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Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony
April 3, 2001, Tuesday
SECTION: CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY

LENGTH: 4814 words

COMMITTEE: HOUSE GOVERNMENT REFORM

SUBCOMMITTEE: NATIONAL SECURITY, VETERANS' AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

HEADLINE: TESTIMONY SECURITY THREATS TO AMERICANS OVERSEAS

TESTIMONY-BY: LEONARD ROGERS , ACTING ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR

AFFILIATION: BUREAU FOR HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE

BODY:
April 3, 2001 Statement of Leonard Rogers Acting Assistant Administrator Bureau for Humanitarian Response U.S. Agency for International Development Before the Committee on Government Reform Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs and International Relations U.S. House of Representatives Washington, D.C. on "Protecting American Interests Abroad: U.S. Citizens, Businesses, and Non-governmental Organizations Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, for the opportunity to testify today. The potential threat to Americans overseas, and the measures we can take to reduce the risks our people face, are very important and timely subjects. The U.S. Agency for International Development has the legislative mandate to carry out development and humanitarian assistance programs abroad. As USAID Acting Assistant Administrator for Humanitarian Response, I have the responsibility for emergency relief for natural and marinade disasters, crisis transitions, food aid and USAID's relations with U.S. private voluntary organizations. USAID is increasingly concerned about the risks to our own employees and to our private partners in many of the countries in which we work. We have taken a number of steps to address the problem. Nevertheless, it is important to continue to be vigilant and to work to improve security operations for all Americans overseas. Today, I would like to focus on the non-governmental organizations which play such a critical role in implementing U.S. development and humanitarian assistance - organizations like CARE, Catholic Relief Services, Mercy Corps and Samaritan's Purse. Since the end of the Cold War, the world seems confronted with a rising number of vicious internal conflicts, many spurred by ethnic and religious hatred. Many innocent people, especially women and children, become caught up in fighting or are intentionally driven from their homes. The American people give a high priority to assisting the victims of this sort of conflict, and private citizens as well as the U.S. Government contribute resources to U.S. non-governmental organizations in order to help. Unfortunately, this means staff from these organizations must put themselves at risk. In addition, we seem to be in a period where terrorism is an ever-present concern. So the security environment for American non-governmental organizations overseas is dangerous. The Security Environment for American NGOs Since the U.S. Government's involvement in Bosnia starting in 1992, Somalia in 1993 and Rwanda in 1994, USAID has become increasingly aware that the relief environment within which our partners and our own staff work has fundamentally changed. More relief agencies are going where only the International Committee of the Red Cross (1CRQ had previously dared to go. Non- governmental organizations (NGOs) are now working in increasingly complex, militarily charged areas and are often ill equipped to deal with the delicate operational, political and moral decisions they are being barraged with on a daily basis. There is a dearth of experience, policy and consistency with respect to how closely humanitarian workers coordinate with military personnel or if they choose to use armed guards to protect relief supplies. Both the U.S. Government and the NGOs we work with are finding it more important than ever to uphold the basic humanitarian principles of neutrality and impartiality. When these principles are breached, the lives of those working in the field are put at risk. The mere perception that humanitarian workers favor one side over another puts their lives at risk. Even so, the neutrality that once sheltered humanitarian workers is no longer sufficient protection in environments where civilians are increasingly the direct targets of combatants. In terms of our funding of NGOs, in 1970 there were 81 U.S. private voluntary organizations (PVOs) registered with USAID. I would like to note that a PVO is the term given to an NGO with registration status at USAID. There are now 446 registered PVOs, of which 234 have received USAID funding. This growth demonstrates how important these organizations have become as implementing partners. USAID's registration process allows us to ensure that a significant share of the PVOs' funding comes from private sources and that the organization has the management capacity to handle U.S. Government resources. Once registered, PVOs can apply for grants from USAID in Washington, or our field missions can provide assistance directly to PVOs operating overseas. (This does not, however, preclude unregistered NGOs from receiving USAID funding.) Most of our disaster relief is allocated directly to PVOs working abroad. This proliferation of PVO activity demands that we take a closer look at how the U.S. Government can further support protection of its citizens in the field. While the U.S. Government can assist with resources, information and diplomacy, protection is largely the responsibility of host governments and institutions, land they need to beheld accountable. We must insist these governments bring to justice those who commit crimes against humanitarian workers. Otherwise, we can expect these acts of violence will continue to escalate. The signs of this more dangerous security environment have been manifested in many ways, from mundane topics like insurance rates to gruesome headlines. As early as 1992, one of our smaller NGO partners reported that its insurance agency was about to charge $2,500 for each of its personnel that the organization wished to insure in Bosnia. In 1993, a larger NGO partner stated it might have to recall all of its personnel in danger zones worldwide when the organization found out that, after a land mine accident in Somalia, the standard worker's compensation insurance did not cover its staff for this type of accident and that it needed