Copyright 2001 Federal News Service, Inc. Federal News Service
October 24, 2001, Wednesday
SECTION: PREPARED TESTIMONY
LENGTH: 3173 words
HEADLINE:
PREPARED TESTIMONY OF PAUL H. O'NEILL SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKING,
HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS
SUBJECT - TERRORISM
RISK INSURANCE
BODY: Mr. Chairman,
Senator Gramm, and Members of the Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to
comment on terrorism risk insurance. These hearings are extremely important. We
believe that there is a real and pressing need for Congress to act on this issue
now. As I will discuss in more detail, market mechanisms to provide terrorism
risk insurance coverage have broken down in the wake of September 11. Such
coverage is now being dropped from property and casualty reinsurance contracts
as they come up for renewal, with most policies renewing at year-end. If
Congress falls to act, reinsurers have signaled their intention to exclude such
coverage meaning that primary insurers may have to drop this coverage or
institute dramatic price increases. As a result, after January 1 the vast
majority of businesses in this country are at risk for either losing their
terrorism risk insurance coverage or paying steep premiums for dramatically
curtailed coverage. This dynamic can in turn be expected to cause dislocations
throughout our economy, particularly in the real estate, transportation, and
energy sectors. 1. The Problem
The terrorist attacks of
September 11 created widespread uncertainty about the risk and potential costs
of future terrorist acts. Since September 11, we have endured this uncertainty
every day as a country. It has permeated every sector of our economy.
A key part of the government's response to the events of
September 11 is to ensure that our economic stability is not undermined by
terrorist acts. Continued economic activity is dependent on well functioning
financial markets - where the lifeblood of capital is provided to business
enterprises. Financial markets allocate capital based on the potential success
of a business. In doing so, financial markets rely on the insurance sector to
mitigate certain types of risk that are not directly related to the plans or
operations of a business.
Insurance companies manage
risk in economic activity and facilitate the efficient deployment of capital in
our economy by estimating probabilities of possible adverse outcomes, and
pooling risk across a large group. Since September 11 the uncertainty
surrounding terrorism risk has disrupted the ability of insurance companies to
estimate, price, and insure the risk.
We learned on
September 11 that, while perhaps highly improbable, terrorists are capable of
enormous destruction. Could such an event be repeated? As a country and a
government, we are doing everything in our power to prevent a repetition of
anything like the events of September 11. But how does an insurance company
assess this uncertainty? How does an insurance company price for it? At the
moment, there are no models, no meaningful experience, no reasonable upper bound
on what an individual company's risk exposure may be.
Insurance companies do not "take" risks. They knowingly accept and
mutualize risks. They are private, for-profit enterprises. If they do not
believe they can make money by underwriting a particular risk, they will not
cover it. Because insurance companies do not know the upper bound of terrorism
risk exposure, they will protect themselves by charging enormous premiums,
dramatically curtailing coverage, or - as we have already seen with terrorism
risk exclusions - simply refusing to offer the coverage. Whatever avenue they
choose, the result is the same: increased premiums and/or increased risk
exposure for businesses that will be passed on to consumers in the form of
higher product prices, transportation costs, energy costs and reduced
production.
The consequences of uncertainties
surrounding terrorism risk are already evident in the airline sector. The
Department of Transportation's initial projection is that, as a result of the
September 11 attacks, airlines will pay nearly $1 billion in premium increases
for terrorism risk insurance in the next year despite a congressionally imposed
cap on third-party liability. Within the next few months, similar increases can
be expected for other forms of economic activity deemed "high risk" - if
coverage is available at all. Higher premiums will divert capital away from
other forms of business investment.
The need for action
is urgent. From our conversations with insurance company representatives, state
insurance regulators, policyholders, banks and other entities which provide
financing for property transactions, the next two months are critical. The
insurance industry relies on a complicated structure of risk sharing. Risk is
shared among primary insurers, reinsurers, and retrocessionairs (i.e., providing
reinsurance to the reinsurers). This structure has worked well in the past and
greatly contributed to widely spreading losses associated with the events of
September 11 across the insurance industry.
However, in
light of the uncertainty created by September 11, reinsurers have told us that
they will no longer cover acts of terrorism in their reinsurance contracts with
primary insurers. And as I have said, most property and casualty insurance
contracts are up for renewal at year end. This will create the following choices
for insurers: assume all of the risk of terrorism coverage and raise prices to
cover all of the associated, unshared costs; reduce coverage levels; or cancel
coverage. Any of these choices has the potential to cause severe economic
dislocations in the near-term either through higher insurance costs or higher
financing costs.
2. Objectives
In grappling with this problem, we have had several objectives.
First and foremost, we want to dampen the shock to the
economy of dramatic cost increases for insurance or curtailed coverage. We also
want to limit federal intrusion into private economic activity as much as
possible while still achieving the first objective. And we want to rely on the
existing state regulatory infrastructure as much as practicable.
