Copyright 2002 Federal News Service, Inc.  
Federal News Service
July 25, 2002 Thursday
SECTION: CAPITOL HILL HEARING

LENGTH: 29894 words

HEADLINE: HEARING OF THE SENATE COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION COMMITTEE
 
SUBJECT: AVIATION SECURITY
 
CHAIRED BY: SENATOR ERNEST HOLLINGS (D-SC)
 
LOCATION: 253 RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C.

WITNESSES: NORMAN Y. MINETA, SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION;
 
MICHAEL P. JACKSON, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION;
 
ADMIRAL JAMES M. LOY, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION;
 
DR. GERALD DILLINGHAM, DIRECTOR, PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE ISSUES, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE;
 
RICHARD D. STEPHENS, VICE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL MANAGER, HOMELAND SECURITY AND SERVICES, THE BOEING COMPANY;
 
CRAIG COY, CEO, MASSACHUSETTS PORT AUTHORITY;
 
CAPTAIN STEPHEN LUCKEY, CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL FLIGHT SECURITY COMMITTEE;
 
CAPTAIN ED DAVIDSON, DIRECTOR, FLIGHT SAFETY, NORTHWEST AIRLINES
 


BODY:
SEN. ERNEST HOLLINGS (D-SC): The committee will come to order. We are pleased to proceed now with our hearing on aviation security. I want to congratulate Secretary Mineta on appointing Admiral Loy to take over this Transportation Security Administration. In that, we're behind a curve. My record shows that they only, in a six- to seven- months period, employed some 2,500 screeners. That's grossly, grossly inadequate, slow, incompetent.

What we had on course was a mammoth task of privatizing, as you were, publicly employing some 40-50,000, whatever, screeners and securing these airports. And we even confirmed the former head of the Transportation Security Administration without a hearing. It was before Christmas. We all wanted to get going, hit the ground running. And instead we've been dragging our feet. The secretary has assured us at every turn that we're right on schedule, we're right on schedule. And I was a little dismayed, Mr. Secretary, when on the House side, you complained for the lack of money. You can't catch this Congress off-base on homeland security money.

This Congress will fight you trying to give it more money. Everybody knows we are at war and that the homeland security front and center and everybody's voting for the money. So we hadn't heard at this committee level of any lack of money. However, one of the main things I want to touch on because I know Senator Burns and others have bills in with respect to the pistols in the cockpit, and we have a bill that's at the desk. It was not assigned to the committee but it's at the desk.

And I want to re-emphasize the mission, the intent and mission. Senator Murkowski wants to make certain that a commercial liner would never be used again as a weapon of mass destruction. And the only ones we know that have ever done that successfully is the Israelis, the El-Al Airlines. In fact, where Senator Murkowski is seated, we were seated just last September, a group of us senators on the committee with the chief pilot and the chief pilot allowed that, "Look, once that door is secured, it's never opened in flight."

We find those now that insist upon pistols, of course, contemplate an insecure door, a penetrable door. In fact, our friend George Will says there's no such thing as an impenetrable door. I refer him to El-Al Airlines. It hadn't been penetrated in 30 years. They have not had a hijacking. And that what was one thing that this particular secretary emphasized even before Christmas with the Transportation Security Administration, "Look, let's once, can fall, get on," They told me up in Massachusetts, Senator Kerry testified they had a kevlar door. The Delta folks, airlines, they had a plan to do it and everything else like that. Try a penetrable door alone, if the door can be broken into, then forget about these pistols and everything else like that.

The enemy are not wandering minstrels. They are karate, judo experts. They'll break in the door before you can ever get to your pistols, strapped and trying to fly a plane. You really arm the terrorists. So let's begin once and for all understand that the door has got to be fixed, impenetrable and never opened in flight. Once that's done, then we'll solve the problems of a commercial airliner flying into the Empire State or the Sears building or into a nuclear power plant. We've solved the problem of guns in the cockpit. The media is still asking me, "Where is your compromise? Would you go along with stun guns rather than --"

They don't understand the problem. The problem is to make sure that a commercial airliner -- now these private planes, they can run into a building like down in Tampa, but they don't have all that fuel and can't really bring the World Trade Towers down to the ground like occurred.

So the whole idea is once that door is secure, the intended terrorist knows it is going right to the ground, and law enforcements is taking them off to the jail. Otherwise you don't have this 30 minutes after takeoff, remain in your seat, that's 30 minutes before you land, take your seats.

I have to fly a Charlotte connection. And coming back, trying to make votes, I'm terrorized that somebody is going to stand up, because the pilot warns that if you stand up and leave your seat we're going to another airport. I'm going to miss this thing, and I'm ready to knock them in the head and put them back in their seat right away, because I'm trying to make votes up here.

(Laughter.)

We've got ridiculous rules. You don't have to have all the planes flying around to shoot people down. The door is secure, and never opened in flight.

I yield to Senator McCain.

SEN. JOHN McCAIN (R-AZ): I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I thank you for holding this very important hearing. The Transportation Security Administration is at a crucial point in its short history. The agency is working simultaneously on several extremely challenging tasks. The TSA must purchase and install thousands of pieces of explosive detection equipment, hire tens of thousands of passenger and baggage screeners at 429 airports throughout the country all in the next few months. At the same time it must build its own massive organization from the ground up.

If these challenges were not enough, the president has recommended that the TSA be moved, another entirely new entity -- be moved to another entirely new entity, the Department of Homeland Security. And as of last week the TSA now has a new acting leader, Admiral Loy, who's accompanying Secretary Mineta today.

In the midst of all these efforts and transitions, the TSA must come to grips with one of its most difficult jobs, dealing with a Congress that's pulling the agency in different directions. For example, some legislators are trying to move the deadline for screening all bags using explosive detection equipment, while others are saying we must keep the pressure on and not weaken our security measures.

The appropriators have substantially limited the total number of TSA employees, cutting the president's supplemental funding request and using earmarks to tie up much of the rest of the money. Just two days ago, Secretary Mineta testified that the amount of money Congress is providing in the Supplemental Appropriations Act, and the strings attached to that funding, will not support the mandates and timetables for aviation security that Congress set up last year for TSA. We passed a law authorizing certain funding. Again the appropriators have now undercut the authorization that was passed by the Senate by a 98 to nothing vote.

On top of it all, every sector of the aviation community seems to be voicing one complaint or another about how security is being handled. All of this is making it difficult for TSA to do the job we gave it eight months ago to keep our aviation and other transportation systems secure.

I hope that the first panel of witnesses will shed more light on some of the issues that TSA faces in the coming weeks and months. DoT and TSA have tried to do a good job, especially given the circumstances. But it is evident that everything has not gone as well as it should.

The road ahead is likely to be even rougher than the one already traveled. In that regard, I know that the GAO will have some important observations about where we stand today and what the future may hold.

Another issue being addressed today is the arming of pilots. I am sure that it is a very important issue. And we will have a lot of discussion and debate about it, and I hope we can resolve it. But I've got to tell you, Mr. Chairman, we should be focusing on how we're going to implement the law that we passed eight months ago which is going to cost billions of dollars, tens of thousands of employees, how we're going to ensure the safety of every passenger on every plane in our aviation system.

Eight months ago members of Congress were unable to reach a consensus on this contentious issue due, in part, to a lack of sound information and analytical data on the issue, as well as the urgent need to pass the legislation. We placed the authority for the ultimate decision with the TSA which we expected to objectively assess the potential benefits and hazards of arming airline pilots.

At our last hearing on aviation security two months ago, former Under Secretary Magaw announced that TSA would not support the arming of pilots. That decision prompted the introduction of several bills in Congress to explicitly allow pilots to use firearms. The issue remains contentious. And there seems to be little hard analysis on either side. Even the GAO recently concluded that without additional research, quote, "The potential benefits, risk and cost of using weapons on aircraft cannot be fully determined." Therefore I am anxious to hear from all our witnesses today on this issue.

It's my genuine hope that Congress, the administration and the aviation community can reach greater consensus and unity of purpose in the area of aviation security. Assigning blame and finger pointing are easy here in Washington. We shouldn't lose sight of the stakes in this fight. Aviation has always been a popular target for terrorists and there is no reason to believe that that has changed. It's not easy to balance the need for greater security with the efficient flow of air commerce that's vital to the economy of our country. But the task will be made more difficult unless we get a lot more direction and a lot less infighting. I thank our witnesses for being here.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. HOLLINGS: Thank you.

Senator Wyden.

SEN. RON WYDEN (D-OR): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman and colleagues, the House of Representatives is now poised to grant extensions of the deadlines with respect to the aviation security requirements. And I want to make it clear that I will strongly oppose any extension unless they're ones that strengthen the protections for passengers and the public, rather than roll them back.

Any modification to the law ought to make our system safer rather than less secure. And I will tell you, I find it especially troubling that in recent weeks the administration has had to replace the director of the Transportation Security Agency. And I'm going to ask Secretary Mineta this morning why that was done, because it clearly does not send a message that the administration is on top of this issue if, in fact, at a crucial time the head of the Transportation Security Agency has to be replaced. And I think we need to know what is going to be done differently with a new head of that agency.

Finally, what it all comes down to is that there is an indication that this issue is sliding back into the same pattern of the last 15 years. For 15 years the pattern has been: there would be a significant tragedy; there would be a huge and understandable outcry from the American people; Congress would move ahead on reforms. After that was done there was all kinds of back sliding, all kinds of blame and finger pointing. But for one reason or another the job didn't get done.

I think, and I want to reflect your comments, Mr. Chairman, and those of Senator McCain's, the challenge now is to stay at it until it's done right. And if that means staying through the summer, working with the administration on issues relating to funding, working with the airports on the issues that they have with respect to the realignments of their facilities and the like, so be it. But I don't think excuses, either from the administration, from the airports, from the Congress or anyone else are acceptable at this point, given the understandable public concern. And I look forward to working with you and our colleagues on a bipartisan basis.

SEN. HOLLINGS: Thank you.

Senator Kerry.

SEN. JOHN F. KERRY (D-MA): Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

Thank you for holding this hearing which is obviously important. In the last weeks, months I guess, Americans have lost about $1.8 trillion of value in the marketplace. One of the elements, certainly only one, there are many, many things going on, but everybody would agree that the economy has been sluggish, not where we want it to be. And that one significant component of it that remains affected is tourism, travel, people aren't coming here from other countries. I hear this all over the nation, tourist places. People are scared, afraid of another act of terror in the United States, afraid of travel.

The full measure of travel in our own country remains reduced. And you hear it all the way down the economic food chain, taxi cab drivers, limousines, restaurants, theater, hotels, the people who do the linen for the hotels, the people who work at them, all the way through the economic food chain, America is impacted. And back in September when we first addressed this issue, we knew we were not addressing just the issue of travel -- of airline safety. We were addressing the restoration of confidence for the American people in our entire system.

I regret to say that this spectacle of the leaders of our agencies, of our entire airport system and to whatever degree, the Congress -- and I take issue with you, Mr. Secretary, that the Congress is responsible for not providing enough money because Mr. Daniels clearly cut significantly from the supplemental as we all know. And if the issue were money all we'd have to do is really put it in front of this committee and this committee will take care of it in about 10 minutes.

The fact is that there is disarray, in my judgment, and the rhetoric of war is far outstripping the response or the results in this sector and in other sectors. It is incomprehensible to me that, given the predicament of flying and what we are asking Americans and anybody who gets on an airplane to do with respect to baggage inspection, that we are not pushing this at the rate that it ought to be pushed.

Now, I'm pleased to say that the CEO of the Massachusetts Port Authority, Craig Coy, will be testifying on the second panel.

They've made enormous strides in turning Massport around since September 11th. And they've turned the bureaucracy around and they've set some goals and they're meeting them. As a result of that effort, Logan Airport is becoming a leader in aviation security and I'm proud to say it has in place a plan that will achieve 100 percent screening of checked baggage by the year's end.

And it's also becoming a laboratory for emerging security technology. So I think it's moving in the right direction as are some other airports. But I regret to say that, you know, when you go to war, you go to war. Your purchasing procedures change, you accelerate, your hiring procedures change, you mobilize. And what we're witnessing is sort of this incredible back and forth turf struggle, political struggle, confusion, lack of leadership and our economy is going to suffer for it and the American people are going to suffer for it and I regret that enormously.

So, Mr. Chairman, I think this is the appropriate time to have this hearing and to measure whether we can do it. And may I say, you know, we're not measuring this, I think, unfairly. At Mr. Magaw's confirmation hearing and in subsequent public statements, the administration itself said we're on track. Deputy Secretary Jackson told this committee, quote, "Secretary Mineta has given us a simple mandate with regard to these deadlines. Let's figure out how to meet them because they are not negotiable." Secretary Mineta himself offered similar statements as recently as May.

So now the rhetoric is changing, as I think everybody is aware, and the TSA's ability to meet the deadline is in question. I think we have to demand a plan, a clear plan, the money it takes, the time it takes, the people it will take and a specific date by which we can expect 100 percent compliance. And I respectfully say to my colleagues, until we do that I think we're not going to be meeting the full measure of responsibility with respect to the economy.

Finally, with respect to the weapons, you know, I understand what our distinguished chairman and my very, very good friend is saying. I understand that. And he's absolutely correct. If the doors are secured and there's a procedure, then you shouldn't need it. But there are all kinds of scenarios in airports and otherwise, even in the air where who knows what may develop. If this gives greater confidence, and that's what we're really looking for here, is the question of confidence, it's very hard to make the argument that a pilot with whom we entrust $100 million plus aircraft and several hundred lives, the pilot who is in fact in charge of managing what has been turned into a weapon previously and could ever on any occasion be a weapon again, that that plane which is in and of itself we now know a weapon, can't necessarily have a sidearm, which is also a weapon for some contingency.

And for those who argue that a properly trained pilot, many of whom have military experience and background, all of whom have enormous clearances and are supposed to be of the highest level of responsibility, can't be an adjunct to an air marshal or even to the police forces in an airport, in order to deter whatever violence -- as we saw recently at Los Angeles -- a mad person might engage in. It's very hard to understand how we can't set up a protocol of use and training that doesn't meet that standard to maximize the confidence. Though I agree with my colleague, if the door is locked, that contingency ought to be taken care of. But who knows what other contingency may arise.

So, Mr. Chairman, I hope we get this done. I think the American people are growing impatient and the spectacle is not a pretty one.

SEN. HOLLINGS: If we can sharpen our opening statements, please, we have two distinguished colleagues waiting.

Senator Burns.

SEN. CONRAD BURNS (R-MT): I'll keep mine very short, Mr. Chairman. I just want to thank you for holding this hearing today. Understanding the circumstances that surround this and I'm excited that we could -- maybe we can put to bed some of the misinformation that seems to swirl around this issue.

Seventy-nine percent of the public support a voluntary program to arm pilots --79 percent. Fifty percent of those people said they'd be willing to pay up to $20 more to have armed pilots on the flight deck. And another 50 percent said they'd switch from their current airline to an airline that had pilots who had a deterrent on the flight deck. That's pretty overwhelming when we start taking a look and seeing where our policies should be going.

Many foreign pilots already carry weapons in the cockpit when they fly into the United States of America. We allow them to do it through an FAA regulation and bilateral agreements we have with those countries. 2554 includes explicit indemnification language that exempts the airlines from any liability. Further, the cost to train a pilot is so much affordable at those costs to train are similar to those costs to train an air marshal. Furthermore, in the case if the air marshal is forced to fire an intruder trying to break into the cockpit, what is his target? What's behind that target? I would suggest probably the pilots.

What about a double door reconfiguration of aircraft that some would suggest? That is not happening and I have my doubts whether it will happen on domestic flights in the United States. What will be the cost to the airline if required airlines to reconfigure their planes to a double door? What would be the cost of revenue to airlines if they had to reduce the number of seats on their aircraft? The consumer pays those costs leading to higher airfares.

Regarding the issue of hardening doors, Congress has allocated $25 million to harden aircraft doors. At $35,000 per aircraft and approximately 7,000 aircraft in the U.S., that's a total cost of nearly $250 million. We haven't allocated enough money. And we don't even have a hardened door yet.

Testing prototypes has led to failure. Sure, we can harden a door but we can still ram a food cart right through it, breaking it down, not only the door but also the frame of the door. Now, we're only weeks away from the anniversary, and I think what will happen today, Mr. Chairman, both pro and con on this issue, we clear the air of some information and logic then will take us to where we want to be as a Congress and also with the American people.

So, I thank you today for this hearing, I appreciate it very much.

SEN. HOLLINGS: Thank you.

Senator Allen.

