Copyright 2002 FDCHeMedia, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  
FDCH Political Transcripts
May 2, 2002 Thursday
TYPE: COMMITTEE HEARING

LENGTH: 23098 words

COMMITTEE: HOUSE TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE AVIATION SUBCOMMITTEE

HEADLINE: U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JOHN MICA (R-FL) HOLDS HEARING ON PROPOSALS THAT WOULD ALLOW FLIGHT CREWS TO CARRY WEAPONS

SPEAKER:
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JOHN MICA (R-FL), CHAIRMAN

LOCATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.

WITNESSES:

SARAH HART, DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
CAPTAIN STEPHEN LUCKEY, CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL FLIGHT SECURITY COMMITTEE, AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL
HANK KRAKOWSKI, VICE PRESIDENT, CORPORATE SAFETY, QUALITY ASSURANCE AND SECURITY, UNITED AIRLINES
RON HINDERBERGER, DIRECTOR OF AVIATION SAFETY, BOEING COMPANY

BODY:

 
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE:
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION HOLDS A HEARING ON PROPOSALS THAT
WOULD ALLOW FLIGHT CREWS TO CARRY WEAPONS
 
MAY 2, 2002
 
SPEAKERS:
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JOHN MICA (R-FL)
CHAIRMAN
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TOM PETRI (R-WI)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JOHN DUNCAN JR. (R-TN)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE STEPHEN HORN (R-CA)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JACK QUINN (R-NY)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE VERNON J. EHLERS (R-MI)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE SPENCER BACHUS (R-AL)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE SUE KELLY (R-NY)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE RICHARD BAKER (R-LA)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE ASA HUTCHINSON (R-AR)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JOHN COOKSEY (R-LA)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JOHN THUNE (R-SD)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FRANK LOBIONDO (R-NJ)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JERRY MORAN (R-KS)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE MICHAEL SIMPSON (R-ID)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JOHNNY ISAKSON (R-GA)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE ROBERT (ROBIN) HAYES (R-NC)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE MARK STEVEN KIRK (R-IL)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TIMOTHY JOHNSON (R-IL)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE DENNIS REHBERG (R-MT)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE SAM GRAVES (R-MO)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE MARK KENNEDY (R-MI)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JOHN ABNEY CULBERSON (R-TX)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE BILL SHUSTER (R-PA)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE DON YOUNG (R-AK)
EX OFFICIO
 
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE WILLIAM O. LIPINSKI (D-IL)
RANKING MEMBER
U.S. DELEGATE ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON (D-DC)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON (D-TX)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE LEONARD L. BOSWELL (D-IA)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JOHN BALDACCI (D-ME)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE PETER A. DEFAZIO (D-OR)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JERRY F. COSTELLO (D-IL)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE ROBERT MENENDEZ (D-NJ)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE CORRINE BROWN (D-FL)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JUANITA MILLENDER-MCDONALD (D-CA)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE MAX SANDLIN (D-TX)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE ELLEN TAUSCHER (D-CA)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE BILL PASCRELL JR. (D-NJ)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TIM HOLDEN (D-PA)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE NICK LAMPSON (D-TX)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE SHELLEY BERKLEY (D-NV)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE BRAD CARSON (D-OK)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JIM MATHESON (D-UT)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE MICHAEL HONDA (D-CA)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE NICK RAHALL II (D-WV)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JAMES L. OBERSTAR (D-MN)
EX OFFICIO
 


*


MICA: Good morning. I would like to call this hearing of the House Aviation Subcommittee to order.

The subject of today's hearing is arming flight crews against terrorism. The order of business will be opening statements by members. And then today we have two panels we'll hear from and we will proceed now.

First, I have my statement, and then I'll yield to other members.

Today, of course, the subcommittee will focus on issues that are related to the arming of flight crews with lethal and also less than lethal weapons. Since the tragedies of September 11, 2001, this issue has received considerable attention and public support. Industry experts, however, remain divided over the questions of safety, security and the effectiveness of such measures. I believe this is one of the most important issues that we have to face as far as aviation security in our country today.

This week Chairman Young and I introduced H.R. 4635 entitled "The Arming Pilots Against Terrorists Act." The decision to arm pilots and crews is not taken lightly. With every weapon there exists a risk of collateral injury and damage. These risks, however, must be weighed against the risks of another terrorist attack. We now face a possible situation where the Department of Defense may be forced to make the difficult decision of having our own Air Force shoot down a plane full of innocent passengers and crew due to a terrorist takeover.

Is that and should that be our last option?

Our aviation system is in a vulnerable stage right now of transition and it will be for some time. I strongly believe that under these circumstances, arming trained and qualified flight crew members is an absolutely necessary step to ensure the safety and security of the flying public. Nothing else can provide the deterrence or the effectiveness of a weapon being wielded by a highly trained individual.

I have said this before, I will say it again; I've never seen an issue with such unanimity among groups. There is always some division. But pilots have expressed a nearly unanimous course and consent that they all ask for the ability to defend themselves. Most people aren't aware of this, but we allowed pilots to be armed and to defend themselves with guns in the '60 and '70s. If this was good enough then, it certainly is good enough for us, I believe today, with the threat of terrorism that we face.

Currently, 12 foreign airlines allow their pilots to carry guns, some into the United States. There has never been an incidence where the safety of the aircraft has been compromised by a firearm. Today, military personnel have been deployed to our major airports -- in fact, almost all of our airports -- with far more lethal weapons than we propose under legislation that Mr. Young and I have put forth.

We have law enforcement officers stationed at many of the departure gates, who are also armed, within the secure areas of our airports. We also have air marshals who are armed flying on high-risk flights. However, today, this day, over 20,000 flights will take off from our nation's airports. Realistically, it's almost an impossible task to put an air marshal on every flight. The question here is the last line of defense; and that's the pilot in the cockpit.

Why should a pilot be denied the ability to use all reasonable force and methods for self defense?

We not only owe this to the pilot but we owe this to our crew and the passengers. The pilot should at least have a fighting chance. If any of the pilots on September 11 had had this right and were armed that day, in fact, would have been quite different. Let me say also that for those that are squeamish or concerned about a small caliber, highly regulated weapon being fired at 30,000 feet, they should realize, again, that our last option today is a F-16 firing an air-to- air missile to bring down a hijacked passenger aircraft.

Under the aviation security legislation, which was signed into law nearly six months ago, the administration has had the authority to adopt a rule -- we gave them complete authority to adopt a rule to resolve this issue. They have not done that to date, and we believe they're about to do it. The fact is to learn, and we'll hear in testimony, that until July 2001 last year, before September 11, pilots, in fact, had the ability under law to arm themselves.

I don't think we can wait any longer for a resolution. And the system again, that Mr. Young and I have proposed is first of all voluntary; secondly, it is required that there be training; and third, that the weapons that would be used would be highly specified and also regulated.

Let me finally say of all of the people who look at aviation security, in my opinion, there is no one that is more experienced than the pilots. There's no one that knows better the weaknesses of the system, and they are asking us to arm and defend them. Congress has a responsibility to hear their pleas in this matter, and I look forward to working with all interested parties as we resolve this issue.

I'm pleased now to recognize the ranking member of the subcommittee, Mr. Lipinski, the gentleman from Illinois, who throws a good party, I might say.

LIPINSKI: I'm glad that you enjoyed it, Mr. Chairman.

MICA: You should tell everyone that was the Chicago...

LIPINSKI: That was the taste of Chicago party. It was held last night in the Rayburn cafeteria. We're having a big luncheon today, too, but it's more exclusive.

MICA: I noticed that...

LIPINSKI: We're not inviting everyone.

MICA: ... in talking to the mayor that the Senate has already acted on your bill.

LIPINSKI: Well, the Senate Commerce Committee has acted on my bill, yes, and as soon as we're sure that the full Senate will act upon the bill, we'll want to act upon the bill here in the House of Representatives.

Now, getting back to the subject at hand -- but I always thank you for the opportunity of talking about Chicago -- I'm very happy that you called this hearing today. I think this is an enormously important subject, enormously important issue. A decision does have to be made on this. But I have to say in all candor that immediately after September 11, the idea was brought up about arming the pilots. And I thought that was a wonderful idea, and I thought we should go ahead and do it.

But, as time has gone on, I develop more and more questions all of the time about it, and in reading the testimony today that we are going to hear or reading it over last night, it seems to me that the Justice Department has done a study in regards to nonlethal weapons, and they really didn't come to any absolute conclusion. In fact, it seemed like they came up with a number of questions. Their testimony that we're going to hear today certainly brought up a number of questions in my mind. And they did nothing as far as testing lethal weapons, unless I can't read it all and I missed that in their testimony, or unless they're going to say something new this morning.

Captain Luckey's testimony is going to say that he strongly supports arming the pilots with lethal weapons, and based upon conversations I've had with a number of pilots, they certainly seem to be very strongly in favor of having lethal weapons at their disposal.

The captain from United is going to tell us how great the advanced TASER is, and I learned in his testimony that TASER stands for Thomas A. Swift Electric Rifle. I assume that's the gentleman who invented this particular weapon, but he really doesn't say anything about lethal weapons. And I congratulate United on the tremendous amount of testing they have done in regards to this.

Finally, Mr. Hinderberger from Boeing is going to testify, and he's going to tell us that one bullet or multiple bullets isn't going to really do anything to bring down an aircraft. It's suffered many, many other more traumatic problems and they've continued to fly. But his testimony really is a testimony to how great the Boeing aircraft is and really has very little to do with arming pilots.

So I come to this hearing this morning, Mr. Chairman, having more questions than ever about this particular issue and, yet, I know we have to get an answer and get an answer very soon. So I congratulate you on holding this hearing. I congratulate you and Mr. Young on putting this bill in. I think it puts maximum pressure on the Transportation Security Administration to make a decision and get beyond where we are at today.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MICA: I thank the gentleman.

Let me recognize the former chairman of the subcommittee, the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Duncan.

DUNCAN: Well, thank you very much, Chairman Mica and I, too, appreciate your calling this very important hearing, and I appreciate the efforts that you and Chairman Young are making to carry this issue forward.

I support the efforts to arm pilots. I noticed in the Aviation Daily this morning that some 50,000 pilots have signed petitions asking that they be allowed to be armed. I think that you and Chairman Young have taken a very reasonable approach toward this by making it voluntary and making it available only to pilots who have gone through training.

The Wall Street Journal said in an editorial yesterday that arming pilots is an important security measure. Federal air marshals will never be able to protect more than a small fraction of flights. Reinforced cockpit doors, while an improvement, aren't impregnable and will still need to be opened periodically during flight. And they ended that editorial by saying it shouldn't take another disaster before we get serious about keeping hijackers out of the cockpits.

I can tell you that just prior to passage of the aviation security law, we had 27,000 or 28,000 screeners. A few days ago the Transportation Security Administration came before the Transportation Appropriations Subcommittee and said that they were now going to need 72,000 employees. That's probably the most ridiculous thing, or one of most ridiculous things I've heard since I've been in the Congress. And I can tell you that I hope, for God's sake, we get some common sense and don't approve that kind of expansion.

But this arming of pilots is something that we can do that will be a great boost to security on our airplanes, and it's something that we can do at almost minimal cost, and I think it's something we should move forward on. And this hearing will help develop what is the best method to arm pilots and what is the best weapon to arm pilots with and the way to go about that. And I know that, Mr. Chairman, you will lead the way and bring to fruition this very important legislation, and I commend you and I support your efforts.

Thank you very much.

MICA: I thank the gentleman.

I'll recognize the gentlelady from California, Ms. Tauscher.

TAUSCHER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think this is a very, very important hearing.

My constituents in California are very concerned about the idea of arming pilots with lethal weapons in cockpits. I am a supporter of making sure that we have the opportunities to secure cockpits. Obviously, we're interested in having nonlethal opportunities, perhaps Tasers or other weapons that are available.

My concerns are very simple: How do you deal with the fact that you could have three people in a cockpit that are armed, no people in a cockpit that are armed? What do you do if the first officer has a gun and the captain doesn't like it? What do you do about flight attendants?

I think that this is important because we have to deal with securing the airplanes and everybody around it and in it. I believe we have to have a security policy that creates a hermetically sealed airplane. And if you believe that the last line of defense should be the captain and the pilot and the first officer, then we're doing a terrible job of securing that airplane. And I believe in the end that security is very important. We should have Tasers and other security devices that are accessible to people on the airplane, but I want the airplane to be flown by someone who believes that that's his job and her job, to fly the airplane, not to be the last line of defense.

So I think that this is a last-step issue. This is not something that is the most important thing we should be doing. And I think, frankly, it's concerning to me that this has become something that we're paying attention to when we have tremendous issues about security in airports that still exist. Much hard work to do, and I think we all need to get together. I think this is a potentially very controversial issue that will break people's relationships and their ability to work together. And I think that we have to be much more open-minded about finding other kinds of solutions that are going to be much more acceptable to a wide range of people and not deal with just something that appears to be, in my opinion, a knee-jerk reaction.

Thank you.

MICA: I thank the gentlelady.

And let me recognize the gentleman from South Dakota, Mr. Thune.

THUNE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank you for holding this hearing to address an issue which is critically important to South Dakota and to this entire country.

