Copyright 2001 FDCHeMedia, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  
FDCH Political Transcripts
September 25, 2001, Tuesday
TYPE: COMMITTEE HEARING

LENGTH: 49773 words

COMMITTEE: HOUSE TRANSPORTATION AVIATION SUBCOMMITTEE

HEADLINE: U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JOHN MICA (R-FL) HOLDS HEARING ON AIRPORT SECURITY

SPEAKER:
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JOHN MICA (R-FL), CHAIRMAN

LOCATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.

WITNESSES:

CAPTAIN DUANE WOERTH, PRESIDENT, AIR LINE PILOTS, ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL
DAVID Z. PLAVIN, PRESIDENT, AIRPORTS COUNCIL, INTERNATIONAL OF NORTH AMERICA
JOHN W. DOUGLASS, PRESIDENT & CEO, AEROSPACE, INDUSTRIES ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA
JOHN MEENAN, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, POLICY, AIR, TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION
PATRICIA FRIEND, INTERNATIONAL PRESIDENT, ASSOCIATION OF, FLIGHT ATTENDANTS, AFL-CIO, PHIL BOYER, PRESIDENT, AIRCRAFT OWNERS AND PILOTS, ASSOCIATION
JAMES K. COYNE, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL AIR TRANSPORTATION, ASSOCIATION
TOM POBEREZNY, PRESIDENT, EXPERIMENTAL AIRCRAFT ASSOCIATION, ON BEHALF OF NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF, FLIGHT INSTRUCTORS
EDWARD M. BOLEN, PRESIDENT & CEO, GENERAL AVIATION, MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION
ROY RESAVAGE, PRESIDENT, HELICOPTER ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL
JOHN W. OLCOTT, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL BUSINESS AVIATION, ASSOCIATION, INC.
JERRY B. EPSTEIN, FORMER PRESIDENT, BOARD OF AIRPORT, COMMISSIONERS FOR THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES
PAUL M. RUDEN, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, LEGAL AND INDUSTRY, AFFAIRS, AMERICAN SOCIETY OF TRAVEL AGENTS, INC.
RALPH S. SHERIDAN, PRESIDENT & CEO, AMERICAN SCIENCE & ENGINEERING
ANDREAS KOTOWSKI, CHIEF TECHNICAL OFFICER & CHAIRMAN, RAPISCAN SECURITY PRODUCT, INC.
PAUL HUDSON, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, AVIATION CONSUMER, ACTION PROJECT
ROBERT G. MONETTI, AVIATION SECURITY ADVISORY COMMITTEE, REPRESENTATIVE, ON BEHALF OF VICTIMS OF, PAN AM FLIGHT 103

BODY:

 
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE:
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION HOLDS A HEARING ON AIRPORT SECURITY
 
SEPTEMBER 25, 2001
 
SPEAKERS:
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JOHN MICA (R-FL)
CHAIRMAN
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TOM PETRI (R-WI)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JOHN DUNCAN, JR. (R-TN)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE STEPHEN HORN (R-CA)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JACK QUINN (R-NY)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE VERNON J. EHLERS (R-MI)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE SPENCER BACHUS (R-AL)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE SUE KELLY (R-NY)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE RICHARD BAKER (R-LA)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE ASA HUTCHINSON (R-AR)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JOHN COOKSEY (R-LA)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JOHN THUNE (R-SD)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FRANK LOBIONDO (R-NJ)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JERRY MORAN (R-KS)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE MICHAEL SIMPSON (R-ID)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JOHNNY ISAKSON (R-GA)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE MARK STEVEN KIRK (R-IL)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TIMOTHY JOHNSON (R-IL)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE DENNIS REHBERG (R-MT)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE SAM GRAVES (R-MO)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE MARK KENNEDY (R-MI)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JOHN ABNEY CULBERSON (R-TX)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE BILL SHUSTER (R-PA)
 
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE WILLIAM O. LIPINSKI (D-IL)
RANKING MEMBER
U.S. DELEGATE ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON (D-DC)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON (D-TX)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE LEONARD L. BOSWELL (D-IA)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JOHN BALDACCI (D-ME)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE PETER A. DEFAZIO (D-OR)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JERRY F. COSTELLO (D-IL)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE ROBERT MENENDEZ (D-NJ)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE CORRINE BROWN (D-FL)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JUANITA MILLENDER-MCDONALD (D-CA)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE MAX SANDLIN (D-TX)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE ELLEN TAUSCHER (D-CA)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE BILL PASCRELL, JR. (D-NJ)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TIM HOLDEN (D-PA)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE NICK LAMPSON (D-TX)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE SHELLEY BERKLEY (D-NV)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE BRAD CARSON (D-OK)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JIM MATHESON (D-UT)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE MICHAEL HONDA (D-CA)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE NICK RAHALL, II, (D-WV)
 


*


MICA: I'd like to call the subcommittee back to order. We're going to hear from our first panel.

And let me introduce again Captain Duane Woerth, who's president of the Air Line Pilots Association.

Welcome, sir. And you're recognized.

WOERTH: Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee.

I am Duane Woerth. I'm the president of the Air Line Pilots Association, International. And we represent 67,000 airline pilots who fly for 47 airlines in the United States and Canada. I'm also a member of the executive council of the AFL-CIO.

Now, of course our hearts and thoughts and prayers are with the families and our friends of those killed as a result of four separate aircraft hijackings. We have lost pilots and flight attendants from our ranks who, though are gone, will never be forgotten.

The survivors of the attack on America must now work diligently to ensure that our country and its airline industry are protected from further acts of terrorism.

Before I get into our specific security recommendations, I want to make two important points on how the Air Line Pilots Association believes we need to approach the entire issue of aviation security.

First, we strongly believe that we must all work to achieve one level of security for the airline industry. The security in place last week -- or two weeks ago was by design of different levels. The rationale behind those levels of security was that the threat posed to small aircraft was thought to be less than those posed to large aircraft. The dangers associated with operating of small airports were thought to be less than the risk at large airports.

The hazards posed by service personnel carrying items around the screening checkpoint were curiously thought to be of less concern than those associated with uniformed crew members going to their aircraft.

For the most part, we also thought that the threat to domestic flights was less than the threat to international flights.

And we believed that the threats to cargo aircraft were minimal.

These assumptions have been proven wrong. It is now clear that any size aircraft from any size airport, international or domestic, carrying passengers or cargo, can be used as a human guided weapon.

Now, to create a truly secure aviation system, we must start with a principle that the traveling public and aircraft crew members need one level of security. Now, the remainder of my comments should be understood in that light.

Second, we believe that airline security must be viewed as a component of national security from this day forward. It is no longer feasible to expect that the airlines alone can protect the industry that gives wings to the rest of the national economy. While we are not suggesting that the airlines be excused from any costs associated with securing their aircraft or their facilities, we are saying that the federal budget must share in the cost of defending this national resource.

Now, the Air Line Pilots Association has 21 near-term actions that we believe should be acted on right away and 9 longer-term actions that we suggest should receive high priority. Our recommendations range from the simple and inexpensive and quickly achieved to the difficult and the expensive and the longer term. I will briefly highlight only a few of our proposals in my oral statement, but our written statement provides details on all of them.

Mr. Chairman, since I appeared before the Senate Commerce Committee last week and since we submitted our testimony, our written testimony to the subcommittee on Friday, the Air Line Pilots Association has reprioritized our security recommendations and have determined that creating a program to allow specially trained and screened pilots to carry weapons in the cockpit must be a top priority.

Specifically ALPA urges Congress to authorize a new program to train volunteer airline pilots to carry firearms in the cockpit to secure the nerve center of the aircraft and to get the aircraft on the ground safely if faced with a terrorist threat.

Immediately following the terrorist acts of September 11, I wrote a letter to the Federal Bureau of Investigation inquiring about the possibility of the development of such a program to address and overcome this new form of terrorism by enabling airline pilots to defend their aircraft and providing the deterrent to any individual who may attempt to use an aircraft as a weapon of destruction.

Now, historically most aircraft hijackings were used as a means of extortion. Pilots were trained to fly the airline during a hijacking and not exacerbate the situation. Today the terrorist threat is very different. Today we are dealing with terrorist suicidal operations. The cockpits must be defended. And pilots must play a pivotal role in protecting their place of work.

ALPA asks Congress to deputize all airline pilots who complete the FBI training course and meet the explicit criteria as deputy federal law enforcement officers who are certified to carry a weapon aboard an airplane. ALPA believes that this action means the deputization of thousands of airline pilots.

Second, we must improve aircraft cockpit doors to insure that flight crews are secure against attacks by would-be cockpit intruders, armed or otherwise. This door system should be retrofitted on current aircraft and installed on all new aircraft. The technology for advanced cockpit doors is already underway. A network as well as the development of governmental standards for these doors must be expedited.

In addition, a deadbolt lock should be installed on the inside of current cockpit doors that cannot be overridden with a key from the outside. And second, a light-weight mesh net door should be installed behind the cockpit door on the flight deck side.

We also recommend the installation of at least two stun guns or tasers as standard equipment in the cockpit of all aircraft airliners.

And there must be a means to verify electronically the identity of all airline and airport employees and armed law enforcement officers who are authorized to enter secure airport areas.

In addition, all airline employee ID cards should be revalidated immediately.

And furthermore, a public awareness campaign should be undertaken to educate the traveling public about aviation security. A better informed public could serve as additional eyes and ears for security, assist crew members as appropriate and cause fewer problems on board aircraft. The understanding that security is everybody's business could be very valuable by thwarting future security breaches in our industry.

Among our recommendations that can be initiated soon but will take longer to implement fully I will highlight only two.

First, we believe the administration and Congress should consider using an existing law enforcement agency or creating a new aviation law enforcement agency. Currently civil aviation security is but one of many responsibilities of the FAA. The FAA is not a law enforcement agency, nor is it staffed to provide law enforcement support.

Whereas the FAA's focus is appropriately on the development and enforcement of safety regulations, the law enforcement agency should focus on countering existing and evolving threats. This agency should also be responsible for coordinating threat and other security information with other law enforcement agencies. And ALPA is committed to working with you to create such an agency.

Second, the U.S. security screening system must be overhauled. We must use highly trained and motivated well-paid screening professionals and the best possible equipment. A well-run security screening corporation selected not on the basis of the lowest bid but on the highest competency should perform the screening function under the supervision of the aviation law enforcement agency I just mentioned.

Now, the Air Line Pilots Association stands ready to work with the Congress and the administration and the rest of the aviation industry to implement these recommendations and to institute the most advanced civil aviation security system in the world. We believe that this will allow everyone who uses our national transportation system to do so with a genuine sense of security.

Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity before you. And I will be pleased to answer any questions you or the committee may have.

MICA: Thank you. And we'll withhold questions until we've heard from all of the panelists.

Let me recognize next David Plavin, who is president of the Airports Council International of North America.

Welcome, sir, and you're recognized.

PLAVIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'm here today on behalf of ACI North America and on behalf of the American Association of Airport Executives. We have a written statement that I'd like to submit for the record, if I may.

MICA: Without objection your entire statement will be made part of the record. Please proceed.

PLAVIN: Thank you, sir.

First of all, I want to bring you up to date on where we are in the airport system at this point. New federal mandated security requirements, a 40 percent decline in the number of passengers using our aviation system and the canceling of war risk insurance so that it is not available at any price are having significant impacts on airports. Some airports may even be forced to shut down critical operations unless they can receive some immediate relief.

First, airports are spending more to increase airport security. And we've got countless examples at individual airports of all sizes. We've already identified increased airport security costs of almost $600 million. And we expect this number to rise to at least a billion dollars per year. We think this is a very conservative estimate.

The federal government has not yet taken steps to help pay for the additional security measures mandated by the federal government that the airports have been implementing. And while we are spending more on increased security, passengers and revenue are declining.

This loss, which is now projected to approach $2 billion, is also causing instability in the airport bond market. Last week Standard & Poor's placed all of its North American airports on CreditWatch with negative implications. And other airports have had experiences that directly result from that. Airports that have bonds that are backed exclusively by passenger facility charges, like Chicago's airports, will be experiencing significant special kinds of problems.

And to make matters worse, liability underwriters have elected to cancel war, hijacking and other perils risk policies without any kind of options for replacement of that.

With the air carriers in danger, ACI and AAA supported the action that Congress took last week to stabilize the airline industry. Now it's critical that Congress and the administration focus their attention on airports whose problems are inextricably tied with the airlines.

First, it's important to remind ourselves that airports are user funded. We get no subsidies. And because that's so we need your help to ensure that our users, including the airlines, pay their bills.

PLAVIN: We cannot survive without that.

Secondly, we urge Congress to support airports with the funding they need to pay for increased security requirements, just as it did with the airlines. And if general funds are not provided, airports will have no choice but to raise the fee they charge their users, including the airlines.

There are other ways to help airports pay for increased security requirements. There are security fees. There is additional flexibility that we could add in AIP and PFC requirements, which today may not be used for anything other than capital investment.

And third, with the decline in revenue, there are other steps to that we could use to help the situation. We could reinforce confidence in the bond market. We could lift the limitations on the alternative minimum tax as applied to airport debt and permit airports to refinance all tax-exempt debt, including debt subject to AMT. And in the interim we're going to need some help with the cash flow that is necessary to pay our debt service.

Many airports have been informed that their war risk policies are being canceled as of October 1. And airport contractors have had their policies canceled as of yesterday. Congress fixed the airlines' problem with the rising cost and liability issues associated with war risk insurance. And we really need your help to do the same for airports at this point because without such protections many airports and their contractors will be unable to operate at all.

In addition to the new security requirements that have been implemented in the past two weeks, there are other ways to improve aviation security. As Captain Woerth said, we need to use well- trained security professionals to screen passengers and baggage. To be sure, we all agree on the need for a funding source that isn't subject to bottom line considerations but is, rather, subject to security considerations and managing liability risk. The key is to improve the hiring, training, compensation, retention, testing and proficiency of these individuals who screen the passengers and baggage.

And if Congress chooses to federalize the screening process, it's imperative that the agency or entity responsible be given the resources, the equipment, the flexibility in how security services are delivered on a long-term and continuing basis without the traditional kinds of concerns that we have about annual appropriations and about being subject to the ongoing limitations on flexibility.

We think that it is critical that the airports be in a position to be able to respond. And right now, unfortunately, the limitations on their ability to respond are enshrined in law and in regulation. We're talking about additional deployment of machinery, filling up the pipeline with equipment that is necessary to control access and to control the introduction of dangerous materials into the system.

We need to have a different kind of a system for conducting background checks on all of those who have access to security areas and for more airports than we now have the right to do that.

We need new funding for more law enforcement officials, especially in K-9 units. And we need to have better intelligence disseminated to designated airport security managers and to deploy additional federal security managers at more airports.

Mr. Chairman, we think that this situation is manageable. We think it is imperative that we get underway with putting the measures in place that will bring back the public's confidence in flying in our aviation system.

Thank you.

MICA: Thank you. And we'll now hear from John Douglas, who is president and CEO of the Aerospace Industries Association of America.

Welcome, sir. And you're recognized.

DOUGLASS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'd like to begin with also saying that our hearts go out to the victims of this tragedy and associate myself with Captain Woerth's comments.

As you know, I represent the manufacturers of America's aerospace equipment. And we're in a position similar to many other parts of the industry. If you take this sector of our economy all together, it represents somewhere between 12 and 15 percent of our GDP on an annual basis.

And one thing that I would urge the committee and urge the Congress in general is to look across the broad spectrum of this industry to see the impact on the manufacturing side. We're looking ahead to the next couple of years, and we can see a loss of somewhere around $15 billion and 80,000 to 100,000 jobs. So it is going to be broad. And most of the things that I've seen so far tend to underestimate it.

Turning to security, sir, the first point I want to make is we what endorse what Secretary Mineta has done in creating the two rapid response task forces that he has created to look at this issue. One is to look at events that can be done and things that can be done to heighten security in the airplanes. The other task force is oriented towards things that can be done in the airports. And you've heard from Captain Woerth this morning on some of the points in the airplanes.

I would urge the Congress, sir, to look at these issues structurally from two points of view. And I've had considerable personal experience in this as a retired Air Force general officer who has been associated with terrorist acts in the past. I've been the target of terrorist attacks. And I've also been involved in the protection of nuclear weapons.

You need to look at it from the point of view of processes and procedures and then from technology. They are two distinctly different ways to deal with the issue.

And one key ingredient that hasn't been mentioned in all I've read in the press and the other testimony that I've seen is ultimately when we decide what technology we're going to deploy and what procedures we're going to deploy, we need to keep that secret. We don't want these people to know exactly how we are going to react in any particular instance. And that's a key thing that the military uses to deter these kind of attacks. And it needs to be brought into the civil side.

Building again on what Captain Woerth said, the overall security situation that we're dealing with is only as strong as the weakest link in the chain. And that chain starts with intelligence. And that is a basically governmental, inherently governmental, function. Only the United States government has the strength and the knowledge and the assets to provide the kind of security that we need which comes from intelligence and knowing what we're up against.

Secondly, there is the security in the airports themselves, the flight lines, the work areas and so on and the screening process for the passengers. We tend to agree with some of our other colleagues. This is probably in the long run going to have to be a federal function.

Then there are the two elements of cabin security. One is the sky marshals program which deals with the security in the passenger part of the compartment and then the cockpit security that Captain Woerth talked about. There are a lot of ways you can approach these things. Some of them are relatively cheap, and some of them involve procedures and not a lot of new technology.

But there are some new technologies which we can employ. And I would be glad to answer those when we get to the question-and-answer session.

And finally, sir, I'd just like to wrap up by asking that my written statement be entered into the record.

MICA: Without objection your entire statement will be made part of the record.

Let's now turn to John Meenan, who is the senior vice president for policy with the Air Transport Association.

Welcome, sir. And you're recognized.

MEENAN: Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

Over the past traumatic days we've witnessed an unthinkable attack on America that was followed by a tremendous pulling together by the Congress, the administration and indeed all of our fellow countrymen in coming to grips with the aftermath.

On behalf of the ATA member airlines, we deeply appreciate the support we've seen.

As we grieve with the families and friends of those lost, we know, too, that the events of September the 11th must mark a sea change in the way we think about security in America, not just in the aviation arena but across the board in our society.

In the immediate hours and days after the tragedy, in consultation with the government, we began that process. The airlines put into place enhanced security measures called for by the government, while the government itself dramatically increased its level of involvement and activity well beyond the airport checkpoints and really throughout our society to deal with the threat.

We know, however, that fully restoring public confidence and security will be a long and arduous process. But it's essential that we do so, not just for our economy, but in truth our whole way of life depends on it.

The United States government has the fundamental responsibility for the protection of its citizens against all threats, including the threat of aviation terrorism. The government has at its sole discretion and within its unique confidence virtually all the means available to counteract the threats. That includes diplomacy, intelligence gathering, economic sanctions, military action, covert action and general law enforcement.

Only with regard to countermeasures, airport security have we seen a sharing of these responsibilities with private industry. We think the time has come for that to end. The ATA members believe that a federal system must be deployed. And in my written statement we provide seven principles which we believe would be helpful in guiding that process.

I'd like to mention just one of those now. And that is the focus on a much-enhanced intelligence gathering system, a computer-assisted screening process that will enable us to focus the tools that we have at our disposal on a much more targeted group of people about whom we do not have sufficient information to be as confident as we are of everyone else in the system. That has to apply not just in aviation, but if we're going to get at the real problem of terrorism, it has to apply across society.

Now, in light of recent events and in keeping with the principles that we've outlined, we believe it's time to put in place a fully federalized unified, seamless security system utilizing all of the tools available to the United States government. This has been recommended repeatedly in the past and was the central recommendation of at least two presidential commissions.

Now, obviously the airline industry will expect to play a continuing and significant role in a cooperative process. It would, however, be a process in which airport security, like it is in most other nations of the world, is treated as a national security priority and is funded and treated no differently than any other national defense program. The airlines and their customers would expect to continue to bear a share of the expense; however, the remaining costs, whatever it takes, must be viewed and budgeted and handled just as any other defense or law enforcement expenditure would be.

As I indicated, September 11 must mark a sea change in the way we think about domestic security. And we believe that that change can best start with the aviation system. Our proposal, Mr. Chairman, is that the federal government should provide financial support for all mandated safety requirements, including reinforcement of cockpit doors, enhancement of screening devices, along with other improved flight deck integrity measures.

It should provide for the significant and rapid further deployment of a federal air marshal program, both domestically and internationally. And it should require the federalization of airport security, including deployment of armed personnel under federal control.

And as I say, this is key, the collection and processing of all appropriate data to identify passengers for whom additional security screening would be advised, control of screening by certified federal security personnel, enhanced training for security screening personnel as part of the federal program and a requirement for the X-ray screening of all mail so that it can be certified as appropriate for carriage.

The government's assumption of the stronger role in aviation security by meeting these responsibilities will be an important step and will go far in resolving public concerns. It will help dramatically to return public confidence in our transportation system. We cannot allow terrorism another victory by restricting our freedom to travel while at the same time crushing our economy.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, we look forward to being fully engaged with you, as well as with Secretary Mineta's rapid response team and Governor Ridge's new effort, as we further explore all approaches necessary to resolve the security issues the United States faces once and for all.

Thank you. And I'd be happy to respond to questions.

MICA: Thank you. And again, we'll suspend questions until we've heard from our last witness on this panel.

And that's Patricia Friend. She's the international president of the Association of Flight Attendants.

Welcome. And you're recognized.

FRIEND: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for this opportunity to testify today at this very important hearing on aviation security.

I speak today as the voice of the 25 flight attendants who lost their lives on board the hijacked aircraft on September 11. It is now my responsibility as a flight attendant to speak for them to tell you today what we can no longer tell you, that on that day those flight attendants were on that airplane simply to do their job and to protect the flying public. It is for them and for all flight attendants that I urge you to move quickly on the necessary improvements to ensure the safety and security of our industry.

Flight attendants are the front line safety personnel on aircraft. In the air we are the firefighters, the law enforcement agents, the first-aid responders and the comforters to our passengers. The flight attendants that day went to work with the knowledge that they might be called upon to evacuate an aircraft in case of an accident, as we are trained to do, or to assist with a medical emergency or even to restrain an abusive passenger.

We know that on that morning they made sure that their passengers were in their seats with their seat belts fastened and all of their carry-on baggage stowed. We know that those flight attendants prepared the cabin and conducted a predeparture safety briefing, as they always do.

Yet we are left to only imagine what horrors happened next. We do know that this was nothing for which any of us have ever been trained.

FRIEND: All 25 lost their lives in the performance of their duties that fateful day. And while we may never know the exact chain of events that occurred once the hijackers took over, we do know with certainty that these women and men did their very best to protect their passengers and the security of the cockpit.

I come here today to implore you to make immediate, drastic and permanent changes in airline security so that our members' voices and our commitment to safety be heard and are never lost.

Our written testimony also details our recommendations for changes to security. In the interest of time I will comment briefly only on some of them.

Action indeed must be taken about important recommendations that you've already heard about, fortifying the cockpit door and limiting access, providing some means of defense for crew members, federalizing the security screeners and increasing the number of federal marshals on airplanes.

But we must also take decisive action on crucial safety recommendations to protect the flight attendants and the passengers in the aircraft cabins and to help us to do our job.

It is paramount that flight attendant training programs be updated and improved and that a process for certification be enacted to formalize and reinforce our role as safety professionals.

Today the FAA requires carriers to provide minimum training on hijacking situations. This training is grossly outdated. It includes showing flight attendants a video focusing on the 1970s scenario of a dissident hijacker who wants to go to Cuba. And it emphasizes a negotiated resolution. That scenario know longer exists.

In order to address the current real world dangers that our members may face on board the aircraft, the training procedures must include appropriate and effective responses to terrorism as it exists today. The training should be realistic and it should include options and recommendations for maintaining the integrity of the cockpit.

The successful completion of the training will be meaningless unless it is recognized by a formal certification process in order to reinforce the flight attendant role as a safety professional. Mandatory certification is the only way to ensure that all flight attendants receive better training in all types of emergency situations. And as with other workers in the airline industry, flight attendant certification and licensing will provide for tighter and more stringent requirements, making infiltration of the airline system more difficult.

If Congress is serious about preventing terrorists from bringing weapons on board an aircraft, then immediate action must be taken to impose a single standard that clearly and strictly limits the size and amount of carry-on baggage that comes into the aircraft cabin.

This is not a new concept. Five years ago the aviation security advisory Committee established the Domestic Security Baseline Working Group to review the threat of foreign terrorism within the United States. The group examined the vulnerabilities of a domestic civil aviation system and identified seven areas of aviation operations as vulnerable, including carry-on bags.

The committee specifically recommended that the FAA prescribe uniform standards to restrict the size, type and amount of carry-on property and to provide for strict enforcement.

Because of the lack of sufficient limits on carry-on bags, security screeners today must check thousands of bags every day. It is clear that the screeners are currently examining far too many bags, some of which are extremely large, and in a very short time frame. This makes proper scanning difficult if not impossible. As a result, it is not inconceivable that the screeners will miss a suspicious or potentially dangerous item that could be used in another attack.

Congress should also provide funding for adequate bomb detection and K-9 detection units at all major airports for use in routine airport and aircraft bomb searches. As unbelievable as it may sound, a number of AFA carriers are making their flight attendants, their ramp workers or their aircraft cleaners responsible for searching the aircraft for suspicious devices in order to comply with the new security directives.

Flight attendants or any of the other employees I've mentioned are not trained in bomb detection. To maximize safety and security, law enforcement personnel should be responsible for all such searches. But if other employees are given this responsibility, they must be trained and certified to do so properly.

Restoring faith in air travel is paramount. We must be primarily concerned with the speed and the precision with which we accomplish these goals and less concerned about the costs involved. We must be totally focused on what needs to be done immediately to avoid another unthinkable tragedy.

It should be the legacy of the flight attendants lost in this tragedy and indeed of all the innocent victims of the attack on September 11 that air travel is no longer a viable target for those intent on destruction.

Flight attendants are on the front lines of aircraft security. Every time we go to work we may be called upon to put our lives on the line. I ask you today, please act now to give us the tools to save lives in the future.

I thank you again for this opportunity and am happy to answer any questions that you may have.

MICA: I thank you for your testimony and all of our witnesses. And we'll go right to questions.

First of all, Captain Woerth, I strongly support your proposal to have airline pilots defend themselves. I have a couple of questions, though.

First of all, would this be voluntary?

WOERTH: Absolutely voluntary, sir.

MICA: You also recommended, I think, that at least several stun guns be available to, you said, pilots, I think, and crew. And you're anticipating that not only pilots but other crew members would have access to and use of the stun gun?

WOERTH: We're recommending certainly in the cockpit that they be installed. And we're working with Pat Friend and others on our committee on other protective devices for the rest of the cabin crew.

MICA: Ms. Friend, you said that there should be some mechanism for defense of crew members. I think I wrote that down. So you agree with at least the stun gun proposal that crew members should have access to that defense system also?

FRIEND: Yes. We absolutely believe there needs to be some nonlethal personal protective devices in the cabin of the aircraft, particularly since we are looking at an aviation environment which will really isolate the cabin from the cockpit, necessarily so. But some protection needs to be in the cabin.

MICA: I understand -- and I'm not that familiar, but I understand -- the sky marshals use a gun that doesn't penetrate the hull of an airplane. Is that the type of weapon that you're looking at?