SEN. GEORGE ALLEN (R-VA): Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing on aviation security. Many of the comments that have been made by you and others as far as the ramp up of the TSA and so forth are appropriate. There are a couple of issues that I'd hope we'll address here. Obviously the problems in them ramping up, the way that they treat different airports that have different security needs. Not every airport's the same. The airports in Missoula are different than Richmond or different than Dulles and different than Dallas Fort Worth. And I hope that we'll discuss that.

Another issue that I hope Secretary Mineta will address has to do with a question when we had a hearing on aviation security in this committee back in May, when I asked the secretary about the situation at our nation's capital airport at Reagan National Airport and the operation of general aviation there, and the secretary assured this committee that a plan would be announced by the end of that month. Again that was May.

We're still waiting for a plan. In fact, it's been stated that they'll not allow general aviation into Reagan National Airport and I'm very eager to hear about the plans from the Department of Transportation and the Transportation Security Administration to remedy this problem. I think it's inexcusable to not identify a solution to allow general aviation back at Reagan National Airport.

On the other issue of this hearing, I look forward to listening to witnesses on the issue of arming a pilot. We have discussed a variety of different approaches for the last nine months. You, Mr. Chairman, and I are in complete agreement that the cockpits ought to be as secure as a vault. No one should be able to get in. Unfortunately that is not the physical state of cockpits today. In the hearing, the then-secretary of the TSA, Undersecretary Magaw, when I asked him I said, "Well, if the pilots on September 11th had firearms would that have done any good?" He says, "Well, it could not have hurt." And then when asking him, you know, what use would it be in the future, he could not answer.

But we have to use some common sense. Maybe they can't figure it out. I don't think we need -- I think GAO reports may be relevant and useful but I don't think we really need to rely on GAO reports to try and quantify what we know would be beneficial. The bill that was introduced by Senator Burns addresses many of the concerns of pilot qualifications, the training, in a variety of different matters that I think are very important and well addressed. Indeed, I think probably the perfect world on all of this is that the federal government withdraw its prohibition on pilots being armed with certain qualifications and training and so forth. And then let the marketplace decide. I think the airlines that have pilots that are armed would get more customers because I think more of the travelers -- consumers -- would feel safer.

That's the ideal but that's not what we have here. We have do nothing versus the bill that Senator Burns and other have signed on to or have proposed and not only does it, in my view, address all the qualifications, training, competence, needs, it also addresses the concerns of the air carriers of liability and it provides them with a very strong liability shield in the event that the pilots have to use as flight deck officers a firearm. So I'm very pleased to hear the testimony today. I've studied this issue very carefully. Listened to people on it.

And I would like to say, Mr. Chairman, and say this to Senator Burns -- thank you for your leadership and, Conrad, I want to sign on as a co-sponsor to your bill because I think we need to move forward in this common sense matter to give the flying public greater assurances and I think the pilots can have the training, can do the job and it's a last line of defense that makes a great deal of sense and I hope we'll move forward on that matter as well.

So, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. HOLLINGS: Senator Hutchison.

SEN. KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON (R-TX): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'm very pleased that we're having a hearing that is more comprehensive than I think the House approach has been. I think it is way out of line for the House to look at passing an extension of the deadlines when we need to address all of the issues of the Transportation and Security Agency. We passed a monumental bill and we gave the Department of Transportation a monumental task. We need, through this hearing, to get the mid-year update to see what we need to do to refine the law, to address the issues of concern. We need to hear from Secretary Mineta and Deputy Secretary Jackson about the problems so that we can address all of them in a comprehensive way. To just all of a sudden to say in July we're not going to have deadlines for checking the checked bags, I think is slightly irresponsible.

I think we need to say what are we doing to do everything possible to make sure that every checked bag is screened and if it's not with a piece of equipment, then what are you going to do to backstop the lack of equipment? I think we should be trying to meet the deadline. If we need to put it out a little way, then I think we should address that in September. But I think now is not the time to do that. Secondly, I would ask what are we doing about cargo? I think the top of the airplane is pretty darn safe. We've got air marshals on flights. We've got better cockpit configuration. Passengers are ready to step up to the plate and report anything that is amiss. We have good screening by and large throughout our system at the airports.

But I think the bottom of the aircraft needs to be addressed. So I want to ask the questions about cargo and the Trusted Traveler Program. We have a lot to address here. Let me just end by saying that I commend Secretary Mineta for replacing the head of TSA. It is my understanding that he wasn't satisfied that we were making enough progress. That's exactly what you do if you don't think the head of an agency is being aggressive enough. And I was concerned that Mr. Magaw did not even think the Trusted Traveler Program should be tried. I think we need to go full force for our safety measures but at the same time we can make those lines go down if we use common sense. And I think the Trusted Traveler Program is common sense.

So I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding the hearing and mostly, Mr. Chairman, I would ask you if when we have all of the information in this mid-course correction opportunity that we would address it in a comprehensive way and not piecemeal and take out a deadline here and a deadline there. I think we need to address it in a comprehensive way.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. HOLLINGS: Very good.

Senator Cleland.

SEN. MAX CLELAND (D-GA): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Sitting here thinking about the difference in intensity between when we first met right after September 11 as a committee, literally with the smell of war in the air, I can remember just a few days after 9/11 we had a report from Wall Street that showed that the entire United States airlines industry, their market value was little better than junk bond. That is why I supported a $15 billion dollar aid package to the airline industry because I was willing to do whatever it took to get security for our airline passengers because I knew that was the only way to begin putting people back in the seats and that that was one of the key ways of restoring our economic health.

That smell of war has been replaced by bureaucracy and what we used to call in Vietnam "wait a minute vines." Wait a minute vines were always those things in the jungle which kind of held you up. Every time you turned around there was one more wait a minute vine, and that's what I think we've encountered here in the last eight or nine months. Just a series of wait a minute vines. Wait a minute, we don't have enough money. Wait a minute, we don't have regulations in place. Wait a minute, we don't have the right person. Wait a minute, wait a minute, wait a minute.

The truth of the matter is we're still at war. We still have the same people out there who came after us that are running loose. So I don't think we've got time to wait a minute. I think the intensity that we felt that week after 9/11 ought to be present today and we ought to do not only our best but whatever it takes to ensure security for our airline passengers. I think that's the only way we can get them back in their seats and get America back flying again. Flying in the air and flying economically.

So, Mr. Chairman, I'm here to support whatever it takes financially, legally, legislatively, to enhance the security of our airline passengers and representing what is one of the busiest airports in the world and one of the great airline passenger carriers in the world, Delta, I think it's in our economic interest and our national interest to do whatever it takes to get this ball moving again and get away from the wait the minute vine.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. HOLLINGS: Senator Dorgan.

SEN. BYRON DORGAN (D-ND): Mr. Chairman, I think that security issues will always be more important than convenience issues with respect to air travel and if people feel air travel isn't safe and secure they simply won't use it. At the same time while there's a tension between security and convenience if, ultimately, the security issues cause so much inconvenience, people won't fly either. I mean, I landed at an airport on Monday of this week and I think were about 500-plus people waiting in line to go through security and you could see some of them were furious. Something unusual had happened at that airport. But the line stretched way outside and I'm sure a lot of people missed flights as a result of it.

And I bet you a lot of those people are going to say well, if this is the way it's going to look at an airport, I ain't going to be here very soon again. But my point is there's an urgency here. There's no question about that. An urgency with respect to security issues and we ought to address it. I agree with Senator Hutchison. Let's not talk about extending deadlines until we get down the road a ways and find out what we can do.

And also there's a tension between dealing with things on an urgent basis and bureaucracy. Bureaucracy is not by nature fast. So I think it's really important for us. It's important for this industry and for an economy to get this right.

Let me make one final point. I just want to say thank you as well to the DoT on one piece of information. You know, after 9/11 they put in place rules with parking lots and so on, and it was one size fits all. And a 300 foot rule, for example, Mr. Chairman, on short-term parking. Well, 300 foot happened to take all the parking in Dickinson, North Dakota. I mean, that's a small airport with computer flights.

So we talked and DoT made some adjustments and did the right thing. You know, they've worked their way through some of these things in a thoughtful way in certain areas, and I want to say thanks to the folks who had the common sense to do that as well, because there's a lot to criticize but there's also some things to say thanks for thinking through them in a thoughtful way.

Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. HOLLINGS: Senator Boxer.

SEN. BARBARA BOXER (D-CA): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Can I put my statement in the record and I'd like to summarize?

SEN. HOLLINGS: Go ahead.

SEN. BOXER: Thank you. I wanted to thank you so much, and Senator McCain, for this hearing and for your dedication to staying on this subject. It is so important and it's always on the front of my mind. And we get closer to the anniversary of 9/11 and I do believe that air travel is safer than it's been in a very long time, but we have a long way to go. And this is not the time to slow down our efforts, to skip deadlines or anything else. We need to move forward.

I'm going to quickly run through the issues of concern. I have strong doubts that the air marshal program is as robust as it should be. The number of air marshals is classified but DoT must be held accountable on this issue. Senator McCain helped me write the provision in the law that says that air marshals shall be on board all high-risk flights with priority given to nonstop long-distance flights. There was a reason we wrote that, because those were the flights that were targeted by the terrorists, it was the heavy fuel load, the light load.

And all I could say is that Senator Burns and I have been asking for a briefing on this issue for two full months, since the last hearing we had in May. The briefing wasn't scheduled until yesterday. And so I say to my chairman and ranking member, thank you for this hearing, because I don't think we would have gotten it yet were it not for this hearing.

Second, our checkpoint screening is still inadequate. On July 1, the press reported results of an investigation showing that checkpoint screeners at 32 of the nation's largest airports failed to detect weapons. Los Angeles and Sacramento airports had failure rates of 41 and 40 percent respectively. In other words, failure 40 percent of the time. I learned when I called those airports on the heels of that USA Today article that they still had acting federal security chiefs. Now Los Angeles has a full-fledged director, and I'm very happy about that. But Sacramento does not, and this is not good.

My call to that airport that day gave me little comfort. The federal head of security at that airport had to read about her airport's failure rate in the newspaper. She said she didn't even know that that was the failure rate, and she was responsible for safety at that airport. There are still vulnerable spots at the airports, as Senator Kerry said. The breach of security at LAX ticket counter at the El-Al ticket counter is a key example.

If El-Al Airlines, Mr. Chairman, didn't have two security guards who were armed at the site of the incident, the death toll would have been far more devastating. I wrote to Mr. Magaw that day, urging him to help local police provide security at these areas of our airport, and to use the National Guard until that could happen. I never received a response to that letter and there were good comments in the paper that this was going to be done, but I got an email -- when was it did we get this?

MS. (?): The following week.

SEN. BOXER: The following week that said no commitment was made, nothing's been done about expanding security to the check-in counters.

Fourth, the installation of baggage detection machines may not be completed. They must be completed period. Fifth, our security system needs to provide protection against the use of fake IDs. I was troubled by a CBS news investigation that showed people getting through security with fake IDs. Mr. Chairman, the technology exists to fix this problem and it needs to be used. It's cheap, it's easy, it must be used.

Six, the crews of our airlines need to be prepared as the last line of defense against terrorists. Pilots need to know what's happening in the cabin in real time. That means a video camera in the cockpit so they know what's happening. It's like a rearview mirror. Flight attendants need wireless communication devices between the cabin and the cockpit. And pilots who are fully trained and volunteer should be part of a guns in the cockpit program. This is something I feel very strongly about, because the military is under orders to shoot down a commercial flight if it is hijacked.

We have a layered defense in our aviation systems, as Secretary Mineta has stated many times. Trained flight attendants and pilot marshals would be an essential layer, a last layer of defense. And I do agree with Senator Hutchison that a trusted flyer program should be on track. I myself have been frisked 15 times. Now, I don't care. It's fine. But the bottom line is it's a little bit of a waste of money for a five foot tall grandma senator, you know.

(Laughter.)

So there's got to be a way that we can concentrate on the bad actors. So we need to get a lot done, let's get it done, and let's keep the pressure on, Mr. Chairman, because without you and Senator McCain keeping the pressure on with this committee, I'm afraid we'll never have safe skies. Thank you.

SEN. HOLLINGS: Very good.

Senator Smith.

SEN. GORDON SMITH (R-OR): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I must admit I was leaning against the guns in the cockpit idea until on a recent flight from Oregon to Washington we were supposed to change planes in Chicago, we were deterred because of the weather and sat on the ground for a long time, and I took occasion to go and speak with the pilots and I asked them their opinion, because I truly have an open mind on this question and even still I do.

But they said something I'll never forget. Senator Boxer just referred to it. It was that, "Senator, there are armed pilots already but they're armed with F-15s and F-16s. They have instructions to shoot us down if we can't control our airplane. We'd rather take the first shot if it comes to that." And I think that that's the logic that really is important to remember in this calculation. And I will admit I have some trepidation about this but we're dealing in a whole new world here.

In forming this Senate -- Mr. Chairman, I want to echo the thoughts of my colleagues who have expressed some concern about the efficiency of how we check in security. We need to spend the money, we need to do the scans, we need to take the steps that are necessary to improve efficiency. Not sacrifice security but improve efficiency, or we will continue to retard the tourist industry and the business of this nation in a way that we have frankly difficulty even calculating. So I hope we will get on with that and keep the pressure up, and it's good to be here and thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your attention on this issue.

SEN. HOLLINGS: Very good.

Senator Nelson.

SEN. BILL NELSON (D-FA): Mr. Chairman, I'm not going to make a speech. I just am looking forward to the uniformity that the department will insist on eventually, and all of the magnetometers, for example.

Every time I go through the magnetometer here at National it never sets it off. But with the same clothes on, when I go through the magnetometer at the Tallahassee Airport it always sets it off. In the Tampa Airport it depends, I suppose, on the weather, because some days it will set it off and some days it doesn't. And so other passengers are having that same kind of experience and it will be good to have the uniformity.

I would just mention in passing also on the overall issue of airline safety. When we addressed this in our initial bill, we put in this committee a provision that said that foreign flight students would have background checks. When it got to conference, it was altered that foreign flight students only learning to fly aircraft of 12,500 pounds or more would have background checks. And if what we're trying to do is to get at the problem of the Mohamed Attas, we need to change the law so that it is foreign flight students on any kind of training get background checks.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. HOLLINGS: Thank you.

Senator Ensign.

SEN. JOHN ENSIGN (R-NV): Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and for you and Senator McCain for holding this hearing.

Safety is very, very important. I think we all consider it paramount. But we have to do this in a way that, first of all, is reasonable. We've heard the deadlines and if the deadlines could be met, physically they should be met. I'll give you an example. The McCarran Airport cannot, no matter what they do, they cannot, because if they have the machines there they can't plug them in because they are waiting for a power substation to be built that will not be online for at least three months post-December 31st. So no matter what the airport does, they cannot use the machines.

There are many other examples that we have around the country where there are problems. So having a -- you know, keeping the pressure on, I think, is very, very important. But we also have to do it in a way that allows these things to be done, to where they can be done, and sometimes taking a few extra months to do something and doing it right and doing it for the limited resources that we have -- we don't have unlimited resources, so I think that we need to do it right.

It was mentioned -- the efficiency, you know, and having the, you know, screening in a way with the trusted traveler program. I'm glad to see that hopefully we're going to be going toward that direction because it is ridiculous. Once again, when you have limited resources, if you can take 15 to 20 percent of the people out of going through all the security checks that the general flying public has to go through, that's efficient. That becomes more efficient, and it keeps those business travelers. Right now, if you're a business traveler, if you don't have to make that short haul between San Francisco and Los Angeles, you don't want to. You just don't want to. And when the December 31st deadline comes, it's going to be worse.

Some of the other concerns that I have, the 40-40-20 rule -- McCarran Airport did a study that if that goes into effect as is currently looking like it's going to, on Sunday and Thursday -- not on Thanksgiving, not on Christmas, not on just the busy holidays, but every Thursday and Sunday are our two busy days in and out of Las Vegas. We are the second busiest airport in the country when it comes to baggage checked. It's not like Dallas or Chicago where a lot of through passengers. Las Vegas -- Los Angeles is number one, Las Vegas is number two-- the number of bags checked.

Southwest Airlines -- current with no increases in passenger numbers. The average wait at the Southwest Airlines ticket counter is going to be four hours and eighteen minutes every Sunday and every Thursday, because of the 40-40-20 rule. It's going to cause such a back-up. What is that going to do to our economy? And I want to propose something because of what happened in Los Angeles. We're talking about security now. And you talked about now wanting security at the ticket counter. What we're going to do with this 40-40-20 rule is, on average, there's going to be 2,000 to 3,000 people in the terminal now down at the ticket counter in Las Vegas.