Congress and the DOT have set in motion a national plan to make commercial aviation more secure and many of those things, those mechanisms are in place; security personnel at the airports, passenger screening, explosive detection technology, reinforced cockpit doors, air marshals are all designed to create multiple layers of security to prevent terrorists from gaining access to or control of an aircraft. And as we continue to implement those measures around America's airports, I believe that something else that we can do is to give properly trained pilots the option to defend the cockpit with lethal force and ensure that we have a last line of defense against future hijacking attempts.

We trust pilots every day with our very lives every time that we fly. Personally, I believe -- and am willing -- to trust them as well with a firearm if it means reducing the risk or the likelihood of another September 11. We all need to remember that if passenger screening, and reinforced cockpit doors, air marshals and all of those less-than-lethal weapons fail to stop determined hijackers, the last line of defense is shoot down the aircraft. On the other hand, if pilots, who are trained in firearm use, can defend a cockpit with lethal force and save the plane and the passengers and avoid a potential shoot down situation, then I would certainly be for it.

I don't think there's any doubt that less than lethal force -- defensive weapons -- can be effective in some situations. However, I believe that pilots should, if they choose to, be able to choose how to defend their plane and cockpit if it means firearm use. We can't ignore the fact that there is some risk, obviously, associated with arming flight crews, but I think that the risk of not arming them is just as real.

And so, Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to support your legislation and look forward to hearing from the witnesses this morning. And I want to thank you and Chairman Young for your leadership on this very important issue.

MICA: I thank the gentleman.

Let me know recognize the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Pascrell.

PASCRELL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Although some polarizing groups have begun to weigh in, I hope we can all keep our debate above that of gun control issues.

Arming pilots is an issue that was not taken very seriously before the unthinkable occurred on September 11. In the wake of that fateful day, we have all had to reevaluate our preconceived notions of what is possible and what is necessary for the high security of our nation.

The American people trust pilots with their lives everyday, and I have the utmost respect for their aviation security recommendations. They are literally the captains of the ship. I am quite comfortable with the thought of less-than-lethal weapons in the cockpit because when I examine the legislation, we talk very specifically about authorizing the federal flight deck officers to carry a firearm and we authorize the use of force, including deadly force, against an individual in defense of an aircraft and, I assume, other weapons besides firearms. I don't know what that means.

I think that the cockpit is the perfect place to perhaps implement what we've talking about in this Congress for three years, and that is smart-gun technology. I would not want a terrorist to get hold of the captain's weapon. And when we see what happens in the history of terrorism in the air, that's a possibility. And I know we've sealed the cockpit, but I think this is a time for the Department of Justice, which has been monitoring that technology over the last five years, to come forth and tell us where we're at.

Now, we have to put our cards on the table here. We have to put our cards on the table, Mr. Chairman. We can't go half way here, and we need to examine the technology as it exists, even if it offends certain groups in this country, if we really believe, if we really believe that we can make our citizens more safe in the air by arming individuals that are captains of the ship. We cannot be blind to the fact firearm accidents do occur, and I would want to cut those down. This is the perfect place to demonstrate the technology -- the state- of-the-art -- to where it's developed so that no one will be able to fire those arms unless it has been so identified, whether it's a chip, whether it's fingerprints, whatever it is. This is the place to do it.

With a renewed commitment to security and funding available to promote new technologies, I think that smart-guns can be effectively utilized now more than ever. And I think the Justice Department has an obligation to tell us where the state-of-the-art is.

There are many questions that must be answered before I can support allowing pilots to carry lethal weapons. Our secretary of transportation and homeland security director have both expressed grave concerns. I hope that the panelists can alleviate some of my fears. Certainly, arming pilots is not the proverbial silver bullet to protect our skies from terror. We must not forget that the key to our security system is keeping the terrorists off the planes in the first place.

September 11 taught us that nothing is outside the realm of possibility, and we should always be prepared. So I'm anxious to hear from the Justice Department about this, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you.

MICA: I thank the gentleman.

Let me recognize now the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Hayes.

HAYES: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I, too, appreciate you having this hearing, and I am in strong, strong support of allowing our pilots to carry arms.

There have been very valid questions raised by my friend, Ms. Tauscher. This is the place to air those questions. But as I look at this whole issue, a number of things come to mind.

We have done a number of things to address airline safety. This is one of the most practical, most effective and the most needed that we've looked at and the simplest even though there are questions that must be answered. There's a term -- Leonard knows it well -- PIC; pilot in command. That's the man or woman who makes the decision on a morning like this "Do I launch down the runway into that thunderstorm or do I wave it off?" That's the person that decides whether to take this route or another route. Air traffic control, their company -- they're not in charge -- that pilot is in charge. So this, among other things, gives the pilot the ability to look at the localizer and glide slope out the window, not over his shoulder, wondering what's happening.

So this to me, among other things, not only provides safety, but it frees up the pilot-in-command to concentrate his effort on his task, which is safely piloting that craft.

For some of you in the audience, I don't know, maybe there's some of you who violently oppose this. I would welcome the opportunity to sit down and talk with you if we're miles apart or if we're in the same boat. So after this is over, I would invite that.

Again, Mr. Chairman, I think this is a very good common-sense practice and balanced approach. It's a great deterrent. It's also a proper last line of defense that frees the pilot up to do his primary duty.

Thank you.

MICA: Thank you.

The gentleman from Oregon, Mr. DeFazio?

DEFAZIO: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The operative words there are the last line of defense, and that's one of the key issues to me. We're moving at the usual glacial speed in providing adequately armed flight decks.

DEFAZIO: I think the proposed regulations are not adequate. El Al has double doors. Personally, I believe we ought to be headed toward a system where the pilots are up behind flight deck doors that don't necessarily have to be double because you should also have a lav and refreshment facilities up there, so the door isn't open during flight.

I watched the, you know, the sort of humorous moving of the food cart in front of the first-class section and, you know, the flight attendant standing menacingly behind it while the pilot opened the door and held the door open for several minutes chatting and came through any number of times on my last flight to Washington, D.C. Not great security. So that's one concern.

Another is that, you know, we're fighting the last war here. It's less likely that they're going to try and take over a commercial airliner since everybody is going to be up, including the 95-year-old women, who are frequently searched under FAA guidelines, hitting the terrorists over the head with their purse. You know, so that's another issue.

I'm very concerned about explosives, and I think that's where they'll go next. I think they'll just take some planes down. They're not going to use them as weapons. And they may be personal bombs, like we see in the Middle East, they may be in baggage. I'm concerned about our implementation of the baggage checking and also a total disregard for screening of passengers for personal bombs -- magnetometers don't find bomb belts. So all those things concern me.

But on the particular debate before us, it is the last line of defense, and I believe that pilots should be given something other than the escape rope and the fire ax to defend themselves in the flight deck. We saw that used rather effectively with the deranged individual on the flight to South America. But, you know, there are other, more effective means.

I'm pretty open on this issue. I have a permit to carry concealed, and, you know, I have questions about where I see that many types of law enforcement officials are carrying guns on board. I hope that their ammunition is being checked because my understanding is that air marshals and potentially pilots would be using fragmentation- type bullets, glazers or others that are less likely to penetrate the hull of the aircraft and cause a decompression or other catastrophic damage.

So I think there are a number of questions to be answered here, and I think we should move ahead deliberately but, you know, I am a bit frustrated at the pace. I've been willing to cut the TSA a lot of slack, but I am concerned at both the magnitude of some of their proposals and the pace at which they're moving on others that I think are even more important. And, in fact, you know, the fact that the administration -- this administration -- has yet to definitively deal with this issue.

We passed this bill last fall. I can't imagine you haven't come to a conclusion whether or not pilots should be allowed to arm themselves and with what. That's extraordinary to me, and I hope that this hearing sheds some light on that lack of action on the part of the administration.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MICA: I thank the gentleman.

The gentleman from New York, Mr. Quinn.

QUINN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank you and Mr. Lipinski both for having this hearing.

As others have said already this morning, this is a timely, timely discussion as we look at other areas of security. Certainly, the Airline Pilots Association and others have been in the forefront with making the traveling public as safe as they possibly can.

Mr. Chairman, interestingly enough, a lot of the questions that have been already brought up this morning and that I echo are also on the minds of our constituents. And I just took a survey in my office before I walked down here to the hearing with our seven or eight staffers and an intern or two that are up there, and there are a lot of questions.

Who doesn't want to make airline safety as safe and secure as it possibly can be? I think all of us have that as a goal. But the traveling public wants to know about the training of the pilots. What if a pilot doesn't pass the training? What if, because of personal preferences, a pilot doesn't want to carry a weapon? What if, you know, a pilot's uncomfortable with that, or a copilot?

There are a lot of questions about where we're going to be headed with this, and I'm looking forward to the panels today to ferret out those questions and to talk them through.

Public discussion: Will the passengers know that the pilots are armed? Will the public know are both armed, and with what? Will there be any options?

I think a lot needs to be discussed, and this is the perfect place to have it begin, Mr. Chairman, and I applaud you not only for the work you've done this far since September 11, but certainly this morning's hearing, as you and Mr. Lipinski have proven to be leaders to get the discussion going, and I'm happy to be involved and salute you both.

Thank you.

MICA: I thank the gentleman.

The gentleman from Maine, Mr. Baldacci.

BALDACCI: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I also would like to echo those comments about the hearing and the necessity for the hearing.

It's unfortunate that the department and the Justice Department haven't been able to promulgate and to expedite the review that was called for in the law that was passed here in this committee and in this Congress.

I just want to say that I respect tremendously all of the pilots. It's been my experiences that they're the most qualified, most professional and, frankly, their backgrounds usually tend to be in the military, so they tend to be the most comfortable in terms of combat situations or situations that require extraordinary means. And I know that they realize that this is a terrorist battle and they don't know, in terms of situations or circumstances, from one person or a group of people to another what to expect. And I'm sure they recognize that they want to be prepared for every kind of circumstances. So I really do appreciate and respect the pilots and their background and am entirely comfortable with their experiences.

The concern that I have in moving ahead in this particular area at this time is that I think it's probably more important that this be developed in a way that can engage the experts because of the potential in terms of the collateral damage, in terms of a lot of other issues that could cause unintended consequences, to allow for the process that's been set up under the public law to continue. We should also realize that there is a process now for pilots to be able to get the permit to carry a weapon on the plane. I also understand that no permit has been approved, requires the cooperation of the company and also the Federal Security Administration, and I think we need to be able to have a review, and hopefully this hearing will allow us that opportunity to see what's taken place or not taken place.

BALDACCI: I share the concern of some of the pilots of not being equipped, but, at the same time, there are a lot of other issues that are competing here. And I think the examinations of this hearing and the discussions taking place today should open up the collateral issues that, you know, would cause some unintended consequences.

So, Mr. Chairman, I also would like to have an update, if it's possible, in terms of where we are with all the other changes that we made in terms of the federal screeners and where we are with our airport security screening. I know at Washington National they've reverted back to the policies that were pre-September 11, in terms of their flight planes and other issues related to that. And I'd like to see where those laws are and what's been promulgated or not promulgated, and see if that's increased the security atmosphere at the airports and with the airline pilots, and if there are problems with those laws that have been passed.

So this may give us a good opportunity to be able to get into all of those other issues, and I look forward to the discussion.

I just want to continue to reinforce the respect that I know all of us have for the pilots and for their experiences and background and being able to protect their people on their plane in looking out for their crew. We're very fortunate with the caliber of pilots and flight attendants and personnel. And I know it hasn't been very easy for them and it's been very difficult to go on, but they've shown a lot of courage and valor, and we appreciate that.

And we look forward to working with you in the committee as we go through the deliberations. And I yield back, Mr. Chairman, any time I have remaining.

MICA: I thank the gentleman.

Just to answer your question, we do have some members present relating to the security briefing next Wednesday, and we don't have the exact time yet. We will have a closed-door, members-only briefing. That will be closed-door because we will have some security, classified issues being discussed. But members will, again, in our periodic sessions with the administration, TSA, have an opportunity to ask questions and meet with these officials and get an update.

Let me recognize the gentleman from Iowa, Mr. Boswell.

BOSWELL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, too, appreciate you calling this meeting, and I think we're on a subject that we ought to deal with.

I just was sitting here listening to everybody talk about it, and it caused me to reflect a little bit on the quality of people we have flying our airplanes. Now, think about it.

I know that you share with me that you recognize these are top- quality people. Now, what do we trust them with? We trust them to take hundreds of people -- on regional jets clear up through these jumbos -- 300-plus, millions-of-dollar costs for equipment, over flying our cities, taking off and landing in our cities. These are the people that we have up there in that cockpit.

Now, question: How many are currently military pilots in the Air Guard or Reserve? We probably know that. A lot of them. How many have had previous military experience? A lot of them. So this doesn't cost very much. We're entrusting people with all this other responsibility, and if they would like to be armed, why are we having such a problem?

I think it's something we can do to give confidence to the traveling public. I think they'd appreciate it. And I think we ought to be about doing that business. I trust them.

Now, the things I've just said, I could add to it and so the rest of you could too. They want to be armed. They care about our safety, the traveling public, and it's something that we ought to do.

And by the way, those of you here that would report back to pilots, thank them for their public relations of talking to the passengers and greeting people and doing their PR thing. It gives a lot of the traveling public a lot of confidence and good feeling, and I want to thank the crews that are doing that and doing it very well.