WOERTH: Yes, Mr. Chairman. They're called frangible bullets. They basically disintegrate upon impacting the target. And they're not likely to penetrate the fuselage or cause a rapid depressurization.

MICA: Last week I think a pilot relayed to me that the last directive that the pilot had on how to deal with hijackers was probably from the '70s or '80s. And it said basically make friends with the hijacker, try to delay them and then had some other recommendations about arriving in Havana and contacting the Swiss Embassy, U.S. interest section.

I heard you comment a little bit about that, Ms. Friend and Captain Woerth. Is that the only directive in place? Has there been a new directive out, Captain Woerth and Ms. Friend?

WOERTH: Well, each airline is rapidly changing their training profile. And to get all the hundreds of thousands of pilots and pilot attendants in will take some time, but...

MICA: Are you aware of an FAA directive that requires an update or any new recommendations from FAA?

WOERTH: I have not personally seen a new directive. I know there's work in progress, but I cannot say that I've seen it myself.

MICA: Ms. Friend?

FRIEND: No. We are discussing it with the FAA. I think there's general recognition it's necessary. But no action has been taken as yet.

MICA: Mr. Meenan, you recommended additional background checks or additional screening; is that correct?

MEENAN: We are recommending a variety of things. Certainly background checks and additional screening are important.

What we really are focused on, however, I believe, is the key to dealing with terrorism in our society. And that is a much more comprehensive intelligence collection system that looks at all available databases that exist and develops the kinds of algorithms you need to pull that information out that is going to be dealing in problems.

MICA: Well, first of all we didn't have the intelligence capable to pick up and fleece on 16 or 17 of these hijackers, anything negative about their background. Then we don't have a system to get that information in place, either, to airlines that's adequate or to law enforcement officials; is that correct?

MEENAN: As things stood before the 11th of September, that is in fact correct.

Our view is that the information is out there and it is obtainable by the government. And we need to do a much better job at drawing that information out.

The second piece of it is why we believe so firmly that this has to be a federal process. We have had communications and structural problems with the current arrangement on airport security from the very beginning. And our view is it belongs under one seamless umbrella controlled by the federal government, not handled by different carriers and different airports in different ways.

MICA: All right. Since 1996 Congress directed FAA to come up with standards and professional criteria, background checks for screeners. That wasn't done. And the year 2000 we passed an additional bill that directed FAA to come up with standards, again, trying to professionalize the screening process and those involved in security. And that still isn't in place.

Maybe I could get a couple of you to comment. Why did they fail? What was wrong with the process?

Captain Woerth?

WOERTH: I think we just all together, the nation, weren't as security conscious as we thought we were. We were so focused on delays. We had other priorities. And we assumed, as I said in my testimony, that certainly the domestic side of our business was safe.

We did focus a lot more on international flights and those security briefings. But we had this presumption that the interior of the United States would probably not be the most likely target of a terrorist attack. We just didn't believe it.

MICA: Anyone else want to comment on what went wrong with the process? I mean, Congress twice directed the FAA. Today we still don't have those rules in place.

Go ahead, Mr. Plavin.

PLAVIN: Chairman, I think that the issue is, was then and is now the question of how we balance the various requirements of a free society. And we did not try to do the kinds of things that would restrict access to the system in the name of trying to make it easier and more convenient for people to use the system. And I think it's obviously something that needs to be revisited.

But by the same token, it needs to be revisited in a way that doesn't require is to be dependent on the availability of resources.

We also continued to allow that system to exist where the bottom line was governing the determination about how many people with what kinds of training we were providing in the system. And I think that it is unacceptable for that to have been true. That applies not only to the screeners. It applies to the information available for checking backgrounds on people.

It's only this year with the support of this Congress that we were finally able to require background checks to include other kinds of checks on people's criminal records.

So it's been a very difficult process because, as I think several of the witnesses have pointed out, we have really not tried because we haven't really understood the nature of the threat. Obviously we're in a different environment today.

MICA: Thank you.

DOUGLASS: Mr. Chairman, if I might add to that.

MICA: Very, very briefly.

DOUGLASS: If you were to go over and look at the Defense Department budget, you would see a huge amount of money in that budget for intelligence collection and dissemination.

John used the term "collection." What he's really talking about is dissemination. Once you find something out, you got to get it out there to the people that can act on it. And the bill to do that, sir, is going to be big. And so if we tell the FAA they've got to improve this, Congress is going to have to give them the resources to do it.

MICA: Thank you. Let me yield, if I may.

WOERTH: Mr. Chairman, with the chair's permission, I would submits at this point in the record a compilation of the history of criminal background checks dating from 1985, which I prepared previously, that explains all this.

MICA: Without objection, that will be made part of the record at this point.

MICA: Let's see, Mr. Lipinski would like me to recognize Mr. DeFazio.

Mr. DeFazio, you're recognized.

DEFAZIO: Mr. Chairman. And I thank the gentleman from Illinois for yielding.

Just on the point that the chairman was making, part of the problem has been that the FAA proposes rules that the industry perceived, the ATA and member airlines and others, as they were going to cost money. So they would immediately begin to file objections, concerns and comments and drag out the process as long as they could. That's the answer to the question, which none of the panelists were able to put in place.

And then, you know, what I'd like to do -- and there was also a comment that there was no perception of this threat. There are members of this committee, Mr. Oberstar, Mr. Lipinski, myself, who recommended federalization two years ago of the screeners after an appalling report came out on screening problems, one of many reports. There are people. I've been recommending enhanced screening, enhanced screening and airport security, for 14 years, Mr. Oberstar for 20- some-odd years, Mr. Lipinski.

You know, these are things -- I'm glad to see the change in attitude, although now I'll go to a few questions.

You said it's going to cost money. It will. I believe the burden should be shared. And the burden should be shared partially among the traveling public, and partially some of it can be attributable to the general security of the United States.

Last week I asked a panel of airline CEO's about the idea of assessing a security surcharge on tickets up to $3 was my idea. Mr. Oberstar has recommended $2.50 on a one-way. That would be $5 round trip.

And Mr. Kelly of Alaska Airlines said that that was totally unacceptable, that people would no longer fly if we assessed them $3 security charge. He said, I quote, "People will not respond to anything other than the total price. And that is strictly supply and demand."

I would like to know, do members of this committee agree with that statement? Or do they believe members of the traveling public would be willing to chip in 3 bucks per ticket on a pass? And I particularly would ask the ATA because I'd like to know that we have the support of the industry other than Mr. Kelly.

MEENAN: Mr. DeFazio, in response to your question, I would like to address first the comments about the security screening certification. That measure was originally advocated by the Air Transport Association in 1996 and has been advocated by us ever since that time. So we have not been lobbying against that in any way.

DEFAZIO: Good.

MEENAN: In response to your question, as my testimony says, we believe that the airlines and their passengers should shoulder a share of the burden. We think, however, that the lion's share of this burden is going to have to shift to the federal government because this is not just an aviation security problem; this is a national security problem. And the terrorism threat we're defending against cuts across all sectors of the economy, not just aviation.

DEFAZIO: Right. But you wouldn't consider $3 to be unreasonable?

MEENAN: At this point, yes, I have no specific numbers in mind. I think we need to get a much more comprehensive look at what we're talking about here before we try to put down...

DEFAZIO: Well, I'll give you a specific. We could federalize all the screeners and pay for them for somewhere between a $3 and $5 security surcharge per ticket. Now, would that be acceptable to the ATA?

MEENAN: I think our assessment of the numbers at this point suggests that we need to take a more comprehensive look at it because I don't believe that we're talking about just the screeners.

DEFAZIO: OK, but then you're not going to answer.

Let me just put it a little more bluntly. Perhaps I'm known for that.

I was appalled when Mr. Kelly said that last week. And I'm a bit disturbed at your response. We want to know that when we propose a comprehensive package with a shared burden with the airline, with the passengers, with the federal government's responsibility, that we're going to have the support of the industry lobby group who for so long has dictated things that have happened with the industry through the FAA and elsewhere.

I would like to know that you would support minimally a $3 surcharge. And if you can't say that, I would like you to go out and poll the traveling public and find me a single passenger who would be unwilling to pay that surcharge. And I'd be happy to chat with him. Because I don't think you can do it. The polling last weekend said people would pay $50. They'd like to get there alive.

MEENAN: Mr. DeFazio, as I said, we believe that a more comprehensive look has to be taken at the numbers. We're not saying we are opposed to any surcharge. We have said that we believe that a share of this burden has to be shared by the airlines and the passengers but that by and large this is a federal responsibility. And we need to be taking a very different look at the way we approach these responsibilities in America.

DEFAZIO: OK. If I could go on to a couple other things.

Ms. Friend, you recommended restrictions on carry-on bags. What do you have in mind?

FRIEND: We have a longstanding proposal we think we should cut it down to one bag. We're supporting that. We believe that that will reduce the workload on the security checkpoints and enhance the ability of the screeners to identify objects which should not go on airplanes.

DEFAZIO: Would the ATA support that recommendation?

MEENAN: Our view is that in federalizing the security system those kinds of decisions need to be left to the people who are running that security system.

MICA: The time of the gentleman has expired.

DEFAZIO: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MICA: Let me recognize Mr. Petri.

PETRI: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'd like to ask unanimous consent the testimony prepared by the Taxicab, Limousine & Paratransit Association be included in the official record, Mr. Chairman.

MICA: Without objection, so ordered.

PETRI: And I'd also, if I could, like to note the presence of a respected constituent of mine, Tom Poberezny, who is going to be on the next panel. And he's going to be testifying. He's head of the EAA and worrying about the fallout of this on flight training and other aspects of it.

But does any -- let me just ask the whole panel. You may not want to -- we'll see. Does anyone disagree with the recommendation that we intelligently retrofit the doors to strengthen cabin security?

Does anyone disagree with the recommendation that we screen and certify but allow pilots and other airline personnel to be armed?

Yes?

MEENAN: I think at this point, Mr. Petri, that that is something we certainly understand the perspective that the pilots bring. We believe that a more informed debate is probably going to be necessary before that's resolved.

PETRI: In that connection, some of my constituents raised this question, too, because they're worrying about people shooting out the windows or losing pressure in the plane.

My understand is that you're talking about devices that are current that have been developed that are currently used on international flights and so on by air marshals and others that have not done that.

WOERTH: That's correct, sir. The ammunition that we would be proposing to use would be the standard issue for that type of purpose, the frangible bullets we talked about that disintegrate and won't even take out a window, let alone the fuselage.

PLAVIN: Sir, I think the other element of that is that for years many of us at airports have been very concerned about the proliferation of people with guns on airports. Now, obviously, this is a unique circumstance. And for pilots in certain circumstances it makes a lot of sense. But I think we really need to be careful about assuming that arming everybody is a solution here. Because I think that at that point the potential for real risk to people is escalated dramatically.

DOUGLASS: If I could add to that, you know, as a manufacturer and as a retired general officer in the Air Force, we routinely, as you know, arm our people on airplanes. And my estimate of the professional quality of the crews on our civil crews are they can handle it. You know, most of these guys and gals that fly these airplanes are military veterans.

And I agree completely with what Pat said. You've got to train them to meet the threat as we know it. And part of the answer to this is procedural, which is training or arming. And I don't see a huge technological risk to the passengers by going down that path.

PETRI: You did indicate in your opening statement that there was further technology that you'd be happy to discuss. Could you inform the committee about that.

DOUGLASS: Yes, sir. Well, there are lots of technologies. Some of the ones that you've heard about or seen about in the paper are things like automatic landing systems in which the pilots could activate the autopilot on the airplane and it would just fly to the nearest base and be automatically landed by an automatic landing system. That's of course what I would call the high-tech end, Duane, wouldn't you? And it would be expensive to implement.

There are simple low-tech technologies. He's talked about arming and using these special kind of bullets. You can reinforce that door with various kinds of technologies. There are things you might be able to give to the stewardesses that could disarm unruly passengers.

All of those technologies exist. And there is a balance that has to be taken into account as you look at each one. And I think Secretary Mineta's done the right thing. He's picked some experts to look at how do you enhance the security inside the airplane. And I think he's on the right track.

But once they come up with an answer, sir, we've got to absolutely have resolve to implement it. One of the chronic problems we have, we all know -- we're all sitting here talking about it -- is report after report comes out saying here's what we need to do, and we don't do it.

PETRI: The minimum it seems to me we -- the weak link was the cabin security, entrance to the cabin. This couldn't have happened if they couldn't have gotten through the door to the cabin. And we should at least be able to do that one.

Thank you.

MICA: I thank the gentleman.

Before I recognize Mr. Lipinski let me ask you. I have a unanimous consent request before us that Mr. Baird from Washington, Mr. Mascara from Pennsylvania, Mr. Berry of Arkansas and Mr. Brown of South Carolina, all members of the...

(UNKNOWN): (OFF-MIKE)

MICA: ... and Mr. Brumenour -- joined by him too -- all members of the full committee, are not members of the subcommittee, be allowed to participate and also, after we've heard the aviation subcommittee members, be allowed to participate with questions.

Without objection, so ordered.

Mr. Lipinski?

LIPINSKI: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, our next person to be recognized was to be Congressman Costello, but he has given his time to Congressman Boswell.

BOSWELL: Well, thank you, Mr. Lipinski.

Why are you yielding me your time, Jerry?

COSTELLO: (OFF-MIKE)

BOSWELL: Well, thank you.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for having this hearing today.

Early comment you made regarding the continuation of last Friday, so having that in mind, I'd like to just make a short statement and then ask you if you feel I could include it in the record, what I've written. Then I have a couple comments and questions to the panel.

And that is, you know, last Friday night we took an important step in providing immediate assistance. And a lot of us thought that was very important to do. And I still feel that way.

We also took at face value the dialogue that took place between a couple of members on the floor that we would bring appropriate legislation as soon as possible to have impact on the many people been laid off of work and not having health care and a whole bunch of things.

So just a matter for the record I hope that as soon as possible is like today, tomorrow or very, very soon.

Could I include this in the record, Mr. Chairman?

MICA: Without objection, your entire statement will be made part of the record.

Please proceed.

BOSWELL: Thank you very much.

I appreciate what Mr. Douglas said about the (inaudible) for intelligence. You got to have it. I got a little history too. And I know that I used to teach at the Command General Staff College.

You know, if you don't have intelligence you can't do much in the field or whatever it is. Same thing applies here. And dissemination is very, very important. So I just want to comment on that.

And I think that. And I'm proposing with others while we're away from here, that we ought to federalize the security. But I still think that ownership, some ownership should go with the airlines. Because if you've got some ownership, you take a little more responsibility.

I think for standardization of security we have to federalize. But some of you have said, some of us have said up here that we shouldn't leave the airlines totally out. And so if you have suggestions on how we can do that, I hope that you will share that with us. I think we need to do that.

Friday we had a response from Ms. Garvey, the FAA. I thought it was very, very good. They got their head in the game. They're trying hard. And it impressed me that way.

But in a moment I want to ask any of you to comment, do you feel like you're getting a response that you need?

And lastly, if I could, on the comment side of it, I agree with you, Captain, that the cockpit's got to be secure. And I support and I would assume that you're saying that you're willing to be deputized if necessary, whatever, but you have to have the training and it would be voluntary. Those who felt they could do that would do it; those not would not. I support you on that.

WOERTH: Thank you, sir.

BOSWELL: Your primary mission is to get the airplane to the ground safely somehow. And if this would enhance that in any way, I certainly will support you on that.

There's not enough sky marshals to go around. I know a lot of work is going on fast to bring these into line.

BOSWELL: A police department in one of my capital cities said if officers off-duty would volunteer, for example, Des Moines, Iowa, to take the leg to Chicago and back or St. Louis and back or wherever in their off-duty time and would take any scrutiny to, you know, maybe five years' experience, the background check, all the things they got to go through, clearly would take minimum training to qualify them to be sky marshals. And I would think that the police officers across the country would probably all feel the same way if asked.

How would you feel about local police officers, trained local police officers -- been through their academy and all these things -- being, at least for an interim period, serve as sky marshals?

WOERTH: I think that for the good of the nation we need to supplement as rapidly as possible the initial cadre. Obviously the training around the airport and special circumstances with the airplane will have to be an important part of that training. I'm going to presume that additional background checks can be done expeditiously. But I think we ought to look at a plethora of willing volunteers with some background already to help supplement this program and get it running very rapidly.

BOSWELL: I haven't quarreled what you've said, but as far as specifically a police officer from Dallas or Des Moines or wherever, if they were properly checked and on the aircraft, would that be something that you'd find acceptable as we try to build up this cadre?

WOERTH: I think as we work with that cadre, we will be addressing that. And in fact we were working with the Federal Bureau of Investigation in how to do a program that would supplement that rapidly. We're working with them right now.

BOSWELL: OK...

WOERTH: Bottom line, yes, I'm trying to agree with you, sir. We think that would work.

BOSWELL: Appreciate your view.

I have some more things I want to say, Mr. Chairman about general aviation, but I think that's more appropriate for the next panel, so I'll wait for that time and talk about it there.

Thank you very much for yielding.

MICA: The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Duncan?

DUNCAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

What I would like to request permission that I yield my time at this time to Mr. Horn who has to leave. If you can come back to me after Mr. Horn.

MICA: Mr. Horn?

HORN: I want to thank the comments that Mr. Petri. I completely agree with them. And I yield my additional minutes to Mr. Duncan. I have to go to another (inaudible).

DUNCAN: OK. Well, I didn't know. I thought he was going to take the full five minutes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

First let me thank all of the witnesses for some very fine testimony and really outstanding recommendations.

You know, I've been on this subcommittee the entire time I've been in the Congress. And during those years we've had many hearings on aviation security. Mr. Oberstar, when he chaired this subcommittee, had a particular interest in that and actually led a commission that produced a bill, a very fine bill, that we passed on aviation security in 1990.

When I chaired the subcommittee working with Mr. Lipinski, we held several hearings arising out of the TWA 800 crash.

And then we had a hearing in May of '98 dealing with the passage of the profiling issue and security concerns at that time. And we had a closed hearing at that time as well as a public one.

And the screeners issue almost all the experts told us that that was one of the real weak links. And so we held a hearing on that in March of 2000, a year and a half ago.

I remember about three years ago I discussed with Mr. Lipinski and we recommended at that time that we set up a school for screeners to professionalize the screeners.

And actually I appreciate the chairman pointing out that in some of those laws, and both that we passed in '96 and 2000, that we made security recommendations such as certification of screeners, more detailed background checks. Some of these things that we tried to do haven't been done over the years for various reasons.

But I think it's fair to say there just wasn't interest, as Captain Woerth has said, that there is today. And so I think this is leading to some real opportunities that can come out of these horrible tragedies that occurred in New York City and at the Pentagon.

Captain Woerth, I particularly appreciate the very detailed, the 21 short-term recommendations and the 9 longer-term recommendations that your association has made. I suppose that I have received and I'm sure every member of this subcommittee has received more suggestions and ideas about what has happened now and about aviation security than anything we've ever been involved in. But your list is a great list.

It has some things on there that I haven't thought of or haven't been suggested. I didn't know, for instance, that the INS was deporting large numbers of illegal aliens without any supervision. And I did know there have been some problems, but I didn't know the numbers.

I support your recommendations to arm the pilots who are trained with these stun guns or whatever you call them. I think that's very good.

I support Ms. Friend's recommendation that we start to limit in some ways these carry-on baggage because it's almost gotten to the point of being ridiculous what some people have tried to carry onto the planes.

I think it's very important, though, that all of us -- and I've said this at two other hearings -- that all of us work together to tell the American public over and over again -- because none of us can do it by ourselves -- that flying today is safer probably than it has been ever before because some of the things that we've done in the last few days and some of the things that under Chairman Mica's leadership we're going to do on aviation security here within the next few days.

And I know many people and businesses have been hurt. I've said at two other hearings that I think we need to open up national airports, all those thousands of people that are employed there and really need that. And we're going to do some of those things, I hope.

I particularly am concerned about the small businesses, the flight schools. Many of these small businesses have been hurt worse than almost anybody.

But I appreciate your being here today and the recommendations you've made. And we're going to work with you.

I don't have any questions. I'll yield back the balance of my time, Mr. Chairman.

MICA: Thank the gentleman.

Mr. Lipinski wants us to yield to Ms. Tauscher.

Recognized.

TAUSCHER: Thank you, Mr. Lipinski and Mr. Chairman.

This is very complicated, isn't it? I think that I can't tell you how much I appreciate your testimony and all the hard work.

Captain Woerth, my concerns about arming pilots are that I believe the core competency of the pilot is to fly the plane and land it safely.

And I believe, Ms. Friend, that your people have done a phenomenal job. And we want to protect the cabin and the cockpit, obviously.

But I think that we all agree that securing the cockpit door is a fundamental thing we have to do right away. And we have to deal with the depressurization issues. But my sense of it is that I want less weapons than more but obviously safety and security.

I would hope that we could work toward a compromise where we deal with having the cockpit secured, providing more time for the captain and the first officer and the crew to be able to deal with any kind of attempt to breach the cockpit but have potential weapons be part of the technology in the plane as opposed to roving around the airports by having people individually armed.

I'm concerned about that for, I think many reasons why we would all be concerned about it. My constituents are concerned about it. Many of them are pilots themselves and members of Flight Attendants.

So I think that what we have to do is step back a second and be practical and that we have to reassure the flying public. I really appreciate my colleague Mr. Duncan's comments about the fact that it has always been safe to fly. It is now more safe than it ever has been. We need people to return to the air.

The comments that you made, Captain, about the wings of the economy, I think are very heartfelt but very cogent. We have got to get this economy moving again and people feeling safe.

So I would be supportive of all of the recommendations that you put forward. I will stop short of supporting arming people in cockpits and flight attendants around.

But I believe that these are some of the best Americans we've had and we've lost too many of them in the last few weeks. And I want to do everything I can to protect them and my constituents that are flying. So I hope we can find a compromise where part of the equipment in the cockpit includes devices to protect the cockpit and the Captain and the first officer so they can fly the plane and obviously protecting the flight attendants, who are the first line of defense, as you so ably said, Mr. Friend, and that we can work toward a compromise that does not increase the weaponry at airports in the short term.

And I don't have any questions.

Thank you.

MICA: Thank you the gentle lady.

Mr. Quinn, you're recognized.

QUINN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And good afternoon, barely, to our panelists. We appreciate your input.

Captain, it's good to see you again.

WOERTH: Thank you.

QUINN: I guess more than any questions for this panel, Mr. Chairman, you and Mr. Lipinski need to also receive our gratitude for your perseverance in these hearings and again another meeting tomorrow. It is important.

And I don't have any questions necessarily for these panelists, but something we've been saying this week and further about the people who are on the job already, many of the people that you represent, in various aspects of this airline industry. And I'm a former schoolteacher. And I really believe that if students aren't taught in class what they need to know for the test, they'll fail the test. And I think we have good people working in all these jobs already, good hard working people, wanting to do the best for their industry and for our country. But if we don't tell them what they need to know for the test, they'll fail the test.

And so whether it's airline security at the metal detectors or the pilots, it's our responsibility to tell them what they need to know for the test. And then they'll pass. And I think our responsibility, whether it's at the gates with the metal detectors or in the cockpit, it's our responsibility in this subcommittee and the full committee and the Congress to tell them what we want them to know, to tell them what they need to know to do the best possible job so the flying public will feel safe.

And, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Lipinski, I'm here only as one of many to say we want to help you do that. And we appreciate the job you're doing. Thank you, and yield back.

MICA: Thank you, Mr. Quinn.

Let me recognize -- Mr. Lipinski recognizes Mr. Pascrell.

PASCRELL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I'd like to ask some questions of Mr. Plavin.

Mr. Plavin, must all the employees in security, were they asked for the documentation?

PLAVIN: The security is actually many different pieces. And that's part of the problem. Some has been airline employees, contractors, some have been airport folks, and some have been the employees of other people who operate on the airport.

The airport's job is, with the federal government, to review first the employment background and more recently the criminal background of people who have access to the secure areas. That is what an airport does at this point, is to check the background of those employees subject to federal law.

PASCRELL: Well, let me ask the question again, Mr. Plavin.

Are all of the employees that are dealing with security at the airports documented? Yes or no?

PLAVIN: They are now.

PASCRELL: They are now.

PLAVIN: They have been for some time.

The problem is that because many employees have been on the airports for a long time, the nature of their specific check will have been different. But today all airports' employees with access to the secure areas are...

(CROSSTALK)

PASCRELL: It is necessary that those employees speak English?

PLAVIN: Yes.

PASCRELL: It is necessary that they have no previous criminal records?

PLAVIN: In certain kinds of crimes that are spelled out in the statute but not all crimes.

PASCRELL: Not all crimes.

What kind of references must one have? Because you contract out most of this work. What kind of references must the potential employee have?

PLAVIN: Well, actually, the airports don't contract out most of the work. Most of them are other employers.

But what they are required to do is to be able to show what their employment background is. And they are required to show the nature of their criminal backgrounds. And that's what they have to have in order to be passing the screening.

PASCRELL: Must they have references?

PLAVIN: I'm not aware that they do.

PASCRELL: Let me ask this, Mr. Chairman. This is almost like don't ask-don't tell, really.

The attorney general says that very specifically that there will be no profiling. And very specifically FAA has responded to that. Yet we hear of those people at Logan Airport involved in security that are identifying those people who are, who look like Arab Americans.

Do you support that, Mr. Plavin?

PLAVIN: I don't support profiling. That's not the law. And we are under instructions not to be doing that kind of profiling.

PASCRELL: The other aspect of this is the relationship of the airports and the INS. Right now anybody who is deported -- correct me if I'm wrong -- they come to a specific airport to move to another country. There is no security whatsoever. They get on the airplanes. They cause many problems on those airplanes. INS needs to supply no security to these folks that are being put out of the country.

Are you aware of that?

PLAVIN: I'm sorry. I don't know the details of that.

PASCRELL: What is the relationship between the airports and INS?

PLAVIN: Actually, the INS controls certain space within the airports and runs its own operation with the airports. The airport actually has no direct relationship with the INS.

They have escort requirements that they impose when they remove people from the country. But that is entirely within their jurisdiction. The airports have no ability to participate in that.

PASCRELL: Mr. Chairman, just one other point I'd like to make. I think that in redesigning security and helping to redesign the security at our airports, that there needs to be a partnership here so we do not get into the debate of whether we should totally nationalize security or not. There needs to be some -- I mean, the airports and airlines can't walk away from their responsibility for this. We should not, however, not understand our own specific responsibilities.

Because I see a divide here between who is responsible for security, and nothing will be accomplished. So I recommend, Mr. Chairman, that we work -- and you've asked for a report, hopefully very shortly, of when we address that problem of shall we nationalize security that we're going to have proper documentation to make the decision, not rush to judgment. I believe that that's the way to go on this, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking member.

And we need to answer that question very soon. But we need to have the cooperation of all other agencies. INS has to be part of this. We know of the inefficiencies within that department. I mean it pales -- let me tell you something. The IRS pales compared to what's going on in INS. And that's part of our problem, of documentation of folks coming into this country.

I mean, I support this. I mean, I support 245-I. But we can't be stupid about this. These are different times. And we've got to be very specific about who's getting on these planes, what they're carrying and how we're protecting the folks that are flying us.

Thank you.

PLAVIN: Mr. Pascrell, for years the airports have been asking for the right to do additional kinds of checks. We were pleased to be able to expand the kinds of things we were permitted to check. But at the moment we're still only allowed to check certain kinds of criminal records at certain kinds of airports. We think that needs to be expanded. And we've been arguing for that for many years.