What happens when somebody now takes a backpack bomb, or a suitcase bomb, or automatic weapon into that crowd? You've just created a security problem. We're going to lose more people than if they're blown up on a airplane. And that's what I'm saying, is we need to think about what we are doing here overall. We can't just look at, you know, the flying public thinks of this airplane crashing, and that's great television, and that scares the bejeebers out of everybody. But we have to think how the terrorist thinks. A terrorist looks for the weakness in the system. Well, if you back everybody up at the ticket counter, you've just created another weakness in the system. And that's going to stop airline travel just as fast as crashing an airplane would.

And that's why I think that we need to look at these things. We need to work with the TSA. Keep the pressure on. Put the resources in. I agree. We need to put resources to make sure that you have plenty of people that check in people, and get them through as efficiently as possible because we want to have a balance with security, as Senator Smith talked about, in getting people through. So that if people want to take a tourist trip, or they want to take a business trip, that it isn't a deterrence, you know, because if you have even an average of an hour wait, if you're taking a business trip and I know I'm going to sit in security for an hour every time, that's going to be a deterrence against travel, Mr. Chairman. So thank you for holding this hearing. And let's make sure that we do this in a balanced way.

SEN. HOLLINGS: Thank you.

Senator Snowe.

SEN. OLYMPIA SNOWE (R-ME): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding this extremely critical hearing that comes at a very significant time, as we try to understand why we haven't been able to be as effective as we should be in implementing many of the enhancements to our aviation security program. Obviously the status quo before September 11th is now history. And I don't think that we can ever think for a moment that we can relax our standards and or our deadlines. I think it sends absolutely the wrong message.

As it is I think the American public are getting a mixed message. Now, we heard last year that the January 18th deadline could not be met on baggage match. A furor was created and the deadline was met. And I think that's essentially the same reaction here today -- is that we have to send a message that we intend to meet those deadlines. It seems to me that it's incongruous, at a time in which are proposing and will be voting the first major reorganization in more than 50 years to create the Department of Homeland Security, to reorganize a 160 agencies at approximately $40 billion and we're saying somehow we can't meet these deadlines to uphold aviation security standards.

We can't vacillate. I would hope that we will hear the 'can do' spirit here today and I'm pleased that Secretary Mineta has selected Admiral Loy because I do believe that he'll bring the same 'can do' organizational and managerial experience to this agency as he did to the Coast Guard as commandant, because that is precisely what we will need.

And what we will also need is a plan, Mr. Chairman. We need a plan. We need to know how the administration is going to approach the baggage screening and the federalizing of all the major airports across this country by the precise deadlines that have been stated in law. We need a plan because obviously if there is no plan it's going to be virtually impossible to meet those deadlines as each week passes by.

So I would hope that here today we will hear precisely how the administration intends to uphold these standards and how we can help. And obviously we have a responsibility as well to make sure that we're providing the sufficient resources for the administration, for the secretary, for the undersecretary of the Transportation Security Agency to meet their responsibilities and obligations. It's a failure on our part as well, if we don't provide the necessary resources and the funding that's essential to keep them on track to meet the deadline.

We can't continue to lose weeks and months because the first deadline is rapidly approaching. So we have to help, consistent with the obligations of the statute that we enacted, to help the secretary and the undersecretary to meet their responsibilities under law. But I don't think that we can afford as a nation to send this inconsistent, vacillating message 'we can and we can't, we don't know, it's going to be difficult'.

I mean, what kind of message does that send? I mean time is not on our side. Time is our enemy. Time is our enemy and this is a national imperative that requires a national urgency on the part of each and every one of us.

So I think we all have to help recognizing there are some challenges and hurdles to overcome. But that's why a plan is essential to understand exactly what they are, what the timetable is for manufacturing-- the production of the screening machines. How can we get these in place? Where are the airports? Can they accommodate them? Are they prepared to accommodate them? The number of screeners that are essential? How are they going to begin to employ the thousands remaining as required by statute -- the thousands that are remaining, both on the checked baggage and also for security personnel at the airports? So we need to have a schedule and a program because it's only in that way that we are going to meet our obligation. But I don't think that we can afford to take any chances by suggesting here today that we should relax our standards.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. HOLLINGS: Senator Fitzgerald.

SEN. PETER FITZGERALD (R-IL): I have no opening statement, Mr. Chairman. So we can -- I'll spare everybody any more comments from --

SEN. HOLLINGS: Thank you.

SEN. FITZGERALD: Thank you.

SEN. HOLLINGS: Senator Murkowski and Senator Smith, we appreciate your patience and we welcome you to the committee.

Senator Murkowski.

SEN. FRANK MURKOWSKI (R-AK): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I've listened carefully to the presentations by my colleagues and one of the suggestions that came to mind -- and, Senator Ensign, if those lines in Las Vegas are four hours, I suggest they move them over alongside the one-armed bandits because that might offset some of the economic loss.

(Laughter.)

Seriously, Mr. Chairman, I am here specifically to talk about one issue and that's the arming of pilots and I join with Senator Smith. And I want to point out that we have to recognize that this is not necessarily the answer. But by the same token, it is a significant contributor to responsible steps being taken from the standpoint of the lines of defense that are traditional in evaluating, if you will, the risk associated with riding on an aircraft. Before September 11th, I think we all had little flashbacks that we hoped there wasn't a mechanical, hope there wasn't a pilot error, hope there wasn't an accident of some kind. The exposure of terrorism was not in our mentality. It is now.

And I think we have to recognize that you are going to have a certain risk in any form of transportation whether it be the train, the bus or the airplane. You've got the mechanical, you've got the accident, you've got the terrorism, you can't reduce them all. So you have to keep a balance. If this Congress thinks it's going to eliminate all the risks associated with terrorism and the exposure, you're wrong. You're not. You can reduce but you can't eliminate. That's just the practical reality.

Now, the chairman indicated his view relative to securing the cockpit. Last week, I flew about 8,000 miles. I flew on three airlines. I flew on United, I flew on Northwest, I flew on Alaska. And when you're sitting there for six or seven hours, you don't have much to do except read, you begin to take on little projects and one of the projects I took on was the entry and exit into the cockpit and how the crew handled it. It was different with every airline.

One airline with Boeing had taken it upon itself to basically arm its own doors. They took conventional doors and armed it with mesh and so forth. One of them had a procedure that when there was an entry and exit in and out of the cockpit, that the cart that goes up and down the aisles carrying beverages would block, if you will, with the two flight attendants the entry door. But there was an average of eight to 12 entries and exits during the six-hour flight. They were necessitated by providing the crew, the captain and the co-pilot with food and obviously relief because there's no relief capabilities in the cockpit.

So unless you redesign your aircraft, you're going to have a real problem with the idea of keeping that door closed through the entire flight. It simply is not a practical alternative, the way your aircraft are currently designed. I think we have to recognize that. Now, it seems to me that what has been presented here from the standpoint of lines of defense and realization that the word out officially is, if an aircraft is taken over by a terrorist, the United States Air Force, the military has a capability and the authority to shoot it down. Now, that's not necessarily, nor should it be, the first and last line of defense.

You're going to find that cockpit crew fighting under whatever circumstances exist, if that door is penetrated. If you arm them, they at least have an opportunity to fight back. All aircraft don't have sky marshals. Fewer have them than we think. They all carry guns. They are armed. Now, logic seems to dictate the reality that if you have a skyjacker that comes in and takes over your aircraft and you have a marshal that has a gun, you have obviously the exposure for an event. What's the difference in that event occurring there and also having an additional back-up in the cockpit? These pilots are trained. Most of our military know how to handle a pistol. They know the character associated with it.

In my state, Mr. Chairman, all our bush aircraft carry in either the luggage of a captain or in the cockpit a sidearm. It's for a number of purposes. If the aircraft goes down in a wilderness area and so forth. But I have yet to hear one good reason not to arm the pilots. And you know the idea that we ought to do this, that and the other thing, they're fine. But the question, I think, that we should resolve -- at least one of the questions before this committee is whether to appropriately arm the pilots and I have yet to hear a good reason for the pilots not to have that additional capability because again, Mr. Chairman, if there is a break into that cockpit, these people will fight.

They will fight as they previously did in the hijacking. But if you give them an opportunity -- they're going to hear that door banging open, they are going to hear an entry, they are going to have an opportunity to react and that reaction as a trained individual, I think, would be a significant detriment.

I thank you for the opportunity to be with you this morning. I wish you well in your deliberations.

SEN. HOLLINGS: Thank you, Senator.

Senator Smith.

SEN. BOB SMITH (R-NH): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for holding the hearing and I understand that my request for testimony from four expert witnesses was denied by the committee. But I would like permission to submit written testimony on behalf of those four witnesses.

SEN. HOLLINGS: Very good.

SEN. SMITH: It would be Patricia Friend, the international president of the Association of Flight Attendants; Captain Tracy Price, the chairman of the Airline Pilots Security Alliance; Captain Philip Beall, chairman of the Committee for the Armed Defense of the Cockpit; and Ellen Saracini, the wife of the late Captain Vic Saracini, who was the pilot of United Flight 175 that crashed into Tower 2. Mr. Chairman, I would just make another request of you to allow Ellen Saracini to testify. It's three or four minutes. She's come here at her own expense. She's lived through this personally. So, again, I would make an appeal to you to reconsider that request.

SEN. HOLLINGS: Well, we'll look and see. We've got a lot of other witnesses and, as you have indicated, there are plenty more witnesses that want to be heard. The flight attendants for example have been left out and we're possibly going to have another hearing. So I would indicate at this point that that's what she'll have to do, is appear at that hearing. Go right ahead.

SEN. SMITH: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'm honored to testify here on behalf of the pilots, flight attendants, commercial airline passengers and the American people who support the idea of arming pilots. The pilots and flight attendants and others are the experts and their testimony will speak for itself. But I want to congratulate Senator Burns and Senator Murkowski, Senator Boxer and others, particularly those three, for their leadership and cooperation as we work through some issues in trying to get a legislation that we can move forward in an expeditious manner to get this situation taken care of before another tragedy occurs. And they've worked very hard with me in order to accomplish that.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, the House passed overwhelmingly a bill, 310 to something, and the administration now is beginning to change its mind fortunately. The American people are overwhelmingly in support of it. Pilots are. Flight attendants are. And I appreciate the fact that you have held this hearing and I would hope that you would allow for a mark up of the bill so that we could deal with this or a bill, if not this particular one.

I did speak with Ellen Saracini last week at a press conference, as did other senators. Senator Burns was there and others and her husband, Vic, supported even before this incident obviously armed pilots in the cockpit. And some say well, maybe, had the pilots been armed on that day, we could have prevented this tragedy. I don't know the answer to that but I could ask this question to leave for your consideration, "How could it have been any worse if they had been armed?" Enough our nation has suffered a great loss, not only with the pilots but thousands of people on the ground and the flight attendants as well. None of us want to see that happen again and I know, obviously, you don't either.

But armed pilots are the first line of deterrence and the last line of defense. It's been said here -- I'm not going to repeat all the comments because they were all said very eloquently, but in particular the eloquence of, I believe, Senator Allen when he talked -- I'm sorry, maybe it was Senator Smith, who talked about the fact that we had to shoot down a commercial airliner. That is not a good option, believe me. And I would rather take my chances with a pilot. Once somebody breaches the cockpit then there's a struggle at best and we need to know that anybody who comes through that door or tries to come through that door will be stopped. Now, some argue that less- than-lethal weapons are the answer. I would urge you to look at the tape that is a five or six minute tape that has been prepared by the pilots in terms of the effectiveness of stun guns and TASERs as opposed to lethal weapons, and you will see that they are not the answer. They might be a supplement to a firearm but they're not a replacement.

A firearm is truly the proper tool. And let me also say, on marshals. We can't go into the specifics of how many marshals are there but obviously there are not marshals on every flight and cockpit doors are not reinforced enough to block somebody from getting into the cockpit. We shouldn't be even thinking about taking another chance that something like this may happen again. So these pilots would be trained, some are already trained, they will be trained, Mr. Chairman. And I believe the time is now to pass legislation to allow armed pilots in the cockpits before we have another incident turning an aircraft into a weapon of mass destruction.

Thank you, very much, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. HOLLINGS: Thank you, very much, Senator Smith.

And if there are not any further questions, Secretary Mineta. We appreciate your patience and please come forward here with the Deputy Secretary Jackson and the administrator, Admiral Loy. I'm glad to see Admiral Loy with clothes on.

(Laughter.)

I usually see him in uniform.

ADM. LOY: Hopefully that was an adequate substitute.

SEN. HOLLINGS: And Dr. Dillingham they had down here listed as panel 2, but from the GAO with the first panel.

Secretary Mineta, I'll take my text from Senator Cleland, "whatever it takes." That's the hearing we're having. We're all on the same team and you've found and listened now for the past hour about all the flaws that we have -- as 17 senators have testified. Let's hear your testimony and complete the thought, what do you need. Tell this committee, because we haven't heard about any needs. We've heard that everything was on course, we're on schedule, we're going to comply with deadlines. Now the ox is in the ditch and we're behind the curve, so tell us what you need.

MR. NORMAN Y. MINETA: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. And good morning to you, Mr. Chairman, as well as Senator McCain and all the members of the committee. With me today is Deputy Secretary Michael Jackson and under secretary of Transportation for Security, James M. Loy.

Today Jim Loy makes his first appearance before the Senate as acting head of the Transportation Security Administration, which everyone has come to know as TSA. I know that you've had the pleasure in working with Jim in his previous position as commandant of the United States Coast Guard. He is an outstanding manager with impeccable credentials in security, intelligence, law enforcement and customer service. He has deep operational skills and leadership focus. This is his first week as acting under secretary, so I would ask that you welcome him to this large task.

This testimony is an opportunity to provide a status report on our work to build the TSA and to meet the vital objectives that Congress set out for this new agency some eight months ago. TSA's every step has appropriately been the focus of intense scrutiny. Now, there is a great deal of concern expressed in various quarters about the difficulty of federalizing security at the nation's 429 commercial airports. Some are urging Congress to revise its mandated deadlines which were spelled out in detail last fall in the Aviation and Transportation Security Act legislation. Others seek earmarks or payments of non-federal security costs that distract from TSA's core missions.

The Department of Transportation willingly took on the responsibility to implement that law and its ambitious timetables. I recruited a superb team that has met literally every single one of the many tough congressional deadlines to this point, tasks that in normal times would have been the work of years of preparation. We have made tremendous progress, but there is much more to accomplish.

Now, my full text of the prepared remarks summarizes details of how we are standing up to TSA to meet the mandates set by Congress. We shouldered this task with enthusiasm for an important reason. We are at war against remorseless, determined, well-trained terrorists who seek to attack and seriously damage our nation and our people. Without doubt, this threat has not abated, just the opposite. The threat is real, the war is real. So the questions that we meet here today to discuss are profoundly important.

President Bush has rightly urged the American people to return to life as normal. He has encouraged us to vacation with our loved ones, to conduct business as usual, not to be cowered by the evil ones. But make no mistake, the TSA employees we are recruiting and training nationwide are frontline troops in the war against terrorism. Unlike the military troops that our nation sent to meet this challenge abroad, at home we began TSA's deployment with a blank slate and a clear command: get the job done and do it this year. No excuses. And again, we accepted that mandate willingly because I am briefed and read the intelligence reports on a daily basis and I know that the threat is real.

Today I will discuss TSA's challenges, seek your counsel, report to you what we're doing, and telling you what's working and what needs improving. The entire Department of Transportation has been focused relentlessly on meeting the ambitious deadlines and important mission established by Congress for the Transportation Security Administration. We have made tremendous progress and we now have private sector partners at work with us at over 300 airports.

But the delay in approving emergency funding, the fact that the president's emergency request has been cut by one-third and the numerous new restricts imposed on TSA have dramatically undermined our ability to make this goal. And let me explain why. Four months ago, President Bush asked Congress to approve a $4.4 billion emergency supplemental to stand up this new agency. Now, I recognize that's a lot of money but that should not be surprising because the mandates set out in the ATSA legislation are ambitious.

And we set out to work in good faith, launching the massive effort required to meet the statutory plan. And we waited for the funding through May, June and now July. In the meantime, TSA borrowed money, renegotiated payment schedules with our vendors, deferred purchase of explosive detection equipment and set back the pilot testing of various security measures. Now TSA is literally days away from running out of money to pay for the ongoing work of screeners nationwide.

Now, we expected active congressional oversight, but we also needed Congress's support to fund TSA and to do it in a timely manner. The administration's emergency supplemental request was the amount that we needed to do the job, no more, no less. Yesterday Congress voted to cut $1 billion from the $4.4 billion requested by President Bush and then to impose new restrictions on our ability to get the job done. Here are the five facts about the emergency supplemental conference report.