So, I appreciate, Mr. Chairman, you having this hearing today, and you probably have figured out how I feel about it.

Thank you.

MICA: I thank the gentleman.

And I recognize the gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Johnson.

JOHNSON: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and ranking member.

Let me say from the outset that I do not support this legislation. I really do believe that it's ill-conceived. I also believe that if we were to enact the legislation, we would be distracting the Transportation Security Administration from doing the job that still lies ahead.

The TSA already has its hands full implementing important provisions, such as the deadline for installing bomb-protection equipment. So I don't think it just doesn't need this exercise to drain away precious time and resources from that task.

I will listen to the testimony. I have not had a single pilot come to me wanting to be a law enforcement officer. Perhaps they do, but I think -- and I trust pilots. I have to. I fly every week back and forth to my district. But I want them to be looking at what that plane is doing rather than taking on a law-enforcement role.

I don't know that I can agree to deputizing pilots and directing the TSA to authorize such personnel to carry firearms. I really oppose this concept because pilots really are, first and foremost, responsible for navigating aircraft and guiding it to a safe landing in the event of a hijacking. With all the security we're supposed to have in place -- homeland security getting all this money -- it shouldn't even be a question as to whether someone has a weapon on that plane. Their primary duty is to see that the plane is flown and landing safely, and we already have air marshals, which is law enforcement. We have never passed a law that allowed the private sector to take on the law enforcement of this country.

So I really oppose this legislation because arming pilots is inconsistent with a sound strategy to combat situations like what happened on 9-11. We have spent millions of dollars reinforcing the walls between the cockpit and the passenger cabins to isolate and separate them. This is a sound strategy because we want to make it harder for a potential hijacker to get in the cabin to have access to the pilot controls.

If we deputize pilots as law enforcement officers and provide them with firearms, they are essentially being told that they would venture out from the cockpit to engage in combat with hijackers. By doing so, that would open up, again, the separation between these two areas in an aircraft. We might as well have not wasted the money or time reinforcing the cockpit walls.

And finally, H.R. 4635 completely circumvents the role of airlines in deciding whether their employees should be armed. Let me remind everyone that, first and foremost, pilots are employees of private companies and are responsible to management for their actions. I'm aware of no other employer-employee relationship in the private sector where the federal government allows an employee to serve double-duty as law enforcement officer in addition to their normal responsibilities without the employers consent.

So I thank you for your leadership. You've been here a lot longer than I have. You've looked at this issue probably more. To my left is my colleague who is a pilot. And, you know, if somebody wanted to give a free pistol to somebody, a pilot probably would accept it. But I think we're headed in the wrong direction.

Thank you, and I yield back.

MICA: I thank the gentlelady.

I'm pleased to recognize the ranking member of the full committee, the gentleman from Minnesota, Mr. Oberstar.

OBERSTAR: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I will be brief, as I think we need to get on with the witnesses, and I have a few observations. I'll submit a longer statement for the record.

OBERSTAR: Travelers are not going to return to the skies if their only sense of security is the ability of a pilot to shoot a terrorist in the flight deck in mid-air. The burden of proof is on those who advocate arming pilots in the flight deck.

In the Transportation Security Act, we crafted a multi-layered system of security redundancy that taken together provided a web of protection for air travelers if fully implemented. We also tasked the undersecretary of transportation for security with evaluating all the issues associated with arming pilots. That process has not been completed.

Our time would be better invested in prodding the TSA and the airlines into implementing positive passenger bag match than dealing with this issue, which is still in its gestation in a stage of study. To create, by an act of Congress, a federal flight deck officer to me gives new meaning to the term "riding shotgun" in the days of the wild west. This is an impatient, ill-advised bill. Should it somehow find its way through to enactment will begin the slow unraveling of the Transportation Security Act with subsequent legislation aimed at other provisions that people are impatient with.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MICA: I thank the gentleman.

The gentlelady from Nevada, Ms. Carson?

Or, Mr. Carson, excuse me.

CARSON: You're confusing me with Shelley Berkley, much to both of our chagrin.

MICA: All right. We got you mixed up. Sorry.

CARSON: That's quite all right.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me join in the chorus of people thanking you and Ranking Member Lipinski for holding this hearing and associate my comments with so many of the members thanking you as well.

Let me also echo what Mr. Defazio was saying that perhaps this issue would be irrelevant if not for the grotesque lack of implementation and scope of the regulations to protect our nation's airways that have been passed since September 11. Like him, I have an open mind about this issue. I think it provides some interesting questions about public policy.

And look forward to hearing the witnesses testify, hopefully sooner rather than later. And I'd be happy to submit a longer statement for the record as well.

MICA: I thank the gentleman.

And recognize now Mr. Sandlin, the gentleman from Texas.

SANDLIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Oberstar and Mr. Lipinski for holding this hearing, which would establish a program to arm pilots within the Department of Transportation.

As we are all aware, this committee and the Congress, after long and arduous negotiations, developed and passed comprehensive aviation security legislation. The Transportation Security Administration is now implementing this new security measure. When developing the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Congress determined that pilots should have the ability to carry weapons to defend the aircraft, and I support that wholeheartedly.

Specifically, the legislation authorizes the secretary of transportation, with the approval of the attorney general and the secretary of state, to allow members of a flight crew to carry less- than-lethal weapons in the interest of avoiding air piracy. This legislation also provides that a pilot of a commercial air carrier may carry an approved firearm while operating an aircraft if he receives approval from the undersecretary of transportation for security and his employer and he has received the proper training.

Although I support the right of pilots to carry nonlethal and lethal weapons, I realize that many issues must be considered, debated and decided upon. I believe that we must give pilots every opportunity to defend their aircraft, period. Airline pilots are a critical line of defense in case of a hostile takeover by an aircraft, and they must have every option at their disposal to ensure the safety of their passengers and those of us on the ground.

I would like to emphasize that this bill does not require pilots to carry weapons, but only would set up a process to ensure that those who do are adequately trained to use them. Those of us that have been trained to use weapons know that they can be used safely and effectively. I support the pilots. I support their professionalism. And I believe they have the ability to protect the aircraft and they have the obligation to protect the public.

Also, I think we should make sure that pilots are given proper attention after the fact in the event that they are required to protect the aircraft and protect the citizens that are on the aircraft. We need to consider things such as paid time off after an incident, counseling with professionals and other appropriate professional action that may be necessary and proper to get the pilots back to work and get them back to work comfortably.

I look forward to hearing the testimony of the witnesses on this issue. I believe this legislation provides the necessary guidance to the Department of Transportation to assist them in developing the policies and procedures required for the agency to implement the provisions of this security legislation. This provides a thoughtful and regimented approach to ensuring that the Department of Transportation screens, trains and evaluates each pilot who wishes to carry a nonlethal or a lethal weapon.

Again, I want to thank the chairman and the ranking members for developing this legislation and calling this hearing. I look forward to the debate. And would again emphasize I support the pilots in protecting their aircraft.

OBERSTAR: Mr. Sandlin, would you yield a moment?

SANDLIN: Thank you. I'm done, but I'll yield. Thank you.

OBERSTAR: Mr. Chairman, I just want to make one point that I had overlooked. I am advocating -- I think most of us are here -- that arming a pilot is a piece of the safety. It's just one of the parts. It's one of the parts. I don't have any argument with other things that have been said about doing the other steps. But this would be a part of it, a piece of it that we could do quickly and without much expense.

I yield back.

MICA: I thank the gentleman.

Let me recognize the gentlelady from the District, Ms. Norton?

NORTON: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I do think this is an issue that needs serious discussion in more than newspapers, and this bill and this hearing forces us to come to grips with it.

If this hearing were being held in the days after September 11, it would be far more understandable than holding a hearing today about arming pilots. There is a terrific presumption to be overcome here, and the burden is on those who want to arm pilots.

The reason that there is a burden to be overcome is that this committee and this Congress have created a whole set of redundancies aimed at assuring the public that they are safe when they get on an airplane. And now, eight months after September 11, we are having a hearing on arming pilots, which must make people wonder whether or not the redundancies in place are working or should work.

I think that there is a terrific burden on all of us to demonstrate that more good than harm will be done by arming pilots. There are a host of nonlethal alternatives that nobody has even tried or suggested. And yet, we are hopping to arming pilots.

Are we aware that the trained military personnel guarding the Al Qaeda in Cuba are not armed? That people who guard rapists and murderers in our jails are not armed? Why are they not armed? These are people who are very, very good at figuring out ways to outsmart law enforcement officers. But the judgment has been made that more harm than good could be done by arming such people.

Here, we are talking about a situation where possibly hundreds of members of the public could be implicated. I am perfectly prepared to regard pilots as law enforcement officers if it should come to that because I regard guns in the hands of law enforcement officers as quite different from guns in the hands of the average person. So I do not bring my normal approach to guns to this issue, as I realize we are talking about a very special class of people. I'm for arming the cops. You know, there's a whole set of folks I'm for arming. And pilots could be added to that if we establish that of all the alternatives left on the table, the most effective one that is now necessary is arming pilots.

We know this much; that guns in the home of average people, or even people who know how to use guns, are more likely to be used in killing relatives and in suicide. That's not the purpose of which a person has a gun in his home.

NORTON: In the same way, a gun in the cockpit, we have to consider might be also subject to be used for purposes other than the purpose intended. Before one makes that great leap, it seems to me that this committee and this House has to look at each and every one of the alternatives, and conclude that none of them is sufficient, and that we must make the great leap to arming pilots. Until that time, I remain open to that burden of proof being met.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

MICA: I thank the gentlelady.

The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Isaacson.

ISAACSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll be very brief.

I would observe that on September 11 -- I certainly didn't and I don't know that anybody really ever contemplated that an airplane would be used the way in which it was, and the protocol our pilots and flight attendants went through at that time were exactly the opposite of what they would be today if an airliner were hijacked.

I want to commend you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this hearing because I think it is something that very definitely should be considered and be considered very diligently. The gentlelady from the district made some good points, but I would say this, you can never have enough redundancy when you're talking about the lives of hundreds of people in an airliner at 30,000 feet. And as a last line of defense, it seems to me plausible that the knowledge that there was a line of defense in the cockpit would be a significant deterrent to those that might otherwise try to hijack an airplane from ever contemplating doing it in the first place.

Now, I say that because I believe we owe it to the American public in the post-9-11 era, which will be forever, to contemplate every line that we can; every regulation that we can; every protocol that we can to make every mode of travel as safe as possible. And as a last line of defense for the airplane and as a deterrent from even accessing the cockpit in the first place, this hearing is about what appears to me to be a very plausible and reasonable thing to do, providing that the training, the compliance of the airline and the pilots and their ultimate agreement is the thing to do is the way in which we approach it.

So I look forward to hearing from the witnesses today. I thank you for calling the hearing, and I think we should always, no matter how far it is post-9-11, hold hearings when we're talking about the safety of the American traveling public and the safety of transportation in this country.

And I yield back.

MICA: I thank the gentleman.

Any additional opening statements?

Yes, Mr. Culberson?

CULBERSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank you for calling this hearing and to state for the record that I've had the privilege in the Texas legislature of working directly with Sarah Hart on a number of matters involving public safety -- the Texas prison system -- and she was instrumental, in fact, in helping the state of Texas in a very innovative and creative way regain control of its prison system after 20 years of federal court control.

And I have to tell you, Mr. Chairman, we're lucky to have her at the Department of Justice. And in my opinion, after 14 years in the Texas House, I never had an occasion to work with a more capable, honorable or intelligent adviser than Sarah Hart. She was instrumental in the work we did in Texas, and she is doing a superb job at the Department of Justice and we're fortunate to have her here today and look forward to hearing her testimony.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MICA: I thank the gentleman.

Any additional opening statements?

There being no additional member statements, Mr. Lipinski moves that the record be opened for 30 days for submission of additional comments for the record.

Without objection, so ordered.

I ask unanimous consent that a statement by the Airline Pilot Security Alliance, who presented me with this petition signed by 44,574 individuals, be submitted to the record.

Without objection, so ordered.

And they did not list all 44,000 names, which will save us some money on the submission.

Also, just before I introduce our witnesses, I did ask that we have a display of a Taser and that weapon is here. Some of you maybe have not seen a Taser. We did have a display yesterday. Mr. Oberstar refused to participate and have it tested on him, and the only volunteer that we had -- although after his statement...

(LAUGHTER)

... but he was tied up at the time and couldn't be Taser'ed. But Adam Zall (ph) from our staff did volunteer and was Taser'ed. And if any of you would like to talk to him after this hearing about how it felt, and I think this is the latest model. Again, it's a nonlethal weapon. But I thought I'd pass this around the committee room here in case you have not seen this, and we'll have some questions about its effectiveness during the hearing.

So with those comments and the opening statements, let me introduce our first panel. We have one witness and that's Sarah Hart. Mr. Culberson told us some of her background. But she is now the director of the National Institute of Justice, the Office of Justice Programs in the Department of Justice.

You're welcome, most welcome. And I know you've been anxiously awaiting during the members' opening statements, and we look forward to your testimony at this time.

Welcome and you're recognized.

HART: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. And thank you, Congressman Culberson, for those kind words.

And just for the record, I'm not volunteering to be tested by the Taser.

But we are here on a very serious matter today.

MICA: You're a little bit...

HART: Can you hear?

