Copyright 2001 FDCHeMedia, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  
FDCH Political Transcripts
September 21, 2001, Friday
TYPE: COMMITTEE HEARING

LENGTH: 31311 words

COMMITTEE: HOUSE TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE COMMITTEE

SUBCOMMITTEE: AVIATION SUBCOMMITTEE

HEADLINE: U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JOHN MICA (R-FL) HOLDS HEARING ON AIRPORT SECURITY

SPEAKER:
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JOHN MICA (R-FL), CHAIRMAN

LOCATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.

WITNESSES:

GERALD DILLINGHAM, DIRECTOR OF PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE ISSUES, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
KENNETH MEAD, INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
JANE GARVEY, ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
LARRY JOHNSON, MANAGING DIRECTOR, BUSINESS EXPOSURE REDUCTION GROUP, LLC
ISAAC YEFFET, FORMER DIRECTOR GENERAL, EL-AL AIRLINES

BODY:

 
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE:
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION HOLDS A HEARING ON AIRPORT
SECURITY
 
SEPTEMBER 21, 2001

SPEAKERS:
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JOHN MICA (R-FL)
CHAIRMAN
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TOM PETRI (R-WI)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JOHN DUNCAN, JR. (R-TN)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE STEPHEN HORN (R-CA)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JACK QUINN (R-NY)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE VERNON J. EHLERS (R-MI)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE SPENCER BACHUS (R-AL)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE SUE KELLY (R-NY)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE RICHARD BAKER (R-LA)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE ASA HUTCHINSON (R-AR)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JOHN COOKSEY (R-LA)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JOHN THUNE (R-SD)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FRANK LOBIONDO (R-NJ)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JERRY MORAN (R-KS)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE MICHAEL SIMPSON (R-ID)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JOHNNY ISAKSON (R-GA)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE MARK STEVEN KIRK (R-IL)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TIMOTHY JOHNSON (R-IL)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE DENNIS REHBERG (R-MT)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE SAM GRAVES (R-MO)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE MARK KENNEDY (R-MI)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JOHN ABNEY CULBERSON (R-TX)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE BILL SHUSTER (R-PA)
 
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE WILLIAM O. LIPINSKI (D-IL)
RANKING MEMBER
U.S. DELEGATE ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON (D-DC)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON (D-TX)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE LEONARD L. BOSWELL (D-IA)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JOHN BALDACCI (D-ME)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE PETER A. DEFAZIO (D-OR)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JERRY F. COSTELLO (D-IL)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE ROBERT MENENDEZ (D-NJ)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE CORRINE BROWN (D-FL)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JUANITA MILLENDER-MCDONALD (D-CA)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE MAX SANDLIN (D-TX)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE ELLEN TAUSCHER (D-CA)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE BILL PASCRELL, JR. (D-NJ)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TIM HOLDEN (D-PA)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE NICK LAMPSON (D-TX)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE SHELLEY BERKLEY (D-NV)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE BRAD CARSON (D-OK)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JIM MATHESON (D-UT)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE MICHAEL HONDA (D-CA)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE NICK RAHALL, II, (D-WV)
 


*


MICA: I'd like to call this subcommittee hearing to order. This morning's Aviation Subcommittee will deal with the future of aviation security.

The order of business is going to be as follows. We're going to start with opening statements of members. I ask them to be as concise as possible. We won't strictly enforce the five-minute rule, however.

After we hear from members, we will hear from our panelists. Then we are going to recess, and we will recess to Room 2253 for members of Congress, members of the subcommittee, members of the full committee that want to attend. That will be a closed door session, and then we will return here for the balance of the hearing. So it'll probably take us a couple of hours to get through this testimony and maybe recess. At that time, we'll have our closed session and then return.

So that will be the order of business today. I think that that'll be the most productive way in which we can really learn more about the subject we came for today and get some answers that I think many people are seeking.

Let me, if I may, start with my opening statement. I want to thank members for their cooperation, leadership senators, and, of course, certainly the minority side. I particularly want to thank staff. Many were up last night past midnight.

The airline preservation legislation that's entitled the Air Transportation System Stabilization Act is basically finalized, just for the information of members. There are some questions, I understand, relating to liability that the attorneys are trying to work out at the last minute, and, hopefully, this legislation will be on the floor in a matter of hours. It has been agreed upon by all sides. But, again, I want to thank people who have worked day and night to try to get that legislation brought forward.

The most important thing we have before us is the stabilization of our airline industry. That's probably the one target that's been hit the hardest in our economy over the events of the last week and a half here.

The purpose of today's hearing, however, is to examine the state of aviation security as it exists today and to hear recommendations about how we can improve security for the traveling public. In fact, the traveling public is not going to take to the air and resume passenger flights in a normal fashion until they feel safe and secure.

I want to say at the outset I believe that the horrific tragedy on September 11th demonstrated several failures. First, our federal intelligence system failed. Clearly, we need to have better ability to penetrate terrorist organizations and keep terrorists out of our country and certainly out of our airports and off of our airplanes.

Next, somehow our federal visa and immigration systems also failed dramatically. Unfortunately, in the past, we've studied, we've reviewed, we've examined, and we've also legislated improvements for airport screening procedures, and we've done that for more than the past five years.

These are some of the studies that have been produced relating to the screening process and airport security, just a handful of some of the reports. So we have studied and reviewed, in my opinion, long enough. Unfortunately, some of the recommendations and rules that are recommended by all these studies and reports are still not in place.

This subcommittee and every stakeholder in the aviation industry must evaluate the weaknesses in our aviation security system and take immediate action, immediate action, to fill those gaps. As chairman, I've been concerned since I took office eight months ago. We've had both face to face meetings and also extensive communications back and forth, most of them because I was not satisfied with the responses we've had in regard to getting some of these improvements in place.

We must make this a different kind of exercise than has been done in the past. Too often, also, we respond with knee-jerk ideas, and we spend huge amounts of money without careful thoughts about the consequences or what our past experience has taught us.

Our approach must be to analyze potential threats, prioritize our risks based on real risk assessment, and then implement workable solutions. The most important thing we can do is restore again confidence in our public so that they feel they can fly with safety and security.

Since September 11th -- in fact, the evening of September 11th, I asked the attorney general -- and right after that, talked to the secretary of transportation and other administration officials -- to voice support for the expansion of the air marshal service and also for getting in place armed security on our passenger aircraft, both domestically and international. While that process has begun, it is absolutely critical that we ensure and that we have on board law enforcement officials on all of our passenger aircraft.

Another security component that has come into question is the screening function. The fundamentals of the screening function are this: first of all, setting standards, having competent people to implement those standards, and then conducting proper oversight.

You can have all of these things in place, but if you don't have also the rules in place, you can have horrible consequences, as we saw last Tuesday. We don't know all the details, but somehow, rules or directives failed to ban box cutters and small knives. That is something that we must look into and see what happened as a failure there.

The idea of federalizing the screening function has been widely suggested. However, let me just tell you about some of our federal approaches.

To date, our current federal approach to aviation security, unfortunately, has been dismal. The focus on screening issues started in 1996 after initial reports incorrectly linked the crash of TWA 800 to terrorism.

In 1996, a commission chaired by Vice President Gore said the FAA should be required to certify all airport screening devices. This was presented to the president September 9, 1996. President Clinton, on October 9th, signed a law requiring the FAA to do this.

Since that time, the General Accounting Office and Inspector General's office have produced -- I showed the mountain of reports with titles reading "Aviation Security, Urgent Issues Need To Be Addressed." Finally, Congress passed the Aviation Security Act of 2000 last year. Here's the law that we passed, telling FAA again to implement a rule.

Nearly five years later -- here's the proposed rules from January 5, 2000 -- we still don't have these rules finally in place. We were almost there, ironically, a week before the tragedy of last week, but they're still not in place.

I point this out, that we can't just pin responsibility on screeners. In fact, it's the federal government who has not set the appropriate standards or conducted the appropriate oversight or the follow-up of that oversight.

And now we have a proposed federal rule before us. Does it set the right standards for screening companies? My understanding is that this rule still does not really impact the actual performance of screening companies. There's one technology, the threat image projection technology, which was touted as a way to measure whether screeners were actually detecting threats.

These performance measures, in fact, could be used to determine whether a screening company should be certified based on performance. But this rule, in fact, does not tie performance to certification. We need to know why not.

We have other technologies that have already been deployed and tested, but not finally put on the scene on a permanent basis, such as this threat image projection software, which has been installed in as many as 500 locations and still hasn't been turned on for use.

Another technology fiasco is the explosive detection equipment. In response to the 1996 scare, we spent billions of dollars on improvements and hundreds of millions on explosive detection equipment. Unfortunately, nearly half a billion dollars of that equipment sits in airports mostly unused. Again, we must ask why, and does the proposed rule even change that.

In addition to the technology that has been ineptly deployed or not deployed, I'd like to encourage the FAA to utilize technologies that exist that can detect plastic or ceramic knives. We've had that technology, and I guess some of the politically correct folks don't want that deployed, and we must take another look at this.

Again, none of us know whether the security function failed or contributed to last week's horrific crime with certainty. What we do know is that there are serious weaknesses that exist, and we must find a way to immediately implement common sense policies to address the real risk that we have and the problems that have been identified for years. We need answers, and we need to find out what went wrong, and we need to find ways to come together to agree on how to immediately implement those changes.

With those comments, I'm pleased to recognize our ranking member, Mr. Lipinski.

LIPINSKI: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. First of all, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Rick Larsen, a freshman on the T&I Committee, would like to be able to sit on the Aviation Subcommittee today, and I ask unanimous consent for that.

MICA: Without objection, so ordered.

LIPINSKI: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secondly, I would like to ask unanimous consent for members of this subcommittee who are attending the Democratic caucus to have an opportunity to give an opening statement when they arrive. The Democratic caucus is meeting on the aviation stability bill, and they are representing the Democratic members of the Aviation Subcommittee at that caucus. So I'd like them to be given consideration when they do come.

MICA: Reserving the right to object, so long as they're brief when they return.

LIPINSKI: I'm sure it will be very brief.

MICA: I withdraw my objection.

LIPINSKI: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MICA: Without objection, so ordered.

LIPINSKI: Thank you.

LIPINSKI: And, once again, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing today. While I often say that most hearings are important -- and they are -- this hearing and other hearings this month of September take on a different sense of importance and urgency.

Since the horrific attacks of war 10 days ago, these hearings take on an immediate need relating to the security of the traveling public and all Americans. Therefore, I thank all of our witnesses for appearing before us today and presenting their findings, views, and expertise on such short notice. With a need to act soon to protect the flying public, what you tell us today will take on that much more greater weight and importance.

Last Congress, some of these same witnesses sat before us to discuss aviation security and security screeners. Concerns were raised that our screener system had some serious flaws that needed to be fixed. While it may not be that the attacks on the 11th were a fault of any screener and that the weapons brought on board the planes were legal at the time, we clearly still need to upgrade our screening system.

Before the 11th, there were some who opposed federalizing screeners. In the past 10 days, it seems as though many more people now agree that it's a very good idea. I know that the chairman of United Airlines favors it. The chairman of American Airlines favors it. The chairman of Continental Airlines favors it. And, also, the former chairman of American Airlines, Bob Crandall (ph), has written a letter to the editor saying that the most important thing that can be done for the aviation industry now is security measures, and the first thing to do in regard to security measures would be to federalize the screeners and to put sky marshals on all the planes.

But what we want to do now with federalizing these screeners and with the sky marshals should have been a good idea last year, as the GAO testified that the weak link in the screening process is the human factor that screens baggage. Minimum wage pay, little or no job mobility, lack of uniform training standards, inexperienced employees, and turnover rates as high as 400 percent were problems that the GAO hit on last year.

Along with panel members Defazio, Costello, and Kirk, I have introduced legislation that would federalize the screener process. H.R. 2895, the Aviation Security Enhancement Act of 2001, also encourages an increase in the air marshal program and limits passengers to one carry-on bag with exceptions.

Our measure pays for all of these added security features with a $3 security ticket surcharge that will be paid for by the flying public. As some members of this committee pointed out on Wednesday, it seems to me that the American public will gladly pay a tax that they know will help keep them safe.

In addition to getting this panel's views on this legislation, I would also like to hear the panel's thoughts on which federal department or agency should oversee airline security screening and air marshals. At the behest of this subcommittee, the GAO has undertaken a comparative study of the security screening process in America and in other countries. If possible, either in this hearing or in the closed session, I would like to hear the GAO's preliminary findings so that this committee can be better educated as it moves forward on security legislation.

Lastly, while many people have tried to affix blame for the terrorist attacks of war, I do not wish to do that today. Thousands of federal, military, law enforcement, and civilian employees stayed at their jobs and brought air travelers safely down to the ground and aided those in need. For that, rather than pointing fingers, we should pat on the back all of those air traffic controllers, military personnel, policemen, firemen, airline personnel, and many others who brought calm, safety, and pride to America on September the 11th.

I would also like to say that we are in the process of working on an aviation stabilization economic bill. I think that that is important to keep aviation in the air and keep the carriers flying. But I think the only way we are going to get the American public back into those planes is by passing security legislation that convinces them that they will be safe in the skies. And until we pass that security legislation, I think it's going to be very difficult for our aviation industry to come back up to the capacity that they had prior to last week, Tuesday.

Mr. Chairman, I again thank you for holding this extremely important hearing, and I eagerly look forward to hearing from subcommittee members and witnesses on aviation security today.

Thank you.

MICA: I thank the gentleman. Again, we have one of the largest subcommittees in Congress, so I'm going to ask members -- Mr. Young had asked to try to keep your comments to two minutes, if we could. I'm not going to impose that rule, but, again, just the sheer number -- then I'll ask unanimous consent for members of the full committee to participate, and, without objection, they are participating. What I'll do, too, is recognize you after we've recognized members of the Aviation Subcommittee first, just as a courtesy.

So with those comments and procedures, let me yield to Mr. Petri.

PETRI: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to join in thanking you and the ranking member for addressing the important subject of airline security in today's hearing as well as that next Tuesday.

When the terrorists attacked us on September 11th, their goal was to end our way of life by striking fear into us. The freedom of travel we enjoy as Americans is part of our way of life, so it's essential that we act to ensure that our airlines are safe and that we can resume our lives. We cannot let the terrorists win by letting our concerns over security paralyze us.

It was pointed out several times on Wednesday by members of this committee that any effort to assist the commercial airlines in this time of trial is futile if travelers are too worried about security to fly. I'm encouraged by the steps the administration has already taken to improve the security of our airports and our airlines, and I look forward to hearing the testimony today and on Tuesday as well as working with my colleagues to ensure that our aviation industry is vibrant and secure.

I yield back the balance of my time.

MICA: I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Boswell?

BOSWELL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate this timely hearing.

Ms. Garvey, I want to say something to you to start with. I appreciate your leadership. You have had quite a role. I appreciate your personal example. At Y2K, you were in the air. It took some courage, but you stepped out and you were a true leader. And, possibly, your decisive decision to ground airplanes last Tuesday no doubt saved countless lives. In my opinion, it possibly did. So I want you to understand that.

And I just got to thinking, listening to the major airlines and the regionals and the cargo -- coordinating with the military and general aviation -- high powered corporate leaders and their training and people like me who fly quite a little bit because I've got a large district, personally -- it must feel like pushing toothpaste back in a tube sometimes to try to stay out in front of all that. And so I just felt like that you deserve that comment.

Many of us have reached a consensus on how to address security, and that's to federalize the system. While security has proven to be successful in the past with no airplanes being hijacked for 10 years, there is no doubt that the terrorist acts of last week have placed the entire system in doubt.

Many on this committee, including myself, have repeatedly called for improved security. Numerous reports indicate the firms we have entrusted with security are plagued with high turnover, inadequate background checks, and little training for the people we entrust with our safety.

I, too, realize the airlines have fiercely resisted federal intervention in this area, and now, predictably, they have reversed their opposition. I commend you and Secretary Mineta for quickly assembling a panel to develop the necessary guidelines to implement the changes for security.

I, along with others, am developing legislation which would federalize airport security and develop the proper screening and training and operation of this vital function. We can and we should move quickly to provide greater reassurance to the traveling public that air travel is safe.

It might be interesting to note that before we met with the majors just recently, I received a call from a police department in my capital city, Des Moines, Iowa. They said, you know, they had had their prayer vigil and their concerns, and they realized as they talked together that they have a lot of off-duty time and have suggested a plan that would be easily or quickly implemented, that they'd volunteer their time. I'm going to give you a copy of this. I'll have Ned go make you a copy of it, Ms. Garvey.

But it may be worth consideration that they would fly without compensation for a period of time. I threw this out quickly to the majors. They might appreciate a voucher for a later flight of their personal choice, but, you know, no dollars are involved for a period of time, and they could be quickly trained, and it would be officers that have had training, experience, background checks, et cetera. And I've got a feeling if we went out across the country that every city would say officers would do that because of just the kind of people they are, the outstanding ones they are.

Then they go on here and suggest after six months, if you still need them, then maybe you ought to figure out some compensation and so on. But I think it's a testimony to who they are, and I'm very proud of them.

Another comment I might make is, you know, it's been tough on the airlines -- no question about it -- the regionals, the majors, everybody in aviation, and, again, you made the right decision. But general aviation is suffering, too, and I think about our little FBOs -- I have so many of them across the country -- and VFR being grounded, and I've tried to figure out if we really need to do that, as a private pilot myself.