And the other side of that is at the federal level, as you point out, we are still unable to get a single consolidated consistent source of information about what's out there on the people with whom we're checking. So I would absolutely support the comments you're making.

PASCRELL: Well, Mr. Chairman, that doesn't make me feel very good about that response. Probably the truth. I'm not questioning what you're saying.

The question of coordination, Mr. Chairman, is something we've talked about on this panel in previous years. If we don't have the coordination, if one agency doesn't know what the other agency is doing, all this is hot air. That's what it is.

Thank you.

MICA: I thank the gentleman.

Let me recognize Mr. Ehlers

EHLERS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have first a quick question and then a more detailed one.

Captain Woerth, on the issue of pilots carrying weapons, would you expect that when they're dead-heading or simply flying into their base station that they would also carry the weapons while they're in the passenger compartment?

WOERTH: Our proposal, sir, is that if these people are deputized and are really federal law enforcement officers, they'd have the same right and privileges and expectations of a federal marshal and have the same rules apply to them.

EHLERS: So then they would really have to go through the marshal training too and learning how to shoot safely within the passenger compartment and so forth?

WOERTH: Yes, sir, everything.

EHLERS: It's not simply sitting in the cockpit and repelling invaders.

WOERTH: Not at all.

EHLERS: All right. Thank you.

And then just a comment, too, about the secure door. I have some reservations about that. There has to be some way to get in there.

I can think of numerous examples where you might have to get into the cabin in an emergency. The Egypt Air situation, for example, where we suspect a suicide pilot, while the captain was in the restroom. Unfortunately, the pilot couldn't save that, the plane, regardless. But that's a case where you'd certainly want the captain to be able to access the plane even though the door might be locked.

Now, my real question is on the emphasis you placed on the federal government and federal role in this, the federal government taking over so much of the responsibility. And I find that surprising, since most people seem to think the federal government really doesn't do things that well.

And I would rather see the airport, for example, being responsible for the supervision and security. They have a vested interest. And we haven't handled the responsibility so well this far. As you know from Mr. Mica's comments earlier, we have tried to strengthen security, and the FAA hasn't even submitted the rules yet after some time.

I'm curious why you're all advocating the federal government now take this over. Is it that you truly believe the federal government can do a better job than you can, either as airlines or as airport managers or even as staff? Or is it just that it's going to be so expensive and you'd rather have the federal government take it over on the hopes that we'll pay for it?

I'd appreciate your responses to that.

MEENAN: Mr. Ehlers, if I might begin, the fact is we believe in our deepest inner selves that the time has come for America to wake up to the fact that terrorism is as big a threat to us as any other national defense threat. And the federal government is the only organization that has the capacity to deal effectively with those kinds of threats to society.

We know that it's going to have to be a cooperative effort. We recognize that airports and airlines are going to have to work with the federal government. But you can't have three different people in charge. You have to have one central authority that runs these things.

And it isn't an attempt to pass the cost off. It isn't an attempt to not deal with these issues ourselves. We have seen that we don't have the capacity to deal with terrorism. Only the federal government does. We are the last, we have been the last line of defense. But frankly, I don't believe that's something that belongs in the hands of private industry.

EHLERS: But do you really believe that the federal government for -- just take the screening, for example, of bags and passengers. Do you really think the federal government will do a better job of hiring, of training, of supervising?

MEENAN: I think if we build a system where you've got career opportunity, you've got a program that is well-thought through from the beginning to the end, it will operate effectively in an aviation environment, yes, I think the federal government can do a better job.

EHLERS: So you really envision these people being federal employees, civil service employees, not contracting out with other --

MEENAN: That's correct, sir. Obviously there's going to be a lot of debate about that subject. But our view is that it's -- part of the problem is one of communication and structure. And you've got to have some kind of unitary, unified structure to make this work. We can't have one airport doing things one way and another airport doing things another way and one airline doing this and somebody else -- all under government supervision, as it is now, but it's a very -- it needs to be improved.

We think the mechanisms are in place now with the existing structure to deal with the immediate problem we're dealing with. But in the longer term if we're going to confront terrorism and beat it, we've got to get smarter as a society. And that includes putting the government in these kinds of roles.

PLAVIN: Mr. Ehlers, I have a somewhat different take on this from Mr. Meenan. I think that the problem with the discussion of security is that there are lots of pieces to it and that the different pieces tend to be confused.

I think I share Mr. Meenan's view that the federal government is the only entity that can provide coordinated, detailed, consistent intelligence and consistency in terms of the way that intelligence is disseminated.

I think the federal government is the only one that can set the standards and enforce the standards for how these kinds of services need to be provided.

I share what I infer from your comments, your concern about making this a typical federal agency with federal employees. As a former airport director who's spent a good deal of time dealing with federal agencies, federal agencies are not known for being the most responsive. And they are not known for being able to deal with immediate kinds of issues that require them to be flexible and responsive on a very short turnaround.

So I think there is a combination of possibilities here that we really need to pay attention to. Federalizing certain dimensions of the security process, airports, some airports, would very much like to be in a position where they can provide this service. They are already in charge with law enforcement responsibility and can do this job. And then at the broader sense I think there are other kinds of relationships, contractual and other kinds of parties that ought to be able to be in this system.

The idea of a one-size fits all solution may not be appropriate. We have different kinds of communities. We have different kinds of airports, different kinds of passengers, different kinds of airlines and different kinds of flex. And I believe that we really need to take all of those things into consideration.

And then finally we also know what happens when we don't provide enough resources in the system in a typical federal appropriation process. We need to figure out a way to make that part of the process more responsive as well.

MICA: The time of the gentleman has expired.

EHLERS: May I just make a closing comment?

MICA: Quick.

EHLERS: Just to respond to that, I want to make it clear I'm not saying that federal employees would do a bad job or the federal government necessarily will do a bad job. But I think the last point you raised is the one I'm most worried about.

Three years from now when we haven't had a hijacking for three years, everyone relaxes. Congress says, "Well, we don't have to put that much money into the system." Employees get laid off. You hire other employees and you don't train them as well. You know, I can see the same thing happening that's happened before.

The only way to do it, make it work, would be to have an assured source of funding. And that gets back to having a passenger charge, which is going to fund it so you know the money is there.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MICA: Thank the gentleman.

Mr. Lipinski has asked that we recognize now Ms. Millender- McDonald.

MILLENDER-MCDONALD: Thank you, Mr. Chairman and the ranking member, and again for your leadership in bringing these series of important hearings to the forefront.

I would like to say and just really kind of piggyback on Mr. Woerth's statement that without a strong airline industry then we will not have a strong economy. And I'm just going to put out what I think would bear that type of strong economy.

I first would like to say, Mr. Plavin, that I agree with my colleague Mr. Ehlers that this should be a shared responsibility in terms of airline safety and that the airport authority should play a role in terms of the screening component of this security.

I am certainly open to any other comments that might be made. But we must get away from this false sense of security that we have now in aviation and come down with a real genuine sense of security.

And with that I would like to say technology is inadequate at our airports. And therefore we need to ensure technology and security monitoring and detection system, like the TIP, the threat image protection.

We need to give the pilots the authority to use whatever apparatus is necessary to ensure that they take us from one destination to the other safely, whatever that might mean, stun guns or whatever. We need to fortify those cockpits so that we will ensure that no one has easy access to those men and women who are trying to take us to the various destinations.

We should have thorough background checks on everyone who handles security at the airport and criminal background checks for everyone who has access to the secure areas of an airport terminal, including fingerprints. I think it's very much required.

We should have K-9 units at the airport as well as the intelligence that is critically needed so that everyone will be on the same page. And that was the central theme that ran throughout all of those who are here on the panel.

We should increase the federal air marshals on domestic flights to return the confidence of the flying public. When I flew to Los Angeles last Friday I was there talking to the flight attendants for some 45 minutes. They felt very assured that five members of Congress were on that flight returning to Los Angeles.

And this is what we must do.

With reference to the flight attendants, person who's representing the flight attendants, I agree solely with your statement of today. I talked with the flight attendants. They talked about this outdated training that you get, grossly outdated when it comes to training you to really be able to meet with the terrorists that we saw of September the 11th.

We should look at the carry-on bags that you're talking about and perhaps reduce those carry-on bags. There's just so many bundles that folks are bringing onto the airplane. We need to look at that.

MILLENDER-MCDONALD: And we need to look at, Mr. Chairman, this domestic security baseline working group that Ms. Friend spoke about. Because they did look into the threat of foreign terrorism within the United States. And that's been some five years ago. I'm not sure we have gone back to that, but we need to revisit that. We need to revisit those things that we already have in place and see how feasible they are with today's threats on the United States.

But by no means should we not secure those folks who are helping us to move from one end of this country to the other.

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I have my statement for the record and letters from a lot of the airports in California who I wrote to asking me (sic) to give suggestions. And some of those are the suggestions that I've just outlined.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and ranking member.

MICA: Without objection your entire statement and the letters requested will be made part of the record.

Thank the gentlelady.

Mr. Bachus?

BACHUS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

My first comment to you -- and I'll ask you to respond to this -- is that the last line of defense can't be the airport. It has to be the cockpit door. Do you all agree with that?

WOERTH: Well, sir, I'll answer that.

I think that's a practical reality that we have to secure the perimeters farther and farther away. But where we are today is that the cockpit door is the last line of defense.

BACHUS: And you know as a practical matter we can secure that where no amount of security is going to result in keeping a terrorist which is trained in hand-to-hand combat -- you know people can kill people with their hands. People are trying to do that.

Once we determine that we've got to secure that door -- I've just written some things down -- it should be deadbolted, I would think. Is that correct? You know, keys, people can get keys. Would you say a deadbolted door is necessary?

WOERTH: On the current door, sir, we're proposing that. I'm confident the rapid response team is going to propose that.

But even more importantly on the new door that we're talking about with a manufacturer we're talking about electric and magnetic locks withstanding 1200, 1500 pounds of pressure. These will be a dramatically different door than is on the airplane at this time.

BACHUS: Would it be steel or capalar (ph)? It will be probably steel?

WOERTH: We're looking at all the different materials, looking at the different ballistic things we might see as a threat. Those design requirements are being worked on by the committee this week.

BACHUS: Yes, with plated hinges, I would think?

WOERTH: Yes, sir.

BACHUS: OK.

Now, you've secured that door. Now I would think that one thing you had to make sure of -- and this is why I question the use of guns in the cockpit -- is you got to make sure that the pilots never, never leave the cockpit. And I don't see how that fits in with the gun.

WOERTH: I'd like to attempt to answer that, Congressman

First of all, the airplane that my seniority holds at Northwest Airlines is 747-400. As I said, that cockpit is larger than the first apartment I had in college. And we can have complete living quarters in there, a lavatory in there. We could prepare our own meals in there.

However, about 90 percent of the aircraft in service are narrow- body small aircraft, and it's not reasonable to assume that at points in time the pilots won't have to leave the cockpit. And all the different procedures, working with the flight attendants, for that and clearing the area. But I don't think it's really possible that on a large majority of our narrow-body domestic airplanes that we can expect the pilots to stay in a cockpit.

So we need procedures and security to handle that eventuality.

BACHUS: Course, that might depend on short hops or long hops.

Now, you have to have a vent of some kind between the cabins in case there's decompression; is that right?

WOERTH: That is correct. And in fact the door itself is the vent.

BACHUS: Could you not use that to pass food in and out, if we're talking food?

WOERTH: I'm talking about the entire door is...

BACHUS: Is vent?

WOERTH: ... is the vent. The door is going to blow open the current door.

So as we develop a new door, we're dealing with the technical problems with the other methods of venting between the cockpit and the cabin so we don't have structural problems with the aircraft.

BACHUS: Sure. And you can pop out windows, so you can escape without going through the cockpit door, I suppose.

WOERTH: But most of the aircraft have windows that the pilot can escape from.

BACHUS: What about an automatic transponder? You know, I've read where, you know, there ought to be a system to turn off the transponder. But you know, you'd have to cut it off when you're taxiing, when you're landing or it causes distortion with the radar. But private airplanes have automatic transponders which automatically turn on and off. Could we not have that?

WOERTH: I believe we can, sir. And we're working with both Boeing and Airbus and all the major manufacturers on what would be required to make that happen.

BACHUS: Let me ask another thing. And I think this is probably the most problematic.

Mr. Plavin, you said, you know, that you oppose profiling. But isn't it a fact that 95, 98 percent of hijackers are twenties, in their twenties or early thirties, they're almost all men? I just don't see my 84-year-old mother being required to take her jewelry off as she goes through the screen.

PLAVIN: What I was referring to was the notion that we are not as a country ready to profile particular kinds of ethnic groups. I have no disagreement with your observation that there are certain kinds of characteristics and traits and behavior and certain kinds of ways in which people do their business that we ought to be looking into more closely when they occur.

BACHUS: Here's some other things.

MICA: The time of the gentleman has expired.

BACHUS: Facial recognition systems and digital fingerprint ID systems. Are those being considered?

MICA: Very briefly respond.

BACHUS: What?

PLAVIN: There are such technologies that exist, and they are being experimented with in different parts of the world, optical readers, biometric readers of palmprints, fingerprints. And in fact we already have one example of them. It doesn't work all that well, but it is in place, where the arriving passengers into the United States can use a handprint in order to gain access.

So I think that the answer is yes they do exist. And there is no reason in the world why we shouldn't be using more of them.

BACHUS: You know, I think...

MICA: I thank the gentleman. His time has expired.

And let me please recognize Mr. Honda. Mr. Lipinski recognizes him at this time.

HONDA: Thank you, Mr. Chair. And I just want to complement you for the format today.

And I want to thank the panelists also.

I'm not going to review everything that everybody has said. I think that it pretty much has been said.

I think that what we're going through, probably is remorse in decisions that we didn't make, decisions we should have made. So I don't know, I've been digging up a lot of information. And I keep asking myself why. And you know, you get upset. You get angry. But then I don't think that's going to be productive at this point in time.

Sufficient to say that we have to resolve, I think someone said that. And the resolution has to be continuous and not be forgotten in six months and then be persuaded to change your minds. That's number one.

And I believe that Mr. Douglas is correct that process and technology are the two areas. But I think the third area is personnel and the application and training of personnel.

I'm willing to see everything on the table. I'm not really convinced that firearms are necessary in all instances. But I think that if we see the complete picture and the different kinds of fuselage that we're looking at -- I know you have different kinds and sets of solutions.

There are some solutions in terms of reporting. I understand that there's some web sites that the flight attendants are able to put their concerns on for the public also. So I think that that's something the public ought to know.

I understand also there's the aviation safety reporting system that's administered by FAA and -- funded by them but administered by NASA. Seems like something that we should look at and maybe perhaps find other ways to deploy that information and that responsibility so that it's continuance would be appropriate on-line.

Mr. Chair, I'd like to submit my full comments for the record and have unanimous consent also to accept a couple of reports I've got, one from Identec, "Securing Airports and Air Travel: Authenticating Passengers and Personnel and Securing Physical Location with Computer Access" and a report from the University of California Berkeley relative to labor and employment. And it addresses the security issues there.

MICA: Without objection your entire statement and the documents cited will be made part of the record.

HONDA: Thank you.

My grandfather, when I returned him back to Japan, I put him on a 747. I saw him boarding. And when I looked to my right he was there again.

I said, "Grandpa, you should be on the plane."

He says, "The plane's too big. It won't fly."

I think the focus now is not so much on the science, because we know that aircrafts are heavier than air and can get off the ground. What we're really looking at is people and people's behavior, both international and domestic.

I think the application technology and the intelligence and being able to use that at the present time of entry where folks can have information, make decisions before people get on the airplane, is going to be critical.

And I think that we're still porous. I still travel. And it seems to me that the identity check and the boarding pass at the gate before you enter the plane is not common practice. And there's a lot of area for contaminating the process, if you will.

So but I do appreciate us sitting down and resolving to solve this problem. It's resolvable.

And I think that the next step is to look at other forms of transportation in our society, because I think that we are at this point where we need to look at our entire security system.

Thank you, Mr. Chair, and I thank the panels for their input.

MICA: I thank the gentleman.

I yield now to Ms. Kelly.

KELLY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for not getting here earlier. I was testifying at another committee.

Gentlemen, you spoke of the possibility of hand recognition as a way of identifying people who had gotten tickets and who were airline workers and so on. I have been exploring this because I think it's a possibility for us to use in terms of public housing to help keep drug dealers out of hallways and so on.

And from what I understand from my research, the unit to recognize a finger or a hand costs about $150. The computer that will read that costs about $300. So you are a talking about something that is about $500 that might be able to help us all be secure in the air.

I think it behooves the airlines to take a look at it. And I'm glad you brought it up.

I also wanted to ask one question because I, too, am interested in the fact that the 747's, as I understand it, that El Al flies have no access between the pilots and the cabin. And that doesn't seem to trouble their pilots.

And you brought up the issue of loss of compression. How often does that happen? And is this a serious problem?

WOERTH: It happens extremely rarely. In fact, we just went through a major data research along with the Boeing Company -- and of course since they bought McDonnell Douglas -- to that. And we're also working with Airbus. It's an extremely rare event, but it does happen. And so we need to certify our planes with that precaution.

The El Al door does not vent. And by regulation when they fly in our country, they have to have the door open right now. So we're going to -- we can deal with every -- there's not a technological fix that we can't deal with and make this vent and be a secure door. So I'm confident that's the door that's going to be built and installed in the United States.

KELLY: Thank you very much.

MICA: Do you yield back the balance of your time?

KELLY: Yield back the balance of my time.

MICA: Mr. Sandlin?

SANDLIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Meenan, you indicated that we should federalize security; is that correct?

MEENAN: That's correct, sir.

SANDLIN: You also said that the private sector should maintain, you called it, quote, a continuing role; correct?

MEENAN: Correct.

SANDLIN: So you understand that this is a shared responsibility between the government and the private sector?

MEENAN: It had to be.

SANDLIN: It would be basically a partnership; is that right?

MEENAN: That would be correct.

SANDLIN: You said you're not trying to just get out of the expense.

MEENAN: Absolutely.

SANDLIN: Now, the security thus far to this point has really not been a top priority, has it?

MEENAN: It's been a very major priority...

SANDLIN: It has not been a top priority, has it?

MEENAN: The security system that's in place today is the security system that was mandated by the FAA. They've done...

SANDLIN: So you couldn't...

MEENAN: ... based on their understanding of the threat level we were dealing with.

SANDLIN: OK. So you couldn't have done even more to ensure the safety of the passengers, right?

MEENAN: Obviously, in hindsight more could have been done by everyone concerned.

SANDLIN: The people at the screen as you're going through, they're paid basically minimum wage; is that correct?

MEENAN: They're paid at different wage rates.

SANDLIN: Basically they're paid minimum wage, aren't they?

MEENAN: That is an entry level position for the most part.

SANDLIN: Most are paid minimum wage, are they not?

MEENAN: That is correct.

SANDLIN: And approximately 80 to 90 percent of them are not American citizens; is that correct?

MEENAN: I don't know the answer to that.

SANDLIN: You work in your position and you don't know that over 80 percent of them are not American citizens?

MEENAN: I'm aware that a number of them are not American citizens. I do not know what percentage...

SANDLIN: In fact, you're aware that over 80 percent are not citizens, aren't you?

MEENAN: I'm not aware of that.

SANDLIN: Would you deny that?

MEENAN: I couldn't confirm or deny it.

SANDLIN: Would it surprise you?

MEENAN: It would not necessarily surprise me, but I don't know the answer.

SANDLIN: Surprise you.

OK. And communication is important when you go through these areas and these screenings, is it not?

MEENAN: Actually, the screening system, as it exists today, is intended to look for things, not to look at people.

SANDLIN: Is that important to be able...

MEENAN: That's the system that was developed by the government.

SANDLIN: Thank you.

MEENAN: My sense is that system needs to be substantially revamped.

SANDLIN: And it would be important for that person to be able to communicate with the person going through the screening, is it not?

MEENAN: Under a different kind of screening system than has been in place up to this point, correct.

SANDLIN: So it would not be important to be able to ask that person a question about what this is that they see. That would not be important under your...

(CROSSTALK)

MEENAN: The primary function of screeners at this point has been to look for things, not to deal with people. As I said, we think that we need to take a fundamentally different look at the way we run this system.

SANDLIN: Then next, it seems to me, the biggest asset of an airline and airports is the employees. And I've noticed that the -- of course, you've already said that you pay the folks at the screening minimum wage. And I see the average first-year flight attendant makes $14,850. And I see that the average pay for pilots is $25,000 to $30,000 with the top international pilots making about $250,000.

You would agree that the top asset of an airline is its employees; is that right?

MEENAN: There's no question about it. And the employees of the airline industry enjoy the highest wages of any industry in the United States.

SANDLIN: The employees of the airline industry -- I want to write that down -- enjoy the highest wages of any industry in the United States.

MEENAN: That's correct, sir.

SANDLIN: I think you've got a big gulf between reality and some sort of pie in the sky dream, because that's absolutely not true.

Now, let me ask you this.

(CROSSTALK)

MEENAN: I could provide you with data.

SANDLIN: In spite of the bailout, it's been indicated you're going to lay off another hundred thousand. They laid off a thousand flight attendants today at America, 508 pilots. And that's the way this is being addressed.

I don't think that's smart for security purposes, do you?

MEENAN: The focus of the airlines at this point is to save as many jobs in the industry as we possibly can by keeping these companies going. Unfortunately, that entails significant layoffs because of what has happened in aviation over the last two weeks.

SANDLIN: Let me ask you about those significant layoffs.

Average industry-wide it's been about 20 percent. I notice that Continental is 12,000, American was 20,000. Don Cardy (ph), to his credit, agreed to forgo any further compensation for the year.

Let me go down some of these earnings with you at some of the top airlines. This is per year. $4,071,000, $3,112,000, $2,221,000, $2,950,000, $1,736,000, $1,245,000, $12,130,000 per year -- $12,000,000 -- $11,568,000 per year. If we're going to talk about cutbacks and savings, you don't lay off a thousand flight attendants, you don't lay off pilots; you do something about this compensation so that money can go into security, don't you?

MEENAN: Actually, sir, you need to retain the kind of people who can run these companies as effectively as possible.

SANDLIN: You need to retain them, so it would be impossible, for example, for the chief executive who made $11,000 (sic) in one year, he just couldn't slide by with $5 million or $6 million a year?

MEENAN: I have no comment on that.

SANDLIN: You have no comment because you know that's so, don't you?

MEENAN: I have no comment on it.

SANDLIN: You don't think you could make it? Could you make it on $5 million a year?

MEENAN: It's not for me to decide what the appropriate wage levels are.

SANDLIN: You can't decide what you could make it on?

Do you think it's fair to lay off flight attendants who make $14,000 at a time that these executives make millions?

MEENAN: I think if it is essential to keep these companies going to make difficult business decisions. Nobody wants to lay off anyone. Obviously they would like to keep as many people as employed as possible. And that's what they're engaged in doing right now.

MICA: The time of the gentleman has...

SANDLIN: Thank you. Appreciate your answers.

MICA: Thank the gentleman.

Let me see, Mr. Thune wants me to yield some time to Mr. Lobiondo.

You're recognized.

LOBIONDO: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be very brief.

And I thank Mr. Thune.

I just wanted to report to you and Mr. Lipinski that I had a very impressive visit yesterday to the federal air marshal program at the FAA technical center, which is located in New Jersey, Second Congressional District.

I want to say that I came away very impressed with the leadership that they have there. That's where the national command and control center is. That's where the major training operation is. They are prepared to meet the challenges that have been laid out by the recent tragedy. They stand ready, willing and able to respond to the will of Congress to expand the program as great as we think is necessary.

They've already started making some changes. And once again, they stand ready and willing to do the job that Congress requires. And I was very, very impressed by what I saw there yesterday.

MICA: Thank you for your comments.

Mr. Thune?

THUNE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Meenan, I have, like a lot of people across the country, you know, and in my state of South Dakota consistently have, consistently heard calls for now federalizing the aviation security industry.

I guess I'm curious as to what pieces of the security operation you think are most critical and most in need of federalization.

MEENAN: Our sense is that the screening system and all of the security within the airport site, the secure environment of the airport should be in the hands of the federal government.

THUNE: Question for Mr. Plavin. One of the things, again, in South Dakota I'm a little bit curious about, too, because we have a lot of smaller, more rural type settings, how the specific issues of federalization might apply to rural airports.

PLAVIN: Yes, that's a very important issue because, as you know, many airports at this point are not in a position to apply security the way large airports are. Many of them rely on the receiving airports to do their security. And that's an issue which we'll have to come to terms with.

But I think the point about needing the resources of the federal government to make sure that the level of security is adequate obviously needs to address those airports because they in some ways are the farthest behind.

THUNE: Would it necessarily entail if you had -- like for example, you board a plane in Pierre, South Dakota, and right now you would wait till Minneapolis to go through the security check. Would federalization entail moving that back then to Pierre or Watertown or Aberdeen or any (inaudible)...

(CROSSTALK)

PLAVIN: I think we ought to be careful that the small communities are not burdened in such a way that their airport experiences become not manageable for the passenger. And I would hope that if we had a more organized, better focused trained professional group, they could make that decision on a case-by-case basis. Maybe that for Pierre it makes sense for them to be cleared in Minneapolis rather than in Pierre. Maybe in other situations enhancing security at the local airport would be a better choice.

And I think we really need to leave that to be made on a case-by- case basis.

THUNE: If we were to go to a more federalized system -- and I guess this is for anyone who cares to answer, but would that function more effectively remaining in FAA or in DOT? Or is there a better agency that ought to be -- I've got suggestions that the FBI, for example, be the one that would have oversight for security at airports.

FRIEND: Our recommendation is that the jurisdiction go to a law enforcement agency, since that is what the work is.

PLAVIN: I think the concern is that the agency have this kind of security as its primary function, whether it's the airport, whether it's a federal corporation. I think the notion of interjecting it into another agency's primary function means that neither of them gets done as well as it might.

And I think those of us who have had to work with the various kinds of bureaucracies would be very concerned that in fact this becomes a bureaucratized function rather than a security function.

THUNE: (Inaudible).

PLAVIN: That's a concern that I think we really need to pay specific attention to.

DOUGLASS: One comment that I would make...

MICA: The time of the gentleman has expired. (Inaudible).

(CROSSTALK)

DOUGLASS: ... sir, from an intelligence point of view is that it certainly makes sense to me that if various agencies in the United States have lists of people who shouldn't be in the United States or who are wanted for criminal activity or whatever, that those lists should be coordinated in some way and the airlines be notified of that so that if a person comes up, you know, either electronically or in person, and tries to buy a ticket, some sort of an alarm bell should go off that this is a known terrorist or this is an escaped prisoner or this is somebody who's wanted, you know, for a federal crime somewhere, sir.

We have the technology to do that today, exists right here. It's just a question of doing it. And it sure seems to make sense to me.

MICA: I thank the gentleman.

THUNE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MICA: Ms. Brown?

BROWN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, I thank all of you for your testimony.

We passed the airline bailout deal, but lots of airports, businesses are still suffering. And there are many major security questions still remain.

You know, I don't know whether -- I've talked with my airport directors. And we've beefed up security at the airports. And I think that it should be a shared responsibility. The airport today has certain responsibilities for people coming to the airport and security. And our local system has chipped in.

So I don't think that we should let any particular group out. For example, I think the airline has responsibilities to the air. I think the airport. And I think the federal government.

