein,
we define "near-term" actions as those that are under development now, or could
be very shortly, and can be implemented in a relatively short period.
1.Current cockpit doors are weak and flimsy, and can be
easily compromised by a determined adult. There is a clear need for the
increased security that a stronger door would provide. A dead bolt lock should
be installed on the inside of cockpit doors that cannot be overridden with a key
from outside; the door must be capable of being opened quickly in the event of a
safety problem. This will offer a relatively small, but needed, additional
margin of security over today's cockpit doors.
A
second, lightweight mesh net door should be installed behind the cockpit door on
the flight deck side. This net door could be used as an additional protection
device in the event of a security breach in the cabin.
2. The development of standards for an advanced cockpit door
technology, and research on this technology, is already under way. Such a door,
when installed, will be capable of securing the flight crew against attacks by
would-be cockpit intruders, armed or otherwise. The door system, which must be
fail-safe in the event of an accident requiring rapid egress, should be
retrofitted on current aircraft and installed by the manufacturers on new
airplanes. This item cannot be accomplished immediately, but ongoing work on it
needs to be expedited.
3.Before last Tuesday, we could
scarcely have envisioned calling for cockpit protection in the form of weapons
carried in the cockpit. However, the world has changed and we must change with
it. We recommend the installation of at least two stun guns as standard
equipment in the cockpits of airline aircraft, three if there are three flight
crewmembers.
There are sophisticated stun guns on the
market today that are capable of immediately incapacitating a person of any size
or strength, without posing any health risks to the individual. The devices have
laser sights for accuracy and are capable of being used on a person up to 15
feet away. Use of these guns would be done in only the most extreme
circumstances, to protect the lives and safety of the passengers and crew.
4.We are most pleased to learn that the FBI is in the
process of creating a cadre of federal law enforcement officers to fly armed on
airline aircraft. The FAA is also making plans to increase the number of Federal
Air Marshals (FAMs) assigned to its contingent. ALPA has long been a proponent
of the FAM program, because we are confident in its training standards and
professionalism. We are also confident that the FBI will successfully create a
professional air marshal group capable of defending against the types of
hijackings that we saw last week. We recommend that the Congress provide such
assistance as may be needed to facilitate the creation of the FBI's marshals and
an enlargement of the FAA's FAMs.
5.One of the most
basic functions of a good security system is positively identifying those
individuals who are authorized entrance to an area and keeping out all others.
The absence of access controls was a primary factor in the downing of PSA flight
1771 in December 1987. Since that time, we have called for the institution of
electronic means of positively identifying each and every employee who has
authorization to enter secured airport areas.
Today,
the failure to require airlines and airports to verify employee identities is
the cause of serious concerns about the security of flight. The reported
possibility that terrorists are, or may have, posed as airline employees has
caused us to focus our limited security resources on honest, trustworthy
employees instead of unknown possible-threat passengers.
Last spring, it became public knowledge that GAO inspectors were able
to gain entrance to 19 federal office buildings and carry weapons around two
airport security checkpoints using phony credentials. The FAA is in the process
of developing a highly secure Memory Chip Card (MCC) system to identify armed
law enforcement officers (LEO's). Plans have been announced to install a special
MCC reader at each security screening checkpoint in the U.S. in order to
positively identify armed LEO's. This technology could also be used to
positively screen airline and airport employees traversing the screening
checkpoint.
Until there is a means in place to
electronically verify the identity of all employees and armed law enforcement
officers, they should produce a company ID and a photo driver's license for this
purpose. These items should be examined and validated by the airport police at
the security-screening checkpoint. An alternative measure that would work for
those airports having a computerized access control system would be the
placement of a card reader at the screening checkpoint for use by employees.
6.In today's aircraft, there is only one way for the
flight attendants to talk with the flight crew when the cockpit door is closed,
namely, by calling on the interphone. This method of communication is very
observable when a flight attendant makes a call under duress. We recommend the
installation of a discreet switch(es) in the cabin for use by flight attendants
which enables them to discreetly notify the flight crew that there is a security
breach occurring in the back of the airplane.
7. All
personnel seeking employment in the aviation industry who need access to airline
aircraft in the performance of their duties should, effective immediately, be
required to undergo a criminal background check. The airline industry must
create and maintain the highest personnel hiring standards
in order to protect against "insider" threats. The technology for processing
criminal background checks has advanced to the point where they can be made via
electronic means.
8.Related to item #5, airports and
airlines should immediately revalidate all of their employee's identification
cards using hologram stickers, or through card reissuance. Some airports may be
able to electronically revalidate their cards, if they have a computerized
access control system. The industry is going to experience significant layoffs
and reductions in force over the next several months; this could lead to many
unaccounted-for ID cards that could be used in an illegal manner.
9. The Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System
(CAPPS) is designed to use the passenger information in airline data bases to
determine whether the individual poses a security risk. We have recently learned
that CAPPS is assisting the FBI in its ongoing criminal investigation by
providing information on the travel history of known and suspected terrorists.
If properly configured, CAPPS can help identify potential security risks prior
to boarding. We recommend that CAPPS be used on all domestic and international
arrivals and departures in the U.S., Canada, and Mexico, even after the current
threat is diminished.