MICA: Maybe pull it as closely as possible.

HART: Can you hear me?

MICA: That's a little better, thank you.

HART: I apologize, Mr. Chairman.

We are here on a very serious matter today, and I am very pleased to be here to testify about the work of the National Institute of Justice in developing and testing less-than-lethal weapons. Today I will focus on less-than-lethal weapons in preventing and responding to on-board attackers and potential acts of terrorism.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act required NIJ to assess whether less-than-lethal weapons could be used by commercial airline flight deck crews. Specifically, we focused on whether less-than-lethal weapons would temporarily incapacitate persons who present a danger to the safety of the aircraft, its passengers and individuals on the ground. NIJ submitted its findings and recommendations to the secretary of transportation on April 18 of this year.

As you know, NIJ was given 90 days to complete this assessment. We, therefore, did not have time to actually test the use of less- than-lethal weapons in an aircraft setting. Therefore, our report was based on three things: First, existing research and development of these types of weapons; second, meetings with experts from the aviation industry, including the FAA; and third, meetings with individuals experienced in the design and use of less-than-lethal technology.

Our report concludes that some less-than-lethal weapons used in accordance with appropriate policies and training have the potential to thwart an attack in an aircraft. These weapons could stop an attack, control the aggressor or delay an attack while the flight crew safely lands the plane. However, we strongly recommend that there be substantial testing before decisions are made as to whether these weapons should be deployed on commercial airlines.

Most less-than-lethal weapons were designed for use in an open setting or inside a house or other structure. Primarily, they have been used by law enforcement officers and corrections officers in riots, hostage rescues and in other situations. Commercial aircraft, however, present a new environment with many challenges.

First, the air is recirculated in relatively small spaces. Secondly, there are sensitive, critical flight instruments that are in continual use on the aircraft. And finally, passengers and crew are confined in crowded spaces. These factors may increase risks to innocent third parties, as well as the likelihood of harming flight crew members or critical aircraft systems.

In weighing these risks, NIJ concluded that less-than-lethal weapons for use in commercial aircraft should ideally have the following attributes: First, it should be able to immediately incapacitate the aggressor; second, it should have quickly reversible and controllable effect, particularly if flight crew members are accidentally incapacitated by the weapon; third, they should be usable in confined space, such as the aircraft cabin. They should be simple to operate, have multiple use capacity, and it is most important that these weapons do not damage critical systems on the aircraft.

HART: For our report, we examined six general categories of less-than-lethal weapons that currently exist or are in development at this time. These are electrical shock, chemical, impact projectile, physical restraint, light and acoustic.

Based on this review, we have drawn a number of conclusions. First, we believe that electrical shock weapons, both barbed-fired, like the Taser that you demonstrated earlier, and direct contact systems show the most promise for use by flight deck crew. However, substantial testing in realistic settings is essential to ensure that these weapons will not damage or disable critical flight systems.

Second, we recommend that impact projectile and physical restraint less-than-lethal weapons should be considered for use. These devices may be especially useful in the aircraft cabin where the restrictions on space are less severe and the risks of damage to critical systems or injury to the flight crew are reduced. These weapons could also be used as part of a multi-layered defense strategy designed to slow the progress of a hijacker toward the flight deck.

Third, we concluded that light and acoustic weapons need more development.

We also recommend that if flight deck crews are armed with any less-than-lethal weapon, handcuffs of other physical restraints should be readily available to incapacitate aggressors until the aircraft can be safely landed and police or other security forces arrive.

In addition, because each of these weapons poses either safety or effectiveness issues, we strongly recommend that these weapons be thoroughly tested before there is any deployment. In particular, they should be tested to determine their operational characteristics in the confined space of an aircraft and any effects they may cause on the aircraft's systems.

Finally, we conclude that based on this testing, modifications of existing less-than-lethal weapons may be necessary before they can be deployed in an aircraft.

Mr. Chairman, I trust that these findings and recommendations will be helpful to the subcommittee as you work to determine the most effective means of protecting passengers, crew and commercial aircraft.

The National Institute of Justice is committed to continuing to develop the tools that law enforcement needs in order to meet the new and emerging threats to our homeland security. As part of this commitment, the National Institute of Justice will continue its ongoing research and development of less-than-lethal weapons, including their possible uses in many settings.

I appreciate the opportunity to discuss our findings with this subcommittee. And I would be very pleased, Mr. Chairman, to answer any questions that you or the members of the subcommittee may have.

Thank you.

MICA: I thank the gentlelady and our first witness and our first panel, Ms. Hart.

What I'm going to do since it took so long to get through the opening statements is ask you to go ahead and have a seat aside and we will question you after we've heard from the second panel. I think we can expedite the hearing in that manner.

So if you wouldn't mind just taking a seat aside there, and we will allow members to question you along with the other witnesses.

Let me call the second panel.

HART: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MICA: And the second panel today is Captain Stephen A. Luckey, chairman of the National Flight Security Committee of the Airline Pilots Association, International. And then we have Captain Hank Krakowski and he is vice president of Corporate Safety, Quality Assurance and Security of the United Airlines. And then we have Mr. Ron J. Hinderberger and he is director of Aviation Safety with Boeing.

If we can go ahead and have Ms. Hart sit at one side and the other witnesses join us.

I'm going to recognize first Captain Stephen A. Luckey, chairman of the National Flight Security Committee, the Airlines Pilots Association. We're very pleased to have all of these witnesses provide testimony. And so, we'll hear first from Mr. Luckey.

Let me just say that we try to limit your statements to the subcommittee to five minutes. If you have to summarize, you can request through the chair, submission of a lengthy statement or additional information or data you'd like to be made part of the official record. That way, we can proceed and allow members to get into questions and I know they have a number of questions.

So with that, let's hear from Captain Luckey first.

LUCKEY: Thank you, Chairman Mica.

MICA: You may need to turn that on.

LUCKEY: Can you hear me now?

Thank you, Chairman Mica and Ranking Member Lipinski and other distinguished members of the subcommittee. I'd like to thank you today for the opportunity to provide you with the cockpit perspective of what we see as a part of the president's war on terrorism and also a key element in the protection of the infrastructure of this great country of ours.

I've also submitted a written statement for inclusion into the record.

MICA: Without objection, the entire statement will be made part of the record. Please proceed.

LUCKEY: Thank you, sir.

As you said, I'm Captain Steve Luckey. I chair the National Security Committee of the Airline Pilots Association International, and in that capacity, I represent the security interests of some 66,000 pilots that fly for 43 airlines in the United States and Canada. I also want to add that my views expressed here today exceed our membership and include the views of commercial airline pilots throughout the country. And also apply equally to passenger and cargo aircraft as well. Cargo aircraft are frequently overlooked in our views of the threat.

First of all, I'd like to applaud Congress for passing the Aviation and Transportation Security Act with a provision for arming pilots. But as someone else stated, it's been five months since that bill was signed into law and to date, nothing has been done with regard to arming the pilots. We still don't have the necessary tools to protect our work place.

In light of that, we certainly also applaud Chairman Mica and Young's introduction of the legislation to fix this, what we think is an unnecessary delay. We strongly endorse and support the legislation, and we urge Congress and the administration to pass this bill as rapidly as possible in order to provide us with the tools that we desperately need.

The reason I'm really here today is because, you know, on 9-11, eight pilots were unable to survive an assault, attack by 19 terrorist on four aircraft. Had they the tools, the training and the tactical knowledge to meet this challenge effectively, I think history would reveal a different outcome. We'd have the World Trade Centers and we wouldn't have an industry that's hemorrhaging profusely at this particular time.

The real tragedy in this, however, I believe is in the fact that this probably could have been prevented. You know, 40 years ago, the Airline Pilots Association requested that we have an armed pilot program, that we put stronger doors in the aircraft and that we come up with some other recommended security improvements in aircraft design. Most of these were largely overlooked.

In 1961, the FAA, in all of its infinite wisdom, with the support of Congress, amended the regulations -- the federal air regulations -- to include a provision to arm pilots and that remained in effect, I believe, until July of 2001 and it was removed.

We have to look and see if this threat is still present, and I believe that the Department of Justice, the Transportation Security Agency, the intelligence community, the military and everyone involved in this will guarantee that this is a viable threat. Will they use box cutters again on the aircraft? Hard to say, but I doubt it. They'll use something else. We've raised the bar. When we raise the bar, they raise their effort. We make them smarter, they just work harder at it.

With the support of Congressman Young and Congressman Mica, I hope that the outcome of this hearing will have a resounding yes to the fact that do we have the will to go ahead and avoid a repeat occurrence of this horrendous event, the catastrophic event that happened on 9-11.

Remember that there are many misconceptions around the country involving and related to arming the pilots. First of all, we're not out there with an irresponsible method of just handing out firearms to pilots. First of all, it's completely voluntary. Completely, independently voluntary to anyone who wants to participate. Applicants will be carefully screened. They'll be selected in much the same way that any other federal officer is selected. They'll meet the most rigid standards and they'll be trained to proficiency. They'll be trained in much the same way that we approach our professionalism in our occupation of flying aircraft. We don't leave anything to supposition. We are very finite, very disciplined and very exacting.

LUCKEY: The reason we're doing this is we want to protect the flight deck. We think that -- of a zone of protection, this is the most important feature that we have, and -- we do have layers. We've made a lot of improvements in aviation security. We've raised the awareness. But there isn't a barrier in the world that can't be defeated by a determined individual that's willing to pay the ultimate price. And these are suicidal people. They're highly trained. They're highly financed. They are capable of doing it.

The only alternative to this between the door is the F-16 or F-15 out there that will shoot us down with the loss of our passengers and crew.

I believe that this program will provide a very high level of deterrence. And I think that's a very important key element in aviation security, and I've been in it for a long time.

I also agree that it's very cost-effective. I think it's an efficient way to go about this thing. I think that pilots are extremely well-suited to meet the needs of this particular task, and I think they'll rise to the occasion very well. I think we have overwhelming public support for it. And I think that a lot of questions can be answered within the written submission that I have, that's very detailed.

And I'm at your service to answer any and all questions that you might have related to this particular program.

MICA ?: I thank the gentleman. And we will withhold questions until we've heard from all of the witnesses.

Let me now recognize the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Kirk, to introduce our next witness.

KIRK: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, we are very happy to have Captain Krakowski here, a constituent of mine. Captain Krakowski is currently the vice president for corporate safety, security, and quality assurance at United Airlines.

In his current role, Captain Krakowski directs the security, flight safety, in-flight safety, occupational safety, environmental safety, and corporate emergency response team.

During his career at United, Captain Krakowski has touched most areas of the airline's operation. He spent two years as a director of flight crew resources, and two years as director of operations control with United. In the latter position, he had direct responsibility for dispatch, air traffic, and meteorology.

Captain Krakowski, we greatly appreciate your time here. We also know that you were the supervisor of Ed Ballenger (ph), a United dispatcher who was the last human being to communicate with United Airlines flight. I think, while it was a tragedy in New York and Pennsylvania and Washington, in Elk Grove we deeply suffered from the loss of September 11. And that if there's a commitment that's deepest to flight safety, it has to be at United, which suffered so much. And thank you for appearing before us.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MICA: You are recognized, sir.

KRAKOWSKI: Thank you, Congressman. Chairman Mica, Ranking Member Lipinski and other distinguished members of the subcommittee, on behalf of United Airlines, thank you for the opportunity for the testimony today.

In addition to my corporate duties, I regularly pilot passenger flights for the airline. And proudly, United enjoys a reputation of leadership in both safety and security in the industry.

Immediately after September 11, we began to research the various ways to stop an attack, up to and including arming of pilots. United considered everything from chemical sprays to firearms, collapsible batons, and the advanced TASER.

We found the TASER ultimately represented the best overall weapons solution as part of a comprehensive training program for security. We, United Airlines, have purchased two M-26 advanced TASERs, which you saw, for each of the airplanes, and propose to use it strictly for defending the cockpit.

Our deployment would make the TASER an actual piece of aircraft equipment, locked in a combination-controlled box, and prior to each flight the two TASERs would be removed from the box and secured next to the pilots for rapid use.

The TASER was developed as a non-lethal option for law enforcement and security use. The M-26, as you saw, resembles a handgun, and immediately disables an attacker through electromuscular disruption. It can be used two ways. First, by firing two probes into an attacker, or by holding the front of a gun on the person and firing the weapon.

Each weapon is equipped with two probe cartridges and has the advantage of stopping an attacker, without being life-threatening if fired into the wrong person or a fellow crew member.

This is one of our primary concerns, as in the confines of an airplane, and given the demonstrated willingness on the part of passengers and other crew members to physically get involved to stop an attacker, the TASER represents safety for those very people who are assisting the response, and minimizes the threat of injury to federal air marshals, or even other law enforcement officers, who may be on board the airplane.

Because we would never proceed in any manner that would compromise safety, we have conducted comprehensive testing of the weapon on all of our airplanes. We just discharged the TASER into cockpit control and electrical panels of every aircraft type we fly. We also did extensive flight testing using our most electronically advanced airplane.

We are convinced that the TASER is safe for flight and this is supported by our engineering study.