First, it eliminated $550 million right off the top. Secondly, it sets $480 million in a so-called contingency fund that may not be available to TSA. Thirdly, it imposes $445 million in numerous earmarks not requested nor supported by the administration. Fourthly, it limits the total number of full-time TSA employees to 45,000, at least 20,000 employees short of what TSA needs to meet its statutory mission. And finally, this important language severely restricts our discretionary authority to manage TSA expenses in a cost effective manner. In short, TSA's budget was cut by at least $1 billion and possibly up to $1.5 billion, and this is a whopping 34 percent cut from the president's request.

Now, here's the dilemma that Congress has created. Congress has not yet changed TSA's mission, yet the budget to do the job has been radically diminished while new restrictions and mandates are being imposed. There are a number of voices in Congress calling for more resources or less, maintaining current law or seeking flexibility and change in the present law. What can be done? The amount of money Congress has approved simply will not support the mandates and the timetables for aviation security that Congress set last fall for TSA. Less money with no flexibility means fewer TSA employees, less equipment, longer lines at the airports, delays in reducing the hassle factor at airports and/or diminished security at our nation's airports.

These conflicting signals have forced us to regroup and revise the TSA business plan. And to complete that task will probably take several more weeks. It will involve complex negotiations with our contractors and vendors and a review of literally thousands of TSA commitments and plans. We need adequate funds now to continue fighting the war on terrorism and protecting the homeland.

After the TSA re-evaluates and revises its business plan to reflect the impact of the supplemental funding level, the administration will propose a significant budget amendment for Fiscal Year 2003 for TSA. And even if approved, we are still confronted, however, with a load that TSA cannot lift. Such funds will not arrive prior to our having to make immediate changes to our existing deployment schedule. Congress has given us a strict and inflexible mandate and insufficient funds to meet it.

Now, I want to reiterate that we are not asking for a free pass from rigorous oversight or criticism -- that is expected. Nor am I telling you that everything is perfect. Everything is not tidy but it is unreasonable to expect from a massive standup the same type of certainty and stability that is usually found in long established programs.

I have been blunt today about the dilemma that TSA now faces but the circumstances demand no less. I know how difficult your job is and I understand the competing pressures all of you face in making sound public policy. And as a former member, I come before you as one who loves this great institution, the Congress of the United States. I am a life long Democrat proudly serving an outstanding Republican president and I close with this simple message: There are literally thousands of committed TSA employees working furiously to improve transportation security. Please support them in their mission. Restore the money and allow us to discretion to complete our work effectively. Give us the tools and the flexibility that we need to build this young organization. We will then be able to hand off to a new Department of Homeland Security, led by a Cabinet colleague, who like me, will continue to work with you to strengthen the Transportation Security Administration.

Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to submit my full statement for the record.

SEN. HOLLINGS: It will be included in the record and we thank you.

MR. MINETA: And I'm happy to respond to your questions.

SEN. HOLLINGS: Good. Secretary Jackson, do you have a statement?

MR. MICHAEL P. JACKSON: No, sir, I do not.

SEN. HOLLINGS: How about Secretary Loy?

ADM. JAMES M. LOY: No, sir, I do not.

SEN. HOLLINGS: All right. I'm trying to find, since we say this, whatever it takes. What about Dr. Dillingham, he doesn't have any statement right now. Whatever it takes. By gosh -- (laughter) -- we want to get on and get this one billion shy that you're talking about, Mr. Secretary. And I'm trying to find out from this staff behind me. By gosh, they have 480 and all of these other darn figures. Are you telling the truth or are you not? Or to put it more politely, are you accurate or inaccurate in this thing? Because you asked for 4.4 and the actual figure was 4.95 that the Transportation Committee approved as of yesterday.

We don't want to get along with this here flexibility. You haven't justified flexibility. We find needs at the airport, nine other needs and everything else. So this committee is not going along with flexibility. If you justify a request we're going to give it to you. But we're not going along with this nebulous -- just tell us what you need, that's what I want to know. And have you got the figures now or not?

MR. JACKSON: I do.

SEN. HOLLINGS: What?

MR. JACKSON: They got 3.85 billion.

SEN. HOLLINGS: You got 3.85 billion, go ahead.

(Cross talk.)

SEN. HOLLINGS: That's right. That there cut was from the request by Mitch Daniels. I suggest you talk to the OMB crowd.

MR. MINETA: Well, in all due respect, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Daniels doesn't vote on these numbers. It's the Congress.

SEN. HOLLINGS: But he tells you -- you've been in the Congress for Lord's sakes, don't give us that stuff. He says the president's going to veto it unless you cut it. You know good and well how these markups and conferences work. You've been in the Congress, so you don't tell me he doesn't vote. He's got the best vote at the table. He's got the president's vote. So that was cut and then they put in 445 earmark funds all for security, so that was one billion. But you put in the 480 contingency. So you ought to still contend that you are a billion shy. Is that correct?

MR. MINETA: Yes, sir. Again, the $480 million contingency is not available to us unless the president exercises the $5.1 billion total contingency fund. So to me I'm not going to count the $480 million. You know, it's like what little I have at home to spend. If it ain't there, I can't spend it. And so again, in terms of trying to be responsible in our stewardship of public funds, I cannot commit on the 480. And even if I do, the 480 will slip over to handle the $445 million in earmarks that are in the appropriations bill.

SEN. HOLLINGS: Well, let's say you've got 4.95, that's what the Transportation Committee's marked up, and you need 5.95. Is that what you're saying?

MR. MINETA: No, sir -- 4.495 I believe might have been if that was done yesterday.

SEN. HOLLINGS: Right.

MR. MINETA: It's the Fiscal Year '03 appropriations level, not the Fiscal Year '02 supplemental number.

SEN. HOLLINGS: So the '02 supplemental number needs how much money?

MR. MINETA: $4.4 billion is what we requested.

SEN. HOLLINGS: How much more than actually -- the president's going to sign the supplemental today. We passed it yesterday. So how much more do you need? That supplemental provides -- how much does it provide? $3.85 (billion).

MR. STEPHENS: Mr. Chairman, but he has 30 days to sign the declaration of emergency. The money's not available to --

SEN. HOLLINGS: Well, I'm just trying to find out for the committee just how much we've got to get for him. I mean, the gentlemen says he's been cut.

MR. MINETA: But again, Mr. Chairman, the 3.895 is the 4.4 billion less the 550 million that the committee took off the top and then, as I say, earmarked an additional 445. And the 445 is still taken from what we needed for TSA for other things. We did not ask for the 445 million in earmarks. As an example the $231 million for airport security or the $125 million in port security funds. And there are a number of other issues. Those are important items, but it takes away from the 4.4 billion that we had requested originally that were earmarked for things to make sure that we were going to be able to comply with the November 19th date and the December 31 date.

SEN. HOLLINGS: Let me yield to Senator McCain.

SEN. McCAIN: Mr. Chairman, could I ask did Dr. Dillingham have an opening statement? Doctor, did you have an opening statement?

MR. GERALD DILLINGHAM: Yes, sir.

SEN. McCAIN: Could we --

SEN. HOLLINGS: Go right ahead. I thought you all came up as assistants to the secretary. I'm trying to move the hearing along. Let's hear you.

MR. DILLINGHAM: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator McCain and members of the committee, I'm pleased to be here this morning to provide testimony on behalf of the General Accounting Office. My testimony is based on our aviation security work that took place prior to and immediately following 9/11 in our ongoing work for this committee. I will be focusing on three areas: first what has been accomplished since 9/11; second what remains to be done to strengthen transportation security; and third, the challenges and opportunities that TSA faces as it moves forward.

Before offering my observations I want to begin by acknowledging the tremendous tasks that TSA and its employees faced. Within a year they would have to go from being non-existent to a fully functioning agency with tens of thousands of employees charged with protecting the security of the American traveling public. To accomplish all this in the mandated timeframes is an unprecedented undertaking. While there certainly have been frustrations, the efforts of the DoT TSA team are commendable. Secretary Mineta has just referred to some of the TSA accomplishments. We certainly agree that TSA has made progress in meeting some of the deadlines mandated by the act to improve security.

It is also the case that TSA's initial difficulties in hiring and training passenger screeners and providing for the screening of checked bags with explosive detection equipment could make it extremely difficult to meet two key deadlines by the end of the year. TSA's experience with hiring passenger screeners at Baltimore, Washington International Airport maybe a preview of things to come. In that case not as many people showed up for the job as was expected. Only about a third of the applicants who had passed the initial screening and who were scheduled for pre-hiring assessments reported for that assessment. And, of those who reported, only about a third passed the assessment.

As it currently stands TSA will need to hire and train about 7,600 screeners per month to staff the commercial airports with federal employees by the November 19th deadline. In addition, assuming that enough EDS equipment can be manufactured, purchased and deployed to the airport, hiring and training, we estimate at 20,000 to 30,000 check baggage screeners before the December 31st deadline may be very difficult.

In the area what remains to be done, perhaps the most critical is the enhancement of systems for gathering, processing and using intelligence information. This will require TSA to work with other agencies to identify potential threats before they reach the airport, before they reach the screener checkpoints and certainly before they board aircraft. Another critical security vulnerability is the cargo carried by passenger aircraft. 22 percent of all cargo loaded in the United States in the year 2000 was carried by passenger flights. Following Senator Hutchison, logic suggests that there is little point to carefully screening every piece of luggage if the cargo placed aboard the same flight is not inspected.

Generally Aviation has also been identified as a potential threat area. General Aviation includes more than 200,000 small privately owned planes which are located in every state in almost 18,000 airports. There are only a few new guidelines related to General Aviation. This leads General Aviation far more open and potentially vulnerable than the commercial sector. Additionally, the undersecretary has discretion with regard to such matters as how to further secure the cockpit, including whether commercial pilots should be armed. These are now subject of pending legislation.

In the longer term TSA's challenges include meeting the responsibility for all modes of transportation and addressing some government wide challenges. And although TSA is responsible for security in all modes of transportation, it is initially focused primarily on strengthening certain aspects of the aviation security system. And because of the push to meet critical aviation security deadlines, TSA has not yet assumed full responsibility for the security of other modes of transportation. TSA also has an opportunity to set a government wide standard by establishing an organizational culture where the focus is on performance at every turn.

The act requires the undersecretary to establish a results based management system that sets measurable goals and standards. Ultimately, by measuring performance in such a way, the undersecretary would be able to quickly spot any problems TSA would have in carrying out its mission. This would reduce the chance that terrorists could exploit weaknesses at any point in the system. Mr. Chairman, in the final analysis, if the question were asked today "Is air travel more secure than it was on 9/11?" I would answer yes with a "but." The fundamental long term challenge is when this committee holds future hearings on the subject, we hope that the answer to the question would be a simple and emphatic "yes" with no "ifs, ands or buts."

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. HOLLINGS: Dr. Dillingham, I'm used to comptrollers giving us audited figures. How much money between now and the end of the fiscal year is needed, and how much do you have? How much money do you intend to spend, or hope to spend between now and September 30th, the end of this fiscal year? And how much money do you have? I'm trying to get to the shortage. We want to correct this.

MR. DILLINGHAM: I think that Secretary Mineta is probably better able to answer that. I'm with the General Accounting Office, not TSA.

SEN. HOLLINGS: But you don't have an accounting of the figures at all?

MR. DILLINGHAM: No sir. We have not looked at it.

SEN. HOLLINGS: Senator McCain.

SEN. McCAIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Dr. Dillingham. It's very interesting figures that you do cite and I'd like to ask Secretary Mineta.

Secretary Mineta, Dr. Dillingham just stated that you have to hire 7,600 people per month between now and the deadline for screening and security as I understand it. You're going to have to hire and train 30,000 people to man the explosive detection systems. Are you going to be able to meet those deadlines?

MR. MINETA: In terms of our hiring program for both passenger screeners and baggage screeners, there is a plan that was devised. If I could back up just a little bit.

SEN. McCAIN: You know I don't have a lot of time. But I would appreciate -- thank you.

MR. MINETA: Okay. But then let me say yes we are on --

SEN. McCAIN: But take whatever time you need.

MR. MINETA: We are on schedule. In terms of the plan that we had for hiring screeners, it's one of these programs where you start out slowly and then you start increasing the number of people who are recruited, tested, trained and deployed. And we look at what we're doing on a regular timetable basis and we are on schedule to make sure that we have the sufficient number of people on the 19th November for passenger screening and the number of people for baggage screening by December 31. Now, someone said then report to the assessment center. Remember, to apply for a job you either dial 1800 or you get onto the interline. And then once they do that, then we tell them to report to the assessment center, and that's those percentages that Dr. Dillingham was talking about. We are on schedule right now, senator.

SEN. McCAIN: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Dr. Dillingham, are you optimistic about their ability to make those -- meet those deadlines?

MR. DILLINGHAM: Senator McCain, I think that the jury is really still out. It is the case that the hiring has increased significantly over the last few weeks, they're moving faster. But it's also true that they're having a tremendous amount of difficulty finding screeners in the big metropolitan areas as well as finding an appropriate number of female screeners to match up with the female searchers. So a couple of weeks from now is a better time to see if that prediction will hold true.

SEN. McCAIN: Maybe we ought to have you back.

Mr. Secretary, what is the effect of the appropriators putting a cap on the number of full-time employees that TSA can have?

MR. MINETA: Well, first of all we have four major contracts in terms of recruiting for people to do site assessments at airports for placement of the equipment and where are the check lines going to be. We have --

SEN. McCAIN: My question is what is the effect of the cap?

MR. MINETA: The effect is that with the lack of money, we are now going to have to tell these contractors we're going to have to cut you off. And so that's why I say whether it's with the NCS Pearson contract, that's going out and recruiting the people that we can have --

SEN. McCAIN: Mr. Chairman, I can't hear the witness. I apologize, but I can't hear the witness. Go ahead.

MR. MINETA: -- so that the contract that they have, NCS Pearson, to recruit and get these people for us, if we have to cut off that contract we will not have the sufficient number of people to be able to do the screening for us. And that's what's going to happen to us in terms of the contract, whether it be for NCS Pearson to bring people in, whether it's the Boeing-Siemens contract that goes out to the airports to do the site assessments or the Lockheed Martin contract that does the hiring and the training for --

SEN. McCAIN: So you will not be able to carry out your assigned mission with this provision in the appropriations bill?

MR. MINETA: Given what our plan was and given where we are with the supplemental appropriation, we will not be able to hire the numbers that we plan to do.

SEN. McCAIN: And therefore unable to carry out your mission.

MR. MINETA: The obligation --

SEN. McCAIN: Did you want to add to that, Mr. Jackson?

MR. JACKSON: Yes, sir. We can -- we would struggle to get to the end of this fiscal year under that 45,000 cap while hiring both passenger screening and baggage screeners. And the real difficulty comes instantly in September. We are going to project to go over that 45,000 cap in our total employment. And this includes the air marshal program and it includes the overhead, it includes the support for ports and other issues. So this is the entire TSA. Our hiring is going to in September punch over that cap, and if we are operating under a CR, for example, in October, we've hit the wall. We have to just stop.

SEN. McCAIN: Do you agree, Dr. Dillingham, with that assessment?

MR. DILLINGHAM: As much as we've looked at the numbers, Mr. McCain -- Senator McCain, I'm sorry, we would agree with that.

SEN. McCAIN: Senator Ensign is going to voice this concern to you for more emphatically than I will, but there is a concern that if you meet these deadlines, suppose you had the equipment, suppose you had the proper number of employees, you still would have inordinate delays in major airports across America, Phoenix Sky Harbor, McCarran, et cetera. How do you respond to that, Mr. Secretary?

MR. MINETA: Well, I guess first of all it would -- it goes airport by airport. But I think within the last probably couple of weeks we have said that there will be difficulty with about 20 to 30 airports across the country.

SEN. McCAIN: Well, then should there be some exemption for them?

MR. MINETA: That's something that we've talked about in House and we haven't come to any determination between our department and the White House on what we ought to be doing on --

SEN. McCAIN: Well, please keep us informed as soon as possible --

MR. MINETA: Absolutely. I mean --

SEN. McCAIN: -- as to what decisions you make on that.

Well, I see that my time has expired and I don't want to overrun it, but this is an important issue obviously at major airports around America and I hope you'll come to a decision on that as quickly as possible.