specific war-risk insurance. Evidence has mounted steadily that heading to the field on a mission of mercy is no longer sufficient protection against random or targeted violence. Incidents include: the 1995 abduction and ultimately declared murder of a U.S. citizen and well known relief worker, Fred Cuny; the murders of six International Committee for the Red Cross delegates in Chechnya in 1996; the murders of a high-level UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) representative and a World Food Program (VvTP) logistics officer in Burundi on October 12, 1999; the murder of three UN High Commissioner for Refugees staff, including an American citizen, Carlos Caceres, in West Timor in 2000; and the killings of UN Mission staff in Kosovo in November of 1999 and May of 2000. Just last week, over 20 relief workers were under siege in the Medecins Sans Frontieres (Doctors without Borders) compound in Mogadishu, Somalia. The increased threat of violence is not something U.S. NGOs are experiencing in a vacuum, or in numbers disproportionate to their representation in the field. Since 1992, the United Nations (UN) has lost 184 civilian personnel to accidents and to random and targeted violence. In addition to the steps USAID has taken to address this issue, UN specialized agencies, the UN Security Coordinator, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee and NGOs are all working to minimize their vulnerability to security threats while simultaneously not compromising the importance of their presence in insecure environments. In February, the UN Security Coordinator's office, representatives from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), and all of the major UN operational agencies gathered in Rome to systematically review and, in some cases, redraft the architecture, mechanisms and procedures of UN security practices. The United Kingdom's Department for International Development's Complex Humanitarian Affairs Division and the European Commission's Humanitarian Office are working directly with their partners and in consultation with USAID in support of community- wide initiatives and increased funding for operational security of individual implementing partners. USAID Approach to Enhancing NGO Security The realities and lessons learned from the above snapshot of the past eight years have informed the methods which USAID uses to address the security needs of relief personnel in the field. These lessons are: symbiosis, management, awareness, accountability, context and capacity. In shorthand, they may be referred to as the SMAACC principles: 1.Symbiosis. U.S. NGOs cannot be safe without the entire humanitarian relief community observing and practicing good security management. A misjudgment or carelessness by one organization can easily compromise the security of another. To this end, USAID, through its Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance in the Bureau of Humanitarian Response (BHR/OFDA), has endeavored to reach the widest possible audience when supporting security training and operational security coordination, and in funding equipment and personnel that support individual NGO programs. This thinking also underpins our attempts to promote universally accepted standards with respect to security planning and practices and in supporting the Security Coordination functions of the UN. 2.Management. In order for security to exist, the leadership of each and every NGO, UN agency and donor office must see security as a top priority and as an intrinsic aspect of program design and personnel deployment. In September 2000, USAID through OFDA funded a "Security Seminar for NGO CEOs" course, including the research and development in preparation for the course. 3.Awareness. OFDA has supported research that has demonstrated that risk can be minimized without foregoing presence. Our approach to increasing awareness has included research on appropriate models of security management. This research has in turn informed the curriculum of various security courses and has been published as stand-alone documents to help individual field administrators and agency managers. The training funded by USAID has probably done the most to date to increase knowledge and demand for better security practices. 4.Accountability. Accountability must be comprehensive. NGOs that engage in good security practices, when conducted sensitively and responsibly, will promote not only their own security but also the security of their intended beneficiaries. USAID has attempted to educate NGOs on this point through OFDA proposal guidelines. In these guidelines, OFDA requires information on how security factors are reflected in the design of each intervention and asks if each agency's board of directors is aware of the InterAction Security Planning Guidelines and if the agency adheres to them. 5.Contex . NGOs and other relief personnel need to understand clearly they are not corporate representatives nor are they diplomats nor military personnel. The security practices and thinking that are suitable to these professions are often inappropriate to relief personnel. Many of the skills and abilities of these other communities, however, can be useful to NGO workers if their application accounts for the "context" of NGO work, that is, to work in solidarity with people in need. It is impossible and inadvisable to mandate or train for a specific response to all security threats; a response that may save a person's life at a roadblock in one country could get that person shot in another. Context is also useful in determining which security concept, or combination thereof, to employ: acceptance, protection or deterrence. 6.Capacity. OFDA provides capacity-building opportunities for NGOs that are committed to improving the security of their international and national staff and protecting their intended beneficiaries. This capacity building is done through funding of training at the community-wide level, subsidizing the costs of equipment and systems, and funding research and writing that demonstrate how NGOs are incorporating security as a value into their agencies, USAID Support of NGO Security It must be emphasized that NGOs are independent of governments, of the UN, and of one another. U.S. citizens work for NGOs based in Britain, France and other countries. Thousands of Irish, Australian, British, Kenyan and Indonesian nationals are employed by U.S.