But just to say we're going to federalize the system, what does that mean? Does that mean that we're going to lay off thousands of people that are doing a technical job that need some additional training? Or should we lay on the system?

From the airport director, would you like to comment on that?

PLAVIN: I believe that your point is really the critical one. This is going to be a shared responsibility no matter how we set it up. There's nobody other than the federal government that can supply the intelligence information to the front line that they're going to need to do this job.

The question about how we organize to do this has to depend on whether we're talking about passenger screening, baggage screening, frontage control, perimeter security. I mean, there are dozens of different elements of this. And different pieces of the system are going to have to take some responsibility for those pieces.

So I think your point is right. We need to figure out a way to share that responsibility.

BROWN: And, you know, I'm real concerned -- I'm probably the only one -- that we've laid off thousands of sky captains for cosmetic purposes, not necessarily that improved security at all. And so I'm concerned as we move forward how we're doing this.

We've given this money to the airlines, but many of the businesses at the airport are dying on the vine. I mean, the airport, what kind of assistance can you help those people? 60 or 70 days before they can make their payments. I mean, many of them are going to have to close their business.

And the reason why people are not flying is because they don't feel safe.

PLAVIN: Yes, I think that the evidence that we have suggests that there are probably about 5,000 companies that do business on airports. And as you know, airports for a long time have really tried to be sure that their local community folks are represented among those. That's turned out to be a mixed blessing for those people because now they're the ones that are hurting the most. They're either laying off people or closing at airports because they don't have the through-put to be able to manage the operation.

And those pieces are also tied together with the other points that we've made, because those transactions are also the source of some of the money that the airports rely on to pay for their operations. As all of the people who are operating at airports cut back, there is no other source of revenue either to support those businesses or to support the ongoing requirements for operation unless we wind up getting some of the relief that we talked about earlier or unless we wind up having to raise the prices to the people who do business at our airports, including the airlines.

BROWN: And my last remark is that I am very disturbed that we keep saying, "Well, we want this to be a federal responsibility." Well, we are the federal government, everybody in this room.

And in other words, we've got to find some dedicated source of revenue. And people understand a user fee. I mean, it's clear that most people will pay $3 or $2.50 per ticket to feel that they are secure.

MEENAN: Ms. Brown, as we've indicated, we think that we're talking about a quantitatively different kind of security system. And the kinds of fees we're talking about are not going to pay for that system. This has to be viewed the same way we view the defense budget of the United States, the intelligence budget of the United States, the law enforcement budgets across the board.

This is not a simple matter of a dollar or two passed on to a passenger, in our judgment. This requires a fundamental change in the way the government of the United States and the people of the United States think about security.

BROWN: And I am not disagreeing with you. We need to make changes. But it's called shared sacrifice.

MEENAN: We...

BROWN: And everybody got to pay their part.

MEENAN: As my testimony says, we believe that we will be sharing in a portion of that. But fundamentally I think that it's different than the kinds of numbers that we've heard talked about up to this point.

FRIEND: If I could just make it clear that our calling for federalizing the security screeners is not in any way intended to be critical of these people who are trying very hard without adequate training, without in many cases the most up-to-date and necessary equipment and certainly without much of a financial incentive to do a job. The turnover rate among the people doing this work is at a minimum is a hundred percent. And in some airports it's 400 percent.

FRIEND: We would hope that through whatever the shared responsibility is to the federal government, to a user fee, to create a well-qualified, well-compensated stable work force who can provide that sense of security that the traveling public is looking for when they go to get on an airplane.

BROWN: One final question for you. Are you saying that at this point we have not started additional training for the airline attendants as far as protection and...

FRIEND: No. Nothing has been done. It's still in the discussion stage.

BROWN: Well, thank you.

MICA: I thank the gentlelady.

There is a vote in progress right now. So we have members that haven't had an opportunity to have questions. Why don't we recess until about 20 after. Gives people a quick break. And we'll reconvene at approximately 20 after, finish this panel.

Thank you. We'll stand in recess.

(RECESS)

MICA: We're still working on the first panel. And I know some people have questions. We want to go ahead and proceed. At this time if the panel could be seated.

Let's see, we did Ms. Brown last.

Mr. Hayes, are you ready?

HAYES: Ready.

MICA: Mr. Hayes, you're recognized.

And then we'll go to Mr. Baldacci.

HAYES: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, panel.

Start with Ms. Friend. Talk to us about your members' opinion of arming the pilots, which I am very much in favor of. But there are all kind of ways to do that.

FRIEND: Right. We are concerned about it, concerned about it just from the basic issue of introducing a lethal weapon into the environment on the aircraft.

And let me just say that personally I hate the idea that we have to sit here and talk about putting guns on airplanes and arming pilots. I hate that this is what has happened to our industry. But it is a reality.

So you have to deal with it. But I'm not sure that I'm comfortable with that as the resolution. Yes, the cockpit is the last line of defense in perfecting the airplane. I just hope that by -- if we approve a concept or a plan that allows us to put guns in the cockpit, that we will suddenly think that that solves all of our problems and we will neglect what I view as the earlier lines of defense.

I view on the airplane the last line of defense as really where we have to act only if our earlier defenses have failed. And I hope that we won't neglect those earlier defenses in exchange for saying, "Well, we'll just arm the pilots."

We are very supportive of nonlethal devices. We believe that we all have a right and a responsibility to be able to defend ourselves and defend our passengers. But I'm very uncomfortable, and I know many, many of our members are very uncomfortable with the concept of a lethal weapon introduced essentially into our workplace.

HAYES: Your comments is certainly relevant. People have different degrees of inner secure feelings about I would call them weapons and guns, weapons to protect the last line of defense.

We secure the cockpit. Somebody comes through, you got a proper weapon, then the pilot I think can be using it.

As we discuss this, again, distribution, we want pilots carrying weapons through the airport? As you and I discussed, there are ways that a security officer for the airlines could distribute the weapon to the trained and appropriate pilot for each flight. So that's one issue.

For the record, I would like to see us include tightening the screening for visas for foreign visitors to this country at our embassies abroad. I don't think we've talked about that.

Another comment, in my own experience, the lavatory location, Captain Woerth, in many aircraft is adjacent to the cockpit door. So it would seem like that's something that we could address as well.

You touched earlier on the -- I think it's called the eye-pass, eye-pass system, retinal identification. Is this something that we need to pursue further?

WOERTH: I think that there's a number of technologies and that certainly the retinal scan has been used successfully in other industries. And I think that the technology could be employed for certainly airline employees and airport workers. Yes, sir.

HAYES: Suggestion, Ms. Friend. There now is technology available where you're seeing your flight attendant could have on a headset which would be open mike as necessary to the cockpit where she wouldn't have to touch anything. She could communicate anything to the captain. That's something that you might think about again.

I mean, even in your sleeve or literally wear it on your head so you could immediately say to Captain Woerth, "I've got a potential problem," or whatever. That would require not a whole lot.

Clearly we need to coordinate. And I spoke with one of you about the background information that various government agencies have that would help us to identify -- call it profiling or identification, whatever -- to make sure that we're screening properly. And we are going to do that.

I would be hesitant in this rush to federalize everything to make sure that people and agencies do the things that they do best. The federal government can provide guidelines through law enforcement agencies and other security information systems as to how we standardize and agree on all of the things that we're going to do. But let's don't slow down or water down the process by jumping to that conclusion.

911 phone system so that you could use the phone in the aircraft now has been discussed by a number of folks as something that I think we can do. And that would be effective.

Mr. Chairman, thank you. That's all I have right now.

MICA: Thank the gentleman.

Let me recognize Mr. Baldacci.

BALDACCI: Thank you very much, Mr. Mica. And I'd like to thank the chairman for scheduling this important hearing on these issues.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, in representing the Second District in Maine and the airports in Maine, Bangor, Maine, and Portland, Maine, particularly, I talked to the security detail in the airport management. And a couple of issues that came through -- and I'd like to direct them to Mr. Plavin there, if he could comment on them.

One was the fact that different airlines have different security procedures that they have to employ. Is this a norm within the industry?

PLAVIN: I probably at some level should ask Mr. Meenan to comment. But from an airport point of view, the requirements for airline security are laid out by the FAA in some detail. Obviously from an operating point of view airlines have to take those guidances and accommodate them to the way they operate. But within the guidance of FAA they certainly mostly have common elements. The individual airline issues I'm not sure I know how they work.

BALDACCI: Well, let me ask Mr. Meenan, are there different security procedures for different airlines that have to be employed by the security details?

MEENAN: I think Mr. Plavin has pretty accurately depicted. We get security directives from the FAA. Those are implemented by individual carriers or their contractors they use.

MEENAN: There are certainly variations in the way they meet the requirements of those security directives. And so you probably will find some subtle differences. But I don't think that in any significant way you're going to find differences from Carrier A to Carrier B when it comes to implementing them.

BALDACCI: Well, in some cases we're dealing with part-time people who are working part-time that are dealing with different standards. And in some instances they told me that one airline has us review all the bags; other airlines don't use the testing of explosive devices on all the bags. And different procedures are employed for different airlines.

Does that...

MEENAN: I think it would...

BALDACCI: ... fall within the FAA guidance and...

MEENAN: ... if it's acceptable to you, Mr. (Inaudible), it's probably better that we have that conversion in private as to why you may see those kinds of things.

BALDACCI: OK.

The other issue that was raised also was the communication of information. And one of the reasons that I'm supportive of having a federal system is to be in the federal loop of information. I think that we cannot allow a situation to continue where, even with the intelligence agencies themselves -- which is why Mr. Ridge is heading up the homeland defense, so the coordination of the information is there, but also to get the information to the people who are on the ground who are at the airports so that they know immediately.

That's where it's going to happen. And we can't hold them responsible if we are not giving them the information. And I feel that there should be some responsibility.

Is there a way to be able to carve out the responsibilities so that there is always someone there with that information who would be a federal employee or a federal marshal or something without -- some of my colleagues have concern -- without making everybody federal employees? Is there some way of being able to carve that out, do you think?

MEENAN: I would imagine that there is.

But I think your fundamental point is the one that we have been trying to hone in on. The difficulty now when you're dealing with the federal government coming through airlines to contractors, to people on the front line is a very cumbersome process.

We think that the most effective way to do that is to eliminate that structure and put into place something where the federal government plays the dominant role.

Now, whether there are variations on that theme that might eventually come into play certainly remains to be seen. But it could be accommodated.

BALDACCI: Let me just ask Mr. Plavin. I appreciate that and look forward to discussions with you.

Let me just ask you a question. I represent three airports, primary airports. And they're in financial straits because they were asked to increase security, increase this and that, and at the same time diminished service that they had the revenues to draw off of.

Do you have proposals, are you supporting proposals that will help small airports like Bangor, Maine, and Portland, Maine, and Presque Isle, Maine?

PLAVIN: Well, obviously, our first request would be for the federal government to assume some of the additional cost that airports have had to undertake.

We think there are some other options as well. We think there are fees that can be put in place. We think that there are existing federal dollars that go to airports that with some additional flexibility could be used for cash flow.

Right now, for example, the AIP program, which is a federal grant in aid program for capital improvements, is limited to capital. And our sense is that for a limited time in this kind of an emergency situation perhaps we can make some of those dollars available for operating expenses as well.

And then there are similar kinds of issues as it relates to the passenger facility charges, which many airports are collecting. The amount of those charges and the direction of those charges may be helpful towards meeting some of the operating expenses, including debt service on bonds.

So we think there are some options available, both short and longer term, which could very well help the airports like Bangor, like Portland to meet their ongoing obligations, to deal with their diminished resources and to pay for their increased expense obligation.

BALDACCI: And I look forward to working with you and the others in regards to that.

I'd like to just recognize the flight attendants and the pilots and just thank you very much and the people that you represent very much. I know that everybody has been through quite a trying process. And I know it's been particularly hard and people have really -- have weathered well in making sure that the passengers and the public are still well served and continue to be well served. And we appreciate your professionalism and expertise.

Just one last question I had, Mr. Chairman, with the pilot, if I could. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your understanding.

The question I had was that with the air marshal program established and being increased as we speak and having an air marshal on every single domestic flight as a federal law enforcement person, do you still feel that you would like to at the same time make sure that the pilots themselves have weapons?

WOERTH: Yes, sir.

And let's be clear about this too. I think there's about 35,000 flights a day. And we're not going to have a federal marshal program up and running to cover that in the near term. So we see this as a supplementary program, a complementary program. And we're not trying to mitigate or lessen any other program. But we feel that the length of time it's going to take the federal marshal program up, to get and build and install a new door, that we should start this program, complementary, immediately.

BALDACCI: I appreciate that. I would like to continue that discussion to see if there's some ways to mitigate that and with the pilots' support.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MICA: Mr. Culberson?

CULBERSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll be as brief as I can.

I wondered if I could focus my questions on what can be done immediately now in the near short term to address the safety concerns of the traveling public.

I've been a regular reader of Aviation Week & Space Technology for about 20 years and found it to be an extraordinarily reliable and authoritative source of information. And in the latest issue is an article that caused me a lot of concern.

And I wanted to pull a couple of quick quotes from and get you all's comments on, that pilots have -- the headline here is "Pilots Devise In-flight Safety Battle Plans."

"As of late last week vigilante type cockpit crew actions were widespread. One pilot told Aviation Week that his crew had carefully worked out its own freelance battle plan prior to a flight on September 18 and that virtually every crew at his airline was doing the same. He said such actions reflected a system-wide disappointment that government and airline leaders have not taken what crews consider strong enough safety measures. And pilots were adamant that none of this was union coordinated.

" For example, pilots were dismayed over what they viewed as caving in by union leaders in the face of government and airline management pressures to get aircraft back in the air. And their angst was exacerbated when the FAA banned pilots from carrying pocket knives and union leaders waffled on the issue of allowing cockpit crews to carry guns."

And I wanted to ask, if I could, each one of you to in particular comment on the ability of pilots of course who are entrusted with our lives -- we get on the flight. We trust them with our lives to get us there safely -- why not go ahead and authorize pilots immediately to carry side arms in the cockpit with the proper type of ammunition?

WOERTH: Well, I will try to attempt to answer that first.

I believe that my association can only support this with the proper training, screening, and (inaudible)...

(CROSSTALK)

CULBERSON: Of course. That's understood.

WOERTH: Well, that's going to take several months. So immediately there wouldn't be firearms. But we do support getting there eventually.

To the other list of questions, I know there's frustration. That report of a lot of crews and the captains and crews -- until there's more guidance, until there's more equipment, they are trying to cope as flight crew with the flight attendants in, you know, preparing for any eventuality.

CULBERSON: Well, is a pilot able to declare an emergency? And if they detect or believe there's an emergency on the aircraft, they can declare an emergency and take whatever action they believe is appropriate, can't they?

WOERTH: Absolutely.

CULBERSON: For example, the article mentions that pilots have begun to make contingency plans for initiating a negative g maneuver, which anyone who's not strapped into the seat belt would be essentially stuck to the ceiling. That would be obviously an emergency maneuver. And that's something that I hope all pilots are looking at this article.

There are other types of actions they could take, such as depressurizing the cabin, for example, pretty quickly in order to very quickly incapacitate people if they felt it was necessary.

What about the idea of simply hiring off-duty local police officers to supplement airplane security? I know I've got lots of constables and sheriffs and local city police officers who in their off-duty would be delighted to come down and work at airports. Why not immediately move to supplement airport security with off-duty police officers?

WOERTH: We are working with law enforcement and especially the FBI to do just that. We support that.

CULBERSON: And how quickly can that happen?

My questions, again, if I could ask each one of you in your responses to direct to what we could do, you know, today, Tuesday, September 25th. What can we do right now, tonight, this week to address some of these issues such as off-duty police officers working airport security? How long will that take?

PLAVIN: It's going on already. I mean, that effort is already undertaking by the FAA in coordination with airports around the country.

CULBERSON: Is there anything to prevent an off-duty police officer from carrying their weapon, for example, on an aircraft? What do we need to do or what can the FAA do to allow a police officer to carry his weapon if they are a licensed, certified police officer -- peace officer carrying the proper ammunition from (sic) carrying that weapon on the aircraft that they're traveling?

PLAVIN: Mr. Culberson, I think, I know everybody is very enamored of the idea of arming as many people as possible on the aircraft. Our experience tells us that unless this is properly coordinated with properly trained people who understand the nature of the airport business, we've actually had a number of incidents where people with arms become a danger to themselves and to the other people on the aircraft.

So while I think it's really important that we be sure that the people whose lives are at stake are properly protected, I'd be really reluctant to sort of encourage people to be carrying arms on an aircraft.

CULBERSON: My question is based on personal (inaudible)...

MICA: The time of the gentleman has expired. And I do want to be fair.

If we can, maybe you could ask one quick question. I know you've waited patiently, Mr. Lampson. Let's start with you. One or two quick questions, because there is at least one vote, possibly a series of votes.

LAMPSON: If I may just ask Ms. Friend -- and I had several, but we have -- I have spent a great deal of time with attendants particularly in the last several days talking with them about the kinds of training that they have received. You've talked a good bit about that. But would you take just a minute and tell us of some specific things that you might recommend as far as the kinds of training that an attendant should have, please.

FRIEND: If you're referring to dealing with an incident...

LAMPSON: With difficulties that they will face...

FRIEND: Right.

LAMPSON: ... not in their...

FRIEND: I don't have a specific recommendation.

What I do understand is that our training is based on a profile of a hijacker of the 1970s, someone who wanted something over which you could negotiate with them.

And what we understand now is that the threat, the hijacking threat, the terrorist threat, currently is not -- you can't negotiate with those people that got on that airplane two weeks ago. And so what we are saying is that we don't know what the appropriate response is. We don't know what options might be available to us.

We know that there are security experts somewhere in the world that do know. And they should be brought in immediately and revamp that training and give us a fighting chance.

LAMPSON: In addition to that would you and your associates also attempt to do the same kind of thing to see if you can't make recommendations in addition to what we find out elsewhere?

And I'm through.

FRIEND: Well, we are, you know. Thanks to Secretary Mineta, to our ability to participate with one of the rapid response teams, we are, we do have the opportunity for that input.

MICA: (Inaudible) Ms. Berkeley?

BERKLEY: I've been told that brevity is the very soul of eloquence, so in the interest of time let me thank all of you for being here.

I'm most interested in everything you have to say. There isn't an issue more important for my congressional district, which is Las Vegas, which at this moment is experiencing incredible economic downturn because of the tragedy that we face. Anything I can do to help make people feel safer so they can start flying again and not only make them feel safer but be safer, I'm there with you and for you.

So thank you very much for being here. And believe me, not all of us are enamored with arming everybody on the airplane in order to protect the passengers. I think that should be the absolute last resort, not the first.

Thank you.

(CROSSTALK)

(UNKNOWN): May I (inaudible) with that?

MICA: We have about a minute and a half.

Mr. Lampson?

LAMPSON: Captain Woerth, what is free-flow security screening?

WOERTH: Let me ask my expert.

Would you mind if I asked Captain Cox to respond to you...

LAMPSON: Is that OK...

WOERTH: ... on my staff?

LAMPSON: ... Mr. Chairman?

MICA: Yes, thank you. Identify yourself for the record.

LAMPSON: You will have 30 seconds.

MICA: Identify yourself for the record, please.

CAPTAIN ROBERT COX, AIRLINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION: Yes, sir. Captain Robert Cox with the Airline Pilots Association.

The free-flow program is looking at several different options to help screening and high-tech screening and moving or utilizing different types of technology to help people basically free-flow through a screening area to get into the system.

LAMPSON: Prescreening, then.

COX: As a screening point.

LAMPSON: OK.

COX: Actually, you could qualify it as prescreening and physically screening.

LAMPSON: OK, I think I understand that.

And then if I can follow up with that as far as employee identification cards. Is there a high-tech something that exists that would allow a very quick and extremely effective -- I can't say perfect -- but extremely effective screening card?

COX: Yes, sir. We're working with a technology right now.

COX: It's a chip card technology -- that would identify a person by his employer or agency, if you will, who the person is, allow them to see a picture on a, say, a laptop or a CRT and identify the person as pilot, law enforcement officer, et cetera.

LAMPSON: I would be most interested in knowing more about those things.

And, Mr. Chairman, I thank you very much. And I'll stop at this point. We have a vote.

MICA: Well, I want to thank each of our panelists. There are a number of proposals that I know the subcommittee will take under serious consideration. And we appreciate the opportunity to work with you.

Of course we have two more panels to hear from. So at this point I will -- first of all, I'm going to take a unanimous request from the other side of the aisle, Mr. Baldacci, that the record be open for a period of 30 days and that we also add the opportunity to submit additional questions and have those responses made part of the record.

Without objection so ordered.

So what we will do now is we will stand in recess until five minutes after the last vote. There may only be one vote. And there possibly will be two votes -- we're not certain -- from the floor at this point.

So we'll excuse you now. Thank you.

And then we will reconvene at five minutes after the last vote.

(RECESS)

MICA: I'd like to call the subcommittee back to order. Members will be returning, but we do have two more panels and I'd like to proceed with the introduction of our second panel this afternoon.

Our second panel, first witness is Mr. Phil Boyer. And he's president of the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association.

Mr. Jim Coyne, he's president of the National Air Transportation Association.

Mr. Tom Poberezny. And he is president of the Experimental Aircraft Association, and he is testifying on behalf of the National Association of Flight Instructors.

Mr. Ed Bolen, who is president and CEO of the General Aviation Manufacturers Association.

Mr. Roy -- is it Resavage? OK. And he is president of the Helicopter Association International.

Mr. John Olcott, and Mr. Olcott is president of the National Business Aviation Association.

And we've also asked Mr. Jerry Epstein, a former president of the Board of Commissioners of the Los Angeles Airport, to join this panel at a special request.

Let me first recognize Mr. Petri, who is going to introduce our first witness in this panel.

PETRI: Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And I mentioned briefly in my opportunity to question the previous panel, but very honored to be able to present to you and the committee the president of the Experimental Aircraft Association, Tom Poberezny. This association has over 170,000 members worldwide and is really one of the nation's foremost voices for the individual aviation enthusiasts and for general aviation. They have contributed a great deal to the industry and to our country and are a very, very prized citizen of our part of the world.

So welcome.

MICA: Well, considering you're recognized, we'll go with you first. Thank you.

POBEREZNY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As mentioned, I'm Tom Poberezny, president of the Experimental Aircraft Association and also representing (inaudible) National Association of Flight Instructors.

In my opening remarks I'd like to commend the actions of Secretary of Transportation Norman Mineta and FAA administrator Jane Garvey for the manner in which they returned commercial air service in a safe and orderly manner and for maintaining a priority in general aviation and flight training, which was getting it back into our national airspace system.

EAA and NAFI recognize the need to provide both security and financial stability for our transportation system. And we support appropriate actions.

But we also want to remind everyone of a quote from Ben Franklin. "If you give up your freedom for security, you have neither."

We also want to remind you of the total spectrum of aviation. A lot of the discussion this morning regarding the airlines is rightfully so, but we want to remember the other spectrum of aviation, general aviation.

As relates to security, we need to be sure to balance risk versus economic stability. General aviation, specifically sport and recreational aviation, which I represent, is not a significant threat to national security. Especially we can look at the size and the relative speeds of these aircraft. It's very difficult for them to inflict damage on a third party on the surface in any great degree.

Also, general aviation aircraft are not involved as freely as commonly thought. There are airspace limitations and restrictions, processes based on the level of pilot training and aircraft equipage. And there are areas designated regarding national security and defense that are controlled even further.

As relates to flight training, it's come under great scrutiny. I'd like to remind the committee that the skills involved in the primary training are not very transferable for piloting large aircraft which were involved in this tragedy. Training in sophisticated aircraft in simulators, which is needed, is a much narrower group of individuals that can be more readily followed and defined.

Economic impact is a major issue here. It's important to remember that the public perceives that the national airspace system was operational three days after the attacks. And let's remember that IFR flights have gone for four days and VFR flights in rural areas 10 days and limited flight training for 11 days.

The public still perceives that there's only one airport closed in the airspace system, and that's Reagan National Airport. As of today at least 600 airports with landing facilities are essentially closed because they are closed to VFR flight with tens of thousands of airplanes still grounded.

The economic damage to flight training and general aviation support structure is significant and devastating. The aviation consumer confidence crisis exists and is growing. So future concerns as to how long will the system stay shut down. We are now in economic paralysis that can lead to economic suicide.

And a few brief numbers. 2400 flight schools were shut down, most, if not all, small businesses. 5600 flight instructors were immediately laid off. Many more, though technically employed, were not receiving pay.

Many flight schools and fixed base operators are already closed permanently. The flight schools that remain open face dramatically reduced business. Student pilots are slow to return. New student starts are reluctant because of the anxiety and the economic prospects that are facing them. And students who are heading for flying careers are reevaluating their employment prospects.

Estimates range between 30 and 45 percent of the flight schools and FBO's will not survive long-term if this continues. The flight training industry was fragile before September 11 has become more so now.

Insurance cost and availability. The shortage of flight instructors and mechanics is growing. All this has had economic impact on the flight instruction and general aviation infrastructure.

EAA and NAFI strongly call for assessment of the economic damage to the general aviation industry and for industry-government economic remedial action.

We talked earlier about the airlines, and they've expressed their importance. I'd like to read something that was written. It's a part of our testimony from NAFI.

"In appealing to Congress for financial assistance, the airlines have claimed to be the backbone of the economy. Assistance for them, they assert, is essential because it will help the national economy recover."

We support that view. But we must recognize that if the airlines are the backbone of the aviation industry, flight training is its life blood. Without a pilot an airplane is fused to the ground. And general aviation's flight training industry makes pilots. If flight training as an industry withers and dies because of neglect and lack of support, it will not make any more pilots. Without pilots in the pipeline the airlines and other commercial aviation will run dry of pilots in relatively short order.

The National Association of Flight Instructors has convened a blue ribbon panel to assess the flight training industry and the impact this has had from top to bottom in safety, security and economics. EAA will actively support that panel.

I would like to ask that our written statements be entered into the record and refer you to that testimony.

And in conclusion, I'd like to remind everyone we can't let the terrorists win the economic battle. We must restore consumer confidence in aviation, not just in airline travel, but in the entire general aviation community. And with airports still closed today that confidence is not growing.

Thank you.

MICA: Thank you for your testimony. We'll withhold questions till we've heard from all of the witnesses.

Without objection, sir, your entire statement, that will be made part of the record.

Let me recognize next Mr. Phil Boyer. And he is president, Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association.

Welcome. And you're recognized.

BOYER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'd like my written testimony, obviously, be to be a part of the record.

MICA: Without objection, so ordered.

BOYER: And most of the committee knows AOPA. We are probably the equivalent on the earlier panel of the Air Transport Association except we represent general aviation owners and pilots.

To take one of their questions from Congressman Sandlin, I would like to say that I would easily work for $5 million a year, but my members don't pay me that much, at least this year.

We offer a great deal of sympathy, not only from our organization but our international affiliates -- and there are 52 of those around the world -- also send our condolences to those on both the airplanes and on the ground that suffered during this recent tragedy.

Our association and others at this table have walked a very fine line during this last two weeks. It's been the balance between our constituents, just like your constituents who are saying, "Get us back in the air," and at the same time the balance between national security interests. And pardon me a little bit today if I cross that line in my zealous attempt to try to represent our membership.

Like Mr. Poberezny, I certainly congratulate the FAA administrator, Secretary Mineta. They have already talked to you in previous panels in previous days. They have been wonderful in keeping us informed and representing us in terms of restoring our role in the air transportation system.