Since September 11, there have been two physical attempts to gain entry to a cockpit -- both by unstable people, not terrorists. On February 6 of this year, United Flight 855 to Buenos Aires was one of those attempts. Even with the door bar installed, a passenger was able to break the door down and began to crawl through a hole in the cockpit door he created. One of the pilots got out of his seat and began to hit the assailant with a crash axe, and was never able to fully subdue the passenger. Passengers and other crew members began to assist, and were able to pull the attacker away from the door.

A TASER would have been effective and welcome for two reasons. First, both pilots would have stayed at their control stations, which would have allowed for control of the aircraft if one of the other pilots was disabled. Second, the TASER would immediately have immobilized the attacker, without endangering the others who were trying to help.

In training 7,000 of our 9,500 pilots thus far, we have found that the TASER is remarkably simple and effective to train on and quality on.

Many of our pilots have changed their opinion from sole support of lethal weapons to also supporting the immediate installation of a TASER.

Two other domestic airlines have decided to move forward with the advanced TASER. That's American Trans Air and Mesa. Korean Airlines and two other international carriers have them in use today, and were used by the United States Air Force providing on-board security during the Afghan detainee transfer to Guantanamo Bay.

In large measure because of the leadership of this committee, the government and industry is already funding the development of multiple layers of security, including a welcome increase of federal air marshal presence on our airplanes.

Adding cockpit weapons must be considered in the context of these other increased layers of security already being planned, deployed and funded.

Mr. Chairman, safety has always been our number one priority at my airline. We strong believe the TASER, along with our advanced security training, represents a balanced approach that would be present in every United cockpit.

Our airline stands ready to work with TSA, FAA or any another governmental agency to facilitate timely approval of the TASER. And in addition, we would welcome any of these agencies or your designees to attend our training and see our deployment in person.

I thank you and look forward to you questions.

MICA: Thank you again. We will withhold questions.

We will hear from our last witness, which is Ron J. Hinderberger. And he is director of aviation safety with Boeing Company. Welcome, sir. And you are recognized.

HINDERBERGER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Lipinski and members of the committee. Thank you very much for this opportunity to speak before the Subcommittee on Aviation and this hearing on the policy issues surrounding carriage of firearm by airliner flight crews on commercial passenger flights.

I too, as the other panel members, have submitted a written statement for inclusion in the record and I'd appreciate...

MICA: Without objection, the entire statement will be made part of the record. Please proceed.

HINDERBERGER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

We at the Boeing Company have been asked to specifically speak to the issue of what a bullet or bullets will do to an aircraft if it were struck.

I will get to that point, but first I would like to provide some context for the question of what happens when a gun is discharged in an aircraft.

Since September 11, Boeing has been directly involved in issues associated with improving aviation security. Without effective protection, travelers are at risk and people on the ground are susceptible to attack using the aircraft as a weapon. Safety and security of the public in the face of highly organized, financed and motivated threats is absolutely paramount.

I can assure the committee that Boeing is steadfastly focused on providing the public with a safe and efficient global air transportation system. Boeing has an enormous stake in the public confidence in that system. The confidence is absolutely crucial to the health of the global economy and to Boeing in particular because of the critical role in the aviation system that we play.

One of the first actions taken in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks was to strengthen the aircraft cockpit door with the intent of making it virtually impossible for a person intent on harm to gain access to the flight deck.

Secretary Mineta convened a rapid response team to make recommendations on immediate steps to be taken to improve aircraft security. Boeing engineer experts served on that team at the request of the secretary.

As a result, all U.S. commercial aircraft have cockpit doors that can now withstand determined strong individuals attempting to enter the cockpit.

Over the next two years Boeing will further develop the cockpit door, door frame and bulk head assembly to provide bullet proof protection.

I should note that this is the last line of defense in an attack where every other layer of security has failed. Those layers of security can include intelligence, airport passenger and baggage screening, sky marshals, flight attendants and in today's brave new world, even the passengers themselves.

Boeing strongly supported enactment of the transportation security legislation late last year, and we are also proud to be an integral part of the continued improvements in aviation security. Polling indicates that the public is placing confidence in the new system now.

Let me turn to the effects of firearm discharge on airplane structure and systems.

We conducted a high level analysis as part of the Mineta rapid response team on this very subject. The risk of loss of an aircraft due to a stray round from a handgun is very slight. Boeing commercial service history contains cases where gunfire on board in-service airplanes, all of which landed safely. Commercial airplane structure is designed with sufficient strength, redundancy, and damage tolerance that a single or even multiple handgun holes would not result in loss of an aircraft.

HINDERBERGER: A single bullet hole in the fuselage skin would have little effect on cabin pressurization. Aircraft are designed to withstand much larger impacts, whether intentional or unintentional.

For instance, on 14 occasions, Boeing commercial airplanes have survived and landed after an in-flight bomb blast. Unfortunately, as we all know, there are instances where bombs have brought down airplanes.

Aircraft are also designed to survive an uncontained engine failure. That is, the failure of an engine which it explodes and expels engine parts as shrapnel.

Commercial airplanes can land safely after the loss or blow-out of a passenger window. In the event a cabin window is blown out, the ensuing decompression could result in a passenger injury or fatality to a non-belted passenger near the window, but there would be little hazard to the continued safe flight and landing.

Aircraft are designed to survive and land after a rapid decompression resulting from the loss of a cargo door and have done so.

Finally, we all recall the 737 accident over the Hawaiian Islands in 1988 when the airplane landed after losing approximately one-third of the upper part of its fuselage. While truly heroic and skillful flying were crucial in this situation, the structure of the aircraft held together, enabling all but one person to survive.

All these type of events are generally greater than the impact of bullet holes in an airplane.

Having noted all that I have regarding the design of our airplanes, there is a remote possibility of causing a fire, explosion, engine failure or loss of critical systems given the unfortunate placement of shots in combination of conditions. However, areas of specific risk vary by airplane model.

A very thoughtful assessment of the risks and tradeoffs involved when considering equipping flight crews with firearms needs to be undertaken, and these hearings contribute to that.

Thank you very much for the opportunity to present this material. I hope it is useful to you in your deliberations over this important policy decision of arming the flight crews.

MICA: Thank the gentleman.

And would like to invite Ms. Hart back, if she could be accommodated.

We now will begin a round of questions. And I'll start with some questions.

Again, I thank all of our witnesses from both panels.

And let me first begin by asking Captain Luckey some questions. You seem pretty strongly in favor of allowing pilots to arm themselves. And I believe you had said before that either in the '60s or '70s pilots did have that right. Is that the case?

LUCKEY: Yes, sir. I participated in a program under the concurrence of the carrier, which at the time was Northwest Airlines, and the FBI -- was trained by the FBI. We had an operation during the Cuban hijacking era when we had frequent hijackings. And I was trained as an armed pilot and carried a firearm, sidearm, for several years onboard the aircraft under the auspices of the FBI training program.

MICA: So pilots have already been allowed to carry weapons during another time of potential hijacking risk? That's correct?

LUCKEY: Yes, sir.

MICA: Was there ever an incident where a firearm in the possession of a pilot caused any disruption or problem, misfiring, hitting any passengers, that you're aware of?

LUCKEY: No, sir, there wasn't, quite the contrary. Although it was used as an asset on several deployable incidents.

MICA: Captain Krakowski, you're an active pilot?

KRAKOWSKI: Yes, sir.

MICA: And since the beginning of the year, I believe that air marshals are supposed to inform you of their presence on an aircraft. Is that the case?

KRAKOWSKI: Yes, that's the procedure. We have very specific procedures, Mr. Chairman.

MICA: So have many air marshals contacted you as they boarded your aircraft?

KRAKOWSKI: I've not had any on my airplanes actually since I've been flying this year.

MICA: It's estimated that there are some 20,000 flights -- commercial passenger aircraft -- that take off daily. That would mean we'd need pretty significant number of air marshals to cover all those flights. Is that correct?

KRAKOWSKI: Indeed, we are aware that the TSA is ramping up with the Federal Air Marshall Service quite a population of air marshals in training at this time.

MICA: I'm not sure if anyone on the panel is aware of the type of weapons or firearms that an air marshal carries. I believe they have, is it frangible bullets? Mr. Luckey, are you familiar with it?

LUCKEY: Yes, sir. They use a Sig Sauer model 229 and 357 Sig, sir.

MICA: And Mr. Hinderberger, would that cause any harm to the aircraft to your knowledge or the experience you've had? Again, there are different kinds of weapons -- but the specific weapon that's being used by air marshals today.

HINDERBERGER: Mr. Chairman, we have not had an opportunity to analyze the type of weapons that are being used today. And my testimony today assumes that any firearm discharge will penetrate the object that it hits.

MICA: But you said that it doesn't appear that it would take down an aircraft from the experience that you've had so far in testing. You've had...

HINDERBERGER: From what we've had from our in-service experience, given discharge of firearms on actual in-service airplanes and other failures on the airplanes which have caused the fuselage to be penetrated, we would see that it'd be a very slight risk of a catastrophic event as the result of a gunfire.

MICA: Mr. Luckey, I think one of the most riveting parts of your testimony is something I came to the realization of actually when I think we first discussed this issue, and you alluded to it again today. "The last line of defense today is an F-16," which isn't exactly going to accompany the aircraft if it's taken over. What's going to happen?

LUCKEY: Well, sir, unfortunately, there's two types of aircraft that intercept airliners, an F-15 and an F-16. The F-16 can talk to us because it has compatible radio. There are very few F-15s that have both UHF and VHF capabilities. So we are really unable to talk to the airliners, which is a real problem that we'd like to see remedied as well.

But in the event we cannot control the aircraft -- and we run into very tenacious situations. For example, suppose we do have a door and the perpetrators have taken over the back of the aircraft and we're 3.5 hours out over the water. They have 3.5 hours to perpetrate that door. And we need lethal force to protect ourselves in the event that they have 3.5 hours to get through that door. That's a sizable amount of time.

MICA: And what's the last line of defense that you testified to today?

LUCKEY: The last line of defense, sir, would be the F-16, F-15 shoot down and quite possibly flown by one of our fellow pilots.

MICA: Not a very acceptable last option, in my opinion.

Ms. Hart, you were given a task to look at non-lethal weapons. And you undertook that. When did you begin?

HART: That was begun in the fall shortly after we got the direction from Congress.

MICA: And finished and submitted...

HART: The final report was April 18 to the secretary of Transportation.

MICA: April 18. So we do have to be reasonable. We're not picking on the TSA or Department of Transportation. They have received your report just within the last few weeks. But we understand that your report is not going to be made public. Is that correct?

HART: That's correct. We have asked the committee not to release it publicly. We feel that the report discloses not only the capabilities of some of the less-than-lethal weapons, but also some of their limitation and ways that they can be defeated.

HART: We don't believe that that's appropriate in public forum, where potential hijackers can...

MICA: So some of the weaknesses of a non-lethal force weapon will not be made public?

HART: No. We are not making it public, and we are requesting it not be made public.

MICA: Furthermore, it does appear, too, that there have been breeches of security. I think, Captain Krakowski, you could -- would you say it's impossible today to get a weapon on a plane given the new system or transitional system that we have in place?

KRAKOWSKI: I mean, given what we learned on September 11, we don't discount anything. I would imagine with proper focus, anything is possible as a threat.

MICA: And your group, does it advocate only -- this is a non- lethal weapon. I know you have been TASERed. And this is a new generation of TASER that is not, as you told me yesterday, this is not a TASER that most people are familiar with. Can you just tell the subcommittee about the new generation, the difference of it, the capability of the TASERs?

KRAKOWSKI: Yes, the primary improvement is in the wattage. The typical early TASERs were in the seven, eight watt range. This is a 25 to 26 watt TASER. Just in preparation for today, I was TASERed last night to remind me of how effective it was. And I don't want to do that again, quite frankly.

It absolutely debilitated me.

MICA: So it's much more powerful. This is a weapon. And it does first emit as you said, I think. Is it a hook? I did not see that part of the demonstration.

KRAKOWSKI: Yes, it's two probes with kind of a sharp point on the end.

MICA: But it can only fire two probes. Is that correct, or one?

KRAKOWSKI: Actually, it has two probes and there's two cartridges, one on the bottom on the weapon that can be rapidly replaced for another shot. And at the airline, our plan would be to have both pilots with TASERs so you could do a shot while that...

MICA: That gives you four opportunities?

KRAKOWSKI: Four opportunities for the probes. You could then take the mussel of the weapon and after you have expended the last one and hold it on the person and continue up to well over 100 additional shocks.

MICA: Would you support a rule that only allowed this weapon as opposed to also say a lethal weapon with specifications? What would be your preference?

KRAKOWSKI: When we think about the system that we're trying to put on our airplanes, when we designed our security training, which we're putting pilots and flight attendants through now, the TASER is just a portion of a security effort of a crew concept on how to protect the airplane.

Flight attendants, pilots are on the same page. We have specific training to flight attendants to be able to address issues in the cabin before anyone would ever even get to the cockpit door. If a cockpit door become breached, then we do have the TASER weapons to slow somebody down. But the intention is for the help from the back end of the airplane to continue at the same time.

So this is part of an integrated security approach.

MICA: You did testify that you believe -- and these TASERs were used to escort the detainees. You testified to that.

KRAKOWKSI: That's my understanding, sir.

MICA: But were not the detainees also hand cuffed? They had goggles and other restraints.

KRAKOWSKI: Yes, I don't have that information, Mr. Chairman.