You know, I can fly an IFR, and I do. But it occurred to me that this last weekend, could I have gone to the airport in my little town and got my airplane out and have flown it to Des Moines or Kansas City and rammed it into a building without anybody stopping me? Absolutely, I could have. I could have. There's no question about it.

So I'm not too sure this financial stress on them is really doing anything. So I'd like to talk to you some more about that. I won't take up the time now. But I think that maybe it's a thought, but maybe not really succeeding and putting general aviation in the predicament that a lot of them are in.

So, anyway, I look forward to this hearing today from these knowledgeable witnesses that will allow us to make best informed changes needed to improve our airport security. The speed at which we make these improvements will directly correlate with assuring our constituents that we have promptly addressed the problem.

And I think all of us here assembled today are trying to demonstrate by example that we have confidence and we're flying, and we're going to continue doing it, and I'm telling the people at home that the job is being done. Yes, we're working on how to do it better, but we've already made great improvements.

Thank you for this stuff, and I think it's just going to get better. But I'm looking forward to your testimony, and I yield back my time.

MICA: I thank the gentleman, and let me recognize the former chairman of the Aviation Subcommittee, Mr. Duncan.

DUNCAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I'll be very brief. I want to first thank you and Mr. Lipinski for the leadership you are showing throughout these days of crisis for this country and in aviation. And I want to say I know it's been a very difficult time and a stressful time for Secretary Mineta and Administrator Garvey and everyone involved in all of these issues.

When these horrible events of September 11th occurred, I started receiving many calls from the media and many other people, and I told them that the quickest, easiest thing we could do, although it would not be cheap, would be to put law enforcement personnel in the air, air marshals or sky marshals, whatever you want to call them. And, secondly, we needed to start retro-fitting these airplanes, particularly our larger ones, making these cockpits secure and letting the flying public know that these flimsy doors couldn't be kicked in by some determined terrorist, and we needed to make sure that these cockpits were locked.

And I'm pleased that these suggestions by Chairman Mica and others and myself are starting to be implemented. We had a hearing that some have noted -- Chairman Mica mentioned it -- a hearing a little over a year and a half ago, because we had been told, I guess in '97, '98, and '99, that the real weak link in aviation security was in the screening process because of the turnover and other reasons that Chairman Mica mentioned.

In September of '96, the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security recommended that the FAA certify screening companies and improve the way that they train and do the background checks. There was an article in yesterday's Washington Times about one of the largest screening companies being placed on probation for failing to conduct background checks and following other essential security rules. Those background checks on the screeners have not been nearly as extensive or detailed as they need to be.

Also, at the hearing yesterday, Dr. Dillingham, who's been an outstanding witness here many times, testified that the screening company certification is two years behind schedule, and the first certifications are not expected until 2002. We can't have that.

DUNCAN: We've got to speed this whole process up.

There are also major concerns about the security within the airports, and at our hearing a year and a half ago, Inspector General Mead and others testified that the Department of Transportation in '98 and '99 was able to infiltrate security areas in eight major airports and breach security on 68 percent of the attempts made. We can't have that. We have got to do better. We've got to move faster.

I mentioned at the hearing two days ago that I come from one of the most rapidly growing areas in the country, and our airport's been growing fast, and the planes are always full or almost full. When I flew up here Wednesday morning, there were five people on the plane. Congressman Jim Walsh, one of my best friends in the Congress, said there were three people flying to Syracuse. I'm hearing stories like that from all over the country.

We have got to make sure that the flying public knows that it's safe to fly once again, and we need to get out the message. All of us need to work on this to get out the message that it's probably safer to fly now than at any time ever before, that we're doing more than we ever have done. But the public's not really convinced of that just yet. Maybe this hearing will help that.

I mentioned also that we need to open up National Airport again, because thousands of people were killed in New York City, and 95 percent or more of the people were killed there. The plane that hit the Pentagon came from Dulles Airport. I said at the hearing a couple of days ago if we're going to close down National Airport, we might as well close down every major airport in this country, and we can't do that. We would be giving, as several members have noted, the terrorists a great victory if we do that. We've got to get things back to normal as soon as possible, and I look forward to working with all of you in the effort to achieve those things.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for giving me this time.

MICA: I thank the gentleman.

Ms. Johnson?

JOHNSON: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me thank you and Mr. Lipinski for your efficient hastiness in getting this hearing scheduled. I will just give brief remarks and pass in my full statement.

I really don't think that anyone believes that the measures that have been put in place since the hijackings are nearly enough. I've heard some of the additional measures we might take to improve airport and airline safety, including expansion of the air marshal program, nationalization of security functions at the nation's airports, reinforcing separation between cockpits and passenger cabins, and providing firearms to pilots and flight attendants.

I also want to call to your attention some measures that have been less publicized but which could also make a significant contribution to the security at our airports. In particular, Mr. Jeff Fagan (ph), the executive director of the Dallas-Fort Worth Airport, wrote to me with suggestions on providing enhanced screening and background checks of airport employees who possess secure identification display area badges in light of the suspicion that the September 11th hijackers may have had help on the ground.

I believe these suggestions merit strong consideration, and I'm going to ask for unanimous consent to place his letter in the record.

MICA: Without objection, so ordered.

JOHNSON: Thank you. It's clear that we had some laxity, and I hope we'll correct it. I am confident by bringing together the FAA, Congress, and the industry, its employees, and other stakeholders that we can achieve this balance.

Thank you, and I yield back.

MICA: I thank the gentlelady. Let me yield to Mr. Horn.

HORN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. During the second world war, I can remember every bridge in California, 1,100 miles long, had a soldier at the bridge, and that went on because they were protecting the economic infrastructure of our state, and this is exactly what is before us now. We're talking about our air transportation, and we should be using -- if we don't have enough civil marshals, we ought to face up to it, in terms of using the Reserves, using the National Guard, and if we need to dip into the trust fund, we ought to adjust that to have the total package on training, on people who are going into planes, and then we can add the money back if we have to.

But we need to get going on it and quit just waiting around for it. And, Mr. Chairman, I'm all for doing it and getting to it today.

MICA: I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Baldacci?

BALDACCI: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to just allow my colleague, Mr. Boswell, 20 seconds to complete his comments as they pertain to the cockpit.

Mr. Boswell?

BOSWELL: Thank you for yielding. I'm sure that we can secure the cockpits quickly, you know, with some effort and maybe a panic button in there -- but do that first. That's an idea that we might do, and there's other countries that have done this. You may want to check that out.

And following Ms. Johnson's lead, Mr. Chairman, I have a short thing from the police officers in Des Moines that I'd like to place in the record, too, if I could have unanimous consent.

MICA: Without objection, so ordered.

BALDACCI: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and my ranking member. I want to thank you for scheduling the hearings, and I want to thank Jane Garvey, as the administrator for the FAA. I want to applaud the work of the FAA over this past week as we've worked very closely with you as it pertained to being able to continue some commerce and trade issues and medical supply issues. And I know that it's been a tremendous and challenging time for you and the agency, and I appreciate that.

Given this new crisis facing America, it's critical that we fundamentally alter the manner in which we view safety. I strongly believe that the federal government should take the lead in reforming aviation security in America. At a bare minimum, I believe that we must federalize airport security and scanning functions to ensure that this service has the best and most updated technology available.

I was quite concerned when I was told that different airlines have different procedures and different reviews. They're within parameters, and safety is the major concern. But at some times, I think it has a way of becoming more complicated at the front end where people are doing the screening and are doing the reviewing.

I think that at the federal level, doing it at the federal level will provide that federal uniformity that is much necessary, especially in light of the tragedy that we've seen our country go through these last weeks. I also believe that we must ensure the reforming of hiring and training and organizing all of the service employees, such as food service providers, baggage handlers, and all those who have access to the aircraft.

And, third, we must strengthen communication between law enforcement agencies and airport security personnel. One of the other issues that has arisen is the coordination of the information, and maybe because of the fact that they weren't federal or federalized, they weren't in the information loop as quickly as they could have been.

And I think for those reasons and many others, I strongly advocate the federalization of this program so that we do encourage and increase safety in the aviation industry. It is such a vital, vibrant part of our economy, and it has such a ripple impact that I believe it's in all of our interests to share in that responsibility, and at the same time to at least require the airlines to continue making the contributions that they have been making toward that program, along with the shared responsibility for all of us at the federal level.

The changes that we must adopt will be costly. Accordingly, we must explore innovative ways of paying for them. So I look forward to working with you, Administrator, and the secretary and the airlines in achieving our common goal and making our planes and sky safe.

Mr. Chairman, I'd like to just be able to include a longer statement in the record. Thank you very much, and I yield back my time.

MICA: I thank the gentleman. Let me recognize Mr. Quinn.

QUINN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to ask unanimous consent to enter into the record a full statement.

MICA: Without objection, so ordered.

QUINN: Thank you. I generally want to associate myself with the remarks of other members -- Mr. Boswell -- to our panel here this morning for the great job that you're doing. I look forward to Secretary Mineta's rapid response teams October 1st recommendations to all of us that, hopefully, we'll be able to act on -- I know we'll be able to act on.

There's a lot we could all say this morning. You'll have a full day of opening statements if we're not careful here. But as we look at security screening, my friend, Mr. Lipinski, and I both have filed legislation to try to federalize that. We'll be working together on that issue. All of us will be.

But I just want to say a word or two about all of our employees, these citizens who are working all around the country. As airlines and other related businesses talk about massive layoffs, I think we have to not rush to judgment and make sure that we have some worker protection in all of what we're going to do.

I think it's also fair for us to slow down a bit and remember the folks that are working at these security screening metal detectors in airports now. We want them to be maybe federalized and better trained, but the fact is the folks that are working there now didn't cause those accidents last Tuesday. In fact, they were doing their jobs to the best of their ability. And if they weren't trained properly or weren't told to do more, it isn't their fault. And it's our responsibility to make sure that we get to a point where they have the information they need, and we're able to hire the right people.

So I want to make sure my colleagues here understand -- and I know they do -- and the rest of the members of Congress understand we're not pointing blame to anybody. Those are good, hard-working people.

It just strikes me that we need to give them better guidance and better tools to do a better job at the airport. To the extent that we can do this in this subcommittee, to the extent that we can get a bill in the House, we'll do everybody, I think, a favor. But I don't think anybody's interested in pointing blame to anybody.

I yield back.

MICA: I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Costello?

COSTELLO: Mr. Chairman, thank you, and I thank you for calling the hearing today. I ask unanimous consent to insert my entire statement into the record.

MICA: Without objection, so ordered.

COSTELLO: I would like to make a few remarks. I just left a Democratic caucus where we were being briefed on what information we do know about the financial assistance package that the House will consider, apparently, today or Monday to help the airline industry.

I don't think there's any question that if, in fact, we need to do that to keep them afloat, the Congress will consider it and probably pass some type of legislation to provide financial assistance to the airlines. But I hope, before we do, that we make certain that the money given to the airlines by the United States Congress, taxpayers' money, is not used simply for bonuses, golden parachutes, and other things with the top executives, while pilots, flight attendants, ticket agents, and others are laid off.

I had an experience recently in my district where a steel company, in fact, was bailed out by the state of Illinois, and shortly after they received their money, they closed their doors, laid off 550 employees and their families, put the health insurance of their retirees in jeopardy, while at the same time, the plant manager and other top executives advanced themselves a year's salary and took bonuses. So I hope we are very careful, and that the language that we craft, in fact, protects the taxpayers' money and also those who, in fact, work for the airlines.

I also believe that we can give billions of dollars to the airline industry, and unless we do something to make the traveling public feel secure, they're not going to continue to fly, and we have seen that. I think every member of this committee probably has been contacted by one of the airlines either in their district or that they have contact with.

We know the problems that they are facing as a result of September the 11th. In many of the airlines, the planes that are flying have many empty seats. So it's not a matter of just giving money to the airlines to keep them in business. It's a matter of saying to the American people that you can fly, and you can be safe in knowing that there is security at the airports.

So I join my colleagues, Mr. Lipinski, Mr. Kirk, and Mr. Defazio and others in sponsoring H.R. 2895, which, of course, would address many of the issues. It would put sky marshals permanently in the air. It would, in fact, have the security screeners at our airports under the jurisdiction of the FAA or another federal agency. They would be highly qualified professionals. It would restrict carry-on luggage, and it would do a number of other things.

So I hope that as we rush to the floor to help bail out this industry that we also make certain that there are provisions in that legislation that we do not regret at a later date. And I also hope that we move quickly to pass legislation to make airport security more safe than it is today and to send a level of security to the American public that they, in fact, can fly, and that it is safe to fly.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

MICA: I thank the gentleman. I'll just say for the record that Section 104 of the Air Transportation System Stabilization Act does impose very strict limits on employee compensation.

MICA: People have asked questions about that, because they don't want some of the airline executives to get big bonuses or big compensation if they become part of this program, and that protection is in there. We do have that language if anyone wants to review it.

Let me yield to Mr. Ehlers.

EHLERS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Administrator Garvey, I just want to add to the accolades. I think you've done an excellent job under very difficult circumstances, and I appreciate your efforts.

Also, Mr. Chairman, I've found that every American, including myself, has all kinds of ideas on how to improve airport security, but I don't think we need a litany of expression of those here. In the interest of speeding this up, I will close with just a one-sentence comment.

Administrator Garvey, I hope you open Reagan National very soon. We can't give in to the terrorists by closing that and restricting ourselves so much in other ways. We have to go on with normal lives or they win.

I yield back the balance of my time.

MICA: I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Menendez, you're recognized.

MENENDEZ: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to echo the remarks of my colleagues as we move forward on our assistance to the airline industry. We've got to make sure that companies are protected but so are people, and that is a major issue for us as we move forward in that regard.

On the question of the subject matter of this hearing, all the money in the world won't save the airline industry if, in fact, we can't restore the flying public's confidence in air travel and get them back on planes, and so security needs to be job one. Security is only as strong as its weakest link. There's no security if you screen carry-on luggage but not checked luggage. There's no security if you secure the terminal but not the tarmac.

The good news is it can be done. Others have succeeded. But we're going to have to be willing to invest the money and, just as important, make the commitments to make it happen, and I know the American people expect nothing less.

There's been a lot of talk of federalizing air travel security. It's a concept I support, but I hope we will send a clear message from this committee that that does not let the commercial airlines off the hook. This is about shared responsibility.

That said, I just want to cite a few things that I think we need to look at in a comprehensive air travel security bill. We need to upgrade the machines we use to scan people and luggage. We currently use machines that cost about a third as much as the top line models, and there's no excuse for that when there are machines available that can be used to detect a plastic knife taped to a passenger's body. That's the kind of technology we need.

We've got to treat checked luggage with the same universal scrutiny as we treat carry-on luggage, and no person who goes into the gate area, whether pilot or employee or passenger, should be subject to a lesser or different standard of security. Federal officers need to be well trained and well paid, and they need to be empowered to ask questions when they are suspicious.

We've got to look at same day plane tickets at the checkpoint, but we need to go beyond that. We need to have I.D., because if not, you can just pass off one ticket to another after you've gone through the place where you obtain your ticket.

I think we should be employing the best facial recognition imaging systems or retina scanners at checkpoints which can quickly match the faces of entering passengers against an intelligence database. There's no excuse to have a network credit card approval system to red flag stolen cards, but not to have a system at airports to red flag dangerous passengers. And, for that matter, anyone who works at an airport should be subject to a background check.

And that, including sky marshals and cockpit doors that are more secure and regulations and standards to ensure that those cockpit doors are closed -- I can't believe how many flights I've been on, in retrospect, where they're wide open through either part of or all of that flight at times. That's an amazing set of circumstances when I look at it in retrospect.

This is not clearly an exhaustive list, but there's no excuse for nickel and diming our national security. We can never allow the tragedy of September 11th to be repeated, and with the resources and commitment, I know we can make air travel safe.

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to enter the rest of my statement into the record.

MICA: I thank the gentleman, and I recognize Ms. Kelly.

KELLY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to particularly thank this panel for being here at this time and for working with us to try to ensure the nation's safety.

Ms. Garvey, the last time we talked, we were in New York, talking about the airports in New York. I want to remind you that when Newark, LaGuardia, and Kennedy went down, it was Stewart Airport that accepted those planes. I hope we'll be able to see you at Stewart sometime when this all calms down and you have some time. We need to have you take a look at that airport, because it has the capability, and we need to enlarge that airport's ability to help New York's air congestion.

The focus of this hearing today, though, is without question, I believe, the most critical factor that we have yet in front of us, and that is ensuring the safety and long-term stability of the aviation system. Security has to be our top aviation priority.

I want to associate myself with my colleague, Mr. Quinn, and his remarks regarding the people who are the security people who are security screeners. They need to be given a higher level of professionalism, I believe. They are professionals, and we need to give them top flight technology and not keep them at a poorly trained minimum wage level.

I think that the workers need to be screened themselves, and I think they need to be given better support by all of us. The people need to know that the security also, the security of the airways, doesn't stop at the skyway. They need to know that they're safe once the plane is pushed back from the gate and taking off for its destination.

People's confidence in aviation absolutely must be restored, and we need to keep the focus and the funding available so that we are able to enact strong and meaningful reform.