10. It has been the experience of
U.S. pilots and flight attendants that, depending on the carrier,
airline-provided security training is poor and outdated. Current training
includes showing crewmembers videos that focus on hijacking situations faced in
the 1970's. Airline security training must not only be more current, it must
also address the threats that a crew is likely to encounter. We recommend that
the airlines enhance their crewmember training through the use of cabin mockups,
problem solving, role-playing scenarios and other quality instructional
methods.
11. The FAA is in the process of updating its
documentation on the "Common Strategy," which is used by FAA, law enforcement,
airlines, and pilots during hijackings. The Common Strategy was written in the
Cuban hijacking era, and so involves procedures for handling extortion-types of
hijackings (e.g., demands for money). It does not address suicidal hijackers or
other such extreme hazards. ALPA recommends that the Common Strategy be amended
to include procedures and training on the newest type of threats.
12. We have a long-standing opposition to the INS's
practice of deporting illegal aliens via airline aircraft. The agency's current
guidance allows groups of up to 10 deportees to board airline aircraft without
any type of escort. There have been serious incidents of unruly behavior and,
most disturbing, the possibility exists that a large group of deportees may
attempt to commandeer an aircraft to avoid deportation. Clearly, INS should find
another method of deporting illegal aliens that does not place the traveling
public at avoidable risk. We urge the INS to only board deportees when they are
accompanied by two or more armed INS agent escorts.
13.
The FAA issues its pilot licenses as traditional paper and ink documents that
could be easily duplicated or forged. Given that pilots use these licenses to
help identify an individual who desires to ride the jumpseat, it is essential
that they be produced in a highly secure format (i.e., electronically
verifiable).
The FAA decided approximately one year ago
to put the names and addresses of pilots in public view on the World Wide Web.
This information could be used in any number of malicious ways. We recommend
that FAA remove the data from the Web and any other publicly accessible
locations.
14. We are all familiar with the
long-running public information campaign of Smoky the Bear, a cartoon figure who
reminds us that "only you can help prevent forest fires." We believe that a
similar campaign should be created by the government and industry aimed at
educating the traveling public about aviation security. A better-informed public
could serve as additional "eyes and ears" of security, assist crewmembers as
appropriate, and cause fewer problems onboard aircraft. We recommend the slogan
"Security is Everybody's Business," and some type of cartoon figure to carry
that message via advertisements, posters, etc.
15.
Consistent with #14 above, the industry should implement the recommendations of
the FAA's Aviation Security Advisory Committee's Employee Utilization Working
Group. The essence of those recommendations is that all airport, airline and
service employees can, and should, receive an appropriate level of training and
ongoing information about how to make aviation more secure. One noteworthy
recommendation is the creation of a security reporting "hotline" at all airports
for tips, suspicious behavior, abandoned bags, and the like.
16. The threat information that pilots get, if any, is poor and usually
outdated. The government intelligence community, working in concert with the
airlines, should develop a greatly enhanced methodology for relaying timely
threat information to the carriers, which can be shared with airline pilots.
17. We must prepare today for the possibility of a
chemical/biological agent attack in our aircraft. Airlines should install
full-vision oxygen masks in all commercial aircraft to enable the crews to
safely land during a chemical/biological agent attack. Aircraft should be
equipped with air quality monitors that can provide an alarm in the cockpit if
the presence of chem/bio agents is detected.
18. The
FAA should immediately develop and implement an ATC communication code for
advising all pilots within radio contact that an aircraft is under duress or has
experienced a significant security-related event. The major purpose of this
action is to alert crews to take appropriate precautionary measures to prevent a
similar occurrence on their aircraft.
19. The ban on
all remote check-ins must include disallowing electronic ticketing check-in
kiosks that currently let passengers check-in and receive a boarding pass
without ever being identified by the carriers. All passengers must check in and
show identification at staffed check-in counters.
20.
Regarding baggage security, we recommend that the FAA impose standard limits on
carry-on baggage in order to let security screeners spend more time examining
each item brought on the aircraft. We strongly support increasing the percentage
of bags subjected to search.
21. Security deficiencies
can, and currently are, impacting safety. One example - virtually every cockpit
crewmember has traditionally carried a small tool kit or "combination" tool in
their flight case for dealing with small mechanical issues inflight. Based on
the most recent FAA Security Directives of which we are aware, pilots may not
carry them through the security-screening checkpoint.
We are urging the FAA to (1) allow pilots to carry such tools through
the screening checkpoint after their identification has been verified, and (2)
require that the airlines place these tools in the cockpit as additional
aircraft equipment.
Longer-Term Actions
Following are our recommendations concerning action items that could be
initiated fairly soon, but will take longer to implement than those above.
1.In view of the unprecedented terrorist threat that may
continue for some time, we believe that the Administration and Congress should
consider the creation of a new aviation law enforcement agency. Currently, civil
aviation security is but
one of many responsibilities
of the FAA. The FAA assumed the task of providing aviation security in the
1970's, approximately 20 years after its creation as a civilian agency. Although
there are many hard-working, talented people at the FAA, it is not a law
enforcement agency nor is it staffed to provide law enforcement support.