Welcome, Admiral Loy. We appreciate your willingness to serve and we appreciate your past service to the nation and we look forward to working with you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. HOLLINGS: Let the record show that the committee was furnished last evening, an updated figure of TSA occupation employees, certain directors, attorneys, law enforcement officers and investigators under screeners have said screeners, 759, supervisory screeners, 1,725, for a total of 2,484. Mr. Secretary, that's where they reckon it is as I've furnished the committee as of last evening.

Senator Wyden.

SEN. WYDEN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I've made a priority to focus on the performance of screeners at the airports and particularly through undercover audits. And it is very troubling to see the results thus far. We, for example, have seen 30, 40 percent failure rates at airports where apparently the testers didn't even do anything fancy to conceal large weapons and yet they all seemed to get through. And I guess I'd like to start by asking you will the results of these audits have consequences? What's been done to date with respect to these airports with these huge failure rates with respect to weapons getting by the screeners.

MR. MINETA: Well, first of all, I want you to recognize that probably 95 percent of the screeners that are in the work force right now were the ones who were there prior to the 11th of September. Under the law, we took over all of the contracts on the 17th of February from the screening companies. We have three airports right now that are totally federalized with federal employees.

Now, the report that was referred to in the USA Today, that was a leak report that was conducted by our own TSA investigation people. And so there are two responses in terms of a report that we get. One is in terms of overall getting to everybody, the interim security directors and the federal security directors at all of the airports, in terms of the deficiencies that they're going to have to pay attention to in terms of training their -- you know, on their on job training to tell their screeners what has to be improved.

The second face of it is on the specific airport where those violations occurred, to go ahead and make sure that they're corrected. And to the extent that they're not corrected or if we find a pattern of underperformance, then those folks have been released.

SEN. WYDEN: Has that happened to date? I mean, what I want to --

MR. MINETA: Yes, sir.

SEN. WYDEN: It has?

MR. MINETA: Yes, sir.

SEN. WYDEN: How many airports, for example, did you put in place changes with respect to making sure that screening performance changed?

MR. MINETA: Well, I can think of one FST that we've replaced. And as I recall, that original report had four or five airports and --

SEN. WYDEN: I will move on, but I'd like you to furnish for the record what have been the consequences of these significant audit failures. I mean, this is a very real problem. And I will tell you, I want to meet you halfway, but you have to show us there are consequences when there have been failure. Now, let me move --

MR. MINETA: You want to --

SEN. WYDEN: I'd like to ask about another --

MR. MINETA: I'll submit it for the record.

SEN. WYDEN: Thank you. That will be fine. Set aside for a moment personalities and working style and those sorts of issues. What was not being done on Mr. Magaw's watch that concerned you? I'd like to know why you replaced him. Get that on the record.

MR. MINETA: Again, I think there are two things there. One is replacing Mr. Magaw. Mr. Magaw submitted his resignation because of his health. He had, I believe it was four, five months ago, a splint put in his --

SEN. WYDEN: Mr. Secretary, we know about his health problems. What was not being done --

MR. MINETA: There was a problem in terms of his health and he submitted his resignation because when you're standing up this kind of agency, this is a very long working day and he was frankly not up to working those long days. And so to the extent then that attention is not -- that his long days are not there -- then his attention was not being put on the job.

SEN. WYDEN: So he was doing everything in terms of the specific functions and activities that you wanted and the only thing that concerned you was his health?

MR. MINETA: No. There are performance issues.

SEN. WYDEN: What were those, Mr. Secretary? This is the third time now I've asked the question.

MR. MINETA: All right. Just as an overall, I would say he was not engaged as a person who is in a leadership position of a new standing up agency.

SEN. WYDEN: Mr. Loy, you're starting. What's going to change? I mean, I am trying to get from the secretary the specifics for example about what happened during those first six months because I do think it was more than personalities and health issues. And we all want to be sensitive to someone's health concerns. But I want to know what policies specifically are going to change now at the Transportation Security Agency on your watch. You're starting. What do you want to change?

ADM. LOY: Senator Wyden, this is my third day on this job. Each of these --

SEN. WYDEN: Tell us what you'd like to change.

ADM. LOY: It's been about a month long. In the efforts I've focused on exactly what your question is. I'm going to make a concerted effort to communicate better with stakeholders. I think there were some problems associated with reaching airlines, with reaching airports, their directors. Many of the other stakeholders that are so important in this business to make this a collaborative effort to engage and produce the security paradigm in our airports that we need to do.

Secondly, I think there are challenges associated with many balls in the air at the same time. This team that has been put together by the secretary, Senator Wyden, really has a superb business plan in place to get done what needed to get done. But we also need to be responsive to the feedback that is forthcoming, not only from the Congress, but from airport directors on an individual basis. If there's a problem at an airport, we need to engage that airport and have them feel that their engagement on the other end is going to get something accomplished.

Another issue is simply correspondence communications. Senator Boxer earlier in her opening statement was concerned about writing a letter and not getting an answer. Well, that's not an adequate situation for us to engage in. So the simple leadership and management skills associated with making not only a new organization stand up but focus on a mission which is perhaps as important to this nation as any other, is going to get my full time and attention.

SEN. WYDEN: Is there a uniform list today on what items passengers can carry on board a plane? I am told by passengers that they're told a variety of different things about what they're allowed to carry on board a plane. Could you tell us is there today a uniform list in this country for what passengers can bring on?

ADM. LOY: Can or cannot?

SEN. WYDEN: Can.

ADM. LOY: I think the list is probably much more discreet as it relates to what they cannot bring on, Senator Wyden. But I will find that list for you and get it to you or if there is a need to create one, we will do that. Constancy throughout each and everyone of those screeners saying the same thing to our flying public is enormously important.

SEN. WYDEN: My time is --

MR. MINETA: If I might add --

SEN. WYDEN: Secretary.

MR. MINETA: One of the things that, for instance, that we experienced recently. Cigar cutters are allowed to go on board the airplane. There is now a new cigar cutter that's come out and it looks like a bullet and it has a very sharp instrument inside. And so that cigar cutter is not allowed on the airplane. And so there is a list and, as the admiral has indicated, most of those are on the prohibited list side in terms of length but there are two lists.

SEN. WYDEN: Just on this point.

There's --

MR. MINETA: It's on the website, sir.

SEN. WYDEN: You're saying there now is one list in this country for what you can bring on and what you cannot bring on. Mr. Jackson is shaking his head. I mean this, Mr. Secretary, is what troubles people. I mean this should be -- and I'm very sympathetic to this point about cigar cutters and certainly the terrorists are not technological simpletons. They are always going to be trying to find new approaches. But for the life of me I can't figure out why there isn't a list of what you can bring on and what you can't bring on. And Mr. Jackson, as far as his response, says that that list doesn't exist today. Is that right, Mr. Jackson?

MR. JACKSON: Our approach has been the negative. What you're prohibited from bringing on. That list of what you're prohibited to bring on is posted on our web site. It's communicated to our employees and it's available at each of the airports.

SEN. WYDEN: Everything else you can bring on?

MR. JACKSON: The list of what you can bring on -- a book, a magazine, a fan to fan yourself in the plan is as vast as the imagination of the American people and we're not trying to limit what you can bring on. We're trying to say, "Here are dangerous prohibited items. Those cannot come on." As the secretary has said that list is constantly changing because the creativity of the bad guys is significant as well.

SEN. WYDEN: My time is up. I'll just tell you that the passengers are confused and the airports are confused. I'm going to look at your list. I'm anxious to work with you in a cooperative way on it. Thank you.

SEN. HOLLINGS: Senator Burns.

SEN. BURNS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I'll move right along here because I'm not going to dwell on how the department is getting along because of the TSA. I want to move into this question of armed pilots. So shift gears here just a little bit. And I'd like to get some answers from the Transportation Department. I want to know right away that we've noticed that recently the administration announced they would re-examine the existing policy for arming pilots. I welcome that. Saying that it has a new director in Admiral Loy. We welcome you and we're heartily supportive of you. If you have any thoughts on this, personal thoughts or whatever, and if you do, how long will it take you to make a decision?

ADM. LOY: Sir, it was just two days ago that the secretary asked me to take on this review, which I will do. I have already directed our technical center up in Atlantic City to look at some possibilities because I need to learn about this and get up the learning curve very quickly.

SEN. BURNS: What's your personal feelings?

ADM. LOY: I think I would be remiss if I offered those. I can say that on the, you know, on the upshot I'm hesitant but I'm also being directed to conduct a review and I will do that. I am as concerned about elements in the House bill as I am in the basic question and I think that is worth discussion with the secretary and yourself as well.

SEN. BURNS: Well, we'll be looking forward --

ADM. LOY: I have to make this decision in the wake of the review and I want to be objective in that regard.

SEN. BURNS: Well, I think some of these cases, whenever we start talking about homeland security, they have to be based on sometimes on gut feeling and some of these things and I think we better start making these decisions right away. You probably have some personal feelings on this but I will not go into that at this time. Has the TSA reviewed the FBI's feasibility study on cockpit protection program in its research for its determination of viability -- that program? I mean, I'm asking the same question again, is this study underway?

ADM. LOY: I'm not sure the FBI.

MR. JACKSON: Senator, is this the study on non-lethal weapons?

SEN. BURNS: On any kind of a weapon I would imagine. It's a feasibility study on cockpit protection.

MR. MINETA: There is a National Institute of Justice study with regard to --

SEN. BURNS: Is that the same thing?

MR. MINETA: I don't know if that's the one you're referring to, sir.

SEN. BURNS: Just on side arms?

MR. MINETA: Yes.

SEN. BURNS: On side arms?

MR. MINETA: There is a NIJ study on side arms in the cockpit and what they have done is to issue, I believe it was in April, a report relating to lethal weapons. I'm sorry, non-lethal. And so that's the extent of what the National Institute of Justice of the Department of Justice has provided us.

SEN. BURNS: Well, have they done anything on lethal weapons?

MR. MINETA: I'll have to ask -- not to our knowledge. No sir.

SEN. BURNS: The new congressionally mandated reinforced cockpit doors are supposed to be installed and operational on all commercial aircraft by April 2003. Is there an FAA certified cockpit door available for installation right now?

MR. MINETA: Yes sir. There are. Two doors for certain classes of aircraft.

SEN. BURNS: For every make or model?

MR. MINETA: Not for every make, but there are two doors that would be applicable as I recall for 737s, 727s, Airbus --

SEN. BURNS: How many airliners are subject to that FAA requirement for enhanced cockpit doors, do you know?

MR. MINETA: They're all -- all U.S. airlines, and that totals about 6500 aircraft plus all aircraft that come into the United States from foreign ports, from foreign airlines, will have to comply with the April 9, 2003 date.

SEN. BURNS: Is that possible?

MR. MINETA: Well, we just met with ATA the other day and we didn't hear anything differently. At least from the American Air Transport Association carriers.

SEN. BURNS: Well now, it sounds like to me -- now I don't know if go along at the same pace that we've been going on the airport security -- and talking to the people from Boeing and the people who make these airplanes, I think that you're pretty optimistic, maybe a little overly optimistic -- by April the 3rd. Now, we're only nine months away, Mr. Secretary.

MR. MINETA: But again remember this is not --

SEN. BURNS: Let the record show he's nodding his head.

(Laughter.)

MR. MINETA: This is not a TSA responsibility in terms of doing the work. The doing of the work is still the manufacturers and the airlines and it's the -- in this instance, the certification comes from FAA. FAA does the certification of the redesign of the cockpit area.

SEN. BURNS: Okay, now let's -- if it's not your responsibility, it's a --

MR. MINETA: It is still our responsibility within the department.

SEN. BURNS: Okay. Well, I'm saying --

MR. MINETA: Not TSA.

SEN. BURNS: I'm saying then in your own estimation, will we make that deadline?

MR. MINETA: Well, that's what we've been told.

SEN. BURNS: John Mica, the chairman of the Aviation Subcommittee on Transportation and Infrastructure said 12 foreign airlines allow their pilots to carry guns, some in the United States. How many foreign airlines do that today? Do you know?

MR. MINETA: No, sir, I do not.

SEN. BURNS: We've been told Korean Airlines, SAS, Lufthansa, are allowed to carry weapons on the flight deck, and you don't know how many of those you have agreements with?

MR. MINETA: I do not.

SEN. BURNS: Well, I'm sitting here looking for some information and it doesn't sound like that we've got the information that we're going to need. And I would tell you that the study -- and I think we've got to make these decisions right away -- it appears to me that, even though it's optimistic at best to complete our task at the airports, then we must act on the next line of defense. And I would say even it might not be on a permanent basis, who knows? But I'm saying we've got to move forward as a Congress and as a government to make sure there is a first line of defense, or maybe a second line of defense.

I do not like the F-16 and the F-15. I think we can do better than that, asking the American people -- this is an alternative that we have that I think is just absolutely outrageous. That is not my United States of America. But I'm just saying we have asked for some reports, asked for briefings. We didn't get them until this week and we will continue to do so. I have more questions and I'm looking forward to the next panel because I want to hear some meat about this. We know what your challenge is and we're probably pretty sensitive to what you're trying to do, but we talked about this less than a year ago when we were talking about this legislation.

MR. MINETA: Senator Burns, one of the things that I guess as secretary of Transportation that I don't want to be caught in, is the same position with the Aviation and Transportation Security Act. It's a great piece of legislation, but I don't want to be in the position of having armed pilots and then all of a sudden facing a bill of $850 million to $900 million in terms of the start up cost, the training, getting the weapons for 85,000 pilots and then doing the $250 million to $260 million in annual costs to do quarterly recurrent training. No one from what I can see has really talked about the cost. And having gone through now my experience with the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, I don't want to go down that alley again.

SEN. BURNS: Well, I would suggest --

MR. MINETA: I want people to recognize --

SEN. BURNS: Then I would suggest you stick around and listen to next panel of testimony because I think you'll find you'll learn that we can do it a lot better and a lot cheaper.

MR. MINETA: I learn all the time, sir.

SEN. HOLLINGS: Senator Hutchison.

SEN. HUTCHISON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to talk about the screening of checked bags and the measures that you're putting in place to assure the best performance that we can possibly make in that area and particularly, I would like for you to talk about the bag match option and the fact that it is not required on connecting flights. But you did have a pilot program put in place you said in our last hearing that would see if it was feasible to screen bags -- rather, bag match on a connecting flight, so I want to know if that study has come back, and what you're doing in that area in general, and what has been the response on that study?

MR. MINETA: First of all, that pilot program is going on and it would be one of the areas that I would look to for implementation in order to meet the December 31 date. Maybe I can have Deputy Secretary Jackson expand more on the pilot program and inform you as to where we are on it.

MR. JACKSON: We did a test on two airlines, United and American and Chicago using hub connections and they had somewhat significantly different types of technology in place to manage the positive passenger bag match connection at those two airports, and so it gave us a highly automated test and a very manual test. We have had a preliminary set of recommendations to us. We're still in negotiations and discussions and assessment phase with the two affected airlines. The punch line from their perspective is the implementation of this procedure on a national basis would produce a significant number of delays and disruptions to the schedule which would compel them to restack their schedules at major hub airports in order to be able to implement this.

They pointed to the high cost of it. These are, I think historically, the concerns of the airline industry -- we're going to have to balance, especially the new circumstances that the secretary talks about. The tool kits that we're going to have available to us to work the baggage screening problem in light of the $1 billion to $1.5 billion reduction that we're facing so that it's an important part of our assessment. We don't have a final conclusion. We are looking at it very closely.

SEN. HUTCHISON: If you assume that you're going to have the money you need, that you are going to be able to hire the people you need, will you be able to make a December 31 deadline for some form of screening or checking checked bags on every flight?

MR. MINETA: We have -- I'm sorry, I was just reading this memo, so go ahead.

MR. JACKSON: We have in the budget that we proposed as part of the $4.4 billion, a layered approach to this issue that's divided into two camps. One, what's appropriate for the all cargo carriers, and two, what's appropriate for the passenger carriers that also carry cargo.

A cornerstone of what we were hoping for was a very material enhancement of the known shipper programs and we had asked for additional bodies, I believe 200 individuals to work those types of audits assessments and to work the supply chain backwards to give us greater rigor and discipline in managing that cargo work. We had asked for technology in the airports which we would use for walkup customers. We're undergoing -- underway with a review at the Postal Service of possibly trying to allow for screening of postal cargo over 16 ounces, and we've done a study with the postal service and with the air carriers to evaluate those issues. So there are multiple tracks to do this.

There is no single piece of technology, machine or equipment that we could drop on the table in the next few months that simply gives us the same level of scrutiny in the same mechanized way that we are trying to put in place relative to the bags. But we do believe we can materially improve it, strengthen it, and that's an ongoing commitment of TSA for the years to come too.

SEN. HUTCHISON: Well, do you think that you will be able by December 31 to have a sufficient coverage until you get the actual machinery that I know you're working on in place?