I really thank you all for working with us, and I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back the balance of my time.

MICA: Mr. Sandlin?

SANDLIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll try to limit my remarks in the interest of time.

As we've heard today, the security of the American aviation system needs study and needs an overhaul. Several of the things that I think we need to consider are automatic transmission devices, the transponders which cannot be disabled, requiring that each and every commercial flight operates and is manned with -- I would like to see two armed marshals.

And I think it's important we point out that marshals is not used as a term of art. Marshals to me means security. Marshals can mean shared obligation and shared responsibility and shared expense. The object is the safety of the passengers, and so I think it's important that when we talk about marshals, we use it in a very broad sense.

We need standardized procedures for handling emergency situations which prevent access to the cockpit. And I would like to say on the issue of federalization that we need a federal component to already existing security requirements. This is not a total responsibility of the federal government. It's not our responsibility totally from a standpoint of financial obligation or safety of the public. It has to be a partnership of the government working in partnership with the airlines and others to provide safety for the American traveling public.

So I want to be clear when we're talking about it, I'm not talking about a substitution. Responsibility is shared in that area.

I'd like to look at installation of video and audio technology on the airplanes themselves, review the regulations of what can be taken onboard, look at the efficiency and effectiveness of the explosive detection equipment and the screening machines, and there are a lot of other common sense ideas that we'll come up with today, I'm sure, that others have. We need to move forward quickly in looking at this, but I think we need to follow President Bush's lead in being cautious, in being focused, in being thorough.

It's our obligation to do a good job, not just to turn out a product. We have to turn out a quality product, and that means taking testimony, that means studying, that means working hard and coming up with something that we can be proud of and something that makes sure that the American public is safe and, importantly, that the American public feels safe.

So, Mr. Chairman, thank you for your focus on this today. I appreciate the members coming today. We've had a day-long hearing in the committee as a whole this week, and I hope that we can continue to focus on this issue and turn out a good product.

I yield back the balance of my time, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

MICA: Thank you. Let me recognize Mr. Cooksey, vice chairman of the subcommittee.

COOKSEY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no comments, other than the fact that I want to compliment Ms. Garvey and all the people on the FAA staff. I think you do a great job. It's been a time of great tragedy, great crisis.

I'm very concerned about safety, about security, and I think that we need to go to the airlines that have the absolute best record -- and I think I know the one in the world that has the best record of screening out terrorists -- and do what we can to make sure it doesn't happen again. So I'm anxious to hear from the witnesses.

Thank you.

MICA: I thank the gentleman.

Ms. Tauscher?

TAUSCHER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Lipinski.

Administrator Garvey, it's always great to see you. Let me tell you how thankful I am that you were at your desk last Tuesday morning and for your quick action and for the action of the people at the FAA.

And Dr. Dillingham and General Mead, thank you for your good service and your hard work and wise counsel.

I think a lot has been said, and I want to echo the comments of many of my colleagues for federalization of the law enforcement component of airport and airline security. I'm going to support this relief package, although I do believe we need the money for security up front, and I do believe that it's important to deal with the worker issues.

I think that Mr. Menendez had a very good list -- you must have been reading over my shoulder this morning, Bob -- of things that we know we have to do. As far as I'm concerned, I want scanners in the airport that I would use to detect a tumor in my mother's breast. The best is not enough. We have got to be state-of-the-art on all of this.

I just want to bring up something that is concerning to me. We all understand that in order to return this industry to the vital component of our economy and mobilization that it has to be, we have to return people to the skies.

Mr. Chairman and Mr. Lipinski, I would hope that perhaps next week, we could actually bring the flying public here, and we could hear from them what it's going to take to get them to buy an airplane ticket. I think we have a lot of anecdotal evidence in what people are telling us. I think that we understand in our own guts, as people that fly multiple times a week, what it could take.

But I think we need to hear from the Fortune 500, because they were missing from the skies for the last two quarters. What's it going to take to put salespeople back on airplanes? What's it going to take for people to buy tickets to go see Grandma for Thanksgiving? Is it uniformed marshals or do they have to be plain clothed? What is it going to take?

I am very concerned that we've got lots of money washing all over the place -- a good thing to do right now -- but we have to hit this mark, and we have to hit it right. We don't have a big runway to land these airline companies. We don't have a lot of time. They're burning cash at a rate that is exorbitant, and we have got to get this right.

So I hope, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Ranking Member, that we will bring people here next week so they can tell us what it's going to take, because we are really, I think, behind the eight ball to return people by Thanksgiving, or else we're going to have more bailouts, more problems, and I think that the American people's psyche, which has been terribly wounded in this affair -- we've got to hear from them.

Thank you.

MICA: I thank the gentlelady.

Mr. Thune?

THUNE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for holding today's hearing on aviation security. Last Tuesday's events have clearly ricocheted through the entire aviation industry and through our entire economy in this country. Airports and airlines have been rocked by these tragic events and their aftermath.

Now is the time for Congress to explore how this could have happened and how to prevent it in the future, and it's clear that Congress needs to provide the security that travelers want and deserve so that the industry can begin the process of recovering, and this hearing, I believe, is an important first step in that process.

I've had discussions back in South Dakota with airport managers, airline executives, security workers, and others over the course of the last week in an effort to learn what they think is the best solution for aviation security, and each and every one believes that the federal government must take a more active role to improve the level of safety and security in the industry. The question is how and in what manner.

Some of my most trusted friends in the industry have made very strong, compelling arguments for federalizing aviation security. I certainly believe this is something that needs to be explored, and that it is a realistic option. However, before Congress decides to spend billions of dollars and hires tens of thousands of workers, I do believe it's important that we hear from experts of all types on this issue.

Clearly, today, we are in unusual times that require quick and decisive action, and that's why we're here today, and we'll meet again next week on this topic. It is that important.

The administration, the Congress, and the aviation industry have to work together to ensure that each and every American is safe and secure when they enter an airport and board a plane. As this process moves forward, I'm eager to go to work.

I want to thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. I'm pleased that we have the opportunity to hear from today's witnesses on this issue and very much look forward to their testimony.

Thank you.

MICA: I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Pascrell?

PASCRELL: Mr. Chairman, if the airlines were in better financial condition, we would still have a dearth of passengers.

PASCRELL: And I don't know, Mr. Chairman, if I can support the legislation that we're going to vote on today, because a decision has been made not to tie this to the security of not only passengers -- we're talking about ourselves as well. We happen to be passengers many times, so we're here.

When everything is a priority, nothing is a priority. It would seem to me that the security is the most important factor that we should be bringing to this table, yet we are not voting on that today.

I know the work that you've done and the ranking member has done, and I know you feel, as I do, deeply about this, that we can get to security second. But it seems to me if we're going to get people back on the planes, they must be reassured, and they're not reassured.

So while we need to stabilize financially the airlines -- and that is critical -- even if we didn't have to do that, we have to assure everybody that it's safe to fly in a very imperfect finite world, and we're not doing that. We're not doing that.

I'm very interested in, Mr. Chairman, the work that is being done in the area of CAPS, that is, the computer assisted passenger screening, better known as profiling. We hate to use that word for what they're doing. And I know how critical it is that -- we've had assurances over the past three years that there is no profiling or screening based upon a particular dress here. I'm petrified at what I've read the last two days of what's come out of this Congress about such things, of who we should be looking at.

There should be no question that we are not going to stop people or focus on folks because they come from a particular segment of our society or from another part of the world. So it is very clear in the guidelines in this screening process of what we will be looking for. It's very clear in the regulations.

Obviously, you can't respond to the question now, and I've said so many times my deep regard for you, Ms. Garvey. But I hope that you'll answer that question before the day is out on what are we looking for, who to report that to, and what changes have we had in the system so that we do not do what happened in the state of New Jersey on our roads, because that's a serious situation, too.

So I commend you for the work that you're doing. I thank the chair and the ranking member, and I wish we would tie this to the issue of security, because I think we're making a very big mistake in not doing so.

Thank you.

MICA: I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Lobiondo?

LOBIONDO: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to join with all my colleagues in thanking you for holding this hearing. I have a full statement. I would ask unanimous consent to enter it into the record.

MICA: Without objection, so ordered.

LOBIONDO: But I'd just like to take the opportunity to thank Ms. Garvey, the FAA, and especially the men and women who work at the FAA technical center in my district, who have done an outstanding job up to this point in time, have taken a renewed energy and responsibility and enthusiasm toward the task ahead of us. Much of what's been talking about today in the most technologically advanced equipment for air safety and security is worked on and tested at FAA technical center.

Mr. Chairman, I'm sorry more of our members did not have an opportunity to take the field trip that you scheduled earlier in the year. I will be there on Monday. They train all our air marshals for the entire nation, and that's an ongoing process. So I want to just take the opportunity -- there's a lot of dedication there throughout the system, but especially from the men and women in my district.

Thank you. I yield back.

MICA: I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Defazio, I think you're next.

DEFAZIO: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I said the other day at the full committee hearing to the airline execs that everything has changed, and from their testimony, nothing has changed with a lot of the major airlines. CEOs in their corporate offices are a little bit insulated from everything except, apparently, their financial problems.

I am extraordinarily disturbed that this Congress would move forward -- this Congress is going to leave town at 2:00 today. It wasn't in session on Monday, Tuesday, or Wednesday, and won't stay in session over the weekend, to include the most robust possible and specific direction to this administration on security measures that this committee can determine. We must and should do that.

The experts have pretty well agreed. In fact, the CEOs even agreed -- federalize the airport security. But there's some foot dragging going on here. This administration says, well, let us tell you in a couple of weeks if we want to do that or not do that. No, we're the Congress. We can tell them we are going to do that. We've had enough of the private security.

Let me just read this. This is a report -- a veteran federal investigator conducting his own impromptu security test at Miami International Airport this week carried three knives through a passenger checkpoint without anyone detecting them.

The agent for BATF walked through a metal detector in Concourse A carrying a six-inch graphite dagger on his leg, a pen-shaped knife in his shirt, and another blade in a folding wallet in his pocket. Nothing was spotted, said the investigator. He went through. Nothing was activated. The incident is a sign of continuing gaps in screening at MIA. Plug in your own airport, except if you've got a really small one like I do.

This incident is a sign of continuing gaps in passenger screening. The company hired -- they're still working today. Guess what, folks. This private company -- because we're going to continue with this low bidder system as long as we can. The company hired to run that checkpoint, Aviation Safeguards of Florida, has had a troubled history at MIA. They're still running security.

Last year, the firm was sentenced to two years probation -- they're still running the security today -- and $110,000 in fines and restitution for failing to do adequate background checks of at least 22 employees and lying about it to federal regulators. That has got to change, and this Congress needs to send a message that everything has changed, and we're going to move forward. I just cannot believe that we're going to deal with the financial side -- and as Ms. Tauscher and others have said, we can dump all the money we want into these airlines, but if the people aren't flying because they don't think it's safe, then we can drain the federal treasury, and they're still going to go bankrupt down the road.

We have to provide those assurances and take those steps, and this is our opportunity. It's time to move forward, not in a second or third or fourth package, you know, a week, two weeks, three weeks from now, not waiting for this commission at DOT to report back in two weeks. There are prudent steps we can take now, and then if they can come up with some others to add onto it, well, then, by God, we can do those later.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MICA: I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Isakson?

ISAKSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Out of respect for the need for us to hear from the witnesses and have our questions answered following, I will submit my statement for the record, except to make one comment.

A lot of the American people are watching this hearing today, and I personally think it's not prudent to not recognize the fact that it is not correct that we are addressing airline financial security first. The fact of the matter is that Administrator Garvey immediately shut down the entire air transportation system in the United States of America on last Tuesday. She did not reopen it until every airline had met with them and all security agencies to dramatically change in a short period of time security in our airports. I have flown on two occasions since that date, and I have observed heightened security.

It is also important to understand that some of the arrests that have taken place in the United States of America since last Tuesday were directly because of security in our airports. I am as committed as any American to even enhancing further and taking whatever action is necessary.

But I think it's important to understand that the administrator, law enforcement, and the administration acted first in the interest of security before a single airplane took off again in the United States of America, and that should not go unnoticed, nor should we not continue to work as we stabilize the industry to further improve and secure the airline passenger safety system in this country.

I yield back.

MICA: I thank the gentleman.

Ms. Norton?

NORTON: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Just let me say I appreciate the way in which you, Mr. Chairman, and the ranking member have proceeded forthwith on this matter, and I, indeed, appreciate the way in which our entire committee has proceeded.

I am on a subcommittee of this committee which, yesterday, was fully prepared to go ahead on domestic preparedness, because the committee has worked on that for months, and we're going to have that bill ready. Of course, we'll take the 40 agencies of the federal government, all of which have something to do with security -- therefore, nobody has anything to do with security -- and put it all under this new homestead, I think -- the homeland person that the president announced yesterday.

The District of Columbia is going to be at the table there. It's the first responder, so I do believe that at least the federal government -- and in no small part because of the actions of this committee -- is getting its act together.

As to the airlines, I certainly am going to strongly support the package that seems to be developing. I believe that the airlines are as important to this country as the military.

There is no such thing as a great power without airlines that can go everywhere in their country. Whole parts of our country would be places from which you could not get from there to anyplace else if the airline industry goes down. It would be the greatest victory to the fanatics.

Moreover, I accept that there has been an act of war here, and I think we ought to respond accordingly. I am prepared to respond accordingly, bearing in mind the condition of the airlines. But I think we have got to move and move forthwith. And if I may say so, not moving on getting air service going back to normal is probably the central ingredient in taking us to recession. I can't imagine we're not already there.

I do know this, that we have sent a huge signal to the world that the capital of the United States can't possibly be open, and the United States can't possibly be able to secure itself, because National Airport is closed. And as long as National Airport is closed, Ms. Garvey, no one will believe that the air space is safe.

I recognize that there are many things on the drawing board now that our country has to deal with. But I certainly hope people know how to walk and chew gum at the same time, because somebody better give greater priority to opening National Airport so that we can wipe away the temporary victory that the terrorists now have.

I would be the last to say fling it open, even given the terrible effects on the local economy and on the regional economy -- 600,000 people who I represent live here. This is the highest profile, highest target city in the world. I want it to be done with safety. But every day that goes by when that airport is closed says to me either that the airport is not getting the priority that it deserves or that you don't know what you are doing, one or the other, and we need an explanation for that today.

We need a date for the opening of National Airport, and we need you to make National Airport a pilot for security in the air for the country. If, in fact, we begin here to lock the cockpits, to do whatever federalization is appropriate for security, and to put in place the dozens of recommendations that are already out there -- if we begin here as a pilot, if we get the shuttle service up first from here to New York and then to Boston and the other cities that were hit, you will send a message that America is open for business. I ask you to give that greater priority than we now see it having in the administration.

Thank you very much.

MICA: Mr. Hayes?

HAYES: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to strongly agree with Mr. Isakson. In an effort to begin a trend and get to the panel, I'll pass on my opening statement and submit it for the record.

MICA: Thank you.

Mr. Lampson, you're recognized.

LAMPSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Our notion of aviation security changed forever, obviously, on September 11th. I don't know that many of us could have envisioned the destruction that was caused by our commercial jet airliners last week.

LAMPSON: Last week's attacks illustrate an important point, that we need to not only respond to the methods that were used in previous attacks, but we also need to work together to think of ways to protect ourselves from future dangers that could come in new forms. It's clear that we need to restore confidence in the flying public.

And while this body considers a financial aid package for the ailing airline industry today, this hearing focuses on the second component, safety. No financial aid package will bring passengers back to the planes unless they feel safe. Passengers need to feel secure or they will, indeed, stay home.

On Monday and Tuesday of this week, I met with airport and airline officials and employees in my district, both in the Houston Intercontinental Airport and Southeast Texas Regional Airport in Beaumont and Port Arthur. I commended the employees for their hard work in getting their airports back up and running in compliance with the new FAA mandates.

With preliminary reports indicating that some of the hijackers started their journey on a connecting flight from a smaller airport, it's clear that all airports, big and small, have a responsibility in this endeavor. I want to give airports the tools and resources they need to accomplish these goals as soon as possible.

Security screeners need to be federal law enforcement officers, not low wage employees. A recent GAO report indicated that screeners can make more money at fast food restaurants and have a high turnover, often 100 percent, at large airports. And I, along with other members of this subcommittee, am working on legislation to federalize this activity and to ensure that highly trained law enforcement personnel are conducting this activity in ways that give the passenger the same thorough and effective experience from one airport to the next.

I want to work with the Department of Transportation to beef up the federal air marshal program. I want to equip airports with the latest technology available to detect bombs in checked baggage. And I think it's clear that we need to develop a system to protect access to our cockpit doors on commercial airliners.

I would also like to see a system to search passenger manifests for names of known terrorists before flights take to the sky. And another thing to consider is a workable means to have a permanent, unstoppable transponder specific to each aircraft in every aircraft.

I'm looking forward not only to hearing Ms. Garvey, as we always do, but also the testimony of the former director general of El-Al Airlines. I think we can learn a lot from the security measures of El-Al employees.

I realize that the world of aviation security changed forever on September 11th. I'm committed to working together to craft solutions and to restore confidence in the flying public.

With that, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

MICA: I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Kirk?