At the same time, they have had to report to a higher authority. The decisions are not just those of the FAA or the DOT as in the past. But they're on a high-level government officials like the National Security Council and others. And part of our problem in trying to come up with solutions to get us back in the air is not understanding totally, as you discussed on the earlier panel, all the threats that they are trying to protect the public from.

And as we look at this higher authority they've been reporting to, shame on us, all of us at this table that represent general aviation, because once again, it's little understood. I don't mean by this committee. I don't mean by the people who represent these interests. But the general public, the news media and obviously those people that Secretary Mineta and Administrator Garvey are going to, do not understand the business and recreational flying, the scope of this industry.

Flight training, as EAA stated, a huge industry. But not just for civilian pilots who will eventually become the Captain Duane Woerths of the world, but also for the military. A member who runs a flight school in Rifle, Colorado, said, "We train military pilots. Isn't it odd while all these flight schools have been grounded, we're at war, the president says, and the very Air Force pilots we're supposed to train can't go up and take lessons from us?"

Critical medical missions, aerial survey work, pipeline patrol, ferrying checks, banner towing, ag spraying, news and traffic reports -- 65 percent of general aviation is used for business or public service at 5300 public use airports.

The airlines, which we talked about in the previous panel, 650 airports. There are more than 200,000 civil aircraft on the registry. 92 percent of these are general aviation. And I'm not talking about big airplanes. I'm talking about four-place, single-engine airplanes with an average age of 34 years with a cost that equals today's new car or SUV. Weight, speed, payload, momentum about the same as a car. 635,000 licensed pilots, 500,000-plus of these fly general aviation airplanes.

This tragedy, airline security was breached. We heard it earlier. Four air transport aircraft were used as weapons of destruction. However, the last segment to return to our skies is general aviation, this system, this infrastructure that I talked about.

Here is where we stand as we are right now. The airlines were flying within days. There are two key exclusionary zones, 25-mile radius around Washington National and JFK. There are no GA operations within these zones. No general aviation whatsoever.

The next segment to fly was charter. Then by the end of the week instrument flights. But understand, only 15 percent of all licensed pilots, all that 635,000 pilots, are current to fly on instruments. And until last Friday there was no flight training at all, no visual flight rules flying for the other 85 percent.

Both allowed at that time, last Friday. But in our 28 big cities where we have an airspace called class B, there is no VFR flying there. Trapped are over 41,000 aircraft that cannot be flown at 282 public use airports.

Now, AOPA's primary effort and the things we call on you as you deliberate and go forward and talk to the agencies involved is to open this class bravo airspace, these 28 cities. They are places like Denver, Seattle, other cities. Reduce the size of the ring in these restricted areas.

And there are others that need relief too. Aerial surveys, banner towers, traffic reporters, pipeline control and, as Tom said, flight training.

AOPA has looked at the flight training institutions. We have 55,000 members that are flight instructors. And we are going to offer, as we did in our testimony to the committee, a bill which we would like to see entered, which is an economic relief for these affected by the general aviation interests.

We're not having our hand out like the airlines. Within 24 hours of this tragedy general aviation didn't say it's going to be $24 billion in losses in the next year. These are mom-and-pop operations. They are in many of your districts, in which they are operating on slim margins for their love of aviation.

So what we did last week was we looked through the FEMA and the Small Business Administration kinds of activities that are used during hurricanes and floods. And we said there's already plenty in place to take care of these businesses. Let's just add aviation. No, their buildings weren't destroyed, but the airspace that they fly in was taken away.

Over the past two weeks I've been asked on numerous occasions about the future.

BOYER: You know what? I'm optimistic. Rest assured that GA may become even a more viable transportation mode in the future.

But we stand as an organization, as you know, Mr. Chairman, in the past, to offer solutions to issues involving security, the pilot licensing, airspace, and other concerns and going ahead from this disaster that occurred on September 11.

MICA: I thank the gentleman.

Let me recognize now Mr. Jim Coyne. He's president of the National Air Transportation Association.

COYNE: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

It's also a pleasure but a moment of sadness as well for all of us to be here. NATA represents thousands of small aviation businesses. As Tom mentioned, we might be described as the support infrastructure of aviation. And all of our members, the thousands, tens of thousands of employees will never forget that terrible scene of seeing two commercial airliners crash into the World Trade Towers.

We extend to all of the victims and everybody great sympathy, but we also are here before you today to try to provide information about how our Congress and our country should respond.

It's ironic that 60 years ago NATA was founded as the first voice of business aviation or general aviation. Back in a time when there were some similarities to what we see today, in 1940 there was a call from various quarters from our government that civil aviation, especially flight training, out to be eliminated as an opportunity during wartime in the second world war.

Fortunately, NATA and other organizations worked to ensure that civilian flight training and general aviation survived throughout the '40s. And here we are today in perhaps an even greater crisis on our national homeland facing many of the same calls.

But hopefully, Congress and the leaders of our government will once again reach the conclusion that business aviation, general aviation, virtually all aviation is critical, more critical today, to our economic success, our ability to respond to this tragedy and our ability to meet the needs of the public than ever before.

Of course NATA represents businesses like FBO's, flight schools, maintenance firms, charter companies, a whole host of small, by and large, businesses at thousands and thousands of airports across the country. These are literally the men and women who are the front line of small business and aviation.

And how ironic that these people are enduring the greatest attack, the greatest burden, financial burden especially, during this crisis.

I'd like to address four particular points that I think the committee would like to hear from us about. First is security improvements. Second is the economic impact on our industry. Third is the need to rebuild public confidence. And fourth is the issue of intelligence.

Last Friday our association organized the first business aviation security task force to try to respond to many of the public and concerns of our customers as well following the tragic accident of September 11. We brought together leaders from our industry, many of our most important individuals in our specific companies that make up our membership, but also representatives from the Department of Transportation, from the FBI, from NASA and from other organizations.

At the conclusion of that meeting we came up with a set of recommendations. And yesterday I presented those recommendations to the officials at the FAA responsible for civil aviation security. And they were pleased with what we have done as in a sense not waiting for the government to go through its bureaucratic steps and hoops but to try to act proactively to meet the public concerns about aviation safety.

We came up with short-term recommendations, things that we believe can be done in the next few days and weeks; longer-term recommendations that may take 30 to 60, 90 days to do; and some perhaps even longer-term recommendations that might take as long as several months or perhaps a year to implement in conjunction with the FAA and others. These recommendations are included in my written testimony. And I certainly hope that you'll refer to them.

But specifically, we believe that the issues of aviation security deal with four fundamental issues: people, the airport site, the aircraft themselves and the communication that occurs between aircraft and controllers and others in our aviation system.

In each of these areas there are things that we can do to improve aviation. And I hope that we, working together with FAA and DOT, will be able to implement changes that we recommend.

But we do have one -- two special concerns. The first is that we believe is it not perhaps smart for everybody involved in aviation security to discuss in open public forum, for the consideration of virtually any reporter or anybody else in our country, exactly what our industry and our aviation experts advise us to do. So for that reason we hope that this committee and others work somewhat confidentially with the experts in this field.

Secondly, we hope that there is not an overreaction. We've seen time and time again in the past. And I think there's a famous general who says the history of military conflict in the world is that each army tries to fight the last war. And I think it's important that in this effort we not try to only fight the last, the catastrophe, in other words, the impact involved with the last catastrophe. We've got to look forward to some of the risks that remain, some of the risks perhaps that weren't really particular issues in this particular catastrophe.

Now, I'd also like to deal with the, some of the, concerns of the economic impact on our industry. Without doubt you've already heard from two excellent spokespersons about the impact on flight schools. And I strongly second these remarks.

You know, none of the airlines are seeing their business fall off even as much as 50 percent. And yet there are flight schools in this country, FBO's and others, whose business has fallen off 90, 95, even 100 percent. It just seems that the obligation of our citizens is to deal with this economic crisis as well as that of the airlines.

There's also another issue that needs to be addressed by Congress. And that is the question of war risk insurance. Many of the providers of service at airports are now in a position where they cannot get war risk insurance at all. We need to respond to that as an industry, just as virtually all of the other major countries in the world that deal with civil and general aviation have already done in a more effective way than the legislation passed last Friday deals with.

Finally, I want to stress, as I think Congressman Duncan mentioned earlier, the importance of restoring public confidence at this time. My hope is that everything that this committee does and that Congress does bears in mind that nothing is more important than getting the American public, the businesses that depend on general aviation, business aviation and just ordinary recreational fliers back into the air as quickly as possible.

And finally I'd like to address the issue of intelligence, probably not the way you think of intelligence in this particular case. Obviously there's a lot of talk about the CIA, FBI, borders and so forth. But I'm talking instead about the simple intelligence of being smarter than our adversaries. We have to as an industry bring together the same kind of human intelligence that designed these great airplanes, that got the man on the moon so that we start thinking smarter than our terrorist adversaries and come up with proposals and plans, many of them which we hope will remain confidential, to deal with this terrible threat.

Thank you very much.

MICA: I thank the gentleman.

And let me recognize now Mr. Ed Bolen. He's president and CEO of the General Aviation Manufacturers Association.

Welcome. And you're recognized, sir.

BOLEN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, when the awful reality of what was happening became apparent on September 11, DOT, Secretary Norm Mineta wisely and really courageously made a decision to close the national airspace system. And in short order thousands of airplanes, commercial and general aviation airplanes, were brought safely to the ground. That was a good and an important decision.

And now we're in the process of incrementally reopening the airspaces. And I think everybody recognizes that this period has been very difficult for aviation companies that depend for their very existence on access to airspace. And already we've had a lot of people talking about the financial impact that this has had. And certainly for the people I represent that is very much a reality.

But I'd like to focus my remarks today not as much on the financial need that is out there but really on a necessity for the general aviation community, perhaps with the help of Congress, to try to work with the National Security Council and others to try to reopen the airspace as fully as possible and in a manner consistent with national security interests.

Because if we don't do that, then the underlying strength of the general aviation industry is going to be lost and all the gains that we've made since passage of the General Aviation Revitalization Act in 1994 are going to go for naught. We need to have a healthy and robust aviation system in the United States. And that depends on access to airspace.

Now, one of the challenges that we have on that is that the general aviation community, as Phil Boyer has said, is not well understood. But it is certainly large and it is certainly diverse. And I think that that is amply represented by the fact that we've got six members up here representing various segments of the industry today.

Despite that, we have shown a pretty good track record of being able to come together and work together to address matters that are of mutual concern. And certainly there is no more important matter than access to airspace. We have right now a general aviation coalition that meets on a regular basis. And I think it would be an appropriate place for us to look for working with the National Security Council on trying to find ways that we can alleviate their concerns on the various segments.

We don't believe that there's a one-size-fits-all solution that's out there. Clearly general aviation has got some operations, some aircraft, some geographic locations that are going to call for certain interventions, others that will call for other ones.

The problem that we're having right now is we don't understand what all of the threats are. And I think this was typified by a conversation I had this morning with one of my manufacturers, who in addition to his facility in Florida also has a facility in Mexico. And he cannot get his in-registered, U.S. registered aircraft, back and forth to Mexico. We don't allow planes coming, even U.S. planes, coming back from Mexico.

And he said, "I'm trying to understand what the security threat is there because maybe we can develop some intervention. Are they concerned that the plane could perhaps be used as a weapon? Are they concerned that we might transport someone? Are there other concerns? Help me understand what it is we're trying to solve."

And my answer to him was, "We don't know." We don't know why in- registered aircraft are not allowed to go back and forth from Mexico. If we can understand that risk better, we can develop interventions.

And so I say that story simply to ask Congress to help us do whatever we need to do to understand what the risks are so we can be more effective in offering solutions.

Thank you.

MICA: Thank you. Let me recognize Mr. Roy Resavage, president of the Helicopter Association International.

Welcome, sir. And you're recognized.

RESAVAGE: Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the aviation subcommittee. I'm honored to appear before you today and express the view of Helicopter Association International concerning aviation security and the future of the aviation industry.

I would ask that you accept my written testimony into the official record.

MICA: Without objection, your entire statement will be made part of the record (inaudible).

RESAVAGE: Thank you.

HAI is a nonprofit professional trade association of over 1400 member organizations in the United States and throughout the world. Member companies include operators of civil helicopters, manufacturers and peripheral industry supporters. Many of the members are small businessmen and women. HAI's members safely operate more than 5,000 helicopters, approximately 2 million hours a year.

A great deal of concern was directed to Congress over the last week in identifying the economic drag applied to the airline industry as a result of the horrific terrorist assault on humanity. Everyone quickly grasped the enormous peril the airline industry faced. And a financial package was developed that would allow the various affected entities to continue their vital service.

However, Congress still needs to address the other major pillar of national air commerce, commercial general aviation services. The business aviation community provides a large measure of the aviation lubrication that is needed to keep our country's economic engine running smoothly. It provides major services to our economy and promotes numerous improvements to our quality of life at a level that could not be obtained by the commercial airline system in isolation.

Not only are the services essential in providing increased efficiencies to the business world; commercial general aviation is a major stimulus to the economy through its payroll, capital assets in the form of aircraft and infrastructure and related industrial support throughout the commercial sector.

The required safeguards that were implemented in the wake of the airline crashes essentially grounded the general aviation fleet. The revenue streams were totally cut off. And as of today there is no plan to even consider options that would keep this important sector of the economy viable.

Today I will focus on the commercial helicopter community, an extremely important subset of general aviation. A great deal of our activity goes unnoticed but has a profound effect on all of our lives. Helicopters with their unique handling characteristics are often the only acceptable form of aviation service that can perform special missions.

Everyone is familiar with the lifesaving MS helicopters, law enforcement helicopters, fire fighting helicopters, tour helicopters, corporate helicopters and even electronic news gathering helicopters.

Probably less is known about helicopters engaged in utility and pipeline patrol, aerial forestry, agricultural application, offshore oil exploration. And the list goes on.

The security requirements associated with these operations, although similar to other aviation sectors, have certain unique aspects for the commercial operators.

RESAVAGE: Helicopters normally operate from thousands of heliports that are located off-site from major airports. The passengers are normally repetitive and known to the crews. Increased security is certainly needed in all of these sectors. But the security should match the potential threat to the public.

HAI would welcome an opportunity to submit security recommendations to this subcommittee.

I would now like to shift my focus to some critically important financial consequences of the horrific assault on our country on September 11.

The majority of helicopter operations are conducted under visual flight rules. And most helicopter pilots and aircraft that they fly are not certified to fly in instrument conditions.

When the FAA started to reopen our aviation system, VFR flight presented the greatest security challenges to the FAA; therefore, it was the slowest sector to be restored. And the predominantly VFR helicopter community has suffered a disproportional handicap returning it to any semblance of normalcy.

We recently conducted a survey of our members. And it revealed a $24 1/2 million per week revenue loss which amounts to about $1.3 billion over the course of the year.

Many report that these are frontal employees and they're at the point now where they may be shutting down their enterprises. Not only would this result in a terrible burden to the small business owners that are the majority of this industry, but it would result in the cessation of vital services to the communities they support.

The FAA is struggling to restore these services. And we certainly appreciate that.

I would certainly welcome the chance to talk with you more about how we could possibly be used in a more efficient and a secure manner, but time precludes me from doing that.

I would please ask this committee to give us very serious consideration, all of the general aviation community, some financial relief from the burdens that we've encountered over the last week and a half with the rest of the country.

Thank you.

MICA: Thank you.

And I'll recognize John Olcott, president of the National Business Aviation Association, at this time.

OLCOTT: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I'm Jack Olcott, the president of the National Business Aviation Association.

NBAA represents companies that use general aviation aircraft for business transportation, a segment of general aviation we normally call business aviation. Our 6,800 member companies operate over 8,000 general aviation aircraft, most of them business jets and turboprops. Our member companies employ over 20 million workers and earn revenues that approach $5 trillion, about half the gross domestic product.

I request that my written testimony be made part of the record.

MICA: Without objection, so ordered.

OLCOTT: Aftermath from the dastardly acts of September 11 badly point to the profound significance of air transportation to the economic and social well-being of our country and of the world.

When all aircraft were grounded immediately following the events of that terrible Tuesday, many businesses were severely curtailed.

Last week Congress heard airline executives say how their revenues were hurt by the inability to operate for about 48 hours as well as the public's hesitancy to travel once the grounding order was lifted for scheduled air carriers.

What was not emphasized last week, however, was how badly another very important segment of air transportation, general aviation, was affected. And it's still being affected because access to the skies for many users of general aviation has not been restored.

Air transportation is an enabling technology for meeting our nation's social and economic objectives in the twenty-first century. This fact is broadly accepted. But what is not fully understood is the vital role that general aviation plays as part of our nation's air transportation system.

Scheduled air carriers provide service to about 550 airports in the United States. General aviation provides access to 10 times that number of locations via public use airports. But more significantly, about three-quarters of all airline passenger enplanements occur at just 31 hub airports in our country. Thus general aviation provides access to over 100 times the number of locations with convenient scheduled air transportation.

It is for this reason, time-efficient travel to most locations, that member companies of the NBAA use general aviation for business travel. In fact, our members are the most active users of business aviation in the world.

Yet they also purchase over $10 billion in airline tickets. They need to travel. They need to travel to see customers, to work with partners, to open new markets domestically and globally. And they use whatever form of transportation best serves their travel itineraries, airlines, when appropriate, general aviation when appropriate.

Research by Louis Harris and Associates indicates that about 50 percent of passengers on company-owned airplanes are middle managers. Another 20 percent are technical or professional employees. But of particular significance to today's environment, all those passengers are known to their crews and to their fellow passengers.

In the few seconds that remain for my statements I urge this committee to consider how restrictions still imposed on your aviation system limit the ability of general aviation to serve our nation and to serve world commerce.

U.S.-owned and registered aircraft operating internationally are constrained because of the requirements to department from a limited number much foreign airports. Non-U.S.-registered aircraft used by corporations for business transportation are not allowed access into the U.S. airspace, even though those companies are business partners from friendly nations.

Deliveries of U.S.-manufactured general aviation aircraft are being curtailed. Aircraft that are meant for overseas delivery are being curtailed in their flight testing and in their distribution. Helicopter operations, as we've just heard, are significantly hampered. And VFR flights are prohibited in some locations.

In summary, many elements of our nation's air transportation system vital to the country's economic and social health are being constrained. We urge this committee to facilitate general aviation's ability to aid our nation's recovery by restoring general aviation's access to airspace.

Also we suggest that the lack of familiarity with general aviation by those responsible for our nation's security at this time of crisis resulted in actions that unnecessarily affected this segment of our community.

And finally, we offer the services of NBAA to work with this committee and with the security leaders of our nation to help develop reasonable rules that will be in the best interests of our country.

Thank you very much.

MICA: Thank you for your testimony.

We'll now conclude with Mr. Jerry Epstein. He's the former president of the Board of Airport Commissioners for Los Angeles.

Welcome, sir. And you're recognized. And I promise to have you out by 3 o'clock. So you'll just make it.

EPSTEIN: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And thank you very much for allowing me to come.

I am perhaps a little bit unique in the fact that I don't represent any group but just perhaps a frustrated member of an airport commission that runs one of the busiest airports in the world. LAX, although they talk about O'Hare, Dallas-Fort Worth and Atlanta as being the busiest airports because of the many that leave and approach. LAX is still the largest airport in the world for O & D, point of origin, point of departure. People use our transportation systems and our city.

I am going to depart from the oral testimony that I had, if you don't mind, and speak a little bit extemporaneously but do request that my written...

MICA: Without objection your entire statement will be made part of the record.

EPSTEIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like that my written testimony be made part of the record. Thank you, sir.

I am going to just confine my remarks to what I thought of maybe as a new perspective for the members of the Congress. It's the frustration that some of us have that have spent over 30 years looking at the transportation system that we have.

We have been talking about airport security, sir, for over 10 years. We have had the secretary of transportation, when Mr. Federico Pena was secretary of transportation, he came out to see us. We had Ms. Jane Garvey of the FAA out to see us numerous times.

I realize that criticism is very easy. Constructive criticism is something that is, I think, sorely needed.

I've been sitting here since half past 10:00 this morning. And I've heard some wonderful remarks from professionals that you have before you. I can just say that I don't want to repeat everything they say, but just emphasize that fear is what's keeping those of us on the airplanes -- when I flew out last night there were maybe 30 people on a 767-200. When I go back in a few hours there will be probably the same number.

We have been besieged. We have asked people in the Congress for years to please take security as a very important issue. We have people screening us that are paid the same salaries as a McDonald's employee. And our turnover is 500 percent a year. Some of them do not speak English. I heard that addressed by someone in the Congress this morning.

We have a security of 17 miles of perimeter fencing at LAX. If you remember, they detained an individual at the Canadian border who was headed to blow us up about a year ago. That should have been an eye-opener for some people, but it hasn't been.

I implore you, Mr. Chairman. I know that you're a strong individual. And I implore you, sir, to please take into consideration everything that's been said here today.

Perimeter fencing security exists today. There are firms that secure all of our military installations, both here and abroad, that detect between an animal intrusion and a human intrusion. Our airport tarmacs and access to the airport are absolutely ridiculous. People can get on our planes and do whatever they wish.

There's only one airlines they can't do it, and that's El Al. They have a security system that we should emulate.

There are so many things that you heard here today that I beseech you to take into consideration and do it as rapidly as possible. We need you now.

My final remark is you have certain infrastructure -- as a World War II veteran myself, you have certain infrastructure now. You have a federal marshals program that's under the Department of Justice. You have a National Guard that has an infrastructure.

You can train these people. Those of us that were involved in World War II were playing on the sandlots of this field when Hitler and Mussolini and Stalin were training their young men how to fight. You trained us, and in a few months we went over and we beat the hell out of them. And we can do the same thing here. Let our people be trained by adequate people within our military.

And give us one source -- that's another thing someone's emphasized. Please do not let us be governed by different entities. There should be one federal agency that takes care of all airports, realizing that LAX's needs are not the same needs of a smaller airport in Maine or some other place in this country.

But we need to federalize and we need to pay people a salary with advancement. And we need all this to restore two things, confidence in the American people that we can fly safely and that we can restore our economy.

I thank you, sir, for allowing me to speak.

MICA: Thank you for your testimony.

We will now turn to some questions.

First I want to ask Mr. Coyne or maybe Mr. Olcott about the problem we're having with acquiring insurance. It's my understanding that some of our FBO operators are not able to get insurance. Maybe you could bring the subcommittee up to date with this problem.

Mr. Coyne?

COYNE: Well, it's a very serious and a very immediate problem. Effectively over the last 72 hours, but most especially just in the last 24 hours, the insurance industry has been sending notices to the fixed base operators and essentially the people who provide fuel and service and other activities at airports, that their war risk coverage was canceled.

The largest company in the industry had their coverage canceled effective last night at 7:00 o'clock. The second largest will have theirs canceled tonight with, I guess, most of the rest are expecting the cancellations to go into force over the next 72 hours.

And frankly, what happened is that the insurance industry looked at the language of the bill that was passed by Congress last Friday, which of course provided war risk insurance indemnification for the airlines but only vaguely addressed the issue of how the service providers could get their coverage restored.

COYNE: My expectation is that there will be a period of just a matter of days before many of the airlines in this country may find it unable to get service, fuel, and other facilities at airports. Not just the airlines, but of course the broad breadth of general aviation as well unless -- certainly at the bigger airports this is a problem. Some of the smaller airports I don't think it's as serious a problem. But at the large airports it's a very, very serious problem.

Canada, interestingly, yesterday passed a bill, their legislature, which essentially granted to airports, airlines and the companies at airports that provide fuel, total to that industry, a 30- day emergency cover, if you will, on war risk insurance so that they could at least continue operating while they waited for the insurance industry to sort of settle down.

And my hope is that Congress would very seriously consider something like that in the immediate future.

MICA: Do you want to respond, Mr. Olcott?

OLCOTT: Mr. Chairman, I believe that the problem really speaks to the focus on the airlines as being the air transportation system in this country. My point was that our aviation system in the country consists of general aviation and the airlines. They're not competitive. They're complementary.

And when Congress looks at addressing the issues facing air transportation, I urge them to include general aviation in this mix. Because as we saw from the war risk insurance problem, the issue affected the general aviation community, but Congress only addressed the airline community.

MICA: Thank you.

Mr. Poberezny, there have been some calls for background checks for students who are instructed as far as flying commercial aircraft. Who do you think should conduct those background checks? Do you think it should be the responsibility of the instructors, the schools or the NFAA or the federal government? Who should be responsible?

POBEREZNY: Well, I think in looking at the issues set for commercial aircrafts, I assume you're looking not at the initial flight training that takes place in the smaller airplanes but as they move on to larger airplanes?

MICA: Well, let's take small aircraft. I mean we may face a future threat with a Cessna or some other small aircraft.

POBEREZNY: I think the real threat, if we look at risk versus security, is with the larger aircraft as we saw happen a couple weeks ago. So that threat really comes down to those who are taking advanced training, simulator training, maybe larger aircraft training, which is a much narrower field of potential students than it is in the broad spectrum of a student pilot in a Cessna 150 or a Cherokee 140.

MICA: How do you feel, then, about background checks...

POBEREZNY: I think, therefore, that...

MICA: ... again, we'll just say general aviation versus larger aircraft?

POBEREZNY: I think for the general aviation it would not be appropriate for flight schools. I don't think they have the expertise and the background to be able to do background checks at the level sufficient to, I think, which you would expect. And the same would be for many of the flight schools.

And I think this is where the intelligence community and their -- there is information already available on file as pilots' licenses and so forth. So we already have information as to who people are that are being trained.

MICA: I want to give time to the members who have been so patient.

Mr. Boswell?

BOSWELL: Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'll probably reserve some of my time with this so we can move to the others. But I think we've heard an excellent presentation here again this afternoon by the different entities that represent general aviation.

And I totally concur that general aviation is a prime part of the overall aviation industry that we have referred to much ever since the last few days.

So I would like to ask this question, though. What -- let me back up. In the earlier panel I made a comment that when we had Ms. Garvey here -- and I'm told that she made an excellent presentation and we all felt very positive about it. And you said that. But as you've gone back to them to get releases and guidance and so on, what are they saying? You know, what's the holdup? What are you being told?

BOYER: This is our greatest problem, Congressman. They are working very hard. We supplied them with data. Is it the weight of the aircraft? We've taken a 200,000-plus GA aircraft and segmented it by weight. And over 140-some-thousand of them are below 6,000 pounds. The weight of a car or an SUV.

We've said, "Is it the airspace itself? Let's look at where restrictions can be put."

I think it's a higher authority, as I mentioned in my testimony, the NSC, others in the security area that are coming back to them and not giving them enough answers.

Now, we're not classified. We can't handle that information. But if we just knew, as Mr. Bolen said, some of the threats, I think the industry itself could offer some creative solutions along with the qualified people as a part in the (inaudible).

BOSWELL: Well, I think that's a common-sense approach. And you probably ought -- well, you should be afforded that information.

Mr. Coyne?

COYNE: I'd like to answer a little bit too. And some of the discussions that I've had with officials at the White House and Mr. Mineta and others, it's clear that much of the concern is a learning curve on the part of Defense Department officials who are shifting their surveillance activities, especially the NORAD activities, from essentially a perimeter defense framework. Heretofore NORAD was geared toward defending our country around the borders out over the oceans. And they were used to looking at radar screens that had nothing but porpoises and an occasional airline coming in.