MICA: Well, I believe that was the case, which might be a little bit different from a sort of a free flowing terrorist on board an aircraft that more than likely would be the way a terrorist would operate. They wouldn't be escorted.

KRAKOWSKI: Yes, I supposed -- it's certainly a different venue (ph), no question.

MICA: Thank you. Let me now yield to Mr...

LIPINSKI: DeFazio.

MICA: ... DeFazio?

DEFAZIO: Sounds like a -- OK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the ranking member for yielding to me.

Captain Luckey, Ms. Hart is reluctant to go into the shortcoming of TASERs. Would you like to address those? I know it's very widely, publicly available, and I don't think that she's exactly protecting state secrets here.

LUCKEY: Oh, by definition, the TASER is definitely a less than lethal weapon. So it's not designed for lethal application, nor -- it does have limitations, although it's definitely a step in the right direction. And I think it's part of the mosaic that Captain Krakowski commented on.

There are limitations are far as stand-off and size. You need a minimum distance. I believe it's three feet. I stand corrected if I'm not correct on that.

There are limitations with any weapon. And there are inherent limitations with the TASER. However, it's a formidable device. I can guarantee that, and it will do the job on an instantaneous basis, providing that if the application is proper and it's within the parameters and the scope of the design of the operation of the weapon.

DEFAZIO: OK. Captain Krakowski, when we met yesterday, I did ask about the capability of firing more than one round. And I didn't at that point catch the details that there's apparently cartridge which has to be removed and then placed -- that doesn't -- how quickly -- how conversant are you with this? And how quickly can you do that and take the second shot?

KRAKOWSKI: Yes, the design is by having the two TASERs, if you have to make another shot, the other pilot would be making that shot while the other person is literally within seconds, removing the cartridge and popping it back on, just about as fast as I just showed you here.

DEFAZIO: OK, I wasn't aware of that yesterday.

You raised a concern yesterday about coordination uniformity. I don't think you mentioned that today. You're concerned about, and I think it was raised by one of the members of the panel, if one pilot or co-pilot were armed and the other wasn't.

And do you want to briefly address that?

KRAKOWSKI: I think when you think of the entire scope of the effort that we're trying to promote at United, we want a crew concept. We learned from an airplane accident in the 1970s, that one person commanding all of the effort was deleterious to good coordination and safety.

And so over the years we have developed a real emphasis on a crew concept in handling any kind of emergency, whether it's an engine fire or even a security issue in the airplane.

So as we thought through the post-11, 9-11 events, it was important for us to get both pilots on the same page, the light attendants on the same page, even our flight dispatchers on the ground on the same page of how specifically we handle threats. So we have developed a crew concept.

The TASER fits like a glove in to that concept, because we will be asking people to -- multiple people -- to be intervening in a situation. And we want to make sure we do not fatally injure one of our crew members or somebody that's being there to help.

DEFAZIO: OK. And Captain Luckey, do you want to address that question?

LUCKEY: No, I think it's a very good integratable device. And I think it definitely has its purposes, design. And also has its limitations. And I believe that, you know, one of the limitations would be if you TASER an individual and there are multiple perpetrators, once you detach the cartridge from the device, you can no longer light up the individual. For me, having law enforcement experience, this is a very nice thing to have.

You have the guy wired up. You can lead them around. If he acts up on you, you can light him up again. And I guarantee you, he wouldn't do that more than once. It makes a compliant subject out of any individual very rapidly.

DEFAZIO: So it's a -- this would have been ideally used in the case of the individual who managed to get part of his body through the door on the South American flight.

A TASER would have been desirable, a good way to deal with him?

LUCKEY: That's a good layer.

DEFAZIO: So what about the idea that perhaps there would be uniformity with the equipment, with the TASERs, but then overlay your idea of at least -- as I understand your idea it's sort of two parts. It's volunteers, sort of initial training and then an expanded program later.

What if we introduced, you know, the factor of there may or may not be a lethal weapon on the flight deck, but there's definitely TASERs on the flight deck?

Would that be a desirable layering?

LUCKEY: Well, a less than lethal device is no substitute for a lethal threat.

LUCKEY: And although it's definitely a step in the right direction and had we introduced TASERs in the 9-11 incident, I truthfully believe that the outcome would have been different in that case as well. It's -- everyone has 20/20 hindsight. We just don't know enough about the details of those particular events to make a very educated...

DEFAZIO: Right, but what I was getting at was essentially you wouldn't -- uniformly, you would know that every flight deck is equipped with two TASERs. But there may also be a handgun. You know, I mean, so you would have the -- not requiring all pilots to have handguns, especially those who don't wish to have handguns, but in cases where the pilot is trained and voluntarily wishes to carry on a handgun, carry a handgun in addition to their being the known threat of the TASER.

LUCKEY: I think layering is very important. We need to remove the threat as far away as we can from the cockpit. And I believe that the application of the TASER and a lethal force is a very good approach to it.

Deterrence is such a key important factor in aviation security that can't be overlooked: you rarely see anyone stick their finger in a light socket more than once to see if the power is on. They immediately choose another option, and I think this is where we're going here.

If we have a lethal force capability, the perpetrator does not know the extent and the magnitude of the lethal force. And I don't think they'd want to play that gamble if I was in that business.

DEFAZIO: If I could, Mr. Chairman, just Mr. Hinderberger, since the issue has come up and you mentioned in your testimony two years to develop these new less vulnerable flight deck doors. Does it really take two years to develop this? Or is there -- you know, I mean, it doesn't seem to me like it would take two years to develop it.

You're talking about two years because of?

HINDERBERGER: Well, actually, Congressman, what I intended to refer to is two years to develop and install bulletproof doors, door frames, and bulkheads...

DEFAZIO: OK, but there's still going to be a single door? And the pilots will still, to use the lavatory, have to go out. And the flight attendant's still going to be pushing the food cart and standing menacingly behind it to defend the pilot while he or she goes to the bathroom.

HINDERBERGER: The installation that we're referring to is a single door, yes.

DEFAZIO: Has there been any consideration of either a double door or moving the single door forward, so the pilots could have a lav on their own so they wouldn't have to frequently open the door and put the food cart in the aisle and have the flight attendant standing there menacingly as a terrorist deterrent?

HINDERBERFER: There's numerous options that could be explored in terms of enhancing security beyond a single-door system. The individual airplane model would dictate the capabilities of whether or not a double-door installation is feasible or not. Certain models, that's feasible, and on other models, that would probably be much less feasible.

DEFAZIO: But putting -- but it would basically just be a space and revenue issue if we were to put a lav up front? You would be potentially -- because right now in most of your designs, there's a lav ahead of the galley. If you put a door there, then you lose access to the lav. So you'd have to locate the lav where there are now some revenue seats.

HINDERBERGER: On some airplanes, it's that way, sir. And on some airplanes, the forward entry door is close enough to the actual cockpit bulkhead that it would preclude a double-door installation.

DEFAZIO: OK, but I'm asking about a lav instead of a double door. You don't need a double door if the lav and refreshments are up-front. They never need to come out except for emergencies.

HINDERBERGER: Well, that's true on those airplanes in which there is a lavatory or a galley between the entry door and the cockpit -- and the existing cockpit entry door. The point I was trying to make is there are a number of airplanes in service today where the forward entry door that passengers plane and deplane from is not sufficiently forward, not sufficiently aft enough that it would allow a double-door installation and a lavatory installation for flight crew.

DEFAZIO: Which of your models is that?

HINDERBERGER: All of the DC-9, MD-80, MD-90...

DEFAZIO: Oh, I forget that you're McDonnell Douglas now. I was thinking of Boeing planes. OK. OK, but in the future we could certainly design planes in that configuration.

HINDERBERGER: In the future, we could design additional security measures, including the one you've mentioned.

DEFAZIO: OK, thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MICA: Thank you.

Mr. Hayes?

HAYES: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Question -- is it Captain Krakowski or Captain Luckey that's more on the TASERs? Captain Krakowski?

KRAKOWSKI: Yes, sir.

HAYES: A shield against the TASER, if you knew one was in the cockpit, is there something that would effectively shield an assailant from a TASER?

KRAKOWSKI: Well, if -- like any weapon like Captain Luckey was saying, any weapon has vulnerabilities. And there are certain protective things a person might wear. We do train away from that. In other words, we train during the training, train people to recognize where the vulnerabilities are. And just like with the firearms, there's certain places you want to try to fire the weapon in certain circumstances. and we train to that.

HAYES: A question for all of you as pilots, is there any distraction from your point of view to you as the pilot because you are armed?

KRAKOWSKI: You know, there's a lot of equipment in the airplane, and there's a lot of situations we face every day we fly. So our lives are nothing but distractions quite frankly. Even going through the metal detectors is distracting sometimes to us that gets carried into the cockpit, which we'd like to try to solve some day for our members.

But in any event, yes -- is it a distraction? It might be. But given the fact that a pilot had to get physically out of his seat to grab a crash axe to stop a cockpit entry is the worst kind of distraction, because the pilot was not at the control station where he belongs.

HAYES: I agree with you. Make no doubt about it. I just wanted for the public to have that in the record. As you say, there are distractions. As a pilot, I would be less distracted knowing that I was armed should I need to be than if I were not. Is that a safe statement?

LUCKEY: One of the considerations that you have to understand is the weapon in the cockpit would be nothing more than another piece of emergency equipment. And our protocols and our standard operating procedures require that even a two-pilot aircraft or another redundancy, the third pilot -- we have what we call a PF or pilot flying, and a PNF, pilot not flying.

One person is focusing on flying at all times. And one would be flying, and one would be defending. And that would not be a distraction any more than any other viable emergency like a fire in the cockpit where somebody has to grab a fire extinguisher and do that.

We're also multi-faceted. We do many things that -- are capable of doing many things at one time. And this entire program of arming the cockpit is strictly restricted to the cockpit itself. We don't open the door. We don't go back and handle anomalies in the cabin. We're in an acceptable risk business, and we manage resources.

The only reason we want lethal force in the cockpit or stun guns in the interim or whatever is to provide the ability to get that aircraft on the ground as fast and safely as we can. We don't have 911. We can't pull over. The resources we have are the ones we sealed in the aircraft when we close that door. We seal the problems in; we seal the resources out.

And it's prudent that we be able to get that aircraft on the ground. And from a cruising altitude, if you can see the concrete you're going to put the airplane on, it's a minimum from cruise of a 20-minute flight and that's ideal. That's about a minimum I'd say of getting an aircraft on the ground from cruising altitude.

HAYES: I know some flight attendants have expressed some concern and desire actually not to see this done. As captain, you work for flight crew all the time. From your perspective, talk about those issues and how you answer those questions. And I'm for arming the pilots. Don't misunderstand that.

LUCKEY: Well, basically I'm challenged with those type of questions all the time. And you know, it's -- we all know someone that we would not like to see have a weapon in their hand. And this is something that's taken out of context. It's just like confusing this with the Second Amendment issue. It couldn't be further from the truth.

This is an aviation security issue which is tantamount to the safety of the flight. And the option -- we weigh things all the time in an acceptable risk environment. One of these things is if we fail to recognize that we need adequate pools to effectively protect the cockpit, then the alternative is the catastrophic hull loss of the aircraft and everyone involved.

And that was clearly demonstrated on 9-11. That's an untenable solution. We can't go there.

HAYES: So as captain, you feel like you can answer the concerns of the flight attendants and others to how -- and, again I agree. I trust the pilots. I trust the crew coordination that is a part of your training and everyday operations.

HAYES: So you think that can be successfully addressed?

LUCKEY: I think so. We have these challenges constantly. There isn't a pilot in the world that would have intentionally, under any circumstances, flown an aircraft into the World Trade Center. He'd have spiked it in somewhere else, as probably easily could have happened in the Pittsburgh situation. We're confronted with these challenges all the time on the aircraft.

And no one likes to accept the losses in the back. When we went to the cockpit encapsulation philosophy after the 9-11 event, when we knew we longer would open the door under any circumstances to compromise the integrity of our operation, we had to accept some losses. And this is an untenable situation for a professional pilot to have to really insulate himself from the losses that may be incurred for the passengers and crew in the back to the perpetrator.

HAYES: I appreciate your efforts. I applaud you for moving forward. Let's do this reasonably, rationally and as quickly as possible.

Thank you.

LUCKEY: Thank you for your support, sir.

MICA: Thank the gentleman.

Mr. Boswell?

BOSWELL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think the questions I've had have been answered pretty much. Would you comment about the safety with the TASER and the avionics. I think I know what the answer is, but I want you to comment about it for the record. And if you'll do that.

Mr. Chairman, I just want to reiterate that, again, again that this is a piece of the package. And I don't hear anybody that's supporting arming the pilot thinking this is the end solution. It's a part of it with people that are capable of carrying out that task. And, I guess, that'll be my last statement on that.

But would you comment, please, about what your feelings are about the avionics.

KRAKOWSKI: And this is specifically on the TASER, correct, Congressman?

BOSWELL: Well, if there's something else you need to comment on about, please do that, too.

KRAKOWSKI: Very good.

BOSWELL: But, you know, for example, I wasn't going to bring this up, but all this concern about cell phones, it was to keep a little order in the cabin of the airplane not to let people use cell phones. I can understand that. But I don't know about what -- Mr. Hayes has gone. I don't find it interfering with avionics in my airplane. But at the same time, I'm going to leave it up to you if you even touch that one or not.