KIRK: Mr. Chairman, I will be brief. The one issue I'm going to raise is when you make a 911 phone call from your air phone that is located in the seatback in front of you, that call will not go through, and there is no cadre of trained people to handle that emergency.

I think as part of this legislation we should be able to make sure that a 911 call from an air phone will be answered by a trained professional that will be able to handle terrorists or a medical emergency. And we can provide that service, I am told by the experts, on fairly short notice at a cost of about $5 million annually, and I hope that we take up that issue here.

Thank you.

MICA: I thank the gentleman.

Ms. Millender-McDonald?

MILLENDER-MCDONALD: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank you and the ranking member for bringing this hearing to us today. As we look at trying to help in the cash infusion to the airline industry, it is important for us to look at the issue of safety, which is absolutely foremost in this whole notion of trying to bring transportation security back to the American people.

I am concerned about this issue of security as we look at the federalization of it, given that the president has come in with his homeland program that he is wanting to establish, and given that program, there will be a shared type of responsibility. I'm not so sure that we shouldn't look at the -- as we look at the federalization security, that it is not a shared responsibility with airport authorities as well as the federal government.

I am eager to talk with you, Ms. Garvey, on that and all of the other folks in your department. I do thank you for the leadership that you have provided us through the years and even now as we grapple with this whole notion of trying to make the skies safe.

I am for the air marshals. Of course, all of us travel twice a week back and forth to our districts. But we are also concerned about the American public. As I looked at the news this morning, everything is down, from football stadiums to Las Vegas to a myriad of things. So the airports and the airlines are so critical, clearly, to help us in the revitalization of our economy.

But in looking at that, we must look at job security. We must look at those folks we are talking about laying off. We must look at the security as it goes across the board, not just in the security of the air traveling public but also those folks on the ground who are workers.

I have a statement to submit, Mr. Chairman, and thank you so much.

MICA: Without objection, your entire statement will be made part of the record.

Mr. Kennedy?

KENNEDY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for organizing these hearings, and I must say this is amongst the most important things we will do, and I appreciate us taking the attention to this.

You know, we have heard many long-term solutions here today, and it's going to take time for those to be put in effect, and we should consider them, and we should move forward on many of those. But we don't have long term, as we've heard. Many of our flights in our tourist locations and others are suffering and need a solution.

When this happened, my daughter, Sarah (ph), said to her mother, "Where's Superman when you need him?" And to a very real extent, we need Superman at time, and, ultimately, I think plain clothes sky marshals are what we need, and they're the best and most efficient and effective way of making sure this doesn't happen.

But to get things jump started in the near term, I think we need to reach out, potentially, to our law enforcement officials statewide. I have a proposal from one of our Minnesota state troopers as to how we can embrace them in this near-term stopgap and get a federal role for them. Just as with FEMA, we reach out to state agencies, and we bring in teams from the states to help with the national tragedies that we're experiencing in New York and Washington, D.C., and we see if there isn't a way in the short term, in the next six months or so, to get somebody that looks as close to Superman as anybody that my daughter knows, some of our state troopers, on some of these planes flying so that we get a near-term jump in confidence. That may not be the long-term solution, but right now, we need both long-term and short-term solutions.

I have a statement I'd like to submit for the record as well as material that this state trooper has put to me that I'd like to also put in the record.

MICA: Without objection, your entire statement will be made part of the record.

Ms. Berkley?

BERKLEY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman and ranking member, for holding this hearing today. I would like to be brief, and I'd like unanimous consent to revise and extend my comments.

But I would like to say a few things, because for my district, I don't think there's a more important issue than the safety of the flying public and restoring public confidence in our aviation system. If public confidence in the safety of flying is not restored quickly, the American economy will fail to rebound, and the airline and tourism industries will be forced to lay off hundreds of thousands of employees.

I'd like to share with you briefly the situation in my district, keeping in mind that Las Vegas had the strongest economy in the United States before September 11th, and at this point, we are laying off literally thousands and thousands of workers. Our economy is at a standstill, and that's in the short span of 10 days.

Las Vegas is one of the top tourist destinations in our country. Our economy, our businesses, and our jobs rely on the vitality of our tourism industry. It is our only industry.

Last year, 38 million people came to visit southern Nevada. Approximately 46 percent of them arrived by air. The economic impact of tourism on southern Nevada's economy caps $30 billion annually, and Las Vegas is the number one convention city in the United States.

In one week alone, 240 conventions have been cancelled, and the city is expected to lose millions and millions and millions of dollars worth of convention business. Since this horrible tragedy, the city's hotel occupancy rate has fallen from 100 percent to less than 40 percent, and these hotels are losing millions of dollars every day.

One out of every four jobs in my district is directly related to the hotel tourist industry. Those are people that actually work in the hotels. Another 50 percent of my population are indirectly related to the tourism industry. Because of the lack of visitors and the resulting financial losses, hotels and resorts are laying off thousands. One particular resort in my district laid off 500 people just this past week, which is nearly 16 percent of the workforce.

Now, we can't allow these terrorists to cripple our economy. I know I'm preaching to the choir when I say that we have to restore our aviation system. Heightened security measures at our airports and airlines rebuild people's confidence in air travel. People must feel safe, and I quite agree, and I'm going to support the airline disaster aid bill, because I think it's vitally important to keep these airlines in the air and doing their jobs.

But I quite agree with my colleagues. If we don't restore public confidence, and we don't get people on these airplanes, we're going to be in a bottomless pit, and we're not going to be able to recover from it.

So security measures -- and I've heard so many here that I think are vitally important. Obviously, securing the cockpit is very important, and having federal marshals on the individual airplanes is very important, and checking out the manifest, and so many of the other suggestions that were mentioned here.

But I would also like to direct your attention to the CAPS program, and that is offsite check-in. And while we're eliminating curbside, why not do the check-ins away from the airport so if there is a problem, if there is a device that can be detonated in the luggage, then we can detect it in a secure environment away from the airport where it would create incredible havoc if it was detonated.

If we can secure the luggage and check them out thoroughly, and then have armed guards bring them to the airport, perhaps we could ultimately -- in addition to all of the other suggestions -- help to restore the public confidence in air travel. Now, I've gone back and forth, like so many of my colleagues over the last week, and there's an obvious seat (ph) change, and there is additional security, and I did feel safe.

But I was listening to the "Today" show this morning while I was getting dressed for work, and they had a town hall meeting...

MICA: The time of the gentlelady has expired. If you could conclude, please.

BERKLEY: All right. The number one issue when they were talking to ordinary citizens is their fear to get on an airplane, and that's, again, our number one issue and concern here.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

MICA: I thank the gentlelady.

Mr. Culberson?

CULBERSON: Mr. Chairman, I think it's vitally important we hear from the witnesses right away, so I'd like to ask permission to insert a statement for the record and yield back the balance of my time.

MICA: Without objection.

Mr. Shuster?

SHUSTER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also believe it's important we get to our witnesses here quickly, so I'd like to ask for unanimous consent to submit my statement.

MICA: Without objection, so ordered.

Mr. Carson?

CARSON: Mr. Chairman, in the interest of continuing this trend, I think it is important that we proceed with haste to hear the witnesses. So I, too, would yield back the balance of my time with permission to enter my full statement into the record.

MICA: Without objection.

Mr. Matheson?

MATHESON: It's hard to break up this trend, Mr. Chairman, so I'd like permission to submit my full statement for the record. And with that, I yield back the balance of my time.

MICA: Without objection. I thank you.

Mr. Simpson?

SIMPSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also would like to ask unanimous consent to introduce my statement into the record.

MICA: Without objection, so ordered.

Mr. Honda?

HONDA: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Being on the bottom of the rung, I think I will take advantage of my time.

I just want to thank the leadership for this hearing. And I'll be very brief, because I'll submit the rest of my comments in writing.

Looking over the future agendas, Mr. Chairman, there doesn't appear to be any panels that would be discussing the employment of high technology. And we've talked about many needs that were known but not addressed, and we know that there will be many needs that will need to be addressed and become apparent as we move along.

But we have many existing technologies and many technologies that are in motion right now that can be applied to security. We've discussed a lot around hardening access to the airplane and how we harden the airplane. What we haven't really looked at very thoroughly -- and perhaps we have information and techniques to look at hardened people before they enter our airports.

HONDA: So I think that we need to look at both arenas, and I would suggest that we have some time when we can pull in people from biotech and high tech so they can speak to us about their technology and how it can apply to increasing the security of our air so that the confidence of our traveling public will be restored.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MICA: I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Johnson?

JOHNSON: Mr. Chairman, I appreciate it, but I think in the interest of time that we'll just go on with the testimony. I'm just listening and learning.

Thank you.

MICA: Thank you.

Mr. Larsen?

LARSEN: Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for granting unanimous consent for me to sit on this. I want to make three quick points.

I represent a district in Washington state where we actually design and build the Boeing airplanes in Everett, Washington, and so I had some time to talk to engineers at Boeing this week. As you consider the testimony and consider questions, there are just three quick points I want you to consider.

With regard to focus, there are four different types of perpetrators, eight separate types of threats, seven different types of modes of introduction for those threats into our aviation security system. So what combination of suggestions that you're hearing today can best address the 200-plus types of combinations of ultimate threats that we face in our aviation security system?

Second, with regard to cockpit security, there are over 7,000 commercial airplanes registered in the U.S. to fly, another 7,500-plus in the world registered to fly, 40 different models, plus any number of customers asking for adjustments in the flight deck. How would you propose expediting a process where we get to either standardization or retrofitting, and what are the challenges of doing that?

And then, finally, with regard to general aviation, I talked to two FPOs in my district. One laid off 20 employees the other day. The other laid off 22 of 35 employees. What assurances can the FAA give that you're working with the security agencies to expedite getting GA up and going again, in part, any VFR flights, all the flights, up and going again?

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back my time. Thank you very much.

MICA: I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Berry, did you have a question or a comment? Thank you.

There being no further opening statements -- Ms. Brown, did you have an opening statement?

BROWN: I'm going to pass.

MICA: Thank you. Ms. Brown passes.

We'll go to our panel. I just want to say one thing before we go to the panel. I have been prepared and am prepared today to meet with the minority or any others interested in finishing or crafting security legislation. Unfortunately, yesterday, a meeting was cancelled, and we did offer to meet yesterday.

But we are prepared to meet today, tonight, tomorrow. Our side is also prepared to bring this to the floor immediately. The question of having it as part of the financial package or not being part of it was decided above my pay grade level. But that's done, and it is important that we get that before the floor.

I ask the subcommittee to be supportive of that, and then work with us, and we will bring it to the floor immediately, as soon as we can agreement on the security package. So I look forward to working with everyone, and after our hearing concludes, hopefully, we'll have an announcement of a time when we can all meet.

Let me now recognize, if I may, our witnesses that have been waiting patiently. And I did want to give everybody an opportunity to be heard, because this may be, with the expedited process, your only opportunity to publicly comment and comment for the record.

Mr. Lipinski?

LIPINSKI: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I don't doubt that you invited the Democratic side to a security meeting yesterday. But somehow that message was never communicated either to myself or to the ranking member, Mr. Oberstar, and I have that from the staff on our side that, you know, we never heard about it. So I don't doubt that you invited us, but we didn't get the message. But I know you have invited us now, and as soon as we conclude this hearing, I'll be happy to sit down with you and start working on some security measures.

In regard to the legislation dealing with the economic stability, I understand your position. I appreciate it. I, myself, at the present time, though, will find it impossible to vote for the stabilization package because there is nothing in there pertaining to workers' rights, workers' compensation, or security.

Thank you very much for the time.

MICA: I thank the gentleman. And let's again proceed with our first panel. We have Dr. Gerald L. Dillingham, Director of Physical Infrastructure Issues with the General Accounting Office. We have back The Honorable Ken Mead, who is the Inspector General of the Department of Transportation. We're also pleased to have with us The Honorable Jane Garvey, who is the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration.

I want to thank each of our witnesses for their patience. I had to listen, and you have to listen, and now we'll have an opportunity to hear from you. I'm going to recognize first Dr. Dillingham.

DILLINGHAM: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Lipinski, members of the subcommittee, we appreciate the opportunity to appear before you this morning. Although it is not fully known what actually occurred or which of the weaknesses in the nation's aviation security system contributed to the horrendous events of last week, it is clear that serious weaknesses do exist, and that their impact can be far more devastating than previously imagined.

Following the tragedy of September the 11th, many voices have called for a change in the way aviation security is organized, particularly the pre-board screening operation. With extraordinary foresight, this subcommittee recognized the significance of this system's vulnerability and, last year, requested GAO to assist it by conducting a study that would address this very issue.

This morning, I'd like to discuss two areas, first, to summarize what we know about the performance of pre-board screening operations, and, second, to provide some preliminary results from our ongoing work for this subcommittee that focuses on alternatives to the current organizational structure for screening.

With regard to the performance question, this is not a new concern. In 1978, our research showed that screeners were missing about one out of 10 threat objects that FAA uses to test performance. At that time, both FAA and the airlines characterized that level of performance as significant and alarming.

By 1987, the miss rate had doubled. In the 10 years since then, test rates show that, in some cases, screener performance has gotten worse. We have also found that as the testing protocols get more realistic, that is, that the tests more closely approximate how a terrorist might attempt to penetrate a checkpoint, screener performance declined significantly.

A principal cause of performance problems is the rapid turnover among screeners. This exceeds 100 percent annually at most large airports. These circumstances not only mean that there are oftentimes very few skilled or experienced screeners on the job, but, equally important, it means that there are literally thousands of individuals out there that know an awful lot about how screening works and how it doesn't work.

By and large, the efforts today to address this problem have been largely ineffective and slow in coming. A case in point is a promulgation of rules to implement the provisions of the 1996 FAA Reauthorization Act that would establish a screening company certification program. The rule was scheduled for issuance later this month, more than two and a half years later than was originally scheduled.

In May, 2000, we reported on our most recent work in this area. In this case, our special agents had used fictitious law enforcement badges and credentials to bypass security checkpoints at two airports and to walk unescorted to airport departure gates. The agents who had been issued tickets and boarding passes could have potentially carried weapons, explosives, or other dangerous objects onto the aircraft. To its credit, FAA acted immediately to put in place an interim measure until a more permanent fix could be completed.

Now, I'd like to turn to the highlights of what we found in our look for alternatives. We surveyed security officials at some of the major air carriers and at the nation's largest airports. We also interviewed executives from several large screening companies and aviation industry associations, as well as a number of aviation and terrorism experts.

Our respondents identified four principal alternatives and a variety of ways that each alternative could be structured and implemented. In each alternative, FAA could continue to be responsible for regulating screening, overseeing performance, and imposing penalties for poor performance.

The first alternative is one in which the air carriers would continue to be responsible for conducting screening. This alternative assumes that FAA will implement the pending certification rule and the other elements of the Airport Security Act of 2000.

The second is one in which each airport authority would be responsible for screening. A third alternative is based on a new DOT agency with headquarters and field structure, created to conduct a national screening program. It would be accountable to Congress through the annual appropriation and oversight process.

The fourth alternative is a new quasi-government corporation, also with a headquarters and field structure, created to conduct a national screening program. Congress could use its latitude to combine government and private sector features, as is currently done with Amtrak and TVA, when creating such a corporation and defining how it would be held accountable and financed.

We also asked our respondents what they thought were the important criteria for evaluating alternatives. The list includes the degree to which each alternative has the capacity to improve screening performance; establish accountability; ensure cooperation among the stakeholders, including the airports, the airlines, FAA, and the screening companies; and, lastly, efficiently move passengers to their flights.

Many of our respondents pointed out that implementing an alternative screening approach, particularly moving from air carriers to the federal government, would be difficult and could be time consuming and labor intensive. They suggested to avoid disrupting screening operations, incremental actions, such as keeping screening companies in place and pilot testing implementation at selected cities, might be necessary.

Mr. Chairman, we are all aware that since the tragic events of September 11th, there's been a lot of activity associated with aviation safety and security. It has also been observed that previous aviation tragedies have also generated similar intense levels of activity and resulted in a cycle of congressional hearings, studies, recommendations, and debates. Unfortunately, the long-term resolve and actions to correct flaws in the system diminishes as the memory of the crisis recedes.

Mr. Chairman, we believe that the future of the nation's aviation system, and as we are only beginning to fully understand so much more, hinges in large part on overcoming this cycle. The GAO stands ready to continue to assist this committee in this extraordinary, difficult challenge.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MICA: I thank the gentleman. Let me recognize now Mr. Ken Mead, the Inspector General at DOT.

MEAD: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I don't think I could start off my summary without first just expressing sorrow for the many families of lost loved ones in the past week. I want to also acknowledge Administrator Garvey, Secretary Mineta, the president, the law enforcement, rescue, and relief workers. I think it's a real statement about this country and their professionalism.

Mr. Chairman, much of what I have to say has already been said. You pointed out that there are -- you held up the stack of reports. Those reports go back 10 or 15 years, actually. They cover virtually every element of this security program, and I'd like to just mention what those elements are. I think it's a good forum and a good focus.

One is the passenger screening function. Another is the screening of both the bags that you're carrying on the plane and the bags that you check. Another is cargo which can be mailed. Another is access to what they call the airport operations area. That's the secure or sterile areas where you walk out to the plane. And another is the issuance of airport I.D. badges. You have reports on all those, and I'm not going to detail those today.