And now they have to learn in a different way how to deal with the surveillance of the airspace over the United States. And many of them were very nervous about the issue of having too many targets on their screens. And they recognize that they cannot ground general aviation. But they seemed to be saying that they had to learn. It took them a while to learn how to differentiate between the different types of airspace users.

My hope is that they learn very, very quickly. Because we cannot continue this. We will be broke. We will have hundreds and hundreds of businesses go bankrupt. And especially true at our two most important cities in this country, Washington, D.C., and New York City. These are the two cities that have the no fly zones for 25 miles around them where no general aviation at all. And these are the two cities of course that have suffered the most loss in this crisis.

How absurd is it to put the worst amount of economic damage on the very communities that are suffering the most today.

BOSWELL: (Inaudible) at the time. I agree, and I think that, you know, just from my personal point of view -- and Mr. Chairman might disagree with. I'm not asking to agree or disagree, but if the case can be made to keep these out, as you've just stated, then I guess the case could be made then for all the other major airports.

And it's just not going to work. We're going to have to beef up the security side of it and get back in operation and not let this yahoo or whoever it is to dictate how we can do our business. And we can do better. And I'm trusting we will.

I personally identified in my district, as I'm sure all the members have, the ma-and-pa operations, as you put it, Mr. Boyer, that they can't handle this. They can't do it. And they're just going to break and all the things you've said, so not to repeat those, you know, is in play.

And so we just have to deal with this. And I as an individual have no trouble at all to support the recommendation that you made. I was willing to support the airlines. I thought that was very important. But you put the numbers together that you've all brought to us today, if that's important, then this is important too. And we ought to be prepared to move on that.

So in case you're looking for some support, Mr. Chairman, I'm ready.

MICA: Thank you.

Mr. Petri?

PETRI: I second the motion of...

MICA: Mr. Poberezny, you had your hand up. Did you want to make a comment on the previous?

POBEREZNY: No. I just think to reinforce the FAA's done an outstanding job of representing aviation interests. And I think they're facing some circumstances and they're dealing with people that obviously have security interests in mind but at the same time don't have a total understanding of the general aviation community and in blanket edicts is providing or sustaining severe economic penalties and suicide, which is exactly what the president does not want. They want us to get back to business.

But basically we've had government condemnation of the airspace that we need to do business. It would be the same as shutting down the roads. Imagine what it would be like to be shut down on our interstate road system.

MICA: Thank you.

Could you go over again the situation with flight instruction in the United States. Is it essentially suspended now?

POBEREZNY: What we have is that in many areas geographically it's been reinstituted, though there are limitations placed upon flight instruction, what they called enhanced class B areas. But with the extensive shutdown that took place and the fact that, as Mr. Boyer stated, almost 40,000 airplanes are still grounded, even though it's been reactivated, the flight instruction community faces exactly what the airlines are facing, and that's public confidence.

Even though some of their doors have been open, people are not coming back. Students that were in process have in many cases suspended. Those who were looking at aviation careers don't see the opportunity to look forward.

We're in this paralysis situation. And if we're going to follow the president's edict to move on, we have to get on with all aspects of business, especially small business. And please remember that flight instruction is the life blood of this industry. These are the people, these are the men and women, who are teaching people to fly that buy airplanes, that have air transportation. They are a corps at the very base and in many cases are being supported by small business, small operations.

MICA: So how much longer can they hang on or will we see a contraction in the industry?

And also, is this going on around the world? Or is this just in the United States? I mean, people can learn to fly a plane in Canada. They can learn to fly a plane in England. Closing down American flight instruction is not going to protect American travelers particularly unless we -- I mean, it's -- I don't quite understand what the...

POBEREZNY: I mean, we are the leader in training pilots. There's no question about it. But you can be trained in other countries. So just shutting down the operations here doesn't limit the opportunity for someone with a terrorist mentality to learn how to fly somewhere else.

We also have to understand that shutting down the operations today with a student pilot, that person learning how to fly is a long way from being capable of flying the types of airplanes that we saw happen two weeks ago. So that's not an immediate reaction; it's more of a long-term view. And we don't think it's a view that's appropriate because it's severely hurting us.

You asked how long. We're day to day. A lot of these small businesses, the loss of cash flow in a highly capitalized industry is killing them. And when you add the insurance issues and the other things, they're facing higher costs, less customers. And small business in many cases has less opportunity to sustain themselves than some of the bigger businesses do.

MICA: But what can we do in the Congress besides expressing concern to help the general aviation industry and its different segments get back up and running (inaudible)?

POBEREZNY: We need to get more airplanes back in the air. I think Mr. Boyer's suggestion about AOPA and the FEMA support, as addressed by Mr. Boswell, I think those are all areas. Economic vitality, not so much just economic support, but as much as getting the airplanes back in the air, providing some of the opportunities at AOP and mentioned others would be a big, big plus.

MICA: Thank the, gentlemen.

Mr. Sandlin?

SANDLIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will a waive my questions of this panel. Thank you.

MICA: Mr. Lampson?

LAMPSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'm sitting here trying to figure out how to ask one question.

If there were one thing that could be done right now to get the largest number of general aviation airplanes back in the air, if you would ask us to please go out and fight for as hard as we could possibly do that would create the satisfaction on the part of the higher level bureaucrats, what would it be? Anybody.

COYNE (?): Free the 40,000 airplanes that are tracking -- that are trapped in the class bravo air spaces in America. I think we'd all agree with that, probably as the most important thing to be done right now.

BOYER: Our web site has a new headline on it as of yesterday that says, "Free the GA 41,000." And that's the mood right out there. That's the single biggest thing. This doesn't take care of the smaller problems, but this was such a tragedy, such an event that we've all had to turn to the greatest number and the greatest masses and then begin to work our way down to individuals.

I wish the ranking member was here. Did you know that hundreds of miles of dangers underground pipeline in Chicago's enhanced class B, which are not being patrolled, much of this cannot be effectively done from the ground? Now a student -- because in Chicago in the class bravo airspace, flight instruction is OK -- now a student can get some instruction in this same area, but I cannot do my helicopter patrol in the interest of public safety.

Does this make sense?

OLCOTT: Congressman, you said what could be done?

The general aviation community has to have access to the security community that's making some of these decisions.

We have excellent rapport with the FAA. We have nothing but compliments for Ms. Garvey, for the people within the FAA. We have excellent rapport and understanding at the Department of Transportation. Congress certainly understands our community.

But the people in the driver's seat are basically in the security community. And frankly, they do not know much about us. And we can't really get into the debates because when we go to the FAA and say we want to be in that situation room, we can't go in. We don't have a security clearance.

Consequently, we have to be able to communicate with the security community so they can better understand what general aviation is all about.

LAMPSON: Can you make a recommendation of something that you would like to see us do to try to facilitate that?

OLCOTT: Yes. I believe that we have to understand that one size of security does not fit all.

OLCOTT: What is appropriate for the 31 airports in this country that handle 75 percent of the airline passenger enplanements is not appropriate for some of the general aviation airports.

We look at Teeterborough. Teeterborough has no commercial airline service. But it has 270,000 general aviation operations a year vital to the ebb and flow of our country. And yet we don't have access into Teeterborough for companies such as the major pharmaceutical companies located in New Jersey that rely on their aircraft to carry on their business.

We have to have a better understanding of the security that presently exists within corporate aviation. The companies that operate these airplanes are very familiar with security and are very sensitive to security.

Better understanding is what we need.

LAMPSON: I wish I knew more about what we might be able to do as a Congress to force that to happen.

Mr. Chairman, maybe you...

(UNKNOWN): Would you yield a minute there, Mr. Lampson?

LAMPSON: Indeed.

(UNKNOWN): Well, I would just -- you know, what we're hearing here is just clear. You go to a general aviation operation, Teeterborough or wherever, and those pilots almost in every case are fully acquainted who they're hauling around, who they're flying. And there in itself is security.

They put them -- they bunch them together. We're going to walk out there. We're going to walk out together. They may be escorted out. We could do something like that or at least observe that nobody else joins in the fray. But because of the day-to-day involvement they understand that. So to hold them down and say that's not security, it just doesn't make sense.

LAMPSON: I yield to the chairman.

MICA: Just let me respond.

I think, since last week and before we've been trying to get general aviation back up. And there are still some restricted areas or restricted activities. FAA has informed me and others that this is not an FAA decision. It is a Security decision.

We have also expressed our concerns to those involved in security and will continue to do so as we're trying to free up the normal activity as soon as possible. I don't understand the delay.

We have a meeting in a few minutes with the secretary of defense, the secretary of state. We'll raise that issue behind closed doors.

(UNKNOWN): Thank you.

LAMPSON: Well, if I may...

MICA: As time is just about up because I used up most of it.

LAMPSON: I know you did, Mr. Chairman. That's why I was going...

MICA: No, but go ahead.

LAMPSON: I figured it might be able to be stretched for just a minute.

We'll certainly raise this issue in the meetings that are going to come up with some of the security people.

Would you consider, Mr. Chairman and other members of the committee, finding some way that we might force an opportunity for these folks to have special specific meetings with the intelligence community leaders?

MICA: We can request that. I'd be glad to request that.

LAMPSON: Thank you very much.

Let me just real quickly, Mr. Coyne, made a comment about the four-color ID's for pilots. What do the pilots have now? And what difference is it going make?

COYNE: Well, I think, as you probably know, pilots have a license that looks like this. It's a printed license not unlike a postcard. It's relatively easily counterfeited, unfortunately. And there's a lot of concern by those people who work at airports who are liable for making sure that the person who walks out to an airplane is the person who's supposed to be there.

So they would prefer to have something like our driver's licenses, which have a colored picture.

I don't think this would be viewed as a big hardship by the pilot community. I hope not. But we certainly believe that it's a reasonable thing to consider at this time.

In fact, the FAA has been doing research in this for, what, about four or five years.

(UNKNOWN): 10 years.

COYNE: 10 years.

(UNKNOWN): They built a building.

COYNE: So I think it's something that's long overdue. It's sort of a no-brainer, I think, in this (inaudible).

LAMPSON: Before the chairman starts throwing things at me to get me out of here, would either you or Mr. Boyer comment again on the background checks. I heard what Mr. Poberezny said, but why not some additional kind of, you know, check into the backgrounds?

Mr. Boyer and Mr. Coyne?

BOYER: Well, we'd like to be part of the solution. We are talking once again about very, very small businesses with limited resources and a flight training community that's pretty fragile.

But I would say first let's look at the government agencies, the Customs Service the State Department, the INS, the people that a background check would be run through. And once those agencies are fully fixed -- and you heard this in the last panel -- once we know their procedures are in place properly, if you feel there needs to be additional security, then drop down to the small business.

Because in fact if these small businesses today were to start checking, they'd go back to the very records that we are suspect about.

MICA: Thank the gentleman.

Let's turn to Mr. Ehlers next.

LAMPSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

EHLERS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank the panel for their excellent testimony. It was very illuminating and very well presented and, I might say, almost unanimous in the recommendations or the concerns.

I am very upset about the way general aviation has been treated. Too often general aviation in general has been treated like the unwanted stepchild by the federal government. And this is probably the worst example of it that we've seen.

I'm especially concerned, or frankly angry, that this is being done by people we don't know, we don't have access to, we can't talk to. And they're making absurd decisions. I mean, our federal government has confiscated 41,000 airplanes. These are expensive devices. They've confiscated 41,000 airplanes that people are not able to use.

It's two weeks now since the tragedy in New York and in Washington. And almost everyone else is being freed but not general aviation.

I think part of it is just lack of political clout. A mom-and- pop flight school doesn't have the clout that a major airline does. And yet for two weeks is four percent of the year's profits. You still have the same expenses by and large because in aviation most of the expense is your capital expense and paying it off and insurance and so forth. And so we've deprived them of four percent of their margin for the year, which for many of them is about their margin.

And I think it's intolerable. I have talked to the FAA and DOT, as most of us have here. I've also talked to Mr. Boswell and Mr. Hayes, who are the most experienced pilots here, about trying to arrange a meeting with the National Security Council under the auspices of the chairman of this committee.

And I appreciate Mr. Lampson's suggestion because I really think, Mr. Chairman, that we should have a meeting, a closed meeting, not necessarily with these gentlemen, although if they want to meet with them too, fine, but of the committee and find out what's going on here, why the delay in opening up the skies for what I think is the safest segment, the least threatening to our national security of any segment of aviation that we have today.

I think it's just intolerable. And I certainly urge that this subcommittee take strong action and try to arrange a meeting as soon as possible and deal with this. I think "Free the airplanes" is a good motto for you to have and a good motto for us to have.

I yield back.

MICA: Thank the gentleman.

We did have a closed meeting last week, but not with the intelligence people. And we will see if we can request that.

Mr. Thune?

THUNE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

We have a lot of open airspace in my state of South Dakota. And we're looking for more planes to fill it, not fewer. And so this is a very real problem and one that I guess I'm curious if there's a way -- and I don't know, but maybe you covered that in some of your previous testimony. And so I apologize for asking it again. But have you quantified what the total losses are?

Jim, have you?

COYNE: General aviation businesses we estimate the total losses at just about $400 million to date. And it affects places that you wouldn't think. It's not just the big urban areas. But you know, because an aircraft, a business aircraft, let's say, is trapped in Teeterborough, it can't fly to California and refuel in Sioux Falls. So there is economic activity that's being affected in virtually every part of the country.

EHLERS: Do you have any kind of an estimate about number of operations that have closed, number of jobs lost, anything like that? (Inaudible).

COYNE: Well, we estimate about 25,000 people have been laid off at this point in the general aviation area. And about 700 businesses have shut down.

POBEREZNY: Sir, in addition to that we talked about in earlier testimony, if this continues long term, we see 30 to 45 percent of the flight schools and FBO's closing down, especially in the smaller communities, to where, whether it's in your part of the country or -- I'm from Wisconsin, the winter is the toughest part of the time as it is. We're going into the slowest time, with the overhead is still there and they've lost significant resources.

And the thought that Congressman Ehlers said, it isn't just four percent of the margin; they had a period of time where there was no revenue coming in but yet most of the expenses were there. So it was even more significant than that.

And the biggest thing right now is the public confidence issue. It isn't just the customers they lost from two weeks. It's the customers they're losing going forward that have to be brought back. And the longer this goes on, the longer we're going to have to work to bring public confidence back.

When I say public, it's the aviation public, the people who have come into aviation, buy airplanes, learn how to fly, buy fuel, et cetera, et cetera.

It's very damaging.

BOLEN: One of the things that I think we have found out, how interdependent all parts of the general aviation community is on each other. If we don't have a healthy pilot population, we don't have new airplanes. Fewer airplanes we have the more that the cost of the ones remaining become. And it becomes a very vicious cycle.

And we're at the beginning right now of a very negative downward spiral. We've lost two important weeks. We still don't know when we're going to get to the other side on some other restrictions. And as a result of that this spiral has already begun.

And the question is how and when can we pull out? We believe that the most immediate way to address that is to get full access to the airspace again. But clearly damage has been done, and it will take a very long time for our industry to work through that and put it behind us.

RESAVAGE (?): I'd also like to add when you asked about what is the impact on revenue loss, there are still thousands of our members that have lost a hundred percent of their revenue. They're not flying. They're grounded, as Mr. Boyer mentioned earlier.

So it's not a question of them operating on a thin margin or losing 30 or 40 or 50 percent. They've lost it all. And there is no relief now. So those people, again, as was mentioned earlier, on a very tight cash flow situation and they have very few opportunities to use their aircraft, their capital assets for some alternate source. There is no alternate use for those aircraft. So they are closing their doors daily as we sit here in large numbers.

And if you run across the industry, maybe we could come up with a number. They say 10 or 20 percent are going down, but if we're talking about mom-and-pop activities, there are a lot of them that, again, have lost a hundred percent. And they may never be able to recover from just these two weeks that we've endured today.

OLCOTT: The impact is far more pervasive than we realize. What about the company from the UK that called us and said, "We had business to do with your companies in the United States, but we can't fly into the United States"? What about the major Fortune 100 company that is sending two airplanes to Asia to develop new business but can't really get back into the United States as effectively because of the restrictions that say you must go through certain departure airports?

What about the fact that one-third of our aircraft, or 30 percent of our aircraft, are exported overseas but they can't do flight tests because they have nonenregistered numbers on them?

The point is that our community has been overlooked. And that's been to the detriment of our country, not just our community.

EHLERS: If you had full access to airspace again -- and you've all said nobody knows exactly how long before we return to normal. But is it fair to say, I mean, if we had -- probably can't put a specific -- quantify this timewise -- how quickly if things are restored to normal, can the industry be back and maybe not getting on all cylinders, so to speak, but back on its feet?

BOLEN: I think there's some intangibles that are there. And that's going to be the help of the U.S. economy is going to have an impact on how our industry fairs. And the confidence of the public is going to have a big impact on the future. So I think there are some things out there that are going to be very, very difficult to quantify.

What we do know is that there were substantial costs during the period where we lost access. We don't know how long it will be before we get to full access. And then after that it will be a question of how much did the infrastructure crumble? and how long will it take to build it? And that includes the pilot community, confidence, the economy and a lot of other things.

MICA: Time of the gentleman has expired. Go ahead.

EHLERS: I would just in closing, Mr. Chairman, echo what's already been said. And that is that the industry, I think, really does need somebody to advocate and to the degree that we can help facilitate getting these folks in front of the necessary officials in the agency. And then we'll have an opportunity to raise that with some of the folks later this afternoon, I think.

But I also would agree with what's been said earlier. And that is that we need to make sure that the point is made and that we're helping to make it.

Thank you.

MICA: Thank you.

Mr. Moran?

MORAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I've listened at least in part to the testimony throughout the morning and afternoon. And particularly from you gentlemen, can you tell me what the current state of the restrictions are in regard to general aviation?

(UNKNOWN): Well, right now...

MORAN: I'm sure you can.

(UNKNOWN): Yes.

MORAN: Actually my question is not, can you tell me? but what are they?

BOYER: OK. Once again we have one big area that it concerns us. And that is that 30 cities in the United States have what is called class B airspace. It's really the hub airports that Jack and others were talking about around them, 20- to 30-mile radius. These are the urban areas in our country.

Those pieces of airspace, 28 of the 30, will allow no VFR flying. 85 percent of our pilots are VFR rated.

Now, there are two zones, very predictably, New York and Washington, D.C., in which they are called exclusionary areas. Because of the tragedy that occurred, they immediately drew a 25-mile circle around Washington National Airport and around JFK Airport. And within that circle there can be no general aviation operations.

Now, those two cities, as was mentioned earlier, have some major facilities. Our Montgomery County Air Park, just up 270, has 250 based aircraft that have been crippled in this no-fly zone.

There's no flight instruction. There's no fuel sales. And this airport is contributing about $15.8 million to the local economy. And it is the third busiest airport in Maryland stopped dead in its tracks.

So the two problems are the 41,000 aircraft that can't fly VFR in the 28 big cities and these two big zones.

Now, there may be a way to reduce these zones. Maybe we can't go all the way back to -- we talked earlier about National opening. Maybe there should be an 18-mile ring. Maybe there should be a 10- mile ring.

But we definitely should take the 28 cities where flight instruction is OK in the class B but a pilot like Mr. Hayes cannot fly an airplane in the Charlotte area.

BOLEN: Congressman, there's another restriction that I think is impacting the business aviation community substantially. And that is an inability to fly U.S.-registered aircraft to foreign destinations and then bring them back into the United States.

Right now you can take a aircraft and fly it out of the United States to a foreign destination. That was relieved a few days ago. But you cannot bring it back in. So you have a company like Cessna who had planned a world tour of their Citation 10. It cannot fly from Hawaii to Australia to begin the tour because it can't make the flight and bring it back. And you have a number of situations like that.

I talked earlier about the company that wants to go to Mexico and back and forth with their management team and so forth.

So that's also a significant restriction that exists today.

COYNE: And, Mr. Moran, may I say also that the FAA has really been on our side on this issue. And they are experts at aviation safety.

Last Monday, not yesterday, but last Monday, I went in there and met with the chief of aviation safety, General Canavan and also the head of Air Traffic Control, Steve Brent (ph), and he agreed at that time that he was going to propose to the White House and the others that the restricted area in Washington and New York be reduced from 25 miles to 18 miles so that Teeterborough, so that Dulles Airport, so these -- Montgomery County, so that these critical airports could be freed up.

The FAA wants to do it. So we are at a total stymied. You know, we can't get the information. We've got to be able to communicate to these people that if the FAA is able to do it -- and certainly no one wants aviation safety anymore highly than they do -- they've got to be listened to.

POBEREZNY: It's like being in prison but nobody knows you're there. The silence is deafening. And the fact is that the advocacy today we're hearing is a breath of fresh air. Because we're chipping away. And those who represent us are being overturned and overridden without us knowing why.

MORAN: The two restrictions, one Mr. Bolen and one Mr. Boyer have mentioned, in addition to that are there others? The one I can think of is crop-dusting. But are there others?

BOYER: Yes, there's crop-dusting. There's no flights by news or traffic reporting. There's, as I said when you were out of the room, Mr. Lipinski, pipeline patrol in Chicago where these small businesses are really having difficulty.

There are also a lot of temporary areas around organized events. Now, I think it's obvious, whether we have a classified security clearance or not, that, you know, if you were having a Super Bowl maybe it's not best at this time to have small planes flying around over them.

But unfortunately, these haven't been very well codified. But there are big segments that we don't think of in business, like ag flying, crop-dusting, the other things that are prohibited at this time.

MORAN: And I assume that you don't know, just as I don't know, whether or not these are specific threats -- these restrictions are a result of some specific piece of information or just a general restriction against general aviation.

BOYER: One television network this entire day is devoting itself to chemical and biological warfare. As we sit here, they're taking all their newscasts, all their morning and late night shows and doing that. So I've got to believe then that they are either feeding the frenzy on the ag flying or just being sensationalists.

MORAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MICA: The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Hayes?

HAYES: Thank you, gentlemen. Excellent testimony.

The insurance industry is clearly a culprit here.

We've been focusing on things. There have been a lot of untrue statements said about airline security, aviation security. It's better than it's ever been. It's going to get even better. So a lot of folks is misled from some of these (inaudible) the American flying public into thinking that nothing is being done. A lot is being done.

Like I say, I want to identify the insurance companies as one of the culprits. We were working on some issues there before this came up.

Mr. Bolen, Mr. Coyne, talk for a minute about the financial impact of our export business of general aviation aircraft that is now shut down. Jobs, people, money, balance of trade, brief hit for the committee on that issue.

BOLEN: Initially -- well, let me just state industrywide exports are about a third of the total deliveries for U.S. manufacturers. And so for...

HAYES: We're at a disadvantage now because of the rules that are out there.

BOLEN: And for a significant period of time planes that were sold and ready to be delivered to foreign companies, that was just not possible.

Now we have a situation where because foreign aircraft are not allowed to fly into the United States and U.S. aircraft are not allowed to fly outside the United States and then return, obviously the capabilities of these aircraft are being lost.

And the public has no idea when they're going to be restored. That has an effect.

First of all, we lost the carrying costs associated with not being able to make deliveries. Now we're looking at a market shrinking as the utility of the aircraft is diminished by not being able to be used with full capabilities.

COYNE: I might also add that there's a very large market in the United States of the resale of used aircraft. And a significant proportion of that also goes overseas.

There's a very significant charter market in the United States which is going overseas. We're by far the leader in international charter out of the United States. And that's also been impacted.

And even flight schools. I had an interesting talk just yesterday with the FBI, who said that they would much prefer that the flight training in the world -- 95 percent of all flight training in the world is in the United States. They said they would much prefer that those foreign students come to the United States to study where they can be surveiled and watched and we can know what's going on rather than shut down the ability of U.S. flight schools to do overseas training and have that all returned to France or some other country.

HAYES: OK, I'd like for you to speak in just a moment about the financial harm, that part 135 carriers. These are air taxis. Great support of general aviation.

I'm sure this committee is very clearly going to approach the administration. I'm going to call the secretary of commerce. Having Governor Ridge as a focal point for security is going to give us access to things where we'll get it done.

And when we had the whole United States government with the exception of the vice president at the National Cathedral for prayer service, that was security risk. Somebody in the administration overruled security people because it's what needs to be done. So we can take logical steps to get the people that can make these decisions.

Out and out damage to 135 folks.

COYNE: Well, very substantial. But I don't want to make it appear like that 135 community deserves to be addressed just exclusively. We believe that the economic advantage to the entire industry has to be addressed.

And I think the greatest concern of the 135 community, besides the loss of business and the decline that's expected in the months ahead, is the concern of a knee-jerk reactionary in terms of regulations and a whole lot of new equipage requirements being added to the -- which they just can't afford.

It's one thing to tell an airline that has millions of dollars and thousands of planes, well, you've got to do X on every airplane and that's going to cost you about $200,000 per plane. Maybe they can afford it. But a small charter operator, which typically only has four, five, maybe ten, fifteen different airplanes, the burdens on them can be incredibly substantial, essentially will put them all out of business. Their owners will decide not to put their airplanes in charter. And the public will end up suffering.

OLCOTT: Now, Mr. Congressman, there are a number of operational characteristics that can be used to help gain access to the airspace while maintaining the highest levels of security.

I believe that the best way we can address this question is to communicate the advantages of business aviation and the capabilities of all of general aviation to the security individuals who are making the decisions.

So the recommendation of this group to help us gain access to the security makers and decision makers would be very valuable.

HAYES: Included in some of your recommendations the relaxation of FET taxes and things like that. And I mentioned 135 simply because you all had talked about some of the other areas.

General aviation is very important to be included when Reagan National Airport is again reopened. So I want to have that officially on the record.

Again, we appreciate you all being here. This is a huge and vitally important segment of our commerce.

Mr. Boyer mentioned a number of things. Production lines are kept running by general aviation aircraft to fill in with parts and things like that. Financial documents are moved.

We appreciate you all being here. And we will carry your message to the people we have access to.

MICA: Thank the gentleman.

Mr. Rehberg?

REHBERG: Thank you very much.

And let me add my voice to thanking you all for being in your industries and bringing great testimony forward.

I'm not a pilot so I won't use the acronyms or the numbers. But representing the entire state of Montana, I spend my entire life in an airplane back there.

Tell me or explain to me how we tell the general public that crop-dusting is OK, let them back up. I mean what would be our response? Because there is the fear. I still remember Desert Storm and the media wearing their gasmasks giving their stories. How do we offset that argument?

BOYER: Well, I think one of the ways we do it is to indicate what kind of an aircraft is used. First of all, in these areas that they are spraying are generally in very rural areas.

The one thing I have gotten from this enemy that we don't know about up there is that they want to protect our urban financial and government centers. Crop-dusting does not take place in New York City or Washington, D.C. But it does take place in many urban areas. And it is very time sensitive, as it is right now.

Now, the aircraft that are used are not long-range aircraft that fly fast or fly high or have any sophistication whatsoever. They carry a minimum amount of fuel to go oftentimes from a grass strip or a mall strip to the closest place they need to spray with a lot of weight of the airplane being used in carrying the fertilizers that they use.

So I think for the American public, which may be watching, as I said, that sensational coverage today, they should understand that these people are generally even relocating their tanks, they're refueling and everything else to an area real close to the field they are spraying. And they are not long-range aircraft with high-speed capabilities.

REHBERG: Thank you. I couldn't have said it any better myself.

Mr. Poberezny, I apologize for missing your testimony. I was looking forward to it. Thank you for your hospitality when we were in Oshkosh.