KRAKOWSKI: OK. I think that's question probably best asked by FAA technical, who really analyze that.

From our point of view, when we looked at the TASER when you first fire it, it sends out quite a shock, as you well-know. So we, too, were concerned as an airline whether or not that electricity could possibly disrupt any of the aircraft systems. So we took our engineering department which we're very proud of -- we have a reputation of a world-class engineering department -- and we fired the TASER into just about every panel, cockpit control we could in all of our airplane types.

And then, as a final test we flew an Airbus 319 and continuously fired the weapon in the cockpit, as it would be used in the real emergency, all the way down from take-off to landing.

Our engineering report was very clear. Particularly, given the emergency nature of what we'd be facing, obviously, you wouldn't even use the TASER -- consider using it unless the airplane itself was already in jeopardy. But even if it was used in an accident, we saw nothing that showed us that the airplane would be compromised. And we have those engineering studies. They are part of the submission. A summary of them is part of the submission. We have the full engineering report that we forwarded to both TSA and the Federal Air Marshal Service.

MICA: Mr. Boswell, do you yield back?

BOSWELL: You know, it's tough duty here when you're senator is wanting to get your ear. If you gave me a question, could you rephrase it, please?

KRAKOWSKI: Yes, sir. We tested every airplane, either on the ground and our most sophisticated electronic airplane, the Airbus, in flight. We saw nothing to make us worry about the air worthiness issues in firing that weapon on the airplane. And we have reports to substantiate that.

BOSWELL: And I thought that should be part of the record. Thank you.

MICA: I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Boozman was here first. Did you have questions?

BOOZMAN: I'd like for you to comment a little bit about kind of the pilots backgrounds. What percentage of these guys are former military guys, just roughly? And also, what percentage are currently in the Reserves, Air National Guard?

You mentioned earlier that, you know, if we did resort to actually shooting down a plane that there would be a fair chance that it might be a guy in Guard unit that's also a pilot -- commercial pilot -- might be the actual one that did that.

LUCKEY: That's basically true. Most of the NORAD cap units are Reserve units and you'll find out that, especially the younger pilots, the new hires that have been hired in the last, I'd say, 10 years, a lot of them are Guard pilots.

Aviation is changing, like anything else. When I was hired in the '60s, I would say that over 90 percent of the pilots were military, probably closer to 95 percent. I think that's changed quite dramatically. Now, I'd say a little bit more than half probably have military experience. I think that a lot of them have law enforcement experience. A lot of them have -- of course, it's a very disciplined group. And I think that, talking about the experience level of the various pilots, I think they lend themselves very favorably to a law enforcement type environment.

I know a tremendous amount of pilots that also work, you know, as deputy sheriffs in their local communities. And I work with a lot of them in the aviation security business in the Air Line Pilots Association. We have a lot of retired military special ops people, Delta Force people. I have a 22-year SEAL that works for me, that worked for SEAL Team 6 -- extremely well-qualified people.

BOOZMAN: Really, it'd be safe to say then that over half really have not just somewhat of a background in the area of carrying weapons and things, but would be very experienced in that matter.

LUCKEY (?): Very much so. You know, that actually the shooting sports are very prevalent as are car racing and many other things that lend themselves very favorably to pilots. Lot of them are shooters.

MICA: Thank the gentleman.

Let me recognize now our ranking member, Mr. Lipinski.

LIPINSKI: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Captain Luckey, some pilots will not volunteer to be armed. So if some flight crews have two guns, some have one and others have zero, how will the air carriers and flight crews establish consistent protocols for handling threatening situations?

LUCKEY: Primarily, I go back to the application of our emergency procedure, SOP, our standard operating procedure. If there is one weapon on board or two weapons, there will be one pilot flying and one pilot defending. If there are no pilots on board, then they will be back to the resources available, which if you don't have lethal force, you can't use it. The bad guy doesn't know that, and hopefully the deterrent value of the program will reflect enough deterrent value to abrogate any attempted breech of the cockpit door.

I think if we've addressed issues, for example, the pilot and command, maybe not being a person that is in favor of firearms and having another one that does, I think this is something not unlike some personality issues that we have in the business. We address these very well through training issues and prioritization.

Again, I go back to the fact that the firearm or the TASER is no more than another piece of emergency equipment and people will be trained to proficiency. Not everyone likes to even use a fire extinguisher is something, but they do it and they do it with a discipline inherent to our profession.

LIPINSKI: Thank you.

Captain, from United there, what's your feelings in regards to that? Do you have an opinion here?

KRAKOWSKI: Well, when we began down the road of the TASER, what was attractive to us is that all the pilots and all the flight attendants would know what to expect from each other. That's why it fit like a glove. As we think about possibly adding some level of firearms in the cockpit, it's unclear to us at this point how well that would fit or how you fit that in, which is working very well on our TASER training right now for both the flight attendant and the pilot coordination, as well.

LIPINSKI: Did you say in your testimony, Captain, that you had investigated the possibility of using lethal weapons?

KRAKOWSKI: Actually, when we began to think about it, I did not have the job at the time. But when we looked at it -- these questions came up very fast. We also realize that the aspect of lethal weapons was much bigger than just my airline alone, and I'm here speaking about United only.

So we concentrated our efforts on what we thought would be a fruitful path by looking at the non-lethal weapons, belief that those could probably be trained and deployed quickly to get something into our pilots hands as fast as possible. So that's where our concentration was, knowing that there would probably be a larger debate, an industry debate later, which we're starting today.

LIPINSKI: Thank you.

Ms. Hart, was it the advanced TASER that you tested? And is this the advanced TASER?

HART: We did not actually test TASERs. There are a variety of electrical shock instruments, both direct contact as well as a variety of brands of barb-shooting electrical shock devices. The Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice often tests weapons, firearms, to see both their capacities and their effectiveness, to make sure they don't jam. We have not done any of that sort of testing on the different brands of TASERs.

LIPINSKI: So this TASER, or any other form of the TASER, actually has never been tested by you?

HART: We have used them in our less-than-lethal program and testing them out. But we haven't done the kind of formal testing that we do, for example, on bullet-resistant vests, where we take every manufacturer's vest, see what the claims are, see how they perform, exactly how they perform. We haven't done that sort of testing on these devices.

LIPINSKI: Captain Luckey, you have talked about the pilots having the ability to carry lethal weapons up until July of 2001. And I understand that started back in the 1970s?

LUCKEY: In 1961 the FARs were amended, sir, to include that provision under the concurrence of the carrier.

LIPINSKI: Do you have any idea how widespread the carrying of lethal weapons was by pilots?

LUCKEY: Well, there's an authorized and an unauthorized version of that, sir. In reality, in the 60's, during the threat time, I know an awful lot of pilot that carried firearms that probably were not authorized to do so. In reality, under the formal program, the auspices of the FBI, and the program that I participated in, there were less than a dozen, sir, that were involved in that program as far as I know.

It was actually...

LIPINSKI: And I understand -- excuse me for a second -- but I understand that in regards to the FAA, they really don't have any records of this whatsoever, because it was really a program that was handled by the FBI.

LUCKEY: It was handled by the carrier specifically, in conjunction and supported by the FBI as far as training went, sir.

LIPINSKI: Do you think that any of the records might still be available, at least from the carriers, on how many pilots were formally, officially trained to do this?

LUCKEY: I believe it was a very small number, sir. You'll find it's probably in the two digits, and in the lower two digits at that. I was aware of only probably less than a dozen of the people I was involved with.

LIPINSKI: So there may have been some additional pilots doing this, but they were not really fully authorized, deputized by the FBI to do it, other than the 12 or so that you are aware of.

LUCKEY: Yes, sir. And this was a reactive program, more of a SWAT application. In other words, we were primarily designed and trained for incident-specific responses. In other words, if an incident occurred, we would be substituted for that particular crew on the mission. And it was a confidential program, instead of something that was publicized for deterrency like the marshal program, et cetera. Deterrency was not a factor here. Determination of the perpetrator was the primary objective of this mission.

LIPINSKI: And do you know of any incidence amongst these 12 who were carrying lethal weapons, when they actually fired the weapons on the plane?

LUCKEY: Not to my knowledge, sir. I was deployed four times. One incident involved the termination of the perpetrator. It was done by an agent rather than one of us.

LIPINSKI: Mr. Hinderberger, did I understand you correctly when you were testifying about lethal weapons being used on planes, that you were assuming that they would all hit their target? Did you say that?

HINDERBERGER: The assumption in our testimony is that any firearm discharged in an airplane will penetrate the object that it hits. That testimony was in...

LIPINSKI: Does that include the skin of the aircraft?

HINDERBERGER: Yes, sir.

LIPINSKI: Oh. OK. Because it sounded to me like you were saying that you were assuming every shot fired was going to hit the intended target.

HINDERBERGER: No, sir. My testimony was really in reference to the question regarding frangible bullets and whether or not frangible bullets would have less of an effect on airplane structure systems. And my assumption again was that whatever is hit would be penetrated.

LIPINSKI: Has Boeing or Airbus or McDonnell-Douglas or anybody else that ever manufactured commercial airliners -- done extensive testing for, you know, either real, full-fledged bullets or frangible bullets in an aircraft? Do you know?

HINDERBERGER: Sir, I'm not aware of any testing that's been done in that area on commercial airplanes.

LIPINSKI: Captain Krakowski, there's been a lot of testimony today about the advanced TASERs really not immobilizing individuals if the individuals have a protective padding on, or they can maybe pick up a seat cushion and hold it in front of them when you're shooting at them. In your testing, did you run into that problem much?

KRAKOWSKI: Well, what we do is rely on the company that makes the TASER, who supplies it to thousands of law enforcement agencies. And they've seen just about everything you could imagine in terms of these types of issues.

Now, they expressed to us some of the vulnerabilities of the weapon. In our training, we looked for opportunities to defeat that. I can tell you, last night I was shot in my lower leg and I was completely immobilized just by that...

LIPINSKI: Well, that's true...

KRAKOWKI: ... one shot.

LIPINSKI: But I mean, were you trying to protect yourself? Did you grab a pillow, or...

KRAKOWSKI: No, because we weren't actually shooting the barbs. That's a little over the top for a pre-hearing demonstration.

LIPINSKI: I think we should have had a demonstration of it here, myself, Mr. Chairman. And I strongly would have recommended the leading expert of aviation to be the individual to be shot. And of course, that would be the chairman of the Aviation Subcommittee.

(LAUGHTER)

Thank you.

MICA: I had that opportunity last night when this was fully loaded, and I declined, and do today. Mr. Culberson?

CULBERSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

All of us who are passengers put our lives in the hands of the captain every time we set foot on an aircraft. And I support the chairman's bill because I want to know that the pilot has that ability to defend the cockpit as a last resort before the F-16 has to get involved.

And I trust the pilot with our lives completely to deal with any kind of a situation. One of which, I understand from previous testimony and hearings before this subcommittee, could involve, for example, the ability of a pilot to perform certain maneuvers that would disorient or, as one pilot indicated, essentially pin a hijacker to the ceiling.

I wanted to ask the Boeing representative first of all, what research have you done or are you aware of? Could you talk to us about the structural limitations or ability of a Boeing aircraft to endure some pretty significant maneuvers?

For example, I had one pilot tell me that they could go to, basically go into a dive or a roll, put about 1.5 g's on everybody in the passenger compartment, and anyone that wasn't strapped in would stick to the ceiling, and that would disable any potential hijacker. Could a Boeing aircraft survive that sort of maneuvering?

HINDERBERGER: The exact maneuvering that our planes can withstand is something that I would have to get back to you on. I'm perfectly willing to submit that in my testimony follow-up.

However, we do have many examples of turbulence encounters and other things in revenue service where the airplane experienced zero g or negative g situations. And you're absolutely correct. Anything that wasn't strapped down did hit the ceiling. And the airplanes in all cases were able to survive that and land safely.

CULBERSON: I remember an incident in Detroit, there was a Boeing, I think 737, that actually became completely inverted and fell many thousands of feet, and the pilot was able to recover and had experienced some rather dramatic G forces and the plane, I think, had a few wrinkles in the fuselage. Is that correct?

HINDERBERGER: I don't recall the specific example that you're referring to. The example that I remember from years ago was a 727 that experienced an event like that.

CULBERSON: In the event a pilot -- one other option I've heard discussed is pilots might depressurize the cabin. How quickly would -- to any of the witnesses -- would people in the cabin lose consciousness?

LUCKEY: Depends on the altitude and the physiology.

CULBERSON: Twenty seconds?

LUCKEY: You can always put people to sleep. It's hard to wake some of them up sometimes. So there's problems in who's going to sleep and who's going to wake up.

CULBERSON: Also to both you, Captain Luckey, and Captain Krakowski, the TASERs that you're -- that United is using would be secured in, I understand, a lock box with a safety -- with a combination. I gather the chairman's bill, which I strongly support, would also allow you to keep pistols similarly secured in the cockpit. Would any of you have any problems with that, as long as the pistol were locked away where only the pilot could get to it once the cockpit door was locked?

LUCKEY: I mean, we have some very specific procedures that I would be more than willing to share for you in a classified environment where we have a restricted audience, because of the sensitivity of the procedures and the equipment involved.