I do want to point out that we've conducted numerous criminal investigations that have resulted in prosecutions, successfully, involving the falsification of airport identification, security screener training records, and background checks. Just this last year, one of the nationwide security firms was placed on 36 months probation, fined over $1 million in fines for failing to conduct background checks, falsifying training records on employees staffing security checkpoints at a major U.S. airport.

Just since last Friday, sir, we arrested 12 non-U.S. citizens who illegally obtained security badges necessary to gain admittance to secure areas at another major U.S. airport.

MEAD: I also want to point out to the subcommittee that we've detailed some of our inspector general law enforcement staff to the air marshal program.

Several of the members pointed out that the aviation security program needs to be tightened up. There is no way that aviation security can be absolutely fool proof, particularly when you're dealing with people who are willing to die in their criminal schemes. And that's why it's, of course, important, as President Bush was saying last night, to move out on an affront of rooting terrorism out as well as strengthening up this program.

For the remainder of my remarks, I'd like to comment on two areas. One is the governance and organization of aviation security, how we govern it, and how it's delivered. And then I'd like to move to some immediate steps that we should take in aviation security from our point of view that I think are practical.

You know, you've got all these reports going back many years. It seems to us, given the scope and complexity of the security challenge as we now know it, given the events of the last two weeks, coupled with the longstanding history of problems with the aviation security program, that the time has come to consider vesting governance of the program and responsibility for the provision of security in one federal organization or not-for-profit federal corporation that would have security as its primary and central focus, profession, and mission. That doesn't mean that they all have to be federal employees, but it does mean that that would be their primary focus.

And how we do it now -- we have the FAA, which has multiple missions and priorities, responsible also for security. Then you have the airlines and the airports, who have multiple missions and, indeed, sometimes competing economic pressures. And I think that has played an influence over the years in the quality of the aviation security.

It can't be done overnight, though. It's going to require careful analysis. There's financial implications. I don't think the airlines or the airports ought to be let off the hook and the taxpayers just pick up the tab. But we have to take some immediate actions to restore, as everybody is saying today, public confidence. So I'd just like to run through a short list here.

Congress has paid, taxpayers have paid, aviation trust fund has paid enormous sums of money for advanced explosive detection equipment. I'm not going to go into numbers here. I'll be glad to in the closed session. But this explosive protection equipment is out there now, it's installed, it's operational, and it is substantially underused. And I think we can, in very short order, greatly increase the usage of these machines that we have, in most cases, expended $1 million a copy on.

Screening checkpoint security -- Mr. Dillingham made a number of points about that and so have the members. One reason this is so important and that this be tightened up and quick -- if we're having problems detecting test items like guns, more complicated items or, indeed, even more simple items, like box cutters, could be even more of a challenge. So that's why it's important to tighten that up in a hurry.

Airport access controls -- this is something that's always important to reinforce, because if you don't get at the planes through the passenger screening stations, how do you get there? Well, you get access to the sterile areas of the airport without going through a passenger screening, which means the doors and various access points.

And, as Mr. Dillingham has also pointed out, GAO, as well as we, have found big gaps there. That's another area that needs to be closed. Just don't go through passenger screens. You go down -- at the top of the concourse, there's a door. There's a technique called piggy-backing. A totally authorized employee opens the door, goes out, and somebody that's not authorized follows him right out.

Issuing airport I.D.s -- I am really pleased that the FAA has announced that they're going to revalidate all these I.D. cards. I gave you one example at the opening of where there were fake I.D. cards out there. So I think it's very important.

In connection with that, I think we should immediately start a requirement to do background checks on everybody. These current rules are these: At certain airports, if you are a new employee, then an appropriate check is done on you. If you are an existing employee at these airports, there isn't one. And, also, at a substantial number of airports in this country, those requirements aren't even in place yet. So I think we could do that very quickly.

We have a report coming out on cargo security. I'm not going to share the details with the committee today, but we will be briefing the secretary and the administrator and so forth very shortly on that.

I also want to add I'm very glad that the administration is making the air marshal program more robust. That's not only a good high profile way of restoring confidence. It's also a deterrent.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MICA: Thank you. And we'll now hear from Jane Garvey, our FAA Administrator, who's done a great job the last number of days and even before that.

We appreciate all of your untiring efforts and working with you. You're recognized.

GARVEY: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Lipinski and members of the subcommittee. I appreciate very much the opportunity to be here this morning. A number of questions I think you have raised I am eager to get to, and some of these may have to be in closed session. But I certainly look forward to that opportunity as well.

I want to begin by associating myself with the comments made by Mr. Dillingham and Mr. Mead, and that is in offering our heartfelt condolences to the families and to the friends of the victims of last Tuesday's terrible tragedy. And I know from hearing from a number of you, personally, that you, too, suffered losses through families and constituents that you have as well. So we extend our deepest sympathies to all of you.

I also want to take a moment, if I could, to publicly thank the staff of the FAA and, in particular, the air traffic controllers. In the midst of the hijacking, as I think many of you know, our controllers successfully guided other aircraft out of the area in which the hijacked aircraft were operating.

And when the order for a national ground stop was issued, the controllers worked with the pilots to safely land more than 5,000 flights in little more than two and a half hours. In the words of one editorial writer who was traveling through the air at the time, the controllers, the systems people, the management supporting them did their jobs and brought tens of thousands of Americans safety back to earth. I'm very proud of their actions, and I must say it's a singular honor to be associated with such professionals as these.

In the aftermath of last Tuesday, the president called on all of us and called on America to begin to return to normal as quickly as possible. For us at the FAA, that meant focusing on two immediate issues. One was to work with the airlines, to work with the airports to put in place more stringent security measures. And the second was to restore the system.

We ordered the evacuation of every terminal in order for the airports to be inspected and to be determined to be safe. Every aircraft was fully inspected before any passenger was allowed to board, and we put in place further security initiatives that would be sustained beyond the reopening of the system.

Some of those initiatives are clearly visible to the traveling public. Others are less so. And a number of those initiatives have been reported in the press, and I won't go through those except to answer questions a little bit later.

Let me just mention one principal. The reason we had going into it was, again, really twofold. One was to limit the control points, to limit those places where we might be forced to deal with some of the security issues, and that, for example, meant eliminating curbside check-in. It also was to create a series of redundancies, really from the curb-side right to the passenger seat.

I do, though, want to comment on a couple of the initiatives, because they have come up in the comments that you all have made. One is the federal air marshal program. We are extraordinarily grateful to Congress because of the fact action that you took in those immediate hours after the tragedy. We are able to move out very, very aggressively with the federal air marshal program. Again, we can get into more detail in the closed session.

I also want to again publicly thank the attorney general, who has given us a very large contingent from Treasury and the Justice Department, and again to our colleagues like Ken Mead, who have also committed some forces as well. But I think that is going to be an important part of our program as we move forward, and I'm eager to talk with you more about it.

We are convinced that the measures we've put in place are the right measures to take at this time. But we also recognize they are not the only steps. Indeed, these are really intermediate measures that we've taken to enable the civil aviation system to reopen.

And I might just add that as we were reopening the system, we were doing it methodically and in a very determined fashion. As Mr. Larsen and others have noted, GA -- some of the restrictions were listed the day before yesterday, but, clearly, there are still issues around general aviation that we need to deal with, National Airport as well.

As you know, the secretary has created two rapid response teams to address airport and airline security, as well as aircraft security. The incidents of September 11th have caused all of us -- and it really came through in your comments as well -- all of us to begin to rethink the balance of responsibility for civil aviation security.

If you look at the work that we've done in the past with GAO and with the IG, much of our focus has been on explosive detection. Much of our focus has been on threats that were very different than what we faced last Tuesday. We are facing a criminal element now. I don't think any of us could have comprehended that someone would be willing to go to pilot training school in order to commit suicide and use an aircraft as a means of destruction. The whole world order, the way we view aviation security, has got to change fundamentally.

Let me just speak about two of the areas in particular that the rapid response teams are focusing on. Clearly, screeners is a big part of the issue. It has been run by the airlines. It has, as so many of you have pointed out, been handled through private contracts for, I guess, nearly 30 years.

In 1999, we looked at how much it would cost for the federal government to assume those responsibilities. It's clearly a big ticket item. At that time, it was probably about $1.2 billion. We think the estimate is closer to $1.8 billion today.

But, clearly, a much more aggressive federal presence is needed. As Mr. Defazio said, we're seeing that agreement even within the industry as well. We are eager to get that fleshed out a little bit more so that we can get that to you very quickly. The whole issue, I think, of certification and how we handle the private companies is something that is very much in need of change. We recognize that.

Secondly, the issue of cockpit doors -- the direction to both task forces is no studies, no reviews, action items only. And we are looking at both short-term what we can do with the cockpit door, and then the longer-term issues as well. As those of you who have been associated with aviation know, there are tradeoffs here. There are safety issues, and there are issues of decompression that we have to deal with as we look at securing the cockpit door.

But we also believe there are short-term initiatives that can be put in place very quickly. We applaud the Pilots Association, the flight attendants, the manufacturers like Boeing, who have worked tirelessly with us in the last week to come up with a series of recommendations.

That report is going to be ready next week. I certainly hope to get a first look at it this weekend and to look at the ideas that are being considered. So let me just say everything's on the table, and it is a whole new day for looking at these issues.

Let me just end by saying two personal observations. One, I have been both heartened and, frankly, overwhelmed by the kind of support that we have received, not just from this committee, but from Congress in general.

GARVEY: I've received a number of personal calls, and in reaching out to all of you, the comments and support and just the eagerness to help us has been very, very heartwarming.

I will tell you that there have been moments in this last week at the FAA when we have felt very -- what we refer to as almost quiet moments of just despair. There have been very difficult times. But I have to say that we are -- more than despairing, we have a sense of resolve and a sense of determination to do whatever it will take to deal with what is an extraordinary threat to this country and to restore, as so many of you have said, the public confidence in aviation.

Thank you very much.

MICA: Before you conclude publicly, could you give us an update on restarting general aviation and also Reagan National, and then we will proceed.

GARVEY: Well, in terms of general aviation, as I mentioned, our restoring of the system was done gradually. And, as you know, the first part of general aviation to be included back in the system were those that filed flight plans, those that used instrument approaches. Obviously, the rationale was that that was something that we could watch more carefully.

We did lift many of the restrictions on VFR the night before last. I think it was about 7:00 that the NOTAM (ph) went out lifting many of the restrictions.

There are still some categories -- flight schools, I think, is the one that we're still obviously the most concerned about, and a number of others. Banners, for example, newscaster travel reports -- those are still banned, and we'll work on those in the coming days.

I think for us, and also from hearing from members of Congress and from the general aviation community, I think the flight schools are really the most critical issue. We will continue to work those with the National Security Council.

There are still restrictions in the Class B airspace, which is the airspace around the most busiest of our metropolitan areas. But the general aviation community is well aware of that, and they are very accepting of that. And Class C, which is the airspace that I think is of most interest to them, is very accessible right now, but for these last few restrictions. We will continue to work that with the National Security Council as well.

In terms of National, I'll be very brief. We have offered, and, again, working with the National Security Council, we have proposed several options of ways that National could be opened, again, in more of a transitional way. For example, just limiting it to shuttles and a number of other options that we've put on the table.

Clearly, there are security issues. No one is interested in opening National until the security issues have been addressed. But I will tell you we are actively working every single day. We've had people over there with the National Security Council. They're assessing the threat. We're providing options that could be included or adopted.

MICA: I thank you. And what we're going to do now is recess up to 2253. I'll ask the panelists to go up there and the members to go up there. We'll be up there for approximately two hours, and at 2:00, we'll take the second panel, which are some security experts.

So that's our tentative plan, and we'll have an open session at 2:00. The next one is for members and panelists only.

Thank you.

We stand in recess.

(RECESS)

MICA: I'd like to reconvene the hearing of the aviation subcommittee.

MICA: We have concluded our closed portion of the hearing and thank our witnesses for their participation. We closed that portion of the hearing so we could ask some security questions. And I think the last two hours, members have had a full discussion and good exchange.

We now turn to our second panel today. And I want to thank both of our witnesses for their patience and also for their participation.

We have in the second panel Mr. Larry C. Johnson, who's managing director of Business Exposure Reduction Group, and Mr. Isaac Yeffet, who's a former director general of El-Al Airlines.

We, again, appreciate your participation today. We thank you for joining us, look forward to your testimony.

And I think we'll start first with Mr. Johnson with Business Exposure Reduction Group, hear from you. Thank you.

L. JOHNSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank the members as well, for allowing me to speak.

Let me say at the outset I'm not here representing any company. I have no business interest in this right now. And I'm going to share with you views that have developed in the course of working in this, both at the State Department in counter-terrorism and the international arena and what I've seen since.

I do not say this in a way to point blame at anyone, but a very good friend of mine, who is a senior U.S. law enforcement official -- and I need to leave it vague in that regard. And I'll be happy to tell you in private who it was -- who worked in a senior capacity with the airline industry told me three years ago, he said, "You know, I've dealt with criminals all my life." And he says, "And dealing with this group of airline executives," he says, "they've been the worst group."

Now, I'm not saying that to disparage anyone. But his point was when it came to security issues, the business interests of the airline treaded on security. You cannot mix security and business. If you do, it's a recipe for disaster.

And this is nothing that we learned last Tuesday. We've known this since 1988 when Pan-Am 103 happened. And we've actually known it before. And we've got studies under both President Bush and under President Clinton which make that clear.

And so, my focus is simply to say we need -- and I understand the men and women of this committee have a terrible responsibility in this regard to carry out. You are under enormous pressure. But the good news for America is the courage and integrity you bring to this process. You now have the support to push some of these things forward that in the past there was great opposition to.

And I was watching the testimony the other day with the full committee. And I about fell out of my chair when one of the airline executives was complaining that three dollars surcharge on a ticket was going to keep people off the airlines.

I mean, the gulf between reality and fantasy is so enormous that they need a reality check. I travel a lot. I'll pay 10 bucks to surcharge. I would much rather be inconvenienced and out $10 than dead.

And it's not a matter of we can't protect Americans and we cannot protect the airline industry. We most certainly can. But it has to be done in a very decisive fashion. And in that regard, I'll just say four quick things and be done.

It does need to have one clear standard. These guys that did this knew that there were no air marshals on domestic flights. They exploited that. They beat the CAPS system. That's number one. One clear standard, no more difference between international, domestic category acts (ph) and the rest.

Secondly, federalize it. Take business out of security. I fully endorse airlines making a profit. I have no problem with that. I am in private business. I favor capitalism. But you cannot put a business whose job is making money from carrying people on airlines in charge or have anything to do with security.

They need to be held accountable. But ultimately, there needs to be someone -- and the federal government, in my view, should handle it in some respect. If this is not a national defense issue, I don't know what is.

Third, we need to get rid of the assumptions about human behavior and come up with technical and/or physical security measures. We used to assume that if you're going to hijack a plane, you're not going to commit suicide. And we now know that's wrong. And we have to come up with security measures that protect pilots and cockpits.

And there are other areas of assumptions that are still out there and that, as of today, are still unaddressed. And I'm not trying to alarm or scare the traveling public. But we are still allowing or relying on some measures of assumption about human behavior. And that must stop.

And finally, you know, it's comforting to come into the capitol today and the surrounding area and you see the security measures in place. But we're battling human nature because the problem with aviation security has always been it's been the one in a billion shot.

And so we keep saying, well, what's the threat? That's the wrong question. We cannot predict the threat. We have a historical record that we cannot predict the threat. So, instead of trying to predict the threat, let's defeat the possibilities. And we're smart enough; we have the technological capability to do it. And now I think we have the will to act.

And I thank you.

MICA: Thank you for your testimony. And we'll defer (ph) questions until we've heard from Mr. Yeffet. Mr. Yeffet is, again, former director general of El-Al Airlines.

Welcome, sir, and you're recognized.

YEFFET: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity that was given to me to come to talk here.

Since 1986 I am doing security surveys at airports inside United States and other countries in the world. 1986, Pan Am hired me after making a big advertisement in the United States through the television, newspapers, radios, pamphlets. And they promised the American people that they will be the number one in security because they wanted the American people to fly with them.

In fact, lots of American people preferred to fly with Pan Am. And they decided to collect extra $10 for cross the Atlantic. In few months, they collected close to $25 million.

In our report, after visiting 26 airports in Europe and the United States, we told them that the fact that they didn't face tragedy was matter of luck.

Look at our findings and look at our recommendations. If you will not implement, immediately, our recommendations, if a terrorist will decide to blow up any aircraft, nothing will stop them from succeeding. They ignored our report. December 1988, we face a tragedy with Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie.

After that, I was hired by Life magazine to do a security survey at major airports around the country. We came with full report, how lack security we have in our country here.

NBC hired me to do security survey in many countries -- in many airports (ph), including Washington, D.C., Dallas, Baltimore. At JFK, I decided to show how easy to blow up any aircraft the terrorist wants to do.

I bought a ticket under the name Abu Nidal, one of the most worst terrorists in the world. I paid cash money. I received the ticket.

YEFFET: I did a fake bomb. And I put it very simple inside the luggage that any X-ray will be able to find it. I went to the crew that were shooting pictures, to the skycap. I tipped the guys. I told them, make sure that my luggage will go to the right plane. He promised he will do it.