MR. JACKSON: Sufficient coverage is an elusive judgment. I think that we are constantly trying --

SEN. HUTCHISON: Some coverage.

MR. JACKSON: Coverage, yes. More coverage than today, better coverage than today. Is it going to satisfy us? No, we're not going to be satisfied until we feel like we've totally nailed this issue, but we have made very significant steps in place to plan in place to do this and I would welcome, you know, your further thoughts and assessment of that with us. That is an area where we want to focus more attention and need to focus more resources.

SEN. HUTCHISON: Let me go, since you've mentioned, to cargo. Senator Feinstein and I have introduced a bill that would provide a much stronger chain of custody in known chipping -- in your known chipper program. It would have a comprehensive system for certifying the known chippers, assigning an encrypted identifier to that known chipper. In other words -- I don't know if you've looked at my bill, but I would like to ask you if you think we need to strengthen in that area? And if you've looked at my bill, do I address all of the issues in the way that you think they should be addressed?

MR. MINETA: We have looked at your bill and again I guess one of the big things that I want to make sure is that specifications that we put out are general enough to be able to be inclusive of vendors and yet be exclusive enough to do a good job in terms of the security responsibility that we have. And that's the nature of what we're looking at in your legislation. And frankly I'm not sure, as we look at your legislation, as to what encrypted identification means and is that something that might become a sole source kind of a problem for us?

SEN. HUTCHISON: Well, we're trying to have an encryption identifier that could not be tampered with or broken.

MR. MINETA: And there are many forms of doing that, and that is something that we want to pursue. But interestingly enough, as I might note, one of the things that we wanted to do with the transportation workers was to start with an identification card for transportation workers, and that would be encrypted. But we have now been precluded from obligating any funds to pursue a transportation workers identification card. Now, frankly, that was a precursor to seeing whether or not we would take that onto a trusted traveler program. But we can't even now work on a transportation worker identification card.

SEN. HUTCHISON: Are you talking about language in the supplemental?

MR. JACKSON(?): It was an earmark in the supplemental.

MR. MINETA: Yes, yes.

SEN. HUTCHISON: All right. Well, Mr. Chairman, I would just say I hope we're going to have a comprehensive bill. I hope it will address cargo as well as these other screened baggage deadlines. I think it is incumbent on us to do that and try to take away some of these barriers you're bringing up.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. HOLLINGS: Very good.

Senator Allen.

SEN. ALLEN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Last time we were here Secretary Mineta brought up several different things and Mr. Magaw was here in those days as well. And I was listening to your answering her questions. There are two things I'm going to bring up, so you should get your mind ready. One is going to be the, in my view, common sense approach to providing a last line of defense for airplane security, and the other's going to be Reagan National Airport.

As I had mentioned back then in May, on American Airlines flight 77 here you had one of the pilots, Captain Burlingame, U.S. Naval Reserves had fought in Operation Desert Storm. And the question I posed was, well, if he had a firearm would that have not been helpful in deterring these terrorists from taking over that aircraft. And the question was that he said, "Well, things are better now than they were then." But still there are efforts to continue to improve in a variety of ways.

And I'm not going to criticize you all for this ramp up of the TSA, to me that worked like a halftime of a football game and sometimes you have to make adjustments and realize that some things weren't going as planned, and I want to work with you to get that done, and there's no reason to be beating you all up unnecessarily in that regard.

But on the -- I sense at least a difference in perspective on the idea of pilots who are properly trained, and you talked about how elaborate the training was and all the precautions and the safety, that there is at least some sense a recognition that having pilots properly trained, with a firearm as a last line of defense at least is something that in the bill that Senator Burns and Smith and others are on, and I guess I'm about the 17th cosponsor, it does have a valid logical common sense approach to it.

MR. MINETA: And I think from a common sense perspective I want to look at whether or not we want lethal weapons in the cockpit. Can it be non-lethal? And in terms of 85,000 commercial airline pilots, do we give all of them arms or do we put the arms in a safe in the cockpit itself and if we're going to go the lethal weapon side. On the other hand, if we're going to go non-lethal, then there are a number of different technologies that exist, whether they be TASERs or going with solid -- the hard rubber bullets.

And so again, that's something that we want to explore. But I just want everyone to keep in mind that there are costs associated with this program as with others. And I just want to make sure that we are adequately funded to pursue whatever program we're going to be adopting.

SEN. ALLEN: Fine. I would say, Mr. Secretary, that all of those considerations are fine, and I think costs, if we're going to be arguing over costs, we're spending billions of dollars on security. It makes sense that this added sense of security -- I don't think it's too much, I think it would give passengers a greater sense of security and I think it -- I do think it ought to be lethal. Now, whether lethal force as opposed to TASERs or stun guns and so forth, moreover, the issue of whether they're always locked up in the cockpit or whether the pilots can carry them through the airport and so forth is another matter, but that's not necessarily addressed in the bill other than in the bill, as I understand it, the firearms would be in the cockpit.

Although there could be situations such as LAX where if somebody was attacking, and Senator Ensign was bringing this up, hundreds and thousands of people that -- other than going to El-Al, that is obviously well armed themselves, even at the ticket counters, you see pilots going through airports and if they had gone to -- and I mentioned, a domestic airline. But that person could have emptied out every single one of his bullets in his cartridge, in his magazine, and there would have been many more people killed on account of that. So if cost is a concern, I think we've made great progress because I think that can be addressed.

Now, on to Reagan National Airport. The last meeting, as you recollect, you lifted my hopes in saying that it would be reopened for general aviation at the end of that month of May. Obviously now it is shut again, or it continues to be completely shut, other than for a few governors, I suppose, to general aviation.

MR. MINETA: And members of the House and Senate.

SEN. ALLEN: And members of the House and Senate. Well, I would like to see it open to more than governors and a few members of the House and Senate. It seems to me that you have the right attitude on it. I know that Jane Garvey had similar sentiments and I do want to comment her for many years of outstanding service. And I recognized you have conflicting people altogether trying to give you different types of information and if it were up to some of them, Reagan National Airport would not even been opened today for commercial aviation. What progress report can you give us at this hearing now in July as to the prospects of having heightened specialized security so that General Aviation, maybe on at least a limited basis, return to Reagan National Airport?

MR. MINETA: As you will recall, Senator, and I've enjoyed working with you on this subject, I believe it was the 23rd June that we were going to be opening up Ronald Reagan National Airport. But in the interim from the time of the latter part of May to the time as we were getting closer to opening it up to General Aviation I was starting to see intelligence reports that said, maybe we ought to take a look at this. And so last, I believe it was last Thursday or Friday, I met with all of the General Aviation groups and gave them the opportunity to hear not classified but information that gave more light to the subject matter.

And what I would like to do, Mr. Chairman, is to offer to all of the committee members, if we could arrange a time, for a security briefing and an intelligence briefing of why I decided not to move forward on opening up Ronald Reagan National Airport and I would be willing to do it for the committee members or, you know --

SEN. HOLLINGS: We would be glad to do it. We've got a role call on in five bells. Senator Allen, I wanted to give Senator Ensign a chance.

SEN. ALLEN: Well, I would like to have that briefing.

MR. MINETA: We would more than happy to set it up.

SEN. HOLLINGS: I think we ought to have another hearing here after we come back in September.

Senator Ensign.

SEN. ENSIGN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I had a couple of questions and I'll try to sum up my remarks so there's as much time to answer as possible. And Admiral Loy, I don't know if you know anything about these, but if you want to comment I'd appreciate any thoughts that you have. If you're familiar with the 40-40-20 rule, I mentioned that at the beginning it's a step to, especially before some of the bags are gone through. I just want to read you McCarran Airport's statistics on this if the 40-40-20 rule goes into effect as is proposed.

Currently average -- I'll just read you the peak times -- peaks times at McCarran Airport for Southwest Airlines right now 43 minute wait at the ticket counter. Under the 40-40-20 rule that peak time goes to four hours and 18 minutes. America West goes from an hour and 12 minutes to three hours and 54 minutes. Delta Airlines goes from 37 minutes to two hours and 23 minutes and on and on. They've come up with, or they've at least proposed several other different scenarios. One would be a 70-30 rule where, I'll just read briefly, "70 percent of the bags would be ADT screened, 30 percent of bags are selectee or random selected, go directly to the EDS system, 100 percent exterior protocol applied to 70 percent. An average time per bag would be about 30 seconds."

Just to compare, if that scenario was used instead, was that that should qualify because the 40-40-20 was not in our legislation. That was done administratively. The 70-30 peak time at Southwest Airlines actually under this scenario because of modern technology that's going to be applied at the airport, that peak time for Southwest will actually go down from what it is today. Instead of going up to four hours and 18 minutes, it'll be an hour and 17 minutes. America West instead of being three hours 17 minutes, will be about two hours and 11 minutes. So all bottom line is -- and that's not a current, that's not under growing conditions -- that's under current passenger counts.

The question was asked "Are we better? Do we have better security today?" And I think the answer is yes. Everybody agrees we have better security. To eke out that last little bit is it worth -- an my question to the panel is "Is it worth four hour waits and what would four hours waits do to the economy of a tourist destination?"

MR. MINETA: Well, first of all, let me just indicate that the charge we have -- that we all have -- from the president's State of the Union message was to win the war against terrorism, home and abroad. Protect the homeland. And thirdly, help revive the economy. Again all three of them fit transportation and TSA and so we look at these things in terms of the impact on the airport. Impact on the airline, the passenger, right on down the line. And I'm willing to take a look at the benefit of the airport's experience or yours or whomever to decide, again from what's been said, a common sense perspective which way we ought to be going.

But, no, again those are -- we don't want to do anything to impact adversely on tourism, airport or the --

SEN. ENSIGN: It's not just affecting the economy. The scenario that I pointed out when you get those kinds of waits in our airports, the crowds. Now you just made a bull of a point and say you've hurt security instead of helping it.

MR. MINETA: No question about it. No question.

SEN. ENSIGN: That's why I'm saying is that if you look at these -- and Admiral Loy, I want you to take a close look at some of the other alternatives that they've come up with that would give us the security that we need without creating these huge long lines and we already have a -- even with the lines that we have with this increased security -- we already somewhat of a problem. But when they see thousands of people waiting there, you know, everybody's going to say we need security to get into the airport and then you just keep backing up the security checkpoints and back up the vulnerability points.

ADM. LOY: Senator Ensign, absolutely I will look at it. And those are unacceptable numbers and we would never impose those on McCarran. I like to think of that rule, by the way, as a 20-40-40 rule as opposed to the other way around based on object searches first and then open bag and closed bag. But when 36 million people go Las Vegas on an annual basis and 18 million of them come and go through that particular airport, we understand that there are out of the ordinary challenges with a volume flow through McCarran. And to go to the same point with respect to our power supply, with respect to machines on 12-31(ph) we will be reasonable in terms of working with the airport director and with the mayor and with whoever is necessary to produce the right kind of a profile that is appropriate for McCarran. And I look forward to getting back to you, sir, with respect to this particular issue.

MR. MINETA: Senator, let me ask about that power supply issue. Was that being all driven by security equipment?

SEN. ENSIGN: Yes. Those are the EDS machines. Those are the EDS machines that are necessary. In other words they have them --

MR. MINETA: And they're driving the necessity for a new substation?

SEN. ENSIGN: Yes. Yes. They have to do that. They have to have that for the new substation.

MR. MINETA: Not because of other expansion and other things going on?

SEN. ENSIGN: No.

MR. MINETA: Hard to imagine that.

SEN. ENSIGN: Well, put it this way -- if they have the new -- I mean they are in expansion right now but, actually they've just finished some expansion, if they have the machines from what they tell me -- I'm just going on what they tell me -- I'm not an expert on power supplies and all that -- if they had the machines on location today they could not plug them in.

ADM. LOY: Sir one of the sources of the secretary's thought process there is $231 million set aside as an earmark in the supplemental. that's $231 million that probably found its way in there as a result of concerns expressed by airports or whomever is going to benefit from those dollars. To the degree they are not available to us to design that right security system including power plants as appropriate but let the right player be producing the dollars for the right segment of their responsibility in that formula. That's where we need to go at the other end of the day.

SEN. ENSIGN: And lastly, Mr. Chairman, I want to make a strong push for the Trusted Traveler Program. I know our previous director was against the Trusted Traveler Program because he thought somehow it would benefit the rich. It benefits everybody if you get people out of the -- you know if you can actually make sure that it's secure but you get them out of the lines. That benefits the people that are currently standing in lines. And so it just makes common sense.

ADM. LOY: Absolutely, sir. There are very serious issues associated with designing it right. And as the secretary was proper to point out, our inability to press forward on the TWIC card is going to put an impediment in the process of gaining progress toward a trusted traveler program that I too agree is a very sensible approach, sir.

SEN. HOLLINGS: Very good, Mr. Secretary. And thanking you and the panel for your appearance here this morning before the committee.

Two things. One, we just got through marking up the emergency supplemental. We thought we had done more than was needed and that the director of the Office of Management and Budget, Mr. Daniels cut us $250 million on the premise that look, you couldn't possibly spend it in everything else of that kind.

Now you appear before the committee and you say you're $1 billion shy in the next two months, between now and September the 30th. So the only remedy to that situation is if you can get Mitch Daniels to ask us for another little emergency supplemental singularly for this billion, we can pass it through quickly in 24, 48 hours, I can guarantee you. Because that was the attitude and mindset of the House members and senators bipartisan.

Otherwise on 2003 budget that we just reported out, we increase that some $150 million more than the president requested again. And so we're over here trying to get you more money. The OMB office is saying cut back, cut back, you can't even spend it, and let's get that cleared up because we've got to keep moving.

Secondly, with respect to -- irrespective of how the fight comes out about pistols, guns, stun guns or otherwise, we cannot come off with a secure door. See if you can accelerate that. If I was a pilot other than guns and door lifts, other kind of argument and everything else like that, I would want the proof positive, tried and tested system of keeping that door absolutely secure in flight, going right straight down to the ground. Let's get it and see if we can do it faster than 2003.

Delta's way ahead some of these other airlines to protect their pilots. They've got that in mind. But once that door's secure, you don't have to worry about taking off from Reagan and going into the White House, you don't have to worry about going into these buildings, the Empire State or otherwise, you don't have to worry about going into a power plant, you don't have to worry about all this 30 minutes after takeoff. That solves a heck of a lot of problems and let them have these intramural on guns. But once that door's secure they can shoot each other or whatever, take practice or whatever they want to do.

But I can tell you if Secretary Mineta and Senator Hollings were in that cockpit and we were both strapped in and that door wasn't secure, even secure we thought, and the stewardess hollering he's got my by -- he's choking me, open the door, open the door. I'm sitting there, I'd say, Norm, you open the door. Because when you open that door you might get off one or two shots, but I can tell you those terrorists are coming in and they've got me, the pilot, and that plane is going into another building. We're talking about real life.

Thank you all very much and we ask the committee to be at ease to receive the second panel.

MR. MINETA: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. BURNS: Okay, here we go. Those outside that want to come in, all aboard and get a board, and if you can't get a board, get a plank.

We have on our second panel and I was hoping that we would get to them just a little bit quicker, but nonetheless, everybody wanted to talk about airport security and I wanted to talk about airplane security and we're going to do that. We have with us Dr. Gerald -- no, we've already seen him. Dr. Richard Stephens, vice president and general manager of Homeland Security Services of the Boeing Company. Craig Coy, CEO, Massachusetts Port Authority. Captain Steve Luckey, chairman of the National Flight Security Committee and Captain Ed Davidson who is director of Flight Safety at Northwest Airlines. Can I trade you all your miles on your airline, captain?

MR. ED DAVIDSON: Any time, Senator.

SEN. BURNS: If I can do that. We welcome you here this morning and I'm going to start with Captain Davidson of Northwest Airlines, and I'm just going to go that way and then we'll have a little dialogue on arming the pilots, if they so choose, on the flight deck of our airliners. Captain Davidson, welcome.

MR. DAVIDSON: Thank you, Senator. Chairman Hollings, Ranking Member of McCain, Senator Burns and other members of this distinguished committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today.

My name is Ed Davidson and I have been a commercial airline pilot for 24 years. For the past 13 years I have served as a captain for Northwest Airlines and I am currently the airline's director of Flight Safety and Quality Assurance. My flying career, that includes more than 20,000 flight hours, began with service in Vietnam as U.S. Navy pilot. In 1994 I retired as a commander in the U.S. Navy Reserve.