I can guarantee you we've looked very extensively at the retention and the transport and the custodial responsibility of using lethal force and actually rendering the device into a non-gun status when it's not in the operational environment where it's required. We've done extensive research on this. And we've got some pretty nice tricks out there that I can share with you in a confidential environment.

CULBERSON: One other, if I could, Mr. Chairman, to -- I just want to reiterate how important it is, I think, for all of us as passengers. We do trust our lives to the pilots of the aircraft, and I have complete faith in you to go through the training and do what's necessary to protect that cockpit.

If I could, also, finally, ask Ms. Hart to talk to us -- your experience, the work that I did with you that I was a member of the House Corrections Committee in the Texas House. Governor Bush and his general counsel, Al Gonzales, worked very closely with you and I in regaining control of the Texas prison system. At that time you were the chief counsel to the Pennsylvania corrections...

HART: Yes, that's correct.

CULBERSON: ... Department of Corrections? And you had some firsthand knowledge and experience in subduing prisoners or riot situations where non-lethal force needed to be used. And if perhaps you could talk a little bit about that, because your experience on non-lethal weapons isn't just limited to this study. You've had some practical experience in that as well, haven't you?

HART: I have, based on my position. I can honestly say, however, I was not involved in any riots...

CULBERSON: But you knew of it.

HART: ... and I did not personally subdue any prisoners, but I was very much involved in the use of force policies on what sort of force that we used and the less-than-lethal technologies that are used in correctional settings.

As you know, Congressman, correctional officers who work on the cell blocks are unarmed. It's been described as one of the toughest jobs in the nation and I think that's true. And the reason they are not armed is because the greatest risk they face is from other inmates taking the weapons from them.

Because of that, corrections settings have become very, very adept at controlling access, controlling how tools are used, how weapons come in, weapons detection, contraband detection, as the kind of safety measures that are needed.

This is the sort of work that NIJ does and continues to do, to work in developing technologies that help protect law enforcement officers and corrections officers, everything from controlling access, use of biometrics, less-than-lethal technologies. And we are making that available to the FAA for its use in any of these important efforts.

CULBERSON: Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MICA: Thank the gentleman.

Let me recognize Mr. Pascrell.

PASCRELL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Director Hart, I read through your testimony and find it very revealing. And my first question is, does the Justice Department express the same grave concerns about lethal weapons on planes as does the secretary of Transportation and the homeland security director?

HART: Congressman, we were requested to review simply less-than- lethal weapons. We felt that it would have been beyond the direction that Congress gave us, so we did not review that and did not express any opinion on that.

PASCRELL: So the department has taken no official position or any division of the department concerning lethal weapons on airplanes. Is that correct?

HART: My understanding is that the administration has not taken an official position at this time. Although there have been concerns expressed by members of the administration, no final position has been taken.

PASCRELL: Thank you. In your written testimony, you said for six desirable characteristics for less-than-lethal weapons for flight deck crews. Does any of the less-than-lethal weaponry you've reviewed, and you went through six general areas in your testimony -- very specific -- even light and sound, which I found to be interesting and exciting to think about. But are any of the weaponry, nonlethal, that you reviewed, do any of them meet the six criteria?

The six criteria are listed on your testimony on page seven -- immediately incapacitate an aggressor, have quickly reversible and controllable effects, be usable in confined space, be simply to operate, have multi-shot use capability and not damage critical systems.

By the way, on the question of the laser, you, in your testimony, question whether or not it does affect or impact upon the equipment on the plane. A little interesting difference here. But what about my question?

HART: In our report, we recommended that there be further testing. Ours was basically a preliminary review. We were not able to do testing in the actual settings where it would need to be done. We found that we believe that the electrical shock devices show the greatest promise because they had the ability to immediately incapacitate based on contact, even though there was quick recovery once the contact was broken. Could be used in confined spaces.

The direct type, direct contact electrical devices could be used with multiple shots, although the barbs with trailing wires are typically one to two shots, but there may be reloading capabilities I understand are being developed.

We did not have information about what the effects would be. We did not conduct tests on the effects on aircraft systems. We are a research agency for law enforcement. We are not experts in aviation systems.

PASCRELL: I would imagine, since you are the only government agency at this particular time doing the testing and reviewing -- and you only had a short period of time to do this, and we understand this -- that what you conclude will have an effect upon what the department says and what the administration says. I assume that you will continue the testing. I assume that we can continue to review. Or are my assumptions incorrect?

HART: At this point, we are not engaged in testing ourselves on aircraft systems, the testing that we have recommended. We continue to make ourselves available to the Department of Transportation, the FAA, for whatever purpose we can help them with. We think it's an important endeavor. The department sees this as a high priority. And we want to make sure that our resources are available to them in making these determinations.

PASCRELL: Thank you.

I have a question to ask Captain Luckey. Let me give you some advice first, which you didn't ask for.

LUCKEY: OK, sir.

PASCRELL: And I have a great deal of respect, as you know, for the pilots of this country. I don't want to pontificate about that, but my record speaks for itself.

You know, what I suspected would happen has happened. You know, the Gun Owners of America, that organization, quotes the pilots and fits you right into their agenda. And I think what we need to do, and I think you'd agree with me, is to get away from the visceral emotionalism and get down to what's going to protect the pilots and the passengers, what can we do to do that within reason.

The association, the Gun Owners of America, in testimony submitted to this committee feels that pilots should be armed with real, not fake guns. Now, they consider these stun guns, which we've been talking about today, which you saw, as fake guns. No, they said they're "toy guns," quote -unquote. But they're -- your friends on this issue, they support what you're attempting to do.

But let me tell you where they're coming from. Let me read part of the testimony to you.

"As far as planes are concerned, however, once it becomes well publicized that pilots are packing heat on planes, it becomes even less likely that such a need to wield a firearm in self-defense will ever exist. Once terrorists know that their box cutters will be no match against bullets, they will be forced to resort to another form of terrorizing the public. No doubt they will look for other gun-free zones, such as schools, to ply their trade."

PASCRELL: Just a little advice. I don't believe that you want to be associated with this line of thinking in order to defend your position, which I highly respect and partially agree with. You are the captains of the ship, but this line of reasoning to forward an agenda to me, I don't believe you want to be associated with in any manner, shape, or form.

LUCKEY: Sir, in response to your remarks, the Airline Pilots' Association has no affiliation whatsoever with any of the gun groups. We recognize that this is not a Second Amendment issue. We recognize this is a security issue, completely, independently. And we're concerned about the entire country looking too much at the pedigree of the dog and not about catching the rabbit, and that's where we need to go. Because we're out there where the rubber meets the road.

PASCRELL: One more question, Mr. Luckey. Thank you for your response. As a good American, you responded.

LUCKEY: Thank you, sir.

PASCRELL: The marshals that we're training now are armed when they board planes, is that correct?

LUCKEY: Yes sir, that's correct.

PASCRELL: Do they report to the pilot?

LUCKEY: Yes sir, they do.

PASCRELL: Is there a form of identification with those marshals?

LUCKEY: Yes sir, there is a form of identification. However, that's one of our concerns in the Airline Pilots' Association is a complete verification system.

You remember the GAO investigation a couple of years ago?

PASCRELL: Right.

LUCKEY: We live under that shadow of doubt all the time, and we would like to see a smart card throughout the industry that would be shared by various industries. We think that's a very important tool at this particular time.

PASCRELL: Because you're captain of the ship, not the marshal.

LUCKEY: Yes sir.

PASCRELL: And let me ask you this question. The marshals are packing heat. Do they have ammunition in the weapons they have?

LUCKEY: Yes sir, they carry that weapon in a particular condition, ready to fire.

PASCRELL: Do you think with the addition of the marshals on the plane -- we're training them quickly to help -- at the insistence of our chair -- we are training them adequately, we're going to go to a system where we're going to get as many on the commercial flights as possible. How do you feel about that, in terms of the safety of your passenger needs and yourself?

LUCKEY: Sir, I work with the Federal Air Marshal Program since its infancy. I can attest to the fact that their shooting skills are some of the best in the world. They were highly trained. When you go to a quantity situation versus quality, something has to suffer. I am somewhat concerned about the quality of the product they're turning out, where we have no reason so support that data, it is in personal experience, being involved in the firearms training, the law enforcement environment for 40 years.

PASCRELL: Mr. Chairman, thank you. And again, for putting this together today. In thank the panel -- did an excellent job.

MICA: Thank you.

Mr. Isakson?

ISAKSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Quickly following up on Mr. Culberson's question. Mr. Hinderberger, you're director of safety at Boeing, is that correct?

HINDERBERGER: Yes, sir, that's correct.

ISAKSON: Since having been on an American commercial aircraft that had to avoid, in final landing procedure, had to immediately go backup because somebody crossed the runway where they were about to land. I'm quite astounded at the capability of these airliners that you build when they have to do something.

To that end, have you made any recommendations or has Boeing looked to offer recommendations to the airlines about what maneuvers or capabilities the airplane is capable of that might be helpful or a good protocol, in terms of disrupting a potential hijack?

HINDERBERGER: Yes, sir. As a result of our participation in the secretary's rapid response team, we committed to working with the pilot association and the operators to define what capabilities exist within an airplane in order to upset a perpetrator on board the airplane. The specific details of those upset maneuvers, I'm not familiar with. However, if it's the desire of this committee I'd be more than happy to submit those to you, as long as they could be so done in a secure manner.

ISAKSON: Well, and I would underline, it should only be secure, because if it becomes common knowledge it might not be as good a technique as if it was a mystery.

Captain Luckey, with regard to the support of pilots being able to be armed in the cockpit, have you taken any position with regard to foreign aircraft that come into the United States? Is your support universal or is it for those airlines regulated in the United States?

LUCKEY: Sir, there's some serious sovereignty issues connected with that that we run into. I also work with the International Federation of Air Line Pilots Association, and work closely with them. We have some grave concerns about the level of security with the inbound aircraft from foreign countries and their level of security on board. Although, due to the sovereignty issues, we have very little effect and control over what they do.

I can say that, from an analysis perspective and being in the intelligence business for years, that the vulnerability that exists that we may be able to cover and guard against in this country is wide open from aircraft coming into some foreign originating flights outside the United States.

ISAKSON: So I take it from your answer then, your support is restricted to U.S. regulated, domestic commercial airlines?

LUCKEY: Yes, sir. That's the only thing that I have any effective control over...

ISAKSON: No. I understand that, but I appreciate the additional comment.

One last question. I flew the rear end of 124 in the service. I was a loadmaster, so I was on the other side of the airplane, and so I don't know a lot about the flight deck. But if pilots were armed, and I understand the captain is the captain of the ship and is in control, do your recommendations include how many of the crew -- because some planes have two, some planes have three -- how many of them are armed or if there's a designated person that's armed or if all of the armed?

LUCKEY: Sir, it's a voluntary potpourri of who wants to participate. The largest majority of our pilots have expressed a willingness to participate in this program. And we're designing the program in two manners. One, to be extremely selective and very well- disciplined in a voluntary basis. We're looking at the surgical application of lethal force, and those people who are capable of doing that will be the people that are ultimately armed.

Again, I'd go back to the deterrent value of this particular thing. We will have training protocols for the one-, two- and three- man crews and support redundant measures, just like Captain Krakowski said, with the alternating TASing of individuals, with that particular weapon.

Pilots are very disciplined. We don't do anything by happenstance. Everything is predetermined and very well-calculated.

ISAKSON: Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MICA: I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Johnson?

JOHNSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I don't have a specific question, just a brief comment or statement, as it were.

I've heard concerns, and very legitimate concerns today and throughout recent past on the basic subject matter of risks associated with arming pilots with lethal weapons. And I think it's important that those issues are raised. The bottom line to me is, as I think nearly all of us would agree was so horrifically demonstrated on 9-11, the risks of not arming our pilots are far worse, which is one of many reasons why I support the bill of the chairman.

In an ideal world a pilot would never need to be concerned with security, only with safety flying the aircraft. And again, in an ideal world a pilot would never have to be an air marshal. However, we all know that we don't live in an ideal world. Our pilots are our last line of defense in a terroristic situation, and I believe they have to be adequately armed.

And again, thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Lipinski for having this hearing today. This is a critical and important issue. And I really look forward to working with you in passing this legislation and getting it to the president for his signature.

MICA: I thank the gentleman.

And it appears there are no further questions for our panel today.

MICA: I want to take this opportunity to thank each of you for your contribution to this important question before the subcommittee for your testimony today. And we may have some additional questions, which we will submit to you in writing for the record.

There being no further business before the Aviation Subcommittee today, this hearing is adjourned.

Thank you.

END

NOTES:
[????] - Indicates Speaker Unknown
   [--] - Indicates could not make out what was being said.[off mike] - Indicates could not make out what was being said.

PERSON:  JOHN MICA (94%); JOHN DUNCAN JR (57%); JACK QUINN (56%); SPENCER THOMAS BACHUS (55%); RICHARD H BAKER (55%); SUE KELLY (55%); WILLIAM ASA HUTCHINSON (54%); JOHN R THUNE (54%); JOHN COOKSEY (54%); JERRY MORAN (53%); FRANK A LOBIONDO (53%); ROBERT (ROBIN) HAYES (52%); DENNIS REHBERG (51%); MARK KENNEDY (50%); SAM GRAVES (50%); CHRIS JOHN (50%); 

LOAD-DATE: May 10, 2002