We knew where the aircraft parks. We went upstairs. The cameramen were shooting when the luggage came to the belt on the way to the belly of the aircraft. I stayed on the ground. The luggage flew to Miami.

I told the guys I am not ready to do it to one airline. We have to do it to more airlines to show it's systemwide and not isolated case. And we went to another two airlines, one to Denver, one other flight to L.A. Unfortunately, the other two luggage flew and I remained on ground.

Just realize what would happen if it was real terrorists.

After Lockerbie, I was invited to appear here in front of the subcommittee that did the investigation. I gave all my findings. I gave all my recommendations. I was told that the report of the subcommittee will go to the president of the United States.

It was September 1999 when I was here. Now we are September 2001. I am back here after the worst tragedy that we faced on September 11. My question, why this happened? The last 12 years, something has been changed? My answer is no.

I am traveling to do a security survey to see if there is any way that we can upgrade the level of security. There are many ways. The problem, it costs money. Money is not more important than the human being, than the American citizens. But money became the issue.

Mr. Chairman, I think that the authorities should take a strong decision, what we want to do. Are we serious, stating that from now on we will have a high level of security? That we will be able to save lives of innocent people? If the answer is yes, and I believe today that, from what I've heard, that the answer will be yes, let's go to work.

This cannot be built in one week or two weeks. This will take months to replace all the screeners that we have today, poor skilled, low level, undedicated. You get for what you pay if you pay the minimum wage.

We need to hire the qualified people. We need to train them, not as today, few hours. To train good people, it pays. And then to test them. And then to make sure that they understand their responsibility that they are holding on their shoulders before any aircraft will take off, that every passenger is the first passenger for them. The fact that thousands already left means nothing to you. He is always the first. Every flight will be the first flight.

We have to cover all what is connected with the flight, from the ticket office -- when people come to buy the ticket, we should train the people to inform the security department if something suspicious they have seen or they believe that one of the passengers looks like.

We need to get all the names of the passengers because we have to get already a list of passengers of suspicious people that we have to match and to see, maybe one of them is on the list. If he is on the list, let us be waiting for him and not he will surprise us.

I read that the FBI, they had the names of some of this group of terrorists of September 11. They were looking after them. Why the security of the airlines didn't receive these names if it's true that they had it?

We could learn that they are coming to fly with us. And we could stop them on the ground, and to avoid this tragedy.

We have to interview every passenger. We have to stop relying on technology only. Equipment are very good to help the human being, the good security people. Equipment cannot replace a good security man.

We rely in this country only on equipment. And who's running the equipment? After a couple of hours, they become the expert? That we expect them to stop these explosives?

When I did the survey at Washington, D.C., I went to the supervisor of security company to tell them that I'm looking for a job. We recorded everything. And she said, I'll give you a form. You just tell us if you had any criminal record the last five years.

I told her, lady, look at me. I am not 25 years old. I don't care how old are you. This is the FAA regulation. Once you have clear record, I'll show you in a few hours how to run the X-ray machine and you'll become the one who would work for me.

And I said, and you believe that I'd be able to identify it?

Yes. We'll show you: hand grenade, gun, dynamite, pipe bomb. It's easy to identify them.

This is what we are running today with the test. I recommend that the FAA will stop doing this kind of test. And then if they fail, only to fine them money, money, money, money.

If they fail, I don't want to see the guy who failed to go for retraining and to give him the second chance. There is no second chance when it comes to life of our people. Get rid of him. You can fine the company. But concentrate on this company that they failed to see if there is any risk that they will fail one more time.

If they will fail one more time, kick them out from the airport. Don't wait until tragedy will happen to us. We have to take care of each passenger and to decide who is bona fide, who is suspicious.

Our problem is to train the people how to approach to the passenger. If they know how to explain the passenger that we have no choice and we have to ask you security questions because we stay on ground and you take the flight, they will be more than happy to cooperate with us.

The bona fide will answer us with no problem. The one who wants to hide from us, even if he is smuggling drugs and not explosives, we will see it immediately on his face.

MICA: If you could begin to summarize, because I know members have questions, sir.

YEFFET: OK.

MICA: Did you want to summarize?

YEFFET: Can I add one more sentence?

MICA: Oh, yes. I just would like you to summarize so we can get to members' questions.

YEFFET: OK. I recommend that the FAA will look at his concept of his regulation and to start covering everything from A to Z. I flew yesterday from LaGuardia to Baltimore. People were getting their boarding pass from a computer. The computer is asking the security questions and they have to punch the answer.

I went to the ticket agent, not even one question about security. Yes, they found a nail clipper on me. And they said, you cannot fly with this nail clipper. Yesterday, before the tragedy, knife of four inches was legal. Today, nail clipper is illegal.

And the last point, with your permission, Mr. Chairman, I've heard today to federalize the security in our airlines. I think it's a big mistake. I think we should leave the security with the airlines. They fly their passengers. They have the ticket people. They have the reservations. They're catering, their cargo, and so on and so on.

Let them be responsible. I don't think that we have to release them from being responsible. If they will work together and if we know how to train the people from each department to all work connecting to the flight, I don't see that we have a problem to force them to run the security.

If they will fail and the American people, that are smart people, will know that this airline is not running their security on the high level that we expect from them, they will stop flying with them. Let them compete each other to show who is the best.

This way we will have most, if not all, the airlines with a high level of security.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MICA: Thank you both for your testimony. A couple of questions.

Mr. Johnson, if we take the airlines out of the security business, as you recommended, who would you assign it to?

L. JOHNSON: I think there are a number of viable options. I think there needs to be a debate on this. You want to consider it as a national defense issue, consider the Department of Defense.

You want to keep it in the law enforcement arena, Department of Justice. If you want to dedicate it within the Department of Transportation, dedicate it.

My point is somebody's got to be in charge that when the security director walks through the doors, they have it -- you know, I know the security directors of several of the airlines. When they come through the door and say, "We need this. We've got this problem," the executives are on the table going, "Wait a second. You're costing us money."

We have to have it in an agency that will be in charge of enforcing it without worrying about how does this affect our economic bottom line?

So, initially, I would favor something with the law enforcement then, probably at the Department of Justice.

MICA: The other thing, as you've pointed out, Mr. Yeffet, that prior to Tuesday, the 11th, a boxcutter or a four-inch knife was permitted on a commercial aircraft. But we've had, since 1996, Congress has mandated that standards for screeners and other standards be put in place for airline security.

That was delayed and put off and in 2000, we passed another airline security bill. And as I've held up this morning, we still have regulations that have not been implemented.

Would you recommend that there be some sort of instantaneous implementation, either by law enforcement or by someone overseeing, even if you say leave it with the airlines or we give it to someone else.

MICA: But the problem we have is getting rules or directives in place in a timely fashion. If you could both respond quickly.

Mr. Yeffet?

YEFFET: I don't see any problem how we can implement the high level of security based on the FAA regulation and above (ph) this.

MICA: Well, on average it takes 2.8 years for FAA to adopt a rule, 3.5 years for Department of Transportation to adopt a rule. We did a hearing on that whole process and how delayed it is.

But we need something in place in a hurry and something flexible to change with the changing threats.

YEFFET: Mr. Chairman, I believe that within three months we can have a good security system here. The point that...

MICA: That would have to be done by FIAT (ph).

L. JOHNSON: Yes. You cannot rely upon the regulatory process to get this accomplished because...

YEFFET: We can take the model of El-Al...

MICA: So, you're saying it could be done...

YEFFET: Yes, yes.

MICA: ...if someone has the authority, within three months.

YEFFET: Yes, yes. If we want to do it, we can implement the decision that will be taken by the authorities. We need only to decide yes, so let's go to work.

MICA: All right. Thank you.

Mr. Sandlin?

SANDLIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank the witnesses for coming.

I would have to agree with Mr. Johnson that we have a problem when we mix profit and security. I would be in favor of some sort of federalization of the security system.

But I think it's critical that we keep the airlines and the airports in the chain of obligation so we would have certain standards. And I usually talk about it in this context of a federal component to security.

Could you tell us physically, what sort of organization you could see if we federalized it, but the airlines maintained some obligation or some sort of input or participation?

L. JOHNSON: Ultimately, whatever organization is given this mission must have, as I think Chairman Mica was getting to this point, the ability to say these are the new security standards. And we're not going to put it out for debate. We're not going to put it out for, you know, endless hearings. If you've got a problem later, we'll come address it.

But when that is issued, that is issued through a government chain of command or a law enforcement chain of command. And the airlines and the airports will have to come in. They have to be trained. They have to be instructed.

There has to be the communication. I recognize that's out there in those areas. And frankly, if it was left to the security directors of the airlines, you wouldn't have a real problem. They face a very difficult working environment.

So, I'm very comfortable that the security directors at the airlines, the security personnel at the airports, if given the right kind of structure and support, could carry this out.

I mean, it's pretty complicated, and it's going to get into a variety of issues. And I don't want to pretend that, you know, we'll just draw a simple diagram and boom, it's going to happen. But we understand what the dimensions of the problem are.

And let me just quickly add, once you do it, it's going to have some other benefits that you haven't anticipated. You're going to catch drug traffickers. You're going to catch money launderers. You're going to catch people engaged in criminal activity because security measures are a big blunt instrument. They don't make a discrimination.

SANDLIN: Thank you.

Mr. Yeffet, let me ask you. I know that the security of the cockpit has been a real focus at El-Al, where you were before.

Could you give us, basically, your idea about the cockpit, what could be done either to make the door more secure or make it harder to get in there, should in fact, there be instructions to the pilots that they are to go forward and fly the plane, no matter what is happening?

Could you just give us just a basic, quick answer to that, please, sir?

YEFFET: All El-Al aircrafts, they have more than one door, solid doors. And you cannot have an access to the cockpit because they are locked. Except the pilots inside the cockpit, nobody has key to open the door. And it's not complicated, in my opinion, to build the same system here.

I believe that Israel will be more than happy to cooperate, to do it immediately.

SANDLIN: Thank you. I think I'm out of time.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity.

MICA: Thank you.

Let me recognize Mr. Petri.

PETRI: Thank you.

I was under the impression that current federal regulations in the United States are such that they insist that a door be built so it could be broken down by a person who weighs 150 pounds or more.

And that clearly was the last line of defense, and it was no defense in this situation. And they were able to turn these planes into weapons as a result. That could be stopped by that one simple step if they were to try to repeat this. So, I do hope we retrofit, just as a matter of deterrence, if nothing else, our airlines with Israeli-type cabin security.

I have just two other quick questions. Some countries have -- we were discussing who should have responsibility. The airlines? Ultimately, the federal government has to set the framework, whether it's on the airlines or some other point.

Some countries, the airport authority has responsibility for the entire airport on the theory that there are all kinds of personnel. They're aware of the local situation; they're linked in with local law enforcement.

Could either of you discuss that as an option, as opposed to airline specific or federal government, one size fits all for the entire United States?

YEFFET: Each country has a different level of security. And because I did a secretive survey for ITN (ph) from London in Europe, so I can tell you that Germany, for example, certain flights, they have the highest level of security. They don't leave a piece that they don't search. To other countries, they only screen and they have the security questions that the passengers should ask.

I came through London. I was not happy at all with the security level that they have. Over there, they rely on X-ray machine with the guys that are running the luggage so fast and to prove that this luggage was X-rayed, they were putting some sort of tape. And it's gone.

A terrorist and his girlfriend, to fly with El-Al from Itser (ph), London. She was pregnant. He told her to go to visit family. And her luggage was filled with explosives. The X-ray didn't identify anything.

She came to our guys for interview. Two simple questions. We came to the conclusion that something wrong with this passenger. She knew nothing. She was sure that she's carrying presents from her boyfriend to his family.

When we took her on aside and we found out that she was told that hit (ph) on Tel Aviv, two weeks, it's more than enough, fifty pounds. This was red light for our guys. And some other simple questions. She answered we could open the luggage and to stop on ground the explosives.

The millions of dollars that was spent for security, it was worth it.

We had the same, different story in Zurich, Switzerland, with a German criminal guy. He thought he's smuggling drugs to Israel. In fact, he didn't know that his luggage was filled with explosives.

On the ground, thanks to the security people, they interviewed him and checked his passport, his ticket. The German guy buys ticket to fly to Tel Aviv from Zurich. You just want to know why.

He was not expecting to this kind of simple questions and we can to determine that something's wrong. We opened the luggage. Kilos of explosives inside the luggage. And we saved one more time life of innocent people.

This is the greatest country in the world. This is the richest country in the world. Please, money are important. But they are not important more than life. Let's do the highest level of the security that a terrorist from now on would understand. If you come to kill American people, you will pay in your life.

MICA: Mr. Menendez?

I think also there's a democratic caucus called for 3 o'clock. If we can go through like we did in the closed questioning, try to get one question or two key questions, it'll help us expedite the proceeding.

Thank you. Mr. Menendez?

MENENDEZ: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Yeffet, let me ask you, you're familiar with the relationship of Israeli intelligence department and the aviation department. And to many of us -- one of the weak links that took place in the sad tragedy of the 11th is that.

Could you give us a fence of how Israeli intelligence information is integrated with the airport security? And that's one question.

My second question, so you can have a knowledge of what I want to ask, is how is it that El-Al security screeners are trained? How is it that you develop solid professionalism versus intuitive judgement?

YEFFET: The first question, intelligence. When I was the head of security for El-Al, if there are any information of threats, I used to receive it directly from the Israeli secretaris (ph).

Based on this, I took the right steps to be ready in case we will have some sort of attack. All my guys, before they started the flight, they knew about the threats. They knew what we expect from each one of them to do.

MENENDEZ: Does that include individuals?

YEFFET: Yes, sir. Yes, sir. Because I cannot say this group that are working on the flight, in the cargo or the catering or the duty free or you name it, they don't have to know it. Everyone should know it. We trusted them.

And this is how we could know what's going on with the information from the intelligence.

And your next question?

MENENDEZ: The difference between how you trained the security screeners. How do you develop solid professionalism versus intuitive judgement?

YEFFET: Not all the passengers are terrorists or criminals. Millions are flying. The majority are bona fide. We are looking for the one or two. That's why we don't have choice. We interview every passenger.

But we concentrate on the suspicious passengers that we get the list before they come to the airport of all the passengers of the flight. And we check the list with the station list that we have to see if one of them is on our list.

Once the answer is positive, he has a problem with us; we don't have problem with him anymore.

Now, if you have to X-ray, the suspicious luggage that is (INAUDIBLE) before you open it to X-ray to see when you open it, do they have wires that in case you open it, the explosives will go off? Yes or no.

Based on this, you know how to X-ray and to open and to search. When you search, you have to look for double button, because most of cases that we had were concealed in a double button.

It's the way how we can segregate between suspicious and bona fide passengers.

MENENDEZ: And one last question. How much time, or what type of training does your screeners actually go through?

YEFFET: The training?

MENENDEZ: That your screeners actually go through. You said these airlines now, they put somebody on the videotape for a few hours and that's it.

YEFFET: That's correct.

MENENDEZ: But the depth of the screening that El-Al's --

YEFFET: Not less than five, six days in the classroom and then on-the-job training. It takes time. Although there are qualified people, they are at least graduated from high school. They know the languages. We test them a lot. And once we are convinced that they are well trained and they can run the security, they can do it after a short time.

MICA: Thank the gentleman.

Mr. Cooksey?

COOKSEY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Glad to have both of you here today.

We admire the security that you have at El-Al. Quick questions. How many El-Al hijackings have there been? Was Entebbe an El-Al plane or another carrier?

COOKSEY: Number two: Could the El-Al security protocol be put in place in this country, the United States, considering our tradition of freedom of civil liberties and aversion to terrorist profiling?

And thirdly, is most of the El-Al security human questioning rather than technical or X-rays, or is it half and half?

Number one, how many El-Al hijackings have there been total?

YEFFET: The aircraft that was hijacked to Entebbe was not El-Al, sir. It was Air France.

COOKSEY: Good.

YEFFET: So, it had nothing to do with El-Al.

COOKSEY: You've had one...

YEFFET: Since then -- I beg your pardon?

COOKSEY: How many hijackings have you had...

YEFFET: Since then? None.

COOKSEY: None. Never.

YEFFET: None.

COOKSEY: Oh, I thought you said one. OK.

Another question, could the El-Al security mechanism that's been so successful be put in place, considering that in the United States we put a high priority on the civil liberties and not having profiling and so forth?

YEFFET: We can implement it here exactly like we do at El-Al. I have heard the stories about this is impossible to build this kind of system here because we are big. We have many flights a day; it's true. We need three to five hours for each flight; it's not true.

It costs big money; it's true. And therefore, it's impossible with millions of passengers to have high level of security. No one from all the people that I've heard them saying it have an experience to build this kind of security system in the United States.

Let's try one airport on the East Coast, one on the West Coast. Let's train the right people and to see how long it takes. The 747 for El-Al, 450 passengers, two hours are enough.

COOKSEY: OK. That answers my...

YEFFET: We are the best country here to show that we can do better than El-Al.

COOKSEY: Do you do body cavity searches very often or at all?

YEFFET: No passenger will be allowed to board if we did not search the aircraft. No cleaners will be allowed to clean the aircraft if we don't have our security people there.

So, we guard the aircraft from the moment he lands and he starts taxiing where he has to park until the second he is on his runway taking off to his destination.

COOKSEY: My question was about body cavity searches. Do you do those?