Note that none of these objectives are directed at providing government
assistance to the insurance industry. The industry is absorbing the financial
losses it contracted for as a result of the September 11 attacks, and is fully
capable of making good on those losses. The industry is also capable of
continuing to provide insurance for non-terrorist hazards. The problem, as I
have said, is one of uncertainty about future terrorist risk. At the moment,
there is no basis upon which to price terrorism risk and no sense of the upper
bound on the risk exposure.
3. Options
Over the past few weeks, a variety of proposals have emerged to deal
with the problem I have outlined. Before turning to the approach we have
developed, I will briefly discuss a few of the alternatives we considered and
some of the shortcomings we identified with each. A case could be made to treat
terrorism risk insurance like war risk insurance. During World
War II, the federal government provided property owners with insurance
protection against loss from enemy attack.
Similarly,
the Israeli government provides insurance for terrorism risk. This approach
would recognize the terrorist threat as one made against all Americans and would
establish the broadest possible risk pool for insuring against this risk. At the
same time, such an approach implies a permanent federal intrusion in the market
so long as any terrorism risk remains.
A second
approach, one suggested in various forms by insurance industry representatives,
involves the creation of a reinsurance company to pool terrorism risk. This
model follows an approach developed in the United Kingdom in response to IRA
terrorist activities. This approach has some appeal, especially in providing a
vehicle for pooling the industry's risk while providing an upper bound on
industry losses through a government backstop. With more time, or in different
circumstances, this approach may have been desirable.
In our judgement, however, it has several significant shortcomings.
First, the approach ultimately leads to the federal government setting premium
rates by establishing the rate charged to the pool for the government's
backstop. If the basic problem is that the insurance industry whose business it
is to measure and price risk - cannot currently price terrorism risk without
distorting markets, why would we think the government can do a better
job?ablishing a pool would also take time, and time is very limited since most
policies expire at year-end. It is unclear how long it would take industry to
capitalize the pool. In the interim, the government's exposure could be
substantial, insofar as it would be liable for 100 percent of losses that
exceeded the pool's capitalization. In addition, we question whether the
government could move quickly enough on its end to establish the contracts, the
pricing structure, and the regulatory structure needed to make the proposal
work.
Finally, the pool approach creates a federal
insurance regulatory apparatus with some presumption of permanence, and a
potentially enormous pool of captive capital that we may never need to use. We
believe that there will be less uncertainty about terrorism risk a few years
from now and that uncertainty will be more manageable by the private sector than
is the case today. Given that, why undertake the effort to create a monopoly
reinsurer and give a new federal regulator the power to both set prices and
regulate insurance companies and their activities? A third option would be to
simply set a large industry deductible and let the federal government cover all
losses from acts of terrorism past that point. For instance, the federal
government could require the insurance industry to cover all losses up to, say,
$40 billion in a given year and the federal government would pay all losses
above that mount.
This approach has two substantial
drawbacks. First, it does not address the fundamental problem: the industry has
no basis for knowing - and hence pricing - terrorism risk. A large deductible
would require them to assess premiums large enough to cover a large potential
loss. In the absence of better information, we might well expect companies to
price insurance as if they fully expected losses up to the deductible amount.
Second, this approach makes it difficult to control losses above the deductible
as insurance companies would have no incentive to limit costs once their
deductible has been paid.
4. A Shared Loss Compensation
Program
After reviewing these and other options, and
discussing these issues with congressional and industry leadership and the state
insurance regulatory community, we developed an approach that we believe best
accomplishes the objectives I set forth. Let me say at the outset that this
approach reflects the current evolution of our thinking on this issue. We want
to work with Congress to achieve the best possible solution. As I have said, the
insurance industry can easily protect itself by eliminating coverage or charging
very high premiums. What we are trying to do is craft a plan that will prevent
the economic dislocations that will otherwise take place if private insurers
follow the course they are now on. It is imperative that we find a solution that
works in the marketplace. We must get it right, and we must get it right now.
When terrorists target symbols of our nation's economic,
political and military power, they are attacking the nation as a whole, not the
symbol. This argues for spreading the cost across all taxpayers. Yet there are
also reasons to limit the federal role. If property owners do not face any
liability from potential attacks, they may under- invest in security measures
and backup facilities. In addition, the insurance industry has sufficient
experience and capacity to price some portion of the risk associated with
terrorism and has the infrastructure necessary to assess and process claims.
Under the approach we are suggesting, individuals,
businesses, and other entities would continue to obtain property and casualty
insurance from insurance providers as they did before September 11. The terms of
the terrorism risk coverage would be unchanged and would be the same as that for
other risks.
Any loss claims resulting from a future
terrorist act would be submitted by the policyholder to the insurance company.