Mr. Chairman, I couldn't agree more with your opening statement. Let's ensure that the cockpit door is the shield we need so we concentrate on our principal job -- flying. And I appreciate the chance today to explain why in the real world of a cramped cockpit, where there is no margin for error, permitting commercial pilots to carry and use lethal firearms threatens the safety of the traveling public.

I'd like to explain how pending legislation undermines Congress' original intent to use hardened cockpit doors as a protective shield enabling flight crews to safely land a threatened aircraft as quickly as possible. Simply put, S. 2554 raises more troubling safety questions than it provides security answers.

At the outset, let me thank the committee and the Congress for your ongoing efforts to improve aviation security. Quick passage of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 after the horrific events of September 11th was a great comfort to the traveling public and particularly those of us who work on board commercial aircraft.

Mr. Chairman, as a professional commercial airline pilot, when I am on duty, my singular focus is, and always must be, the safe operation of my aircraft. And I fully subscribe to the view that my colleague, Captain Duane Woerth expressed in testimony before this distinguished committee last fall, when he said, and I quote, "We can't be Sky King and Wyatt Earp at the same time."

The two roles cannot coexist without compromising a pilot's duty to safely operate his or her aircraft. Now, I understand that reasonable people can differ on important issues and I respect the fact that some of my fellow commercial pilots, including Captain Woerth whose position has now changed, have a different view of this legislation. And I believe congressional supporters of S. 2554 are certainly well intentioned. However, the unintended consequences of arming pilots in a confined cockpit are too alarming and potentially disastrous to disregard. I have several concerns. First, this legislation completely undermines Congress' intent to make hardened cockpit doors an unbreachable line of defense so flight crews with a threatened aircraft can safely land as quickly as possible. Second, it compromises the safety of the cockpit, and third, it contradicts key provisions of last year's security law.

As Congress envisioned, the cockpit door has become a significant line of defense. And in fact, I feel much more secure in the flight deck today as a result of hardened cockpit doors which are now being installed and tough protocols that severely restrict those times when the cockpit door can be opened. This bill, however, would create a dangerous breach. Having a firearm in the cockpit creates a temptation and more likely an imperative for flight crews to open the flight deck door in dangerous and chaotic cabin situations. That is exactly the wrong direction for this Congress to give flight crews. These are precisely the times that the cockpit door should remain closed while the pilots land the aircraft as quickly as possible.

Your conclusion that hardened cockpit doors are the most effective way to protect the cockpit remains valid today. In case you haven't been a cockpit of a commercial aircraft, it's extremely cramped quarters. Pilots are literally shoe-horned in among equipment and monitors from floor to the ceiling. The legislation would add a lethal firearm to this proverbial china shop.

What happens if a firearm discharges in the cockpit, inadvertently or otherwise? Bullets could kill or incapacitate members of the cockpit flight crew or they could strike one of the critical systems required for safe flight.

Mr. Chairman, I can see that these are worst case scenarios. However, I am trained and I train other pilots to address worst case scenarios. That is the most effective way to ensure that passengers arrive safely at their destinations. By no means, however, are these scenarios far fetched.

According to at least one study, 21 percent of police officers killed with a handgun were shot with their own service weapon. Struggles for control of firearms are not uncommon and, sadly, neither are accidents involving firearms.

Contrary to the intent of heightened screening directives in the new law, the legislation will lead to a proliferation of firearms being carried into the sterile security areas of airports and on board aircraft. It could have the unintended effect of drawing a roadmap where terrorists could procure lethal weapons. Any pilot in uniform would be viewed as being a potential repository of a lethal firearm. Air marshals, on the other hand, do not present the same threat because they are anonymous. On board the aircraft, the legislation would simply draw a roadmap straight to the cockpit for terrorists seeking lethal weapons. Simply put, there is no guarantee that firearms brought to the airport and into the cockpit will remain in the hands of the guys with the white hats.

Before I conclude my remarks I want to address a specific argument that's been made by the proponents of arming pilots. As a former naval aviator and a commercial airline captain, there is nothing I want more than to prevent a scenario in which the military might be called upon to shoot down a commercial aircraft. I would suggest, however, that the objective of security legislation be to prevent any loss of life on board aircraft or on the ground resulting from terrorism-related activity or our responses to it. We need to carefully and thoughtfully heighten security without creating a greater risk than the one we seek to address.

Mr. Chairman, let me conclude by again thanking you and your senators for the opportunity to speak before you today, and I certainly would be happy to take questions.

SEN. HOLLINGS: Very good.

Captain Luckey.

MR. STEPHEN LUCKEY: Yes, sir. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Senator Burns, distinguished members of the committee.

I'm Captain Steve Luckey and I'm chairman of the National Flight Security Committee of the Airline Pilots Association, and in that capacity I represent the security interests of some 67,000 pilots who fly for 43 airlines in the United States and Canada. I've submitted a written statement for the record, by the way.

My comments today reflect the feelings of pilots beyond the scope of this membership, and I guess disagreement is healthy. We have a very different approach and a very different viewpoint of addressing the threat. Protecting the aircraft is a team effort. It's something that both the flight attendants and the pilots need the proper tools, the training, and the tactile knowledge to effectively address the threat. Today I want to address the protection of the cockpit, the arming of the pilots, a little bit about verification and also something about -- address the cargo security issue.

I'm confident that I can build a strong case for our position and clear up many misconceptions regarding the armed pilots issue. First of all, we're not trying to put guns out into society and arm the general population or anything like that. What we're going to do is -- we're proposing to do is to arm sworn federal law enforcement officers who just happen to be pilots. They will be there for the limited defense of the cockpit proper. That weapon will not be used in any way, shape or form outside of the cockpit, and it will be used as a last line of defense to get the aircraft on the ground in the event of an intrusion.

It may be of interest to you that in the '70s I was selected and trained by the FBI as a pilot to carry firearms on board an aircraft. It's a very small program, very elite. It was something that was requested by the president of our airline. It was -- I was trained by the FBI, I was approved by the FAA at that particular time. It was not always a pleasant experience. Custodial responsibility of a firearm when carrying it for many, many years is definitely something that's very serious. I thoroughly believed in the concept at that time, I thoroughly support it now, and I believe that we need it in this day more than we have ever needed it before.

We never recommended arming all the pilots, that's not what we want to do. As a matter of fact, only probably a small percentage would ever go through the process. Our statistics indicate that about somewhere between 75 and 80 percent of the people support it, that fly. That's an overwhelming majority of numbers. The public supports it, as you've heard the statistics today. The pilots would go through a brief but very exacting training program.

The selective process would be very much like that for the recruitment of any other federal agent. You would go through a selection process first of all. It's completely voluntary. The volunteers would be subjected to an interview, background check, and suitable training to see if they're suitable for the particular task at hand. Do we need this capability? I think we must be able to predictably protect the cockpit from a terrorist attack. We need a central piece of emergency equipment, and that's all this is, is a piece of emergency equipment.

Its purpose is to defend against a demonstrated threat, or the alternative is to be shot down by an F-15 or F-16. I think we need something between that door which -- there isn't a barrier in the world that cannot be defeated by a dedicated individual who is willing to pay the ultimate price to get through that barrier. That's been demonstrated successfully many, many times.

I believe that the armed cockpit program will create a high level of deterrence so I think it's efficient, and I think it's relatively economical when you look at the cost that we're talking about here and the money and the budget that's been mentioned this morning. Pilots are exceptionally well suited for the task and the public definitely overwhelmingly supports this particular concept.

Some argue that the new doors, the federal air marshal program, the improvements in the security program negate the need to arm aircraft. I disagree with that wholeheartedly. I think that that's a misconception and it's a very dangerous thing tactically to assume something that this particular element can very well address, and that is to ultimately guarantee that in the event that that door is breached -- and doors aren't always closed, they're open.

And if you look at the Israeli concept it's easy to see that the new proposed door does not in any way address the Israeli tactical concept of having the double doors with the mantrap concept in between and the submarine tactic whereby only one door is opened at any one time. They have a marshal on every aircraft. We don't have that luxury, we have them only on a small percentage. And they also have a kill zone in front of that door. They're very pragmatic. It's been my experience that we're not quite ready to go there where the Israelis are. They put the oil on this week. We're not quite ready to do that.

All layers of security contain some level of porosity. And these levels need to be increased, they need to be more dedicated, they need to be more finite as you approach that principal point of protection, which is the cockpit. We have to at all -- to use all methods and all capabilities and all tactics and all tools to adequately address this threat. It's a very pervasive issue and, you know, it's something I'm very compassionate about, as you can see.

Since 1987, ALPA has worked very hard to establish access control verification in our system. And we've worked with a company in Minneapolis to develop a very economical system to do this. The cards cost about 50 cents and it costs less than two cents per transaction. But we don't know right now if the armed LEOs, the guys getting on the airplane with guns, are who they say they are. The GAO study in 2000, you know, they breached 19 federal buildings and, you know, two airports with bogus IDs.

We are recommending that we establish an independent not for profit organization to handle this particular thing like the transportation workers' identification cards, or TWIC. We also strive for one level of security. That one level of security is the same it should be on passenger or cargo aircraft. Cargo aircraft are vulnerable right now. Terrorists have been known to occupy containers and ship themselves on board vessels. There's nothing to prohibit that they couldn't do that on a particular aircraft in our business. The known shipper concept just doesn't quite -- it's not enough to adequately address the screening of cargo.

Thank you for allowing me to present the cockpit perspective and helping us to acquire the tools, the training and the tactical knowledge to return to our families alive.

That's what we want to do. Eight pilots didn't make it on September 11, 2001. And I'd be happy to answer any questions. Thank you, sir.

SEN. HOLLINGS: Thank you very much.

Mr. Coy.

MR. CRAIG T. COY: Yes, sir. Chairman Hollings and members of the committee, for the record my name is Craig T. Coy, chief executive officer of the Massachusetts Port Authority, owner and operator of Boston's Logan International Airport.

The Transportation and Aviation Security Act, which you passed last November, represents an extraordinary commitment by this nation to the safety and security of everyone who travels. In its scope and urgency, this new act with its historic mandate to screen every piece of baggage that goes on a commercial airliner belongs with those other celebrated actions America has taken on in our past when foreign attacks have forced this nation to mobilize quickly for war.

As the new head of Massport and Logan Airport, I took this mandate for 100 percent baggage screening as a rallying cry. It represents a stretch goal around which all of our employees and the citizens of Boston can identify and point to achieving with pride. Every airport is unique with its own set of circumstances. The Massport board of directors and I believed in no uncertain terms that we would lead the way. And since I assumed this position at the Massachusetts Port Authority about four months ago, my top priority has been to make sure we are doing everything we can to work with the TSA to encourage them to meet all of their mandates, including the 100 percent baggage screening program.

My analogy is that TSA was handed the ball on the baggage screening. They pitched the ball to us and we've hit a long shot to centerfield. We're running hard to first base. It's a long way to home plate and we're not yet sure we'll get there to score the winning run. However, there's one thing I know in sports, in life or in public policy: we will never succeed unless we try. This security precaution is long overdue and the designing and building a system to screen more than a billion pieces of luggage that fly domestically every year is an enormous challenge for this nation.

I knew Logan would never have a chance to make this deadline unless we committed 100 percent to the effort. We put our best people on the project and we hired the very best consultants from around the world. The same consultants, in fact, as those hired by the TSA. Because of the role Logan played in the attacks on September 11, Massport has been very aggressive on this project. So rather than back away from the challenge, we asked the TSA to accelerate our plans instead. We were polite, we were professional, but we were persistent.

We worked closely with the TSA, early and often. Maybe earlier and more often than they really appreciated. We called them on their cell phones and at home. We made numerous trips to Washington to present our plan. When there wasn't a conference room available, we rented one at a nearby hotel. And on June 14, Logan became the first major airport in the country to receive federal approval for a baggage screening plan. I can't say enough about the help we received from Senator Kerry, Senator Kennedy and the entire Massachusetts congressional delegation in moving this project forward.

I also want to say that the cooperation Massport has received from the TSA in our joint efforts to make sure Logan meets this important deadline has been outstanding. And it will only get stronger with my friend, Jim Loy, at the helm. George Naccara, the TSA security director for Logan is on board and our staffs could not be working more closely together. Last week we met together with two Massachusetts firms that manufacture this screening equipment to impress upon them the urgency of stepping up production. As local Massachusetts companies, we are glad to have them as part of our team and they have assured us that they are fully committed to making Logan's effort a success.

Once we got the go ahead from TSA, we have pulled out all the stops to have an inline hold baggage screening system at all our active terminals by December 31. Because of Logan's severe land constraints, high passenger volume and the advanced age of our facilities, it is arguably more difficult to build these screening facilities at Logan than any airport in the country. What helped immensely was the comprehensive, complex computer model that we used at the outset of the project that allowed us to see how different baggage screening systems would interact with the rest of the airport.

Right from the start we were able to rule out the interim lobby solution because our computer model showed us we simply didn't have the room. We've also been able to design our facilities so they are flexible to accommodate new systems as they evolve. During peak times, Logan handles up to 5,000 pieces of luggage an hour. As designed, the inline baggage screening system will accommodate both present and future capacity without delays at the check in lines.

On July 11, just three weeks after getting TSA approval, Massport broke ground on a project that includes the renovation of 11 bag rooms, major building additions at seven locations, and the construction of five new substations to handle the electric load. Accelerated construction like this at an airport like ours must be choreographed to perfection. To get the work done we are bussing workers to secure areas, prefabricating sections offsite, pre- purchasing materials and performing other amazing feats of engineering magic. My motto has always been "Every person counts, every act counts." But on this project the motto is "every minute counts" because we have none to spare. For the most part we will be running double shifts, six days a week and at times working round the clock all week long.

Another important benefit was the waiver we received from the state on certain public procurement laws, which was supported from Governor Swift on down. It pared the normal two or three month bidding process down to just 10 days and we're still doing competitive bids. Contractors bring a signed copy of our proposed contract to the bid opening and, if they're the low bidder, our construction manager signs the contract right on the spot and they can start that day. In public construction this is unheard of. Being first is a double-edged sword. There are no rules to slow us down, which is a good thing, but neither are there guidelines to help steer the way and the schedule for completing this monumental task leaves no room for error. Over the next five months Massport will remain vigilant and focused, because any slippage in the project can push the completion date beyond the new year.

Progress on the whole baggage screening is just one of a number of security firsts for Massport. Again, because a group of evil men stole two airplanes from Logan Airport on September 11 with 177 innocent people on board, Massport feels a special obligation to be a national leader for airport security as well as port security for our maritime facilities. For the past several months we've been working with the TSA as one of 15 airports to establish security procedures and protocols for all 439 commercial airports in this country.

Logan has also volunteered as a test site for the development of promising new security technologies, including the first in the nation facial recognition program, hand held wireless devices that let security personnel access the National Crime Information Center while walking the beat, as well as technology that can detect fake passports and other bogus identification. Massport is aggressively pursuing these programs along with the 100 percent baggage screening program. We are committed to providing our passengers with the best possible security as quickly as possible.

We've opened up our wallet and we've spent a lot of money to do the job right and to do it fast. Six days after getting TSA approval for the baggage screening plan, and with no written guarantee of federal reimbursement, Massport committed $100 million to complete the project. I do not want to understate the enormous financial strain this unfunded federal mandate puts on Massport and all airports seriously impacted by the attacks on September 11. We will continue to seek financial support for these federal mandates but are prepared to act now.

Already September 11 has forced Massport to cut $51 million from our programs, lay off 15 percent of our workforce, and in the midst of our most aggressive building program in history, delay more than 37 percent of our capital projects. Nevertheless, we believe strongly in the promises made by this nation to the flying public when you passed and the president signed the Transportation and Aviation Security Act. We also fully support the new federal mandate to inspect every piece of luggage that flies out of our airport.

Massport has now stepped forward. It's done its part to help the federal government meet this mandate.

Critically important to the continued success of this historic effort to protect the safety and security of the people who use America's airports, is the assurance which all airports need: that the federal government's commitment remains just as strong.

Thank you for the honor and the privilege to be here and I will be happy to take your questions, sir.

SEN. HOLLINGS: Thank you.

Mr. Stephens.

MR. RICK STEPHENS: Chairman Hollings and members of the committee.

I am Rick Stephens, vice president and general manager of the Boeing Company's Homeland Security and Services Business. I'm pleased to have the opportunity to present a status of our team's work that supply checked baggage screening equipment to American airports. The Boeing Company, its partner Siemens and our supplier team understand very clearly that this is a national priority. Success in completing this program will help strengthen security in our transportation and support growth in both air travel and our national economy.