-based NGOs. As an influential donor, we can promote best practices, we can encourage NGOs to create policies and to manage and plan for security, and we can provide funding to help ensure they have sufficient resources to ensure their security. However, we cannot force NGOs to do what they will not, and we cannot assume responsibility for their actions, nor can the U.S. Government be held directly accountable for the decisions of individual NGOs and their staffs. Currently, USAID, through OFDA, is contributing over $1.4 million to UN operational security coordination in Angola, Southern Sudan and Burundi. Additionally, OFDA regularly funds coordination structures in other disaster situations that serve as the locus for the exchange of security information for the entire relief community. On an on- going basis, OFDA funds the hardware (radios, satellite phones) and personnel costs (guards, increased employee benefits) required. Moreover, OFDA funds increased insurance premiums and more secure housing required in each USAID- supported NGO program in order to ensure that our partners have adequate resources available to meet their technical security requirements. OFDA has decided that its security-specific initiatives, as distinct from operational requirements, are most useful when they are targeted to the community rather than to individual NGOs. This practice promotes community standards and a common language for discussing security. The practice also demands that NGOs demonstrate their own commitment to improved security management. In 1995, OFDA solely funded InterAction's development of a curriculum and two pilot security training courses that continue to inform training and thinking on the subject around the globe. OFDA continues to fund field security management training through RedR, an NGO that provides a variety of training for humanitarian personnel. To date, RedR has offered security management workshops in Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Indonesia, Liberia, United Kingdom and Angola to over 160 NGO managers and staff and also has offered one "training-of-trainers" course to 20 persons in the United Kingdom. The next offering of the field security management course will take place in Nairobi, Kenya targeting NGOs working in Sudan, Burundi, Rwanda, and Somalia. Another way that OFDA promotes security, maximizes impact and reinforces the need for humanitarian community-wide solutions to security needs of NGOs is by working formally and informally in consort with other donors. USAID's OFDA, State Department's Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM), and the European Community Humanitarian Office have signed a joint statement supporting further security initiatives. State/PRM has pursued its own security initiatives as well, such as in providing $500,000 to the United Nations to help establish a country-wide field security mechanism in the Democratic Republic of Congo to include the deployment of UN field security officers and to provide for some of the security needs of NGOs. The United Kingdom's Department for International Development and a private company, Cable and Wireless, co-fund, along with OFDA, the RedR security course program. As I said earlier, last September, in an effort to increase NGO top management's commitment to and realization of improved security practices, USAID, through OFDA, sponsored InterAction's two-day seminar targeting the chief executive officers (CEOs) of U.S. and European NGOs. As a follow-on to the NGO CEO program, OFDA is funding research into an area that the CEOs identified as one requiring more answers: how to better address the security of their local staff. OFDA has also sought more directly persuasive ways to promote NGO security via the requirement the 1998 "Guidelines for Grant Proposals and Reporting" that NGO proposals submitted for OFDA funding include information on how the security context of a given situation has informed program design and by including NGO security in the programs of the past three biennial conferences of OFDA's NGO partners. OFDA also reinforced the "InterAction Security Planning Guidelines" by reference in its own guidelines and by including the entire text as an annex. Through OFDA, USAID contributed to the research and writing of the book, Operational Security Management in Violent Environments, Van Brabant, K., 2000 and directly and indirectly completely funded the subsequent publication, Mainstreaming the Organizational Management of Safety and Security, Van Brabant, K., March 2001. These works build on many of the initiatives described above and offer not only theoretical models and practical advice, but provide a roadmap for the institutional change required for the integration of security into the management of NGOs. In the future, in addition to direct programmatic and coordination costs, OFDA intends to continue funding security training. In early summer, OFDA intends to issue an annual program statement soliciting new ideas for the promotion of NGO security. USAID will also continue to coordinate its activities with other donors and leverage its funding to ensure the greatest impact on NGO security. USG Support of Expatriate Community Mr. Bergin has just spoken about the Overseas Security Advisory Counsel (OSAC). The USAID Director of Security represents our Agency to OSAC and, with the complete encouragement and support of OSAC and the Director of the Diplomatic Security Service, has worked to have the interests of U.S. non-governmental organizations represented. OSAC has opened its electronic bulletin board to NGOs. The USAID Security Director has made an effort to reach out to NGOs to share awareness of the availability of security support through OSAC, in meetings with the Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid, the Overseas Cooperative Development Council, and constituent NGOs of USAID's Office of Private and Voluntary Cooperation. This is an ongoing initiative. The Security Officer has advised USAID senior staff to be cognizant of the security of NGOs and has given specific guidance on how to accomplish this. In conclusion, USAID takes seriously the security threats to its private sector partners working in difficult environments abroad. The Agency has taken and will continue to take action to make others aware of security needs and to give these needs serious consideration.

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