YEFFET: If we have to do, we do it. Sure. Sure. If we have to do, we do it.

COOKSEY: And the third question was is most of your security -- is it human intelligence questioning or is it mostly technical or is it half and half? By technical, I mean X-rays and so forth.

YEFFET: We don't rely on the six FAA questions. We don't like to ask any questions that the answer will be yes or no. I want to hear words from the passengers. Once the passenger is giving me words in his answer, I can give immediately, the next question.

Because the problem here, did you pack it? Yes. Do you have it with you? Yes. Somebody give you to carry something with you? No.

I don't want all these questions. I want words to hear from you. And our guys are trained to ask you the questions that you will be forced to answer me in words and not with yes or no.

COOKSEY: Thank you, Mr. Yeffet. And thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MICA: Thank you.

Mr. Lampson?

LAMPSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Yeffet, I didn't hear all of your explanation a while ago about the door on the El-Al Airlines. It's a double door, correct?

YEFFET: That's correct.

LAMPSON: And is there a space between that door or is it like in a passageway or...? Can you explain it a little bit more in detail for me, please? Or do you want to do that?

YEFFET: We have -- it's not door together with another door. It's not; it's not.

LAMPSON: OK.

YEFFET: And in between, there is a space. And you cannot open the door and to have an access to the second door, because once you try through the first one -- not you. If the terrorist will try the first one, I can tell you he will be dead, if not arrested if he doesn't have weapon with him, in seconds (ph).

LAMPSON: OK. I understand.

You had mentioned a while ago about when the security person made an error, terminate them. Don't give them a second chance. Are El-Al security personnel fired upon the initial failure of a spot security check?

YEFFET: Sure. I used to do thousands of tests every year. And I didn't do through the X-ray machine. I did complicated tests that cost money.

I used to send passengers with different kind of signs and stories. Something was wrong in the ticket, something wrong in the passport. You look 50 years old and your passport, you are 25 years old.

I wanted to know if they pay attention, yes or no. If they fail, go home, because test or real should be the same for the security people. There is not any different for them if it's real or test.

And this is how we brought the guys to be always under aware, that maybe we will have today test or real. And they don't want to lose their job because we pay them good.

LAMPSON: Mr. Johnson, about security equipment and technology. Are we using all of the technology that is available to us in this country right now? And what do we need to do?

L. JOHNSON: No, we're not. In fact, for example right now, one of the assumptions is that we have positive passenger/bag match, that if a passenger gets on an airplane with their bag, they're not going to commit suicide. That's an assumption we can no longer make.

The only way we can really defeat that is you have to subject each bag to detection through an explosive detection system. It has to pass through. Don't make any assumptions.

I think the fact that equipment that the Congress has appropriated money for is sitting in warehouses because in the past the airlines, they didn't want to maintain them. There were, you know, problems training people. And, you know, they find a reason not to get it out there.

The reality is it's going to have to be in every airport until you can come up with some other way to tell people there's no way to put a bomb on a plane.

So, the equipment's available. The technology has made important advances over the last five years. And we're not facing the situation we were after Pan Am 103 of not having equipment to put there. There is equipment that can be deployed that can meet those security standards.

LAMPSON: Are we doing things, that you know of, to look at beyond where we are now? I mean, I know that we're looking for explosives and we're trying to develop equipment, or we have equipment that can pick that up. What about those things that are not normal, plastics and such?

L. JOHNSON: There is one area that's a real vulnerability. I know FAA's working on it from an R&D standpoint.

I tell you, though, what I think our greatest weakness remains. And it's on the intelligence side, the integration between intelligence and law enforcement.

Because when you talk about setting up an agency to deal with this -- the information that customs has, the information the DEA has, the information that Immigration and Naturalization Service has and that FBI has on the law enforcement side -- they don't share that back and forth.

And if they're involved with a case, once the case is done, it goes into a black hole. Compounding it is the information that they do have is never really available to the intelligence community so that they can integrate it.

And we have -- I don't even want to call it decentralized intelligence. We have stovepipes (ph) that makes gerrymandered congressional districts look well organized.

And that is really, I think, where the top priority has to come, to get that information into one hand where it is available at the check-in counter, where there are databases you can put together that personnel at airline and customs checkpoints can run.

LAMPSON: Thank you, gentlemen. And thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MICA: Thank you.

Mr. Hayes (ph)?

HAYES (ph): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Couple of comments. One of you says federalize; the other says privatize. We need to work on some of those issues.

Mr. Yeffet, Israel is a good friend of the United States. You and I -- I have the utmost regard for human life, including the unborn child, so that's not the issue here.

But in Israel, as I understand, all of your flights are international. I mean, maybe you have some internal -- you have a passport. You have a document to work with.

Is it your opinion that we should have internal security documents which are as significant, in terms of difficulty to get, such as a passport, to increase our ability to screen passengers?

YEFFET: No. I don't think that we have to ask any American people when he fly domestic to carry with him the passports. But I expect to see an I.D. with picture. I expect to interview the passenger. I expect that the ticket office that is part of the airline will be forced to work with the security department, reservation...

HAYES (ph): Yes. I agree with all that. But do you think we should have an internal security document, in your opinion...

YEFFET: No, sir.

HAYES (ph): ...over and above a driver's license?

YEFFET: No, sir.

HAYES (ph): So, we've got enough documents?

YEFFET: Yes, we have more than enough. All the difference is that I'm asking is to allow the security people to interview the passengers, domestic and on international.

HAYES (ph): That's fine with me. But the American free and open society -- there's going to have to be some rethinking of what we allow each other to do. And that's an internal decision that we, as members of Congress, and others are going to have to make.

Now, one thing we haven't mentioned -- the horrible people that took over our airlines and flew them into buildings -- one of the profiles was they had spent a lot of time getting physically fit. The weapons that they had were significant, but their physical strength was an overwhelming factor in all this. We haven't even touched on that.

Mr. Johnson, you seem to have a real ax to grind.

YEFFET: Excuse me.

HAYES (ph): OK, go ahead. Excuse me.

YEFFET: I interviewed hundreds and hundreds of American passengers in this country. And I know the problem with convenience. And when I told them if they would be ready to give some of their convenience for their safety, not even one said to me, no way.

No one wants to lose his life or his children's life. Above all this, they agreed with me that if for their safety, they have to add few dollars, they will be glad to do it, because when I travel with my family, I don't want for $20, $25 extra to risk my life.

HAYES (ph): We have no argument. We're in agreement. But again, the makeup of the U.S. airline industry is based on getting a lot of people to fly that would not otherwise fly. If you have two hour security check -- and that may be the answer; I'm not resisting that -- they're not going to go through a two hour check to take a one hour flight when they can get in their car and do it.

So, that's an issue, again, we're going to have to decide internally.

Mr. Johnson, you seem to be unfavorably disposed toward the airline in your opening statement. I don't really know how that fits in here, because there's plenty of blame to go around. Our concern here is to get at the issues that can provide real, real and then perceived (ph) security for folks who're going to fly.

Can you sort of change gears and focus again -- you're an American. You're familiar with our system. What do you think we can reasonably accept, given the mindset of the American people and our economy, to really make some dramatic, realistic improvements to the system?

L. JOHNSON: Congressman, I think one of the first immediate steps that has to be taken is breaking that link, right now, where the airline industry, who has a legitimate profit motive -- I don't question that. But the legitimate profit motive constantly has come into conflict with the security issues. And as long as that link stays there, that problem will not be solved.

It is not my opinion. I know this from talking to friends of mine who are and have been the security directors in the U.S. airlines. They're good people. There's lots of integrity and professionalism.

But they run up against very significant corporate obstacles, because at the end of the day, they don't add money to the bottom line; they take money away.

And so, this fits into the picture of we have to deal with that as part of insuring that there's also one single standard for aviation security. We don't have multiple standards. You know, we don't put air marshals on international flights and leave them off domestic flights.

We want anyone that comes into this country or gets on a U.S. carrier to think they're going to get the best security. But one other issue that's not touched on is international carriers that are coming here as well.

HAYES (ph): If you federalize, you can't fire after one offense. If you unionize, you can't -- if you turn it over to El-Al, maybe we can.

MICA: Time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Carson?

CARSON: Thank you so much for appearing before us today. Just a couple of questions.

First of all, Mr. Johnson, you talked about some of the EDS equipment we have in our airports today. What percentage of our airports, if not all of them, are outfitted -- that are engaged in significant commercial aviation -- are outfitted with that particular equipment?

L. JOHNSON: I would estimate it's probably less than 20 percent.

CARSON: Actually have the equipment. Is that correct?

L. JOHNSON: Yes.

CARSON: So, for example, we know in this instance that two of the hijackers came through Portland, Maine before coming down to Boston Logan.

Apparently, at no point were they -- well, we don't know if they checked bags or not. But let's say, do we know if Portland, Maine, has that particular type of equipment since it's a smaller --

L. JOHNSON: No. I would be very surprised if they did have that.

CARSON: If they did have that. Well, let's say that they came through with checking bags. Would an airport, say the size of Portland, Maine, or many other small cities around the country have access to the kind of profiling data?

Would there computers be equipped to do that, that would perhaps highlight the fact that these are people who need to be checked out further?

L. JOHNSON: My understanding at this point is the profiling data is there, but it appears that these people beat the CAPS system.

CARSON: No. I understand. But in the future, if someone comes forward in Portland, Maine, who would otherwise trip off the profiling system at a much larger airport -- do the smaller airports like Portland, Maine, or Tulsa, Oklahoma, where I'm from -- would they have the ability to flag this person as someone who satisfied --

L. JOHNSON: Some do; some don't. It's not in place across the board. And that's the problem.

CARSON: And even if, say a small city like Portland, Maine, flagged the person because they satisfied the profiling data, they wouldn't have the sophisticated EDS equipment to test all of their baggage. Is that true?

L. JOHNSON: Well, the reality is right now if you go into any of the small airports, in particular, and every bag checked on an airline is not going to be subjected to any kind of guaranteed explosive detection system testing.

CARSON: Is there a procedure in place, though, if Portland, Maine, is not capable of checking every bag and doesn't have sophisticated equipment, by the time they connect through Boston Logan, that we still have that data about that passenger, and their bags are then put through the more sophisticated equipment that a place like Boston Logan no doubt has.

L. JOHNSON: They could be pulled off at that point. But again, I think one of the things we need to eliminate is this assumption that we don't have to check every bag.

We had that luxury before last Tuesday. Since last Tuesday, I think we need to just take a complete comprehensive approach to it, design it as a security system, not a security component.

And that means that there's not one magic bullet out there that's going to solve this.

CARSON: No. I agree with you. But my question is under the current system, I agree we have to change it just as you advocate. Are they being flagged in places like Boston Logan or the larger airports would then (ph) be checked more scrupulously?

L. JOHNSON: My understanding is it's going to vary from airline to airline.

CARSON: OK. Very good.

Mr. Yeffet, if I could ask you a couple of questions about the El-Al procedure.

There's been some discussion that the heavier doors, the impregnable doors on El-Al Airlines cause some pressurization problems. And that's one of the downsides, perhaps, from a safety side of that.

Can you explain more what those concerns are and kind of what El- Al's approach to dealing with that concern is?

YEFFET: The main concern is the safety of the passenger. From here, any department that has any work to do with the flight, he has to be secured.

If it's the cargo, if it's the luggage that goes from the check- in to the baggage room, we have a station sticker with the code of the flight and when it's come to the baggage room, the security guards first get the luggage, he checks.

If we have all the security signs, then he allows the guys to put it on the cart. From the baggage room to the aircraft, they escort them.

CARSON: Well, let me rephrase the question. I'm told that some of the resistance in the United States to the heavier doors, such as El-Al uses, is because of some potential depressurization in the cabin that would affect the cockpit differently or vice-versa like that.

Perhaps, Mr. Johnson, you can weigh in on that, too, and discuss what those concerns are and whether those are realistic concerns.

YEFFET: Mr. Congressman, El-Al has the same aircraft that we have in the United States here, Boeing, all of them Boeing. So what's the difference between 747 of El-Al and 747 here or 767 or 757? So, if there they can do it and there is no problem, why should we have a problem here?

CARSON: Well, I guess there are people at the aviation industry that says El-Al makes different tradeoffs, or has in the past, between various forms of security about that.

I know my time is up. Mr. Johnson, would you like to weigh in on that?

JOHNSON: My only real technical knowledge on that was gleaned from listening to the Boeing representative that testified yesterday before the Joint Senate-House Committee.

And you know, I thought he had some very compelling things to think about. I mean, he understands it and those are the kinds of people we need to have looking at that and fixing it. It's fixable, but again, at this point it's not easy.

MICA: Thank you very much.

Mr. Kirk?

KIRK: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I just wanted to focus on the El-Al issue. Maybe I should call you Abu Nidal, because I know you've tried to fly under that name. And you were actually successful in placing a simulated bomb on U.S. aircraft.

YEFFET: I'm very sad and shamed that I succeeded.

KIRK: You did. You did, several times, I see.

YEFFET: Yes. I'm shamed that I did it. And I succeeded.

KIRK: Right.

YEFFET: It's to show the authorities, stop it.

KIRK: That's right.

YEFFET: Don't wait until a real bomb comes.

KIRK: We have an issue of arming pilots. And I wanted to ask you if the El-Al pilots were armed.

YEFFET: I cannot comment in open session, sir.

KIRK: OK. Roger.

On the issue of airport security personnel, I've flown El-Al many times and always we have that third area of security at the El-Al gate itself. What is the nationality of the security personnel at the El- Al gate?

YEFFET: 99.9 are Israelis.

KIRK: All right. That's what I would figure. Sadly, not true in the United States.

Would it be possible for you to provide a chart to the committee of some of the publicly discussed security measures we do -- we do at least five or six that I can think of -- and the publicly discussed things that El-Al does so that members of Congress could see a chart of how many more things El-Al does than our own domestic airlines?

YEFFET: I prefer to do it in a closed session. Then I'll be more able to be open and to describe whatever I can to the subcommittee here.

KIRK: That would help us, because I think for us, on one page, to see security measures that we commonly do together and then all of the additional measures would be a great help.

In your previous high level capacity, could you roughly estimate how much more this costs El-Al than the U.S. airlines?

YEFFET: This costs many millions. I cannot talk about the right figure, because first of all, it's different from the time that I was the head of security and today. It costs much more today.

And again, I have to emphasize that money, for Israel, it's more difficult than this nation. And if they invested the money and we could save lives, I was told the millions of dollars that they gave us was worth it.

KIRK: We've heard that costs could range, for enhanced security measures, upwards of $20 or $30 per ticket.

YEFFET: I don't think so. I think it's much less than this per ticket. Much less. For security?

KIRK: Right.

YEFFET: Much less, sir.

KIRK: That's good to hear. That's good to hear.

Mr. Johnson, any --

L. JOHNSON: Oh, I would agree with what he said about that. I think it can be done for less than that. And there are really some other benefits that would come from doing so.

KIRK: I've toured El-Al's facilities out at O'Hare, some that we don't want to discuss. It's quite impressive. It's clearly a direction we need to move.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MICA: Thank you.

Mr. Kennedy?

KENNEDY: Yes. Mr. Yeffet, you've talked about the fact that you don't want questions answered by yes or no. And we've never really been through this type of a process before.

So, maybe you could talk about two or three of the questions that you've found to be most productive in identifying whether someone is someone you want to let on the plane or keep off the plane.

YEFFET: Yes. If you want few questions that they'll ask?

KENNEDY: Yes. A couple of example questions, yes.

YEFFET: Where are you coming from? Who helped you with the luggage? To whom this luggage belongs? Can you describe for me what you have inside the luggage? Have you been already on our flight before that? When? Where you are going? For how long you are going? Whom you know over there?

This kind of questions you answer in words. And once we see that you are nervous; your face become white; your lips become dry; your Adam's apple jumps up and down (ph); you start to yell; something wrong with you.

Because if you are bona fide, then you know that we do it for your safety. You cooperate.

KENNEDY: OK. And you talked about a number of measures that you're doing, the more intensive questioning that you just mentioned, the doors, the sky marshals, the tickets on the baggage and all that stuff. And I'm sure that what makes it most successful is it all working together.

If we were to drive down just one of those four or five different areas, what do you think is the most effective way, of those five, recognizing that you prefer to have all of them, that we should be focusing on first?

YEFFET: I don't think that we can say this is more important than this, because we are dealing with sophisticated enemies. They are looking, where are the weak holes to use access through that?

For us, every single point is important, not less, no more than the others. For sure, that interviewing is the most critical point, because then we have to concentrate on the bad guys and to separate them from the good guys.

KENNEDY: And on biochemical terrorism, what actions do we need to make sure that we're safe from those perspectives?

YEFFET: Intelligence should work with the security. We should know how to interview people, how to X-ray luggage, how to look for the suspicious passengers and luggage.

If we will train the employees of the airlines that they have to understand the responsibility that they have, once they get any, some sort of information, even if they think that there is something important, show them, yes, it's important. Throw it. Don't let them know that you did it.

Make any information that you get from them very important to them. Encourage them to cooperate with you. And you talk with the people of the catering, those who are guarding the cleaners, those who are taking care of the fueling, duty free, the baggage handlers.

Everyone should be cooperate with you. But your eyes is on them.