And please don't tell anybody in Montana that I suggested this, but VFR seems to be the problem. Not because it's visual; it's because probably you file a flight plan. You probably more than anyone get to see the greatest number of people who are in it for recreational purposes, just for fun.

Is there something in the short-term that we could do to ask VFR to file some kind of a plan, tell somebody that are out there that they're just out flying around, having fun, doing stuff, just to get us through this period so we can get back up in the air?

POBEREZNY: That's one of the problems that the system couldn't take. You know, the system only has so much capacity, whether it's filing flight plan, transponder codes, and so forth. If you take the typical VFR flying on a nice day in a local area, it's going to actually jam up the system to a certain extent for those who are looking to monitor the activity. You're going to flutter, for lack of a better word, the screen, the overview with a lot of unnecessary traffic.

Plus you're going to keep people out of the air because the system, like I say, to file, to make the calls, it's going to just clog everything, create gridlock.

REHBERG: OK.

Explain radar to me then. I thought that at certain altitudes everybody was watched, they knew you were there.

POBEREZNY: Well, a lot of it has to do with distance away, your officers and so forth. And then with the transponder code, there you know who it is. They have a code. You can monitor whether it's 1200 or have a specific code.

But the key is -- and a lot of the open airspace, the GA aircraft, single-engine airplanes especially, it's just an amount of security risk in terms of their physical capability, their speed, the areas they're in.

REHBERG: Right. And I don't disagree with that. I'm just trying to find a way to convince the intelligence community, who we don't seem to have access to either, otherwise National Airport would be open.

REHBERG: They're not listening to us either.

POBEREZNY: And with us not knowing, it's like (inaudible), it's one brush fits all. It's that they're trying to paint with the same brush. And you can't put a 757 in the same category as the Cessna 152.

REHBERG: Right.

BOLEN: You know, I think the questions that you're raising are exactly the ones that we've been struggling with so much and form the foundation for some of our testimony.

You're saying, how do we convince them of the safety? But we don't know what the questions are. We don't know what they're concerns about the ag airplanes are. We don't know if their concern is because they don't understand the range or the handling characteristics or something completely different.

And until we can get at those questions, why are you concerned about VFR? why are you concerned about the ag airplane? then we can specifically go and determine whether that is a serious threat, a credible threat or something that should be ruled out and it was only a threat because they didn't understand the community.

REHBERG: Before I run out of time, I'd like to ask specifically, is Canada having the same problem as a result of our problem?

BOYER: Yes. Actually we have an AOPA in Canada that is constantly on our back about when we will allow their people to return. We are having a problem with people trying to close winter fishing bases, et cetera, from the United States getting up there.

And Canada did have a restriction. Actually many places in the world have had restrictions. Czechoslovakia put a ban on VFR flying because of the tragedy that occurred two weeks ago.

REHBERG: How about Alaska?

BOYER: Alaska was exempt from these rules very, very early because of the unique nature of aviation in that forty-ninth state.

MICA: The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Graves?

GRAVES: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

My question is more just out of curiosity than anything else. And I guess I'll direct it to Mr. Poberezny since I'm a member of VAA.

But what is your worst-case scenario? What do you fear for VFR aircraft in the future? Do you think there's going to be some permanent restrictions that are going to be a little tough to live with?

POBEREZNY: Well, I think that's a feeling that we all have is that there would be, for lack of a better word, knee-jerk restrictions put in that would be unnecessary or they'd be, quote, temporary. And temporary somehow becomes reality.

When our members in the aviation community called -- and calls have picked up -- it was first shock, disbelief, belief, support, et cetera. Then it went to why are we a security risk? Then it went to, is this going to be used as an excuse for those who want to keep restrictions on general aviation and use these unfortunate national security issues as a matter of doing so?

So what happens is if you talk about it long enough, I don't think it becomes reality. It becomes a spiral (inaudible) every one of us have talked about here. So it affects the consumer confidence right in your home district.

(inaudible) these aircraft is they're in Mexico. And you know, they're a small business that maybe sells four or five, six airplanes a month. If you lose one or two airplanes a month in sales, that's 20 percent.

And so what we have right now is a spiraling fear that those in the community are not going to enjoy, relatively speaking, the same privileges as before, and that fear is creating gridlock and economic paralysis.

And when they hear that the agency they first started to blame -- the public, the aviation public was saying, "Well, why doesn't the FAA let us back in the air?" When they're hearing that FAA is an advocate rather than adversary, that gets pretty scary because now the control is with those who don't understand our mission and what we do for the aviation community.

And I think the biggest thing is that we live in a free society. And people are worried about the balance between security and freedom. And if we lose that balance, we lost everything.

REHBERG: Thank you.

MICA: The gentleman yields back the balance of his time?

OK.

Well, I want to thank each of our panelists for your patience. We've been going since this morning. And I know you've been waiting. Thank you for raising the issues you have.

We're going to try to address some in the subcommittee and also full committee and Congress.

Again, we're appreciative of your cooperation. We'll excuse you at this time.

And let me call our third and last panel who have been waiting patiently.

Mr. Paul Ruden. He's senior vice president, legal and industry affairs, of the American Society of Travel Agents.

Mr. Ralph S. Sheridan, president and CEO of the American Science & Engineering.

Mr. Andreas Kotowski, chief technical officer and chairman of the Rapiscan Security Products.

Mr. Paul Hudson, executive director of the Aviation Consumer Action Project.

And Mr. Robert G. Monetti. And he is with the Aviation Security Advisory Committee and also speaking on behalf of the Victims of Pan Am Flight 103.

I want to welcome these panelists. You can get the staff to go ahead and change out the nameplates there.

Let me just say for the record again we appreciate your patience and participation today. A long hearing.

We have at least 18 to 20 witnesses and people who are before us tomorrow. And that will be in 2253 at 9:00 a.m. Anyone else wishing to participate should contact our staff at 564491 so everyone has a chance to be heard.

With that let me welcome Mr. Paul Ruden with the Travel Agents.

Mr. Ruden?

RUDEN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MICA: Welcome. And you're recognized.

RUDEN: When the airlines testified here last week, they were too self-absorbed to concern themselves or to inform you about all the other dimensions of the travel industry problem created by the catastrophes of September 11. And ASTA is here to do that today.

Despite the airline claims, many people will not be better off even if all the airlines continue to fly. Their businesses and careers in travel will have been destroyed completely for the same reasons that brought the airlines before you. These are the businesses and careers of thousands of very small family-owned businesses who arranged 75 percent of the air travel bought by Americans and almost all the package tours and cruises plus large shares of hotel rooms and car rentals purchased in this country.

On September 11 the travel agency industry was, just like the airlines, already struggling with a severe financial problem when the terrorist attacks brought a halt to the sale of travel in all forms. Travel agents are caught between the hammer and the anvil. There's no new business, topped off by the recall of the commissions on business sold before September 11 that was not performed or is being canceled.

After the first of the year they will face renewed penalties for failing to meet their CRS segment booking thresholds.

The details of the financial losses by this industry are set out in the written testimony exhibits. For the period through the end of 2002 ASTA estimates the total loss for all product lines will exceed $4 billion.

The average number of agency employees in an agency location was six. In normal times these small businesses handle an enormous volume of air travel. Through July of this year travel agencies sold $47 billion in airline tickets, accounting for over 113 million airline sales transactions.

This business has shrunk to almost nothing since September 11. This is normally the peak season for holiday bookings. That business is at a standstill. Large group bookings made for travel months in the future are being canceled. The details of a small sample of these stories are set out in Exhibit A to our written testimony.

Travel agents and at-home retailers of travel services number about 300,000. We estimate job losses in the hundred thousand range if immediate action is not taken to help these firms and individuals. Travel agencies simply do not have cash reserves and other assets to use as collateral for regular bank loans. They have nowhere to turn but the federal government.

The public uses travel agencies because they provide what the public needs in the way of information, counseling and transaction services for all forms of travel. During the heartbreaking days immediately following the September 11 attacks, America's travel agencies were there for their clients. And they were there for others as well. Across the country travel agents were in their offices trying to help the many thousands of people stranded by the nationwide airport closure. Many of them provided free assistance to people who had bought their tickets on the Internet and had no one to contact for help.

Travel agents performed these services because they were the only people who could. At the same time they watched their businesses collapse. Many agencies report gross earnings for the week including September 11 of less than $50.

It is a fact in this unprecedented situation there was no substitute for the travel agent for tens of thousands of people who needed help.

And it's also a fact, perhaps the most important one of all, that without travel agencies the nation's travel industry, airlines included, simply cannot function. The airlines and their web site cannot handle all the consumers with the myriad of services that professional travel agents have provided and that account for the public's continuing preference for dealing through travel agencies.

The services of professional agents with expertise in travel option analysis are going to be crucial to bringing the public back to the airways. Consumers are going to want and need to talk to people with real knowledge of the system, the new rules, and the requirements for achieving safe and expeditious travel.

National economic recovery could be delayed for a very long time if travel agents are not there to connect and serve the customer and the airline.

Given the magnitude of the short-term losses and the uncertainty of near-term recovery, we are seeking $4 billion in grants and no- interest loans to be made available to travel agencies. These funds will help assure that irreplaceable travel agency services will not be cut off to the public when they need them the most.

Now, on the subject of the aid that has been provided to the airlines, Mr. Chairman, our written testimony sets out a number of conditions that we believe should be imposed on the financial aid granted to the airlines. And in the interest of time I will not recite them all here. But I would observe that they are critical to preventing the airlines from accelerating their plans to lay off additional costs on travel agents and the public and eventually to eliminate third-party sources of information for consumers at a time when such sources are more important than they have ever been.

On the subject of security, ASTA has previously advised the Congress that we think the task of securing access to aircraft should be placed in the hands of the secret service. Airlines should not, in our view, be asked to conduct two businesses that are in some senses in conflict with each other. The security job should be handled by interests independent of airline economic and operational needs and should be paid for by everyone. Surely it is now clear that the airlines are a public utility service essential to the economic welfare of the entire country.

The task of assuring that the service continues and flourishes as regards public safety should be in the hands of experts in personal security and the cost shared by everyone who benefits from the service directly or indirectly.

Finally, regarding the national recovery, the continued closure of Reagan National Airport stands as stark evidence of the government's lack of confidence in the current state of air travel security measures. On top of that the continuing release of vague information about the continuing presence of terrorists in our midst and about the evidence being collected about other unfulfilled threats is contributing materially to the public's sense that it is not safe to travel by air.

The fundamental goal of restoring air travel and therein stimulating the economy as a whole cannot be accomplished until the government makes up its collective mind about the message it is sending to the public. All the travel industry's efforts to encourage the public to travel will go for nothing if counteracted on a daily basis by nonessential disclosures having the opposite effect.

ASTA appreciates the opportunity to present its views and remains at the committee's disposal to assist in any way it can.

Thank you.

HAYES: Thank you, Mr. Ruden.

Mr. Sheridan?

SHERIDAN: Thank you, sir.

This on? Good.

I'm here today speaking to you as the CEO of a company, American Science & Engineering, that is dedicated to supporting the U.S. government in X-ray security. Over 50 percent of my sales are for 30- plus federal agencies of the U.S. government, the other 50 percent taking that technology and supporting our ally governments overseas.

The reason we're here is because since the Cold War the U.S. has taken the role of being a global policeman. But we haven't protected the police station. The public today is asking this committee and all of us involved in the security industry to help restore the trust in the infrastructure.

This is a problem that is much bigger than aviation. Aviation was just the vector of choice two weeks ago for the terrorist attacks. The problem extends to protection of U.S. military, protection of federal facilities, which include embassies overseas, includes our Department of Energy facilities. It includes our federal office buildings.

And finally, it includes our ports and borders. And marine today, or marine security, is a grossly overlooked area of protection against terrorism.

AS&E was one of the original pioneers in X-ray security stemming out of a response to the Cuban hijackings in the late '60s and early '70s. We took that technology. We developed it. We came up with a proprietary technology called X-ray backscatter that is unique in its ability to see organic materials, specifically plastic explosives, organics such as drugs and plastic weapons.

We developed that for security agencies around the world.

SHERIDAN: In the mid-1990s we exited U.S. aviation. Why?

First of all, there was a paucity of funding for aviation- specific R&D.

Secondly, there was a strategy, a strategy of convenience, that was based on deterrence and deploying lower-cost technologies instead of focusing on detection.

Instead we moved forward with funding from the Department of Defense to develop the capability to scan sea containers, trucks and cargoes, our mission being to detect drugs and to protect U.S. military bases overseas and inspecting trucks to avoid additional Al- Khobar type bombings.

Where are we today? Today in aviation we're mostly overseas, particularly in the Middle East with some of our allies where they used our equipment to protect against Islamic fundamentalist threats. We're also in Sri Lanka, where they have a very strong incidence of terrorism. Our equipment is used for scanning air cargo in Egypt, in protecting their ports, all funded by the U.S. government.

In force protection the air mobility command uses our equipment for all overseas flights to and from our U.S. military bases.

In addition we have a system at the Bahrain U.S. Naval base scanning trucks to prevent against terrorist bombing.

In federal facilities there are some 30-plus federal agencies that use our equipment to protect federal personnel and facilities from terrorist bombings. Why? Because the test done by your capital police, the Secret Service and the FBI demonstrated that our equipment was superior in finding sophisticated terrorist devices that were disguised to foil normal X-rays.

Recently last November at JFK Airport the New York port authorities conducted a test using live C-4, live dead cord (ph), and they ran it through five different X-ray vendors and the two trace detection systems. All of them failed with the exception of the Invision system, which found one of the explosives, the live C-4, after four tries.

Our system, which is at the airport, used by U.S. customs for scanning arriving mail for explosives, outgoing mail and parcels for drugs and arriving passenger luggage, identified both of these live explosive threats.

This is just an example of the effectiveness of our technology.

On ports and borders we've taken the funding that was originally provided for us by Department of Defense and we built a broad capability in addressing cargo scanning, vehicle scanning, sea container scanning. We are in ports in Africa, the Middle East, the U.K. and Asia.

In the Middle East the issue, again, is scanning, looking for weapons and explosives, threats to those governments that are our allies.

My message to you, to this committee, is to think broader than aviation alone. There is no silver bullet single technology today that can solve this problem. What is required is a gauntlet of technologies working together.

We are just a part of that solution at my company. I believe that if this committee is bold and moves forward with funding available technology and deploying it, what we'll find is it's expensive, it's cumbersome, but it will help restore public trust. With additional R & D funding to the industry broadly we can refine the technologies, we can make them faster and less invasive to the traveling public. That is the opportunity for this committee.

Thank you.

HAYES: Thank you, sir.

Mr. Hudson?

HUDSON: Good afternoon, Mr. Hayes, Mr. Sandlin and Mr. Kirk.

I would like to ask that my written statement be made part of the record and distributed to the other committee members.

HAYES: Without objection, so ordered. True for all of them.

HUDSON: My name is Paul Hudson. I'm executive director of the Aviation Consumer Action Project, known as ACAP. It's the nonprofit organization founded in 1971 with thousands of air traveler supporters. It acts as a voice and ear for air travelers and the general public on national aviation issues.

ACAP has been a member of the FAA's Aviation Security Advisory Committee since 1991. And it's advocated for stronger aviation security for more than 15 years.

From 1989 to '93 I was president of the Families of Pan Am 103 Lockerbie and a grieving terrorist victim family member.

I've testified before congressional committees many times, well over 10 anyway, lobbied to strengthen aviation security, particularly enactment of the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990, which forms the legal basis of the system we have today.

From '77 to '87 I was counsel to the New York Crime Victims Board and a consultant to the American Bar Association and the National Institute of Justice on Crime Victim Rights.

The September 11 attacks proved that airliners can be used as weapons of mass destruction, something never anticipated or even imagined in my many discussions with aviation security officials and experts.

September 11 was also certainly a day of infamy for America and the world. That day changes forever how we look at aviation security and terrorism.

Clearly it must be upgraded at least to the highest standards of federal law enforcement and national security in the coming months. In the meantime, aviation security must under no circumstances be allowed to repeat the September 11 attacks.

Accordingly, we need to focus on emergency measures that can be done in days or weeks and not even consider things that undercut security while we are still under imminent threat of this new form of terrorism.

I would note parenthetically no new form of terrorism that I'm aware of in history has not been repeated.

ACAP recommends the following emergency measures to the FAA. First, quickly secure airliner cockpits. Initially this will require deploying armed guards or law enforcement agents or armed flight crews. Later stronger cockpit doors and security barriers or screens must be installed. We feel if you do this the system will start to stabilize and be able to recover. If it's not done we fear bad things may follow.

Secondly, to restrict or ban carry-on baggage. Since carry-on baggage can contain weapons that can be used in hijacking and the current screening systems are known to be inadequate, carry-on should be restricted to one small bag with hand-searching or else eliminated entirely.

We are also calling on airline passengers to voluntarily reduce or eliminate their carry-on baggage. This will both improve security and reduce delays.

Unfortunately, the FAA has yet to take these essential security measures.

I'd like to quickly mention two backward steps that we're concerned about. By September 16 the FAA had lifted the ban on much of general aviation except within 25 miles of New York and Washington. With over 200,000 private airplanes and little or no security systems in place, the risk of terrorists using such planes with explosives or other means to attack landmark or tall buildings as well as general population requires temporary restrictions.

ACAP recommends that general aviation be banned within a hundred miles of major cities or likely terrorist targets without special FAA security clearance. In some respects this is more restrictive, in others less restrictive than what we have in force now.

On September 17 the FAA lifted the ban on passenger airliners carrying unscreened mail and cargo. This ban was only instituted on the 12th. The ban was in place last time during the Gulf War and its aftermath. While some half measures remain in effect, we feel the ban should be immediately reinstituted.

We also indicated in our testimony some medium-term measures. And I would just mention one that we consider most important, which is the federalization of aviation security. Clearly the current system has failed. Without going into detail, we feel that an aviation security agency is essential and that at least initially it should be put in the Department of Justice.

Thank you.

HAYES: Thank you, Mr. Hudson.

Mr. Kotowski?

KOTOWSKI: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee. I'm Andreas Kotowski. I'm the chief -- Chairman, members of the subcommittee. I'm Andreas Kotowski and presenting this testimony as the chief technical officer of Rapiscan Security Product. I thank you for providing the opportunity to provide this testimony and ask that my full statement be inserted into the record.

Rapiscan is one of the world's leading suppliers of screening systems for luggage, mail, parcels, cargo, as well as personnel. Our state-of-the-art systems utilize X-ray as well as electromagnetic pulse technology.

Based on the terrorist events of September 13th and information available to us since then, we would like to make some technological recommendations in a partial answer to these problems.

Time limits my remarks to our most significant and immediate proposals. These technologies are available as current production and are not research and development projects.

We believe that the inspection of passengers and their baggage represents the most important and difficult screening task to ensure the safety of an aircraft. There are no automated systems for performing this task. We depend on human screeners interpreting X-ray images on video display screens. Very high quality X-ray screening systems are available and are deployed in many airports.

A continued issue has been the training and motivation and vigilance of the screeners.

The FAA, in cooperation with industry, has developed a technological answer to this problem, designated TRX, or TIP-ready X- ray. TIP represents threat image projection. TIP is a method for randomly inserting the images of threat items into the stream of images seen by screeners. The response of the screeners is recorded for purposes of measurement and training.

The advantages of TRX are numerous, one of these being that screeners can see threats every few minutes providing quick feedback as well as motivation to stay alert.

We recommend the immediate utilization of TIP on every TRX unit deployed. There are currently several hundred TRX systems at U.S. airports. Further TRX systems have been slated for deployment over the next several years ago. We recommend that deployment schedule be accelerated and expanded to provide consistent and high level security for all airports for both cabin baggage as well as whole baggage screening.

Each of us has observed the human factor limitations present in the area immediately surrounding the cabin baggage screening at airports. It's often chaotic and difficult to manage given the number much people who pass through these areas. Add to the confusion the fact that we have gotten used to showing up at the airport shortly before takeoff.

The FAA, in cooperation with Alaska Airlines and Rapiscan, has developed a system for improving the supervision of screeners. The Ethics system provides supervisors with a workspace and the tools they need to effectively supervise a whole group of screening lanes. Supervisors have the ability to monitor the checkpoint as a whole as well as to provide assistance to individual screeners.

The recording of video and X-ray images as well as checkpoint performance provides for after-the-fact analysis, training and improvement of checkpoint operations.

Currently passenger screening at airports is limited to metal detectors. High quality metal detectors are available and in use at some airports. We believe that the standards for performance of these systems needs to be updated and that substandard systems need to be replaced.

Additionally we believe that these detectors should be integrated into a checkpoint supervisory system such as Ethics. There is only one technology available today that can disclose all types of contraband concealed on people's bodies, even under clothing and hair, including plastic weapons, ceramic weapons, explosives, not only metallic items. These devices, known as body scanners, utilize a minute dose of ionizing radiation to create images representative of persons and contraband.

The Rapiscan Secure 1000 has been available for a number of years for very high security applications. The Secure 1000 system looks essentially like a household refrigerator. The person to be screened steps in front of the device and then turns around for a scan of the back. A video image representing the scans is presented to a screener. The screener reviews the images for the potential presence of weapons, metal, plastic, ceramics or glass, plastic explosives or other contraband.

The main issues regarding the use of body scanners are privacy concerns and radiation exposure.

KOTOWSKI: Privacy is a legitimate concern that should be addressed in relation to the security needs.

The design of the Secure addresses this issue. And operating procedures can mitigate the privacy concerns.

The level of radiation used by this system is well below national and international guidelines for radiation exposure to the general public. The level used is less than one percent of the minimum natural level of background radiation that all people are exposed to every day. Indeed the levels associated with everyday life are much larger than the Secure 1000 inspection dose.

For example, every 20 seconds at 30,000 feet elevation causes a similar radiation exposure. Or watching television for a few minutes can accumulate the same dose. These minute exposures are insignificant.

Again, this technology is available today and has the opportunity to give authorities a new tool.

In conclusion, the terrorist threat to commercial aviation has definitely become more important. While not a total solution, significant new technology is available now and should be deployed with all speed. TRX deployment should be expedited. Enhanced checkpoint supervisory systems should be deployed. Improved metal detectors should be deployed.

We also believe that advanced technology passenger screening systems, such as the Secure 1000 should be deployed immediately.

Thank you.

HAYES: Thank you.

Mr. Monetti?

MONETTI: Mr. Hayes, I'm Bob Monetti, the president of the Victims of Pan Am Flight 103. We are the friends and families of the 270 innocents murdered by Libyan agents over Lockerbie, Scotland, in December of 1988. The Victims of Pan Am Flight 103 members number about 400 voters.

The horrific events of September 11 brought back to our members those awful December days before Christmas of 1988. Unfortunately, we have some idea of what those families are now going through, and they are all in our prayers.

I'm an engineer. And I served on the FAA's Aviation Security Advisory Committee since it started 12 years ago. I was the only full-time public representative on the baseline working group in 1996. And I'm also a member of the Airports Council International Public Safety and Security Committee. I have also served several engineering contracts for the FAA security, mostly involved with protecting airplanes from the effects of bombs.

I've been passionately committed to prodding, coaxing and educating the airlines, the FAA and Congress to provide real security for the flying public.

My 20-year-old son Rick was one of the Syracuse University students murdered on Pan Am Flight 103. Pan Am Flight 103 was of course the first attack on a large group of U.S. civilians, which are now what President Bush and the American people have now come to see as terrorism and war.

I've heard a lot of talk about passing some more laws and bills in the hopper. And I just wanted to comment on some of the previous laws.

The Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990 still has not been implemented fully by the FAA. The aviation security improvement mandated after the Gore Commission Reports still have not been implemented fully by the FAA. And of course the FAA Security Improvement Act of 2000 still has not been implemented by the FAA.

I think the last thing we need you in Congress to do is pass one more law telling the FAA how to provide aviation security. It just doesn't work. You cannot write a law that will actually improve the current FAA security system.

The only thing you could do is to write and pass a law that is designating a new agency to take over responsibility for aviation security. Give them a funding stream and monitor their performance on a regular basis.

Now, our goal at Pan Am 103 has been constant. Our goal is to get the industry and the FAA to create an intelligent integrated security system, one which will provide prudent security at a reasonable cost without dramatically affecting operations.

September 11th told us that we failed miserably. The security activity that's performed at airports is perfunctory. The attitude of the airlines and the FAA needs to change. The people who perform the security operation and also all the other people who work in the airport, especially in the secure areas, need to understand that what they do in terms of security affects their livelihood and also affects the safety of the U.S. public.

Now, what passes for security at most airports is a hodgepodge of measures enacted over various times to counteract various threats over the years. I just heard a gentleman in the last panel say that general aviation wasn't a threat. Well, every time we have an event we have a new threat. Pan Am 103 the threat was checked luggage. The World Trade Center garage bombing it was Ryder rental trucks. Now we find out that 767's and 777's are the threat.

The next event it could be crop-dusters. It could be cruise ships. It could be nuclear plants. The terrorists have a great way of never using the same threat twice, so as soon as we all sit around and decide we know what the threat is, we're in deep trouble because they're again still ahead of us.

But in one of the first things that came out that I heard of is that they were going to ban the parking in the parking garages near the airport because in 1972 they parked a car bomb in front of LaGuardia Airport. And it might still be a threat. Or it may not be a threat.

I think we need to evaluate what we're doing in light of what the intelligence people tell us actually is a threat today or what the potential threat is for tomorrow and then design a very flexible system that can be changed depending on what we think the threat might be.

What passes for security in most airports in this country is also the result of some very effective lobbying by the airlines, both at the FAA and here in Congress. Measures that might have prevented terrorist attacks were watered down to reduce cost and reduce potential delays.

One example is the computer-aided passenger screening system, where they selected passengers that probably merit further screening or further scrutiny. Well, the original plan was to examine the checked baggage, the carry-on baggage and the passenger more carefully.

Well, what happened is that we only examine their checked baggage because the carry-on baggage and the passengers were too expensive and too difficult to examine. So we just dropped that idea.

What passes for security at most airports is also the result of contradictory and complicated interests at the FAA. The airlines justifiably distrust and fight against many of the measures proposed in the past by the FAA because they were impractical, unworkable, and did not actually improve security.

And also what passes for security at most airports in this country is a result of what you and the House of Representatives have allowed to happen. You have oversight responsibility. You've read the GAO reports. And you've read the DOT IG reports, or you should have. And not only didn't you watch what was going on and try to stop it, but in some cases went even further.

The funding bill last year earmarked $5 million of aviation security budget to be spent in a particular district in Tennessee. FAA security people continually complain to me about directed spending items in the funding bill, both geographic and technology.

I've got about four more pages, but I'll stop now.

HAYES: Thank you, sir.

A couple quick questions, then I'll recognize other members for questions or comments.

Before I adjourn the meeting any of you at the panel who have additional comments that you would like to make, I will come back to you. So if you've missed anything, you can certainly come back.

Quickly, Mr. Kotowski and Mr. Sheridan, what are the similarities and/or the differences between the two systems that you all have at your companies?

KOTOWSKI: OK, I'll start.

I think our primary technology is X-ray. And there are many flavors of X-rays. And certainly 20 years ago X-rays were just marginally able to deal with these things. The X-ray technology has increased steadily. And it's sort of like an arms race that the detection technology becomes better; however, terrorists become more sophisticated to try to defeat these.