Additionally, this branch of the FAA has to compete
internally for resources and priorities within the agency's overall budget. To
avoid this conflict and provide the law enforcement expertise which is now
necessary, we believe that a law enforcement agency should be established whose
sole responsibility would be to prevent and combat aviation-related crime. The
removal of the security responsibility from the FAA would allow the new agency
to be much more proactive. Whereas the FAA's focus is on the development,
promulgation and enforcement of regulations, the law enforcement agency should
be focused on countering existing and evolving threats. This agency would also
be responsible for coordinating threat and other security information with other
law enforcement agencies. ALPA is committed to work with you to create such an
agency.
2. The government's own inspectors, from the
General Accounting Office and DOT Inspector General's Office, not to mention the
FAA's security auditors, have found time and again that the U.S. security
screening system is ineffective. The status quo, whereby airlines contract with
the lowest bidder to perform security screening, has been a complete validation
of the concept "you get what you pay for." It is past time to fix this problem
using highly trained and motivated, wellpaid, screening professionals and the
best possible equipment. A well-run, security-screening corporation, selected
not on the basis of lowest bid but highest competency, should perform the
screening function under the aegis of the aforementioned aviation law
enforcement agency. The U.S. should borrow from successful European security
screening systems, which employ interviewers, maintain separate ramp crew access
and other measures in the development of the new security screening system.
3.Government and industry have, as partners, made great
progress in the development of explosive detection systems capable of spotting
the most ingeniously disguised bombs and most minute particles of explosive
material. However, there is much work still to be done.
FAA is in the initial phases of researching "Free Flow," a high- tech
security screening system. We strongly support this concept and urge the
Administration and Congress to fully fund it, ultimately as a means of rapidly
and accurately detecting explosive devices, weapons, and chemical/biological
agents on persons and in their bags.
4.We have known
for some time that individuals, almost certainly terrorists, are stealing pilot
uniforms and credentials. The imposter threat cannot be effectively dealt with
unless there is positive, electronic verification of the identities of each
employee authorized to enter the secure areas. It is past time that we created a
system that will prevent an airline employee imposter from fraudulently gaining
access to our aircraft and threatening the lives of all onboard and others on
the ground. We have long supported the development and implementation of the
Universal Access System (UAS), an effort aimed at closing the gaping hole in
airline employee identification. FAA has completed UAS standards; we urge that
implementation of it begin immediately.
5.Similar to
the problem of employee identity verification, the airlines are not currently
capable of positively determining who is getting on their aircraft. This is
demonstrated when aircraft leave the gate with an inaccurate manifest; we know
of one airline that routinely allows flights to leave the gate with a two-person
error. As another example, after one accident last year, an airline CEO made a
public request for assistance in identifying the passengers on his own aircraft!
The security ramifications are substantial - unless we know that the person
boarding the aircraft is the same one who bought the ticket, we cannot
positively ascertain that the individual has been through the security
checkpoint and is not carrying a weapon.
6.We are aware
of a technology, available today, which is capable of taking a photo of each
person and their checked bags. The photo is encrypted on the airline ticket in
the form of a striated bar code, known as two-dimensional bar coding.
The ticket is machine read at the gate and a monitor shows
the gate agent the photo of the ticket bearer. If the two faces do not match,
the passenger is denied boarding. The photo of a checked bag can be used to
identify it easily, if it needs to be taken off the aircraft subsequent to
boarding, but prior to flight. The system also avails the ability to positively
match the passenger with his/her bags.
We recommend
that the government investigate the various technologies available for positive
passenger and checked baggage identification and begin moving toward the
eventual goal of requiring the airlines to use it for security purposes. This
identification system can be integrated with CAPPS for even greater synergy.
7.In connection with the item above, the airlines should
create, and have readily available, basic information about each passenger's
special capabilities, if any. In the event of an emergency, the captain could,
by contacting dispatch, immediately determine if there were any doctors, police,
bomb specialists, etc., on the flight who could be requested to provide
assistance. This capability would be extremely helpful in the event of a
security breach, because the captain could determine whether there are onboard
resources that could help resolve the problem.
8.There
is much discussion ongoing today about the feasibility of arming
pilots. The events of last week demonstrated that lethal force could be used
to advantage. We have given this matter serious discussion and we believe that
there could be potential for making this possibility a reality. However, as
noted above, we have a seriously deficient employee identification system that
must first be addressed. We want to ensure that anyone who is armed and going
through the security checkpoint is positively identified.
After meeting that goal, a thorough study should be given to a program
where airline pilots who meet strict qualifications could voluntarily be trained
as sworn federal law enforcement officers with arrest authority and allowed to
carry weapons in the cockpit to protect themselves and their passengers.
9. The FAA should begin a program to certify flight
attendants as safety professionals. This would enhance flight attendant training
and formalize and reenforce their role as safety professionals. This would also
ensure proper training for all types of emergencies. It is essential that flight
attendant training be improved in this area.
Thank you,
again, for the opportunity to appear before you today. I would be pleased to
respond to any questions that you may have.
Document 18 of 24. 