The insurance company would process the claims, and then submit an invoice to
the government for payment of its share. The Treasury would establish a general
process by which insurance companies submit claims. The Treasury would also
institute a process for reviewing and auditing claims and for ensuring that the
private/public loss sharing arrangement is apportioned among all insurance
companies in a consistent manner. State insurance regulators would also play an
important role in monitoring the claims process and ensuring the overall
integrity of the insurance system.
Through the end of
2002, the government would absorb 80 percent of the first $20 billion of insured
losses resulting from terrorism and 90 percent of insured losses above $20
billion. Thus, the private sector would pay 20 percent of the first $20 billion
in losses and 10 percent of losses above that amount.
Under this approach the federal government is absorbing a portion --
but only a portion -- of the first dollar of losses, which we believe is
important to do in the first year of the program. The key problem faced by
insurance companies right now is pricing for terrorism risk. While this type of
loss sharing approach does not completely alleviate that problem, it does
provide insurance companies with the ability to evaluate potential losses on a
policy by policy basis, with clearly defined maximum exposures. For example, on
a $100 million commercial policy the insurance company's maximum exposure would
be $20 million. If industry losses were greater than $20 billion that exposure
would be reduced even further.
More importantly, price
increases to policyholders should be lower under this approach than under an
approach that requires companies to absorb 100 percent of losses up to a large,
aggregate industry loss deductible. Under this approach, if an insurance
company's maximum exposure was defined at $20 million on a $100 million policy,
the insurance company could then price that $20 million exposure on the
probability of a complete loss event occurring.
Suppose
instead that the insurance industry had to absorb $20 billion in losses before
any government loss sharing began. Then, in our example, the insurance company's
maximum loss exposure would be $100 million on that policy, not $20 million.
Pricing to this maximum loss would create the economic dislocation we are trying
to avoid.
The role of the federal government would
recede over time, with the expectation that the private sector would further
develop its capacity each year. As private sector capacity increases, the nature
of the government's loss sharing agreement would also change. Given more time
and experience, we believe that the insurance industry could reestablish robust
risk-sharing arrangements such as reinsurance that would enable the private
sector to insure losses from terrorism before the government loss sharing
commenced., we would have the private sector be responsible for 100 percent of
the first $10 billion of insured losses, 50 percent of the insured losses
between $10 and $20 billion, and 10 percent of the insured losses above $20
billion. The government would be responsible for the remainder.
In 2004, the private sector would be responsible for 100 percent of the
first $20 billion of insured losses, 50 percent of the insured losses between
$20 and $40 billion, and 10 percent of the insured losses above $40 billion. The
government would be responsible for the remainder.
To
preserve flexibility in an extraordinary attack, combined private/public
liability for losses under the program would be capped at $100 billion in any
year. It would be left to Congress to determine payments above $100 billion.
The federal government's involvement would sunset after
three years. It is our hope, indeed our expectation, that the market problem we
face today will have been corrected by then so that the private sector will be
able to effectively price and manage terrorism risk insurance going forward. Of
course, should that prove not to be the case, Congress and the President can
reevaluate the program in place and decide at that time on an extension of the
program or establishment of some other approach.
This
approach would also provide certain legal procedures to manage and structure
litigation arising out of mass tort terrorism incidents. This includes
consolidation of claims into a single forum, a prohibition on punitive damages,
and provisions to ensure that defendants pay only for non-economic damages for
which they are responsible. It is important to ensure that any liability arising
from terrorist attacks results from culpable behavior rather than overzealous
litigation. These procedures are important to mitigating losses arising from any
future terrorist attack on our nation, and are an absolutely essential component
of the program I have outlined.
Finally, this approach
requires a clear definition of an "act of terrorism." We suggest that the
Secretary of the Treasury, with the concurrence of the Attorney General, and in
consultation with other members of the Cabinet, be given authority to certify
that a terrorist act had taken place for purposes of activating the shared loss
compensation arrangement.
We believe that this approach
dampens any adverse economic impact from a sudden increase in the cost from
terrorism risk insurance over the next 12 months. The imposition of a deductible
in the second year, and an increase in the deductible in the third year, permits
the federal government to gradually withdraw from the market as the private
sector adapts to measuring and pricing terrorism risk.
5. Conclusion Mr. Chairman, for the reasons I have set forth, the
Administration believes that the economy is facing a temporary, but critical,
market problem in the provision of terrorism risk insurance. Keeping our economy
moving must be our overriding concern. Leaving this problem unresolved threatens
our economic stability. The approach I have outlined limits the government's
direct involvement, retains all those elements of our private insurance system
that continue to operate well, and provides a transition period to allow the
private sector to establish market mechanisms to deal with this insidious new
risk that confronts our nation.
There are no perfect
solutions to this problem. We have developed what we believe is a sound
approach. As I explained earlier, we do not believe that creation of a
reinsurance pool can be accomplished under the time constraints we face, but we
would be glad to explore modifications to our approach with the Committee.
I would be pleased to answer any questions the Committee
may have.