Now, I'm sure that Mr. Sheridan and I probably disagree on what the best X-ray technology is, but we all live by the same laws of physics. And as a matter of fact, the AS&E scatter systems measure the same physical phenomena as Rapiscan dual energy systems. We measure (inaudible) scatter.

So with that, Ralph?

HAYES: Mr. Sheridan?

SHERIDAN: Interesting enough, the dual energy systems have some flaws. They are easily fooled in cluttered environments in a bag, in a parcel, in a piece of cargo. And with Backscatter we are able to highlight the organic material and make it stand out from the clutter.

That's why we're used by over 75 percent of the high-threat federal buildings here in Washington. it's why at every entrance to the Capitol and the Senate and House office building you have an AS&E system.

Now, Andy is correct in that we both have a similar technology for scanning passengers. Andy and Andy's company and my company are both putting these systems into prisons. We both have systems for U.S. Customs for scanning passengers as an alternative to an intensive pat search looking for drug contraband on arriving passengers.

I believe that there are substantial differences in the two technologies. What we try to do is to branch out and to focus on security agencies that believe that they are a target and have to know that what they're looking at does not have a bomb in it. That's why we're here. That's why we protect the White House.

HAYES: Am I right or wrong in thinking that either system is not being used by airlines for normal screening now; is that correct? We're using it in different places but not using it for airline screening?

KOTOWSKI: Well, actually our systems are in use in airlines as well as at government agencies for the screening of packages and cargo. However, there isn't a current FAA deployment for cabin baggage screening called TRX. And my understanding is that this is scheduled to run over several more years before all airports are equipped with this technology.

SHERIDAN: And we're used to military airports. And we're used in airports overseas in the Middle East.

HAYES: The point of the discussion is there's better technology available that we can made wider use of. That's what we're saying, right?

SHERIDAN: I believe that's true, Mr. Hayes.

HAYES: OK. Mr. Monetti, you had a comment?

MONETTI: In this building specifically there's an AS&E machine at the front door. And there's a Rapiscan machine on the basement level entrance. That's in your building here.

HAYES: OK. Mr. Hudson, just a quick comment. I think the hundred-mile general aviation is impractical and unnecessary. I appreciate your concern, but I would respectfully disagree with that.

Now, Mr. Sandlin, I recognize you for comments or questions.

SANDLIN: Thank you.

And we appreciate all of you coming up today.

Mr. Ruden, prior to the recent vote on the stabilization package were you consulted by the airlines concerning what impact it might have on your industry?

RUDEN: No, we were not.

SANDLIN: What percentage of tickets currently on airplanes would be arranged through an agency?

RUDEN: The travel agencies account for approximately 75 percent of the air travel sold in this country.

SANDLIN: So you mean even though you account for 75 percent of the tickets to the airlines, they didn't talk to you about what impact it might have?

RUDEN: That's correct.

SANDLIN: In the event that you do not get any relief that you're requesting today, that does not happen, what impact do you see it having on, number one, your industry, number two, on the airline industry?

RUDEN: Well, on our industry the effect will be devastating. We already have, as set out in Exhibit A, graphic evidence of the economic effect on very small businesses whose sales have essentially disappeared. And because they do not have large reserves of cash or other assets, they have the same liquidity problem the airlines have in spades. And they cannot go to Citibank and ask for loans and the rest. It's simply not possible.

SANDLIN: How about for the airlines?

RUDEN: So many, many of them are going to go out of business. There are already some closures. And there will be many, many more, perhaps thousands of them. And the bigger problem then is what does that mean?

It's a tragedy in and of itself, of course. And there are many, many industries which have been impacted. And you've heard from some. There are many more out there.

RUDEN: But the reality is that our long-term goal as a country of getting the public back into a trust position and getting them back flying and traveling and getting the economic stimulus to travel, which as the second or third largest industry in the country, produces for everyone, that goal is going to be impaired because the public is going to have such difficulty accessing the system in a way that they're comfortable with absent the presence of all these travel agents.

SANDLIN: Let me ask you this since we are limited in time. Since you provide 75 percent of the ticket sales to the airlines, even though we have voted for this stabilization package, in the event that your industry goes down, even though we have voted for this stabilization package, do you see a serious problem for the airline industry itself?

RUDEN: Certainly. Their cost, if they were to attempt to replicate what travel agents do, their costs will go right through the roof. They simply don't have the people, the technology or the commitment to do it. And therefore, if the agents aren't available and the airlines attempt to do it themselves, the aid package will just disappear on you and you meet yourself coming the other way.

It is an incomplete solution. It was probably necessary, but it is incomplete. And that is our real point here, that until you complete the package, you haven't really addressed the problem.

SANDLIN: Mr. Sheridan, what is the current minimum educational requirements for the security screeners that you use with your company?

SHERIDAN: Interesting you asked that question. Our equipment is all used with trained security officers. They are all federal security officers, capitol police, other security personnel at the White House, at the other three-digit security agencies. And overseas they tend to be military personnel or other well-trained professionals.

SANDLIN: Do you know what the average beginning wage of those people might be and some wage maybe at a five-year or a ten-year point?

SHERIDAN: It's the wage scale that you have for the capitol police.

SANDLIN: Well, I'm not sure what that is. I was asking -- I can look that up. Thank you.

It's somewhat better than what is paid, the minimum wage that we were talking about this morning.

SHERIDAN: What we're talking about is our equipment is used by professional...

SANDLIN: Professional.

SHERIDAN: ... skilled security officers.

And there is a difference. And it's probably one of the reasons why we aren't used in airports today, is because of the emphasis of the FAA that there is such a weakness in the current staffing for operators of scanning equipment.

SANDLIN: And you believe that a good educational background and good training is vital to having a good screening process; is that correct?

SHERIDAN: Having a dedicated professional operating the equipment.

SANDLIN: Mr. Hudson, you indicated that we should limit possibly take-ons to one bag. Should take-ons be eliminated altogether?

HUDSON: What we're saying, one bag with hand-searching.

SANDLIN: Let me ask you another thing. I think the public is erroneously under the impression that the bags that are checked are always x-rayed or, say, in some way inspected. And of course we know that unless you meet the CAPS (ph) guidelines, those bags are not inspected at all.

Now, as we move away from carrying bags on and having more checked bags, won't we have to work in conjunction with increased inspection of those bags that are checked?

HUDSON: Yes. And you also have to probably increase the equipment by about eight to tenfold because the bomb detectors are not there except maybe five or ten percent of what is needed to do a full check.

SANDLIN: Mr. Kotowski, if we are doing more checks -- let me ask you this -- how many bags per hour can go through your equipment and would a one hundred percent screening process in this country significantly slow down the boarding and the transportation in this country, taking into account that the Europeans apparently have a one hundred percent goal to be accomplished within the very near future?

KOTOWSKI: In the United States generally only carry-on bags are screened. And at those screening points there is a tremendous number of bags that are processed an hour, well over a thousand bags an hour. That's not a very reassuring thought.

And as you had pointed out earlier, the operators, especially at airports are very poorly trained. And so the equipment may be there, but there's no assurance as to what the operator sees and what the operator reacts to.

And that's where we feel that this TIP methodology is the first methodology that actually allows figuring out what the operator sees. So that this thousand bags an hour could be brought to a level where the operator finally performs well.

And so you have to bring that screening process to where the operator performs not well. You have to have enough operators to process all the bags.

SANDLIN: Thank you. I think I'm out of time.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

HAYES: Mr. Moran?

MORAN: Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Mr. Monetti, first of all, let me offer my condolences to you and your family and other victims of past terrorist acts. The world we know now is a different place than I thought it was. But I guess the reality is the world was a bad place before two weeks ago today.

And we now know, become more aware. I think we Americans have thought ourselves immune from what we saw occur 14 days ago. And it's a shame that it takes another tragedy to remind us that danger exists, that evil is in the world.

Let me ask you, you listed a number of items of legislation, pieces of legislation that have been passed by this Congress that you indicated have not been implemented by the FAA. Had that implementation occurred, are you suggesting that the results of last Tuesday would have been different? Is there a relationship between lack of implementation?

MONETTI: The terrorists are very good. They took the system and said, "Gee, what if they actually performed security? What could we use that would be acceptable?"

And they used things apparently that are all legal to get through the screening system.

If we in fact had a security system, we would understand, since they're legal to get through the system, that we're going to have on our planes small sharp objects. And we ought to have the plane, the crew, the pilot or some combination thereof able to deal with those things.

This has been the case forever, not just for the last two weeks ago or the last couple months. So the fact that now we're talking about doors to the cockpit rather than 10 years ago is kind of simply because we haven't taken the whole system of security as a system seriously.

MORAN: I think you're suggesting that we only react to the circumstances that we're presented with.

MONETTI: Of the last event, that's right, a last event. This event is knives. The next event is going to be something else. So if all we focus on this time is knives, we're going to miss the next one too. We really need to be intelligent and create a thinking system, kind of like an artificial intelligence but we have to use people so that it can adapt to what's going on in the world and what we think is going to be next. Otherwise we're always going to be sitting here reacting to the last thing that happened.

MORAN: Thank you.

Mr. Ruden, you indicated that 75 percent of the tickets are purchased through a travel agent. Any suggestions that the travel -- incidentally, I think the role that your members play is tremendous. I appreciate what they do. And particularly for a large segment of our population flying still is an unusual occurrence, and the comfort that comes from having a travel agent make those arrangements and assist people in their travel is important.

It reminds me of I'm a supporter of the hometown pharmacist, and yet every day they're endangered because we have computers and we get prescriptions by mail and by computer. And yet they perform an awfully important function. And we lose something, I think from the speed or efficiency that comes with a computer that we really need with a human being.

And I think there's an analogy between what your members do and what my hometown pharmacist does, particularly for many people that this is an unusual experience for.

Is there a role that you can play or do play in weeding out potential passengers? Are you suggesting in any way, can you suggest the travel agent has an ability to screen passengers?

RUDEN: No. I would not suggest that. In the first place, a great deal of the business the travel agents do is done over the telephone. And so in those circumstances, unless there was something really, really unusual about the reservation, there's nothing that could be done there.

And I don't know what constitutes unusual. There are people who pay with cash. There are people who buy one-way tickets that are perfectly legitimate people. And so I don't think it's practical to expect that travel agencies would be effective as a group in providing another threshold or another screening process.

MORAN: Do you have an opinion as to the willingness, the elasticity of demand for airline services that we heard testimony this morning questioning, at least this morning, about increasing fees for security purposes? Is there a willingness of the traveling public to pay more for additional security?

RUDEN: We believe that there is. And that is one of the points I struggled to make in my testimony about separating the economics of operating airlines from the issue of safety and personal security. There is, to some extent, a conflict in asking the same business enterprise to do both of those jobs.

I think the public today is certainly aware, as you've indicated, of things that no one wanted to admit before and that the public will pay reasonable additional costs for providing real security.

It's going to take a lot of work to get the public back to the point where they believe in the security system. And I think that's one of our fundamental goals and I believe one of the government's fundamental goals, which is why I made the point I did about all these reports.

But I think they will pay, for sure.

MORAN: You believe that increase in traffic will occur in any significant way without activities by government and the airlines responding to the tragedies of September the 11th? Will we see an increase, a significant increase, in passengers over the course of time? Or is it going to take some significant level of encouragement and credibility with safety issues before the traveling public returns?

RUDEN: I think it's going to take an enormous amount of not only commitment but action. And that action really needs to start yesterday to get the public back. There are some people traveling today. But load factors we hear are in the 30, 40, 50 percent range. That will not support the airline industry. It will not support all the other industries that are dependent upon the airlines to deliver passengers to them, like the cruise lines and so forth.

So it's going to take a tremendous amount of effort from the industry but also particularly from the government to get the public satisfied that it's safe and to rebuild from there. It's going to take some time.

MORAN: So absent our activities, the airlines, the government, the FAA and the security folks, the people who tell me that the traveling public will be back for the holidays, that's a mistaken belief?

RUDEN: I believe that it is. This is the peak season, as I said in my testimony, for travel agents to be selling the holidays. And it's not happening. And I don't think that there's anything coming in. We're monitoring this on an hourly basis. There's nothing coming in to suggest that it's changing in any material way.

MORAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

HAYES: Mr. Kirk?

KIRK: Just a couple quick questions. First, when you make a 9- 1-1 call on the air phone, there will be no answer right there. We've seen some technical data which show that it would be possible to set up a service through air phone and others where there would be a trained person responding either to a medical emergency or a law enforcement situation so that that call would be answered.

Any comments or thoughts on giving the passenger that ability?

HUDSON: You mean a call for help from someone in the airlines?

KIRK: From the seatback phones in front of you inside the aircraft.

HUDSON: Well, we sort of had that on at least one of the flights. And I suppose it could, as an ad hoc measure, provide some encouragement for the passengers and the crew to take defensive action.

But we think that the measures that we've suggested with both passive security and active armed security on the airplanes is really where we need to be going initially.

KIRK: Is there anything the travel agents, given such large volume they do -- I agree with my colleague's comments. With the huge volume makes sense here. But many times they know the customer, they're coming in contact with the customer.

Is there anything the association can do voluntarily that help tip off law enforcement further or...

RUDEN: Well, we run into this problem from time to time with various kinds of scams that are being perpetrated against the airlines. And travel agents will, when they believe something is going wrong, attempt to alert the airlines.

But again, I say to you, as attractive as it might be to sit here and say yes, my industry could step up and do all this stuff, I don't think it's realistic to expect that from these folks. These are very small businesses by and large. They were the sort of prototype of the American small business.

We've got some big firms in the industry too, but most of those franchise their outlets to people who are family-owned businesses. They are not trained in security.

RUDEN: One role we will play, absolutely want to play, is -- and this is one of the things that troubles us so much about DOT's ignoring us in all of us this -- we want to be distributors of information to help assure the public and help them understand.

If they don't understand, they're going to be uncertain. And uncertainty causes people not to travel. It causes them to spend their money on other things or not spend it at all.

So we want to be in the process of informing consumers about what they have to do and making them understand that these are real requirements that they must comply with.

KIRK: Because I'm thinking about something that would actually give you an advantage. I no longer have complete confidence that Abu Nidal, using a credit card he set up off the web site, is going to not come in contact with any travel agents. Perhaps there might be some financial advantage forcing the customer or encouraging the customer to interact with a travel agent rather than booking their flights from the Internet web site in Kabul and then being able to move forward.

RUDEN: When the time comes that -- and I believe it will eventually come -- that the public says, yes, it is OK to travel and we get back to what we would like to think of as normalcy -- that's a long way down the road -- when we get to that point, I have every confidence, based on past experience before September 11 and what happened in the time after September 11, the public is going to want and need travel agency services as never before.

And that is one of the main reasons why it is so important that the industry not be destroyed by these events. Because the airlines simply cannot do that job. And the recovery, the process of getting back to normalcy, whatever normal may turn out to be, is going to take a great deal longer if you let these small businesses be destroyed.

And that's what's going to happen to them, as certain as we're sitting here, because they don't have the resources to cope with the kinds of reductions in business that they are experiencing. We have case after case of people making less than $50 for a week's work with five or six employees in the office. And it's the same this week. And probably going to be the same next week.

We're estimating 50 percent reductions, for the rest of the year this year and through the year 2000, off the average. And if that's even close to correct, if it's off by even 50 percent, it's still a disaster.

And I don't know what the airlines can do. Web sites can't replicate what travel agents do. And the airlines can't replicate it. And if the public doesn't have it, then they simply won't travel.

KIRK: Last one, Mr. Chairman.

In my district flight is very common. Most of our people in business are on the plane at least once a month.

We all look now to El Al operating out of O'Hare as an example of an airline with a terrorist bull's-eye right on the fuselage for over 25 years and successfully managed it.

Do you have a problem with that model, moving to that model?

MONETTI: It's a model much a very small airline. It's the model of an airline that people fly on because they choose to fly on them. I'm not sure -- well, I'm sure in our current hub and spoke system we couldn't possibly do what we do. Now, maybe we can't use our hub and spoke system anymore. But the timing and the setup and the choreography that goes every hour or so in our airports just is totally opposite of the El Al model.

El Al says be at the airport at 2 o'clock. We're going to leave sometime after that. And it might be 3 o'clock or 4 o'clock or 5 o'clock whenever they're done. I can't imagine that...

KIRK: The point that I make is the El Al passenger actually arrives.

MONETTI: Yes. And up until September 11 most of ours did too.

KIRK: Right.

SHERIDAN: Mr. Kirk, I believe what El Al does well is a fusion of technology and processes that are overlapping and repetitive to ensure security. And that's part of what I think we need.

Today at the airports we're employing trace detection systems. Trace detection looks for explosive material on the outside of a bag or a briefcase or a computer. And it's based on the theory of a sloppy bomber contaminating the outside of the bag. It has value. But it has value in process testing most of the bags, not just randomly the way we do it today.

And that's what El Al does very well. It's overlapping repetitive security.

KOTOWSKI (?): I could also say both El Al, the Israelis and the Swiss have sky marshals. And they've never had a hijacking successfully.

KIRK: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

HAYES: Again, I want to assure you all that we appreciate very much your being here. The committee and the Congress is listening very carefully to each and every one of you. And as we work towards solutions and preventions, we certainly appreciate your ongoing input into what we're doing.

Having a cabinet level position called Homeland Security, I think hopefully will help coordinate and expedite some of the very valuable things that you and others have brought to our attention.

Mr. Ruden, we certainly appreciate the travel agencies and the role that they play in our economy. Do you have or would you put some sort of proposal before us for consideration as to what you think would be appropriate for us to do as it relates to your industry?

RUDEN: Our basic proposal, there are two components to it. One is the straight financial component. We believe and ask you to find a way to make both grants and low-interest or no-interest loans available to this industry to help get them through -- just as you did for the airlines -- to get through the financial crisis which they are facing and will continue to face for the next year and a quarter at least.

And secondarily, we are very concerned and have set out in our testimony five specific conditions that we think should be added back into the grant of loans and money for the airlines to prevent the misuse of that money to alter the competitive situation in the industry. This is not the time, obviously, I think, to settle our scores and internal struggles and battles within the industry over who should get to do what.

But it is very important, we think, that the public's money, having been authorized to be spent and given to the airlines under these very difficult circumstances, should be carefully restricted so it isn't misused. It should be used to recover and for recovery only, for the operation of airplanes only and be not marketing initiatives and other things that are set out in the testimony.

We were very troubled, I must tell you, about the intention of the airlines, already being implemented less than two weeks after these terrible events, to recall from travel agents the commissions they earned on business sold before September 11, which is now either not performed because of the airport shutdown or is being canceled because of these events. The airlines are already sending travel agents messages saying, "That commission you earned for selling those tickets must be turned to us."

So on top of the fact that there is no new business, they are being asked to give back money they already earned. And I understand that it was not perhaps anyone's particular fault that these circumstances arose, but it illustrates the problem that these small businesses face. They are helpless in the face of the airlines market power. And it is that fact which brings us to you as the only way they are going to be salvaged so that they can continue doing the services they do for the public.

HAYES: Thank you, sir.

Mr. Sandlin, further questions?

SANDLIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Just briefly. Several of you have mentioned the necessity to federalize security at airports. And I generally agree with that. But I think it's important. And I would like your input on this as the debate continues. I think it's important that we talk about a partnership and a federal component to security.

Mr. Ruden, I know, brought out the fact that you don't need to have someone that has a profit motive involved with security. They need to be separated. And I think that's an excellent point. And I think it's very important. It's something we need to remember. And that's certainly so.

And obviously that has something to do with why we see minimum wage being paid at these positions.

But alternatively, also, we don't need to take the airlines and the airports completely out of the loop because once they're out with no responsibility, no liability, no input, you will really see a move toward loading those people onto the planes, pushing the employees, trying to get through the security as quickly as possible.

So I think it's important that we maintain an idea about some sort of partnership, a federal component, have federal standards, federal training, some sort of combination private-federal. I'm not saying we need different standards. We need one standard. But somehow everyone has to stay in the loop on security.

And we would, you know, appreciate your input and appreciate your input today on that point.

Also, Mr. Monetti, of course, as a father my heart goes out to you on your loss. And I appreciate your testimony today and your continuing to push Congress and the industry on safety measures.

And I would like to read into the record something that he brought today that he did not testify to. We established this morning that folks at these security points generally are not American citizens. They generally are paid minimum wage and oftentimes cannot speak English. And I thought this was interesting that Mr. Monetti brought up today.

At Syracuse at the Hancock International Airport a maintenance worker is paid $12.08 an hour, a bathroom custodian $10.96 per hour, a pizza cooker $7.34, a parking lot cashier $6.15 an hour. And I think that shows where we've placed our priority and what we think is important.

And it's critical as we move forward with this debate, that they get qualified people, as Mr. Sheridan indicated in his testimony, that are trained, that are responsible, that are professional, that are adequately paid. And it's critical that these companies that are operating these security checkpoints understand that and understand they are a critical part of our security system and we will expect a certain level of professionalism and performance out of them. And they will stay in the obligation loop.

Nothing further, Mr. Chairman.

HAYES: Mr. Monetti, closing comment? I'll go back this way for any closing comments you would like to make.

MONETTI: Let's see if I get this right.

The airlines know how to train pilots. They know how to get pilots to perform. The airlines could train security screeners, and they could get them to perform the same way. It's just a matter of emphasis. It hasn't been important until September 11. I think now that they know it's important, perhaps they could do an excellent job of it.

The people don't need to be federal employees in order to do this job. Besides, much of the security job is well outside of the screeners. The screeners are a small part of the whole security job.

The security system consists of the preinformation they get in the computer system on the passenger, part of the computer-aided passenger screening system, which the airlines do. The ticket agents are all airline employees. And they're the ones that ask the questions and get to look at the passenger in the eye. The screeners now are part of the airline. And the preboarding agents are all airline employees and as well as the pilots and the flight attendants.

So the airlines are in the security business up to their ears whether they get rid of one part of it or not. They're still part of it. Maybe we ought to let them keep the whole package and tell them they're actually responsible and see what they come up with.

HAYES: Thank you.

Mr. Kotowski?

KOTOWSKI: Mr. Monetti stated earlier that he thought laws had been passed numerous times, each time saying improve security. And the problem is not passing new laws; the problem is actually acting on the decisions that were made earlier and implementing them.

So again, one thing is that we should really move forward with deploying the technologies that do exist.

The other item, which has been said, simply if you take the same people who are working checkpoints now and you pay them twice as much and you make them put on a new uniform will not change their performance. So there needs to be the requisite amount of training and supervision and management to bring up the standards as well.

HAYES: Testing as well?

KOTOWSKI: We think...

HAYES: Mr. Hudson?

HUDSON: With respect, we must vehemently disagree with those who would entrust our national security again to the present system with perhaps a little better training and pay. We lost 6700 on the ground, 200 in the air. The system has obviously failed. We should not give it, in our view, a second chance.

Our priorities need to be switched. Security now has to be number one; second, commerce; and third, convenience. When those conflict we have to go to the higher priority.

Also I would ask you to consider if we're to take to heart what the president has said, that we are at war with these terrorist groups, then we are at war. And what is normal in wartime is not the same as what is normal in peacetime.

HUDSON: And the worst thing we could do is to go back, to try to go back, to a normal peacetime situation when we really are at war.

Thank you.

HAYES: Thank you.

And, Mr. Sandlin, you may want to comment. But my comment would be in spite of agreements and disagreements, I don't see anyone who is saying go with the system status quo or try to dress it up a little bit and make it better. I haven't heard that from anybody.

SANDLIN: No. My comment could be, too, I believe there should be very serious increased federalization of the system. I just say the answer is not by taking more people out. It's by keeping people that are responsible in. And by taking, completely taking, out airlines and airports from security, I think we're making a serious mistake.

I'm basically on the federalization side, but I think the more the merrier as far as responsibility. Although I agree there has to be one standard.

HAYES: Mr. Sheridan?

SHERIDAN: During the TWA 800 investigations and hearings I testified that our equipment was used by U.S. Customs to meet airplanes, to look at luggage coming on and being placed on the plane for the purpose of finding drugs and drug money that is put there by airport personnel working in internal conspiracies with drug rings. And my testimony was those people don't know whether it's drugs or drug money. And it could just as easily be a weapon or an explosive.

With regard to the issue of staffing and operating equipment, the system is no stronger than its weakest link. And that says if we're going to change the way we do staffing, it has to be consistent and universal across the country.

The terrorists are creative. They're entrepreneurial. And they can respond faster than government. So we have to treat this much more seriously than we have in the past. We have been guilty of strategies of convenience, strategies of convenience for the airlines, for the government in terms of the willingness to fund vis-a-vis other priorities, strategies of convenience for travelers who don't want to be hassled and want to get to an airport 15 minutes before their plane and jump on.

From my perspective as a technology executive in the security arena, there are technologies available today in the industry that can help improve security and regain the traveling public's confidence in the airline industry. They're available. They need to be deployed.

And they need to be funded for additional improvements to take out the wrinkles in terms of inconvenience and speed and to improve their reliability.

But more importantly, aviation is the discussion of this week. The other areas that we need to be concerned about as a transportation committee are ports and borders and as a government protecting our federal facilities and our military facilities and personnel. It's a broader problem.

HAYES: Mr. Ruden?

RUDEN: Thank you.

I think I have made as well as I can the point about what we believe is going to happen if some form of federal relief isn't made available to travel agencies. So I won't sum up on that point.

I think listening to the other folks on this panel I've been thinking here about Disneyland and the huge numbers of people who go there and stand in line because the demand exceeds, at any given moment, the supply of access to the popular rides and other exhibits. People go, they pay and they experience some measure of what is arguably inconvenience, as Mr. Sheridan points out. They accept it. They still go.

And when travel resumes, they will go again to places like that. So my real thought here is the airlines are specialists in trickle-up economics. And they are probably going to argue, as they always do, that anything that increases their costs is going to be catastrophic to the growth of air travel, catastrophic to the national economy and so on.

And so I would just urge the committee and the Congress not to buy that. I think in the current context especially it's inappropriate and it's simply wrong. The public will pay for security and they will travel again once they are satisfied that it is safe to do so.

And they will accept inconvenience if necessary. And it is necessary. There's no question about that. They will accept it. They will learn how to do it. And we will all learn how to do it better as time goes on.

So I just urge you don't buy the notion that a dollar here, $5, $10 on a price of a ticket for security is too high a price to pay. Because it's not.

Thank you very much.

HAYES: Thank you for your comments.

And I don't hear or see anybody buying that notion.

And again after what, Adam, 18-plus hours of testimony before this committee, every piece of information that's been provided by yourselves and others like you has been very valuable. I have seen a consistent enthusiasm and agreement among all members and people that have talked here to be a very active part in the burden sharing.

And we will continue to work with this.

And again, thank you very much for your testimony. And without any further ado, the meeting is adjourned.

END

NOTES:
???? - Indicates Speaker Unknown
    -- - Indicates could not make out what was being said. off mike - Indicates could not make out what was being said.

PERSON:  JOHN MICA (94%); JOHN DUNCAN JR (57%); SPENCER THOMAS BACHUS (56%); JACK QUINN (56%); RICHARD H BAKER (55%); SUE KELLY (55%); JOHN COOKSEY (54%); WILLIAM ASA HUTCHINSON (54%); JOHN R THUNE (54%); JERRY MORAN (53%); FRANK A LOBIONDO (53%); SAM GRAVES (51%); MARK KENNEDY (51%); DENNIS REHBERG (51%); CHRIS JOHN (50%); 

LOAD-DATE: September 29, 2001