KENNEDY: OK. Mr. Johnson, we've talked a little bit about cost. But if we were to scan every bag, you know, checked in or otherwise, carried on or otherwise -- how much incrementally more? Do you have an assessment of that? Have you tried to make an estimate of that as to what that would cost?

L. JOHNSON: No, I have not. But this much I know, having, you know, looked at it over the last five years. It's not a static situation. In other words, you're not looking at if you start screening tomorrow then you're going to face the same kind of delays a year from now or two years from now.

The amount of time spent in screening baggage has dropped dramatically over the last eight years. The FAA found a middle ground by saying, all right, we will not screen bags of people who fit the CAPS profile as being frequent fliers and et cetera.

And they try to narrow the number of bags that are inspected. I think we recognize that now we have the technology to do it. It may initially create some delays. But over the long term, there will be a financial incentive in that industry to really push the time down and make it workable.

Part of the problem has been you haven't had the investment, really, to get the industry up and running at a level where you've got several companies competing and offer a quality product at a low cost.

KENNEDY: Well, thank you both for your testimony.

MICA: The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Shuster?

SHUSTER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Yeffet, can you tell me when's the last incident -- a terrorist incident -- on an El-Al plane?

YEFFET: It was 1986.

SHUSTER: '86.

And can you comment on the significance of having security on the plane? Go through, maybe some of the procedures, whatever you can comment on, how many people, (INAUDIBLE) plain clothes, who knows that they're on the plane.

YEFFET: The number of air marshals is different from flight to flight because it depends on what country you go, what problems of passengers you have on the flight, what kind of security measures you can get from this country.

YEFFET: But we have air marshal that are focusing on the cockpit from one hand and to the suspicious passengers that are flying with us, even though we found out that we have to search them so deeply and seriously.

But we cannot leave them on ground, because we are not there to cause losses to the airline. But we assign them a seat, that if there is any problem, we are ready.

SHUSTER: And who on the flight knows that they're on there? Just the pilots? Or nobody?

YEFFET: The pilots know. The...

SHUSTER: The flight crew know?

YEFFET: The personnel. He knows. Not everybody from the air crew know them. Within the time, if they are permanent, they will identify them. I don't want to leave with illusion that never.

SHUSTER: How significant a deterrent do you believe it is that the terrorist knows that there is armed personnel on the plane? Sort of like putting a big dog out in front of your house. How significant is that in your efforts?

YEFFET: It's not secret that we have air marshals. And it's not secret they prefer not to try to hijack an aircraft from El-Al. What they did, they tried to kill our passengers in Paris at the airport. Thanks to the good guys, with the local authorities, not one of our passengers was injured. And all the four guys, the terrorists, were dead.

SHUSTER: Well, I guess maybe the way to get at that answer is are there significant attempts still to get on planes, in view of the fact that there is armed guards, or armed personnel? Are the attempts down? Are they -- are you catching a significant number of people trying to get bombs on the plane?

YEFFET: It's very difficult to answer this question, Mr. Congressman. For us, every flight we say, we might have an attack. This is the concept. We cannot say, yesterday, nothing happened, last week, last month, last year. So, why today?

For us, every flight is the first flight. And it might be any attempt to attack us. Therefore, all the flights should be run at the same level of security. Because if we sleep once, who knows if they don't try that day. And we don't want to lose.

SHUSTER: Mr. Johnson, do you care to comment on sky marshals?

L. JOHNSON: They provide a deterrent factor. And just by looking at the way this latest operation was conducted against the four aircraft, they chose domestic flights for a very good reason. They understood somehow that they weren't going to face that possible threat.

I don't think sky marshals in and of themselves are the ultimate solution. But it's an immediate comfort to everybody on the plane. If nothing else, it's going to make the pilots right now a little calmer.

And there are several nervous pilots out there that I've talked to that are having problems with some of the airlines where they're making some statements to passengers before liftoff that has alarmed passengers.

So, I think it's important to do that immediately. As it's being done, it will help calm the situation and bring us back toward a little more, what I call the normal fear of flying.

SHUSTER: Thank you, gentlemen, for appearing before us today.

I yield back my time.

MICA: Thank you.

Mr. Johnson?

T. JOHNSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You'll forgive me. I've been in and out. I hope the question I ask hasn't been asked and answered before. If it has, you can refer me to the record.

Let me say, first of all, I had occasion about three weeks ago to fly to and from Tel Aviv on El-Al. And not only was there enjoyable flight and courtesy, but an extraordinarily well-run airline. And I appreciate that.

What -- and I understand that you may not be familiar with what training, education and so forth that pilots, on-aircraft personnel, screeners and otherwise go through within the American airline industry.

But to the extent that you know that, contrasting and comparing that with what pilots, stewards, others go through on El-Al. Is there a significant difference? And if so, what is the difference?

YEFFET: I really don't know what's going on with the pilots in this country. I know what's going on in Israel.

T. JOHNSON: Right. Well, that answers the question, then. And I don't mean to ask the question in any way being derogatory toward our training process. But obviously, that gears into how well- equipped we are or not and what steps we need to take to parallel maybe more some of your experience.

I guess my other question is this, and again, I say this with all due respect. But you don't have, for better or worse, Israel doesn't have the Bill of Rights. I'm not saying you don't have rights. But you don't have to deal with the First Amendment and the 14th Amendment and otherwise in the same sense that we do.

Do you see that our -- and again, I'm not suggesting a change in the laws here or a change in the laws in Israel. But do you -- as you look at the situation, is your job easier, more difficult or the same because of the lack or presence of some of those constitutional standards or other standards that we have here?

And I say that with a, really, lack of education about what you specifically require in Israel. But, just generally?

YEFFET: The question bothers me a lot because we didn't even try to see what will be the reaction of the American people in one flight, in one terminal, in one airport, and to see what kind of cooperation, they will cooperate with us or they will start to say, you are violating my rights.

From my experience with so many interviews, I believe very strongly that when it comes to life and death, the American people are enough smart to cooperate with the security if we will show them that we mean business. This is a real security for your safety.

T. JOHNSON: Don't misunderstand me. I'm not in any way being critical.

YEFFET: I understand.

T. JOHNSON: You run a great airline. And I'm not suggesting that we -- my flight to and from Israel was no different than a flight on American Airlines or United. It was a terrific flight.

All I'm suggesting is, as a matter of policy, do we have to do some extra things in order to be able to reach your state of preparedness, not only in terms of technical aspects, but in terms of a legal structure that would allow us to do that.

And again, I say that you shouldn't be bothered by my question. I'm being very complimentary in what you do. And I'm wondering how we can more parallel what you do.

YEFFET: If you flew, sir, with El-Al, I don't see any difference if we will build the same system here. We don't have to make revolution when we are talking about having high level of security. We have to change our concept without bothering the people, because people are looking to fly and to arrive safe and secure to their destination.

It depends on us how we approach to the passenger to bring him to cooperate with us. Lots of Americans are flying with El-Al. Once they understand the questions, they have no problem.

Why we cannot have the same system here? And we don't have to exaggerate from what we have today. And we say, oh, my God. This is now completely revolution with the system that we have. Just make some changes.

T. JOHNSON: And I don't disagree with that. And I think your presence here and your expertise is extremely helpful to us in this process. And we appreciate it. So, thanks.

YEFFET: Thank you very much, sir.

MICA: Thank the gentleman.

Let me recognize Mrs. Kelly.

KELLY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm going to make this very quick and very brief.

I'm appalled, Mr. Yeffet, that you were able to get through security as Abu Nidal. I can't imagine anybody would have put that through.

I'm interested in the fact that I understand that the security company for Logan, Newark, Reagan and Dulles airports was fined a million dollars last year because of inadequate training and background checks on their employees.

I'm wanting to ask the two of you if you think that fines are an effective way to force security. And I wonder if you'd be willing to address that, please.

YEFFET: The fine is one of the ways, but not the only way. Today, this is the only way, to the best of my knowledge. And I'm running from airport to airport. And I know what's going on because I do a security survey. And I'm working as a consultant for a company to try to upgrade the level of their security.

If we will let the security company or the airline, just paying money, I think this will be wrong. We have to show the security private company that are running the security for the airlines, if you do it three times, you are out of this airport.

And the airline has to suffer, because they signed a contract with the lowest bid and very low, poor skill of the security people. You cannot get somebody to train in few hours. After a month he's out; after three months he's back. Somebody else is replacing him. The security people should be trained from the foundation of the system.

The FAA -- I know how many millions of dollars they fine. This will save our life? My answer is no, ma'am. What will change and save our life is to change this kind of low level of security people and to hire the qualified people that will know that if I will fail, I caused loss of innocent people's life because of me.

And this is what I want to bring the security people.

KELLY: So, you say three strikes and you're out on anything like this where there is a breach of security that can be demonstrated.

Mr. Johnson, do you want to address that?

L. JOHNSON: Well, I agree. One of the -- there is a practical problem that the airlines face that when the company is fined or if you're throwing them out, they're going to have a period where you've got to find something to fill in.

It's not like you have another company right off the shelf you can immediately put into place. It's not like having a broken tube in a television that you pull out one or insert a new circuit board. So, there are some practical considerations with airline operations that come into effect.

But it's got to be punitive; it's got to be quick. And it has to be constantly followed up. The follow-up is critical on it.

KELLY: Thank you very much. Thank you.

I turn back the balance of my time, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

MICA: I thank the gentlelady.

Are there further questions from members?

There being none, let me just sort of sum up here.

First of all, I think we have agreement from both of you that we need a better system of intelligence. That agreed upon. And then we need a better system of disseminating that intelligence so it's available to the screeners, to the airport personnel, whoever comes in contact with the passenger. Is that correct?

L. JOHNSON: Yes, sir.

MICA: It also appears that we need some clearer standards. I think Mr. Johnson, you said I think, you agreed, too, that there be some very specific standards. We need someone to set those standards. Now, there's some conflict about that.

Mr. Johnson, you were opposed to having the airlines in control. You felt the airlines should be in control. But if someone else set the standards, say, rather than FAA, a law enforcement federal agency. Would that be an agreeable structure?

L. JOHNSON: As long as the airlines are not in the position to veto the decision...

MICA: OK.

L. JOHNSON: ...I think, as long as they...

MICA: So, if someone set the parameters, clear standards, and we had someone setting them who isn't (ph) controlled and this isn't financed (ph).

Mr. Yeffet, you said Pan Am imposed a $10 fee, went on TV and said what great security they had and then had the Pan Am 103 flight tragedy. They weren't spending the money on security.

MICA: They were spending it on advertising.

YEFFET: That's correct.

MICA: So, we need that protection in place.

Now, everyone focuses on the screeners. And they're important. And they need to be professionalized with standards. We have a wide range of other people who have access to baggage, to the airplane, to the tarmac. Who do we put them under? In most instances, they're under the airport in most of our locations.

Who controls that process? Because that gives you a wide gap, screening, information, interrogation or questioning of people. How do we secure the airport and who's in charge of that?

Mr. Yeffet, Mr. Johnson?

YEFFET: In the baggage room that receives the luggage from the check-in, the luggage cannot go from the check-in if we don't have a sticker with the...

MICA: OK. That's outside the realm of what I'm talking about. I'm talking about caterers. We're talking about cleaners; we're talking about ramp people. It appears that one of the terrorists may have had a ramp access identification pass.

Who is in charge of setting the standards, conducting the oversight and the review to make certain that that area is secure? I mean, we can -- it's like Jell-O: You push down here and it pops up there.

So, who do you two recommend be responsible for setting those standards, conducting the operations and the oversight?

YEFFET: The security of the airline.

MICA: Pardon?

YEFFET: The security of the airline. They have...

MICA: Same thing?

YEFFET: I beg your pardon?

MICA: Same?

YEFFET: Yes. They have to do it. Excuse me. They have to be in charge of everything connected with the flight. If it's catering, if it's duty free, if it's cargo, if it's luggage -- you name it -- the security of the airline must be responsible for everything from A to Z.

And I believe that the airlines should not be released from this responsibility. Because the moment they will be released, their employees will show their back to the security, because this is not anymore their responsibility.

And if we share the responsibility between the law enforcement and the airlines, God forbid, something will happen. Now we have to look to whom to blame. You cannot share or make a compromise when it comes to the security. The airline security should be responsible from A to Z.

MICA: OK.

Mr. Johnson. Go ahead.

L. JOHNSON: I have a different perspective on it.

I'm not suggesting that the airlines be divorced from the security operations or have no responsibility. I'm saying I don't want any decisions made about security, spending and what's needed to be based upon whether or not it's going to be profitable to an airline. That needs to be kept separate.

And so, in this respect, when I talk about federalizing the system of security at airports, I'm not trying to, you know, beef up the federal government's work force.

But ultimately, I think it has to be a federal official at that airport that's in charge, because ultimately when you're talking about integrating the intelligence, the law enforcement, control of borders, control of immigrants, all of that has got to come together under one hat.

And the only one that has that is the...

MICA: The airline.

L. JOHNSON: ...is the federal government.

MICA: Well, but the airline -- I'm sorry -- has the access to the passenger and the passenger list. So, they have to be kept in the loop in that fashion.

JOHNSON: Absolutely. Absolutely.

MICA: Now, one of the gaps that we also have is I described the nightmare that we've had in trying to get some clear standards in place since 1996.

Mr. Yeffet, you testified that this could be done in three months. It's taken us six years and we still don't have it in place. So, we need either an enforcement agency or an agency that can adopt directives, implement rules, regulations. How soon? Immediately?

Mr. Johnson, Mr. Yeffet?

L. JOHNSON: I would say we've got to move immediately in this direction, because the airline industry is too important to the economy...

MICA: And the threat also may change day by day, week by week.

L. JOHNSON: I don't like trying to worry about threat, per se, from this standpoint. We can't predict it.

MICA: OK.

L. JOHNSON: So, let's just recognize it's out there. I don't worry about whether my house is going to be broken into. I just make sure I've got locks on the doors and windows so nobody can get in.

MICA: Mr. Yeffet?

YEFFET: Mr. Chairman, I'm afraid that we became superprofessionals in reacting and not in preventing. When we face tragedy, we have tons of money for investigation. Look what's going on now with the military of this country, how many billions of dollars we are going to spend.

I don't see why we cannot have this security system immediately. We implement it in order to save, first of all, life, and then money.

MICA: Thank you.

I have one more request for a question.

Mr. Johnson?

T. JOHNSON: Let me just ask again a different question of you, sir.

When I was in Israel, we took one intra-country flight from, I believe, Tel Aviv to the north, near the Sea of Galilee, different airline. It appeared to me in my surface glance that the same degree of security that was existent from New York to Tel Aviv and back was also on this small -- we have huge numbers of those flights from smaller regional terminals to major terminals and internationally.

Is there the same degree of security, and given the fact that, you know, there are economic aspects to this in smaller airports, how would you -- I'm not asking you to plan our economic program.

But how does the degree of security differ, if at all, internationally versus intra-nationally? And how might that translate over into our experience?

YEFFET: Allow me to answer you with a question. Let's assume that we have 10 passengers in one airport. And other airport, they have 400 or 4000 or 40,000. The 10 passengers, they don't have the same rights to fly safe like the other 40,000?

T. JOHNSON: Of course. I'm not suggesting they don't, at all. I'm just asking if you have that uniform security at little airports as well as the big airport?

YEFFET: Yes, we do have it.

T. JOHNSON: OK. That's my question. And that's...

YEFFET: And the flights in Israel.

T. JOHNSON: Don't put words in my mouth. I'm for keeping our airports safe across the board, including in Champaign and Bloomington.

YEFFET: I apologize, Mr. Congressman.

MICA: Well, there being no further questions, I want to take this opportunity to thank both of our witnesses today for your expertise, for your insight and for your candid responses to our questions.

As you can see, we do face a very difficult challenge trying to craft a new approach to meet what we've seen happen, not only in the last week, but in all the areas of aviation security.

We, again, thank you.

There is a motion from Mr. Kennedy that the record be left open for a period of 30 days and that members be allowed to revise and extend. Without objection, so ordered.

I do want to say, in closing, that we do have a diversity of opinion on the solutions. Again, I know the minority is in caucus. But I'm ready 24 hours a day until we get this solved. We have legislation, we think, on the floor this afternoon to deal with the financial situation of airlines.

We need the security legislation on the floor as soon as possible. And we also have other pending proposals dealing with economic assistance to others who have been directly damaged by the events of September 11, and to which we have a responsibility to assist.

So, we invite suggestions. We look forward to working with members on all sides. And hopefully, this afternoon we can continue some of those discussions.

There being no further business to come before this subcommittee on aviation, this hearing is adjourned.

Thank you.

END

NOTES:
???? - Indicates Speaker Unknown
    -- - Indicates could not make out what was being said. off mike - Indicates could not make out what was being said.

PERSON:  JOHN MICA (94%); JOHN DUNCAN JR (57%); JACK QUINN (56%); SPENCER THOMAS BACHUS (56%); SUE KELLY (55%); RICHARD H BAKER (55%); WILLIAM ASA HUTCHINSON (54%); JOHN R THUNE (54%); JOHN COOKSEY (54%); FRANK A LOBIONDO (53%); JERRY MORAN (53%); MARK KENNEDY (51%); DENNIS REHBERG (51%); SAM GRAVES (51%); CHRIS JOHN (50%); 

LOAD-DATE: September 27, 2001