Boeing was awarded the contract to install the explosive detection systems and train baggage screen employees on June 7, 49 days ago. The task requires airport studies of passenger movement, architectural designs, structural changes and the coordinated supply of 1,100 EDS machines and approximately 4,600 explosive freight detecting devices. Following completion of the former task, the contract includes five one-year options for support and continuous evaluation of improvement.

Our team was in motion within hours following contract award, responding to TSA planning and organizational requests. One of our first actions was deploying survey teams to 66 airports on July 1. Deployment has continued throughout July. As of today, 153 airports have been or are being surveyed for data such as passenger and baggage characteristics, existing physical and operational conditions and airport information such as terminal area development plans, local building codes, airlines' plans for operational areas and preferences for future operations.

All designated U.S. airports will have received site assessment survey teams by August 21. Let me please describe our approach. We are collaborating with airports, airlines, federal security directors and other TSA officials to develop effective checked baggage screening solutions for individual airports for implementation by the end of the year. The challenge is not simply meeting a deadline. It is providing the most secure and efficient checked baggage screening solutions within the time constraints established by Congress. A one- size-fits-all configuration for all airports is clearly inappropriate. When you have only seen one airport, you've only seen one airport. Each airport terminal has different characteristics that will drive the most appropriate solution.

A single approach for all airport terminals would result in higher implementation costs and decreased levels of customer service. The best way to avoid this outcome is for the Boeing Team to work closely with the airports and airlines throughout the process. The first step in our approach is to send out a site assessment team to meet with airport and airline officials and other key stakeholders. The primary goal of the site assessment team is to establish an EDS/EDT concept plan that can be implemented by December 31st, 2002, and is acceptable to the airlines, the airports, and the TSA.

Following the site assessment, design survey teams then deploy to the airport to evaluate the design and construction requirements. These teams will also meet with airport and airline officials and other key stakeholders. Our data collection is continuing. Analysis and assessments are under way and will continue for some weeks yet. Conditions, characteristics and expectations at airports have varied widely. I will try and generalize the findings so far.

First, 160 days are left to complete the task by December 31st, 2002; 150 assessment teams have been mobilized; 153 assessments are underway or completed. In addition, 33 airport assessment site visits have been initiated this week. Of the site assessment tasks scheduled to have occurred to this date, we have been delayed by one week or more in 18 tasks due to weather and other factors. In order to maintain schedule, 20 tasks have been accelerated and we expect to be back on schedule for the delayed tasks in the first week of August. The airlines have been eager to engage in the process, and Boeing and TSA are engaging them and their representatives through existing relationships and airline associations. Boeing and our contractor team are completely committed to the successful execution of our contract in response to the needs of TSA, the Congress and the American people.

Let me conclude on a more personal note. We at the Boeing company were deeply affected by having our products used as weapons of terror on September 11th. We realize the importance of air travel security to our national security and to our country's economic health. Boeing appreciates the significant challenges ahead in equipment delivery, airport facilities modification, and the implementation of full baggage screening procedures. However, the safety of the American public and the health of the airline industry demand that we press forward with this task. We look forward to working together with all stakeholders as we continue to do our work for the American public.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to responding to your questions.

SEN. HOLLINGS: Thank you. Go right ahead. We appreciate you for that.

SEN. BURNS: Thank you very much for your testimony today and I'm going to -- again, we've heard a lot of talk about airport security. We didn't do TSA right and I'm not going to go down that debate with you today, but nonetheless we really had an opportunity to do that. I'm told an amendment in the TSA bill that would have put the enforcement over in the Department of Justice, because I felt that's like where it ought to be, that was stripped out in conference. And we've still got the situation with security of the airplane after it gets off the ground. No matter how good a work you do, you've got screaming weaknesses and we know that. It's all over the country. And as long as we've got those weaknesses I want the last line of defense.

Mr. Davidson, until 1987, pilots were allowed to carry firearms in the cockpit, and you know what? With no training. And since the inception of the aviation -- until 1987 there had been no recorded accidents of a pilot accidentally discharging a weapon. I wanted to bring that up.

Now, I've got a question for Mr. Luckey. This is a two-part question. Can you please describe the FBI's Cockpit Protection Program and tell us what you think about the program? And (b) what is the cost of this program in comparison to the statements that's been made by others?

MR. LUCKEY: First of all, sir, right after the 9/11 incident I went down to Quantico because that's where my roots are in aviation security. I have the greatest respect for the capabilities of the FBI academy down there. I think they're the finest law enforcement group in the world and they're also charged formally with crimes aboard aircraft and their enforcement. I had a retired agent poll the Retired FBI Agents' Association and we got 100 affidavits from retired FBI agents, 80-some percent of which supported arming the pilots in the cockpit.

I then went down there and asked informally -- and we were in a hurry, I just took for granted that since I'd carried a firearm in the '70s and '80s that this would be a normal deal. It seemed like a no- brainer to me so I went down there to expedite the process and got hold of some friends of mine and asked them if it was feasible and what kind of a program they would develop. So these people were experts, they do this every day, they work in the firearms training unit there, they train law enforcement groups all over the world. They looked at this and they took the regular agent criteria and they took the things out that we don't need. We don't need felony warrants, felony arrests, investigations, driving -- all of those things we took out.

We left the most important things in, starting with safety, going through the force continuum, the law, all the tactical stuff. Terrorism is a tactic. It's a method of attack and we looked at that foremost and what we needed to do to do this. We figured out that within 48 hours, we could adequately train a pilot to have all of the qualities of a federal agent as long as he was limited to the environment of the cockpit. The authority doesn't extend outside there, neither does the tactical expertise.

We've heard all the arguments about distractions and everything else. I mean, how can you fly, how can you function, how can you think, how can you be safe when somebody is busting down the door trying to kill you? How do you fly when your throat's cut? These are things that we really have to face in this business. So we looked at that. And I think it's a very good program. We ran the costs of this thing right down the coffee break. Now, again, this wasn't an authorized program. This was something that we did down there very professionally. We did it in a hurry, but we did it with great attention to detail.

And the costs, in answer to your second question, sir, were about I'd say in the neighborhood of 50 percent of what the costs that I've seen here today. I also might add that, sure, there's 95,000 commercial airline pilots in the United States. Only say 80 percent of them support this program. Probably out of that there's going to be a much smaller number that are going to volunteer for this. And out of our very strict recruitment and selection and training process, I believe we're going to have in the neighborhood of 25 to 30,000 pilots that we're looking at in this thing so the cost would be substantially lower and it will be quality instead of quantity, sir.

SEN. BURNS: Should the airlines be allowed to opt out of this program to arm pilots?

MR. LUCKEY: I think we have a problem with that. I think if we do that it's not going to exist because they're all going to opt out of it. They're broke. They don't have any money and they're afraid of the relative incurred costs. I also think that if one airline decides to opt out and the other one doesn't, then the public gets cheated out of a standardization of the same level of security on all the airlines. I think we deserve that.

The bill includes a lot of protection from liability. And I think if a carrier gets into opting out they're going to have some influence on it and they're going to lose that protection for liability. I think these are very important factors.

SEN. BURNS: As you know, the original House bill to arm pilots was a two-year bill allowing 1,400 pilots to carry weapons and it would be subject to repeal by the director of the TSA after two years was up. Do we know what we need to know about pilots carrying weapons at this point or do we need another pilot program?

MR. LUCKEY: When I was down at Quantico we talked about this and we decided that a good sample program would be to take 50 airline pilots and put them on the weekly course we had, 40 of which would be people with a lot of prior experience like myself and other special ops people and former policemen, former FBI agents. Put them in there with 10 people who have never fired a weapon before, are not really gun people, and the 40 could see how these 10 progress and we could see if this was an efficient system, if it was cost effective, and if the training was appropriate to our needs. The course would include somewhere between 1,700 and 2,000 of live fire simulations, force continuum, FATS, or firearms training scenarios for shoot/no shoot drills, open hand self defense tactics and things germane to the mission exclusively.

And I think that they did an excellent job and I think that a study like this, it doesn't take months or years to do something like this. We already know how guns work. They work very well when they're with the surgical application of lethal force in this intimate tactical environment; it's very easy to employ a weapon very effectively. And I think that this could be -- I think a test like this would be a very good one and I think it would be something where we could get our feet on the ground and get our teeth into this one and see if it works.

SEN. BURNS: Captain Davidson, you used a figure a while ago that 21 percent of all law enforcement people were lost because they were shot with their own weapon. Our figures show 2.1 percent. Is that a correct figure or are we reading the wrong statistics?

MR. DAVIDSON: Mr. Chairman, Senator Burns, I'm reading from a submission I think that was made to this committee perhaps from the Violence Policy Center -- I think it was made to the Federal Aviation Administration -- on the use of firearms in commercial air flights. Their citation was 21 percent of officers were killed with a handgun and it was their own service weapon.

SEN. BURNS: Well, the real figure is 2.1 percent, and we'll take a look at that. I would look at this, and I know that not all pilots are going to want to carry a firearm. What do you think the value of a deterrent is? Do you think it acts as a deterrent? Do you think having armed marshals on an airplane is a deterrent?

MR. DAVIDSON: Senator, is that for the older captain to answer or the younger captain?

SEN. BURNS: (Laughs.) I want to ask the younger captain right now, the one that has hair.

MR. DAVIDSON: Actually, I believe he is actually senior to me.

(Laughter.)

SEN. BURNS: Okay. All right, you guys.

MR. DAVIDSON: In answer to your question, Senator, we think the question needs to be framed more along what the chairman mentioned in his opening remarks. To us, we are very pleased with the fact that this Senate committee and the Senate and the Congress looked forward and was forward thinking enough to understand that the flight deck door is the impenetrable shield that we need, to maintain the fact that we are going to be able to control that aircraft from the time any problem arises in flight until we can get it on the ground. We think that is the way to move ahead in this industry and that adding the potential safety and cockpit distractions of firearms is not in our best interests or in the interests of our passengers and your constituents.

SEN. BURNS: I couldn't agree with you more on the door, but it ain't there and it's not going to get there very quickly.

Mr. Luckey.

MR. LUCKEY: Yes, sir, in answer to that let me throw out a scenario here briefly. I was an international captain, as is Captain Davidson. Suppose we're three hours out over the water and all of a sudden the group of terrorists that got onto the aircraft through our porous security systems or a foreign one were to take over the cabin of the aircraft. They have three hours out there and we don't have any way to protect our cockpit. Do you think in three hours, with the food carts and the capabilities and the innovation that they have as specially trained tactical operations people -- do you think the pilots would have a chance to defend that cockpit without the appropriate tools, the tactical knowledge and the training to meet that challenge effectively?

SEN. BURNS: Are you asking me?

MR. LUCKEY: Well, yes, sir. Anyone. This is just food for thought. This is the real scenario that we face on a daily basis. We're three hours out, we don't have any tools. It's kind of tantamount to being down in the bad part of town and they did away with lug wrenches because -- made them illegal because there's enough gas stations, and you ran out of gas -- not ran out of gas, had a flat tire and needed to change your tire but you didn't have a lug wrench. All the gas stations are closed. So you decide to take a walk, and guess what happens to you in the bad part of town? You get mugged, they kill you, steal your car, strip it, just because you don't have the lug wrench. We need that tool. It's another piece of emergency equipment that we desperately need to meet a demonstrated challenge that's very real.

SEN. BURNS: Mr. Luckey, the training that they would have to go through in order to carry a weapon, do you want to -- do you have any questions?

SEN. HOLLINGS: I'm going to have when you get through. Go ahead.

SEN. BURNS: The training that is going to be required in order for the captain to be authorized to carry this weapon.

You do a psychological test?

MR. LUCKEY: Yes, sir.

SEN. BURNS: Physical test?

MR. LUCKEY: Yes, sir.

SEN. BURNS: Shoot or no shoot?

MR. LUCKEY: Yes, sir.

SEN. BURNS: Understanding the weapon?

MR. LUCKEY: Very much so, sir.

SEN. BURNS: Understanding the enemy?

MR. LUCKEY: Very much so.

SEN. BURNS: And what else needs to be done -- what I mentioned?

MR. LUCKEY: First of all, the mission safety. We started out with that. We started out with custodial responsibility, in other words, weapons retention. In reality the cockpit is the only tactical place on the aircraft that favorably favors the defender. In other words, it's a channelized narrow avenue of a predictable approach. They can only go through that door one at a time. We're talking about the surgical application of lethal force probably at a professional individual that's wearing body armor. That means we have to do a specific shot in a specific critical area of the body. This can be done much better in the cockpit because of the intimacy or the very close range. It's just like reaching out and touching someone. We train at five, 10 and 15 feet instead of seven and 50 yards that the normal agents train at. Our performance requirements exceed the federal agents'. The federal agents qualify at 80 percent. The program that I was responsible and working with had a qualification score in excess of 95 percent, due to the tactical intimacy and the close proximity of the target and the threat.

SEN. BURNS: Senator Hollings.

SEN. HOLLINGS: Let me on behalf of the committee thank each of the members of the panel. It's been very, very helpful and very valuable to the committee.

Captain Luckey, with respect to the emergency equipment or having that one tool that's needed, you see, I've got a different view of it. That's the door. My friend, Senator Burns, says we're not going to have it. Well, we're not going to have the pistols or anything else right there and the training and where to put it and the money and everything else like that. We're behind the curve. But the whole idea is to make absolutely certain that that plane cannot be used as a lethal weapon. And to do that, we know of one airline -- and I've sat right there where you are with that chief pilot and he impressed me. That chief pilot of El-Al, he said, "Senator, they can be assaulting my wife in the cabin, I go straight to the ground." Now, the terrorists know that. They know that, and don't give me any of this stuff about that's a small airline. I've tried it out with pilots. Incidentally, my poll is about 50/50. I fly every week. I probably fly more than you do, because I know they ain't supposed to fly but half the month.

I have to fly every week, coming and going, so I've got as many hours almost as a pilot. And I love the pilots and I love the planes and I'm trying to figure out how do we solve this problem because, as was just stated, the first line of defense is to shoot you down. That doesn't help us at all. I can tell you right now a lot of people are saying I'm not getting on, I'm taking the SL up to New York because I don't fool around with getting shot down, and everything else. And then you worry about the White House taking off from Reagan and they've got all of these other super-duper checks and in your seat before and after and everything else of that kind. And now we're onto a money argument. It's solved as long as you get that secure door. That's the emergency equipment.

And I want to make absolutely sure that the pilot doesn't have a responsibility to open up that door. He's got a responsibility only to fly and land it. That's what I want to make absolutely sure. Once I've got that as fixed in El-Al and it's worked for 30 years and the door is impenetrable, then I've solved all the problems because -- you've got the pistols and you've got the training and you and the Marines and everything else of that kind, whoopee, do it your way and you hear all that disturbance going on and everything else back there and they're calling to the pilot, they say, "Captain Luckey, come, come quick" and everything, you're going to squat?

MR. LUCKEY: I'm not going back, sir.

SEN. HOLLINGS: You're not going back? Well, then you agree with me. Keep the door locked and go down to the ground. Shoot, you done solved -- Senator Burns, I just won.

(Laughter.)

SEN. BURNS: You just won?

(Cross talk.)

SEN. HOLLINGS: The captain said he ain't going back.

SEN. BURNS: That's right. Well, Mr. Chairman, I want to remind you that they might have got them double doors.

SEN. HOLLINGS: Look --

(Cross talk.)

SEN. BURNS: Wait a minute, let me finish.

(Cross talk.)

SEN. HOLLINGS: We've got to have a secure door.

SEN. BURNS: That's right. But I want to tell you even though I said they have the double doors and the reinforced doors, their pilots carry a sidearm. They are armed.

SEN. HOLLINGS: (Cross talk.) -- door. You don't have the responsibility of opening the door.

SEN. BURNS: Well, they've got a sidearm in case somebody takes a little bit of explosive or a penetrative explosive site that can bust those doors -- and I've never seen one other than Fort Knox that you can't do that. And my banker -- of course, my banker keeps me out of that safe all of the time. But that's what I'm saying. He's not going to go back there and take care of that situation either.

SEN. HOLLINGS: And Captain Luckey is the nicest witness we've had --

SEN. BURNS: I know, and Captain Davidson is not going to go back there and take care of that situation.

SEN. HOLLINGS: That's right. Now, the worse situation is if you ever open that door, the team now -- they've got four and five member teams of these Mohammed Attas, and they're not coming with any even card-cutters or anything else. They're coming with judo, they're coming with all kinds of karate and everything else like that. I can get four to five fellows that can take over your plane if you ever open that door. I can't get in the door. We've got to agree to that, but if I can start choking the stewardess and everything else so she's hollering "open the door" and once you open the door, with pistols, you might get the first of us, of the team, or even the second one or whatever it is. But I can get hold of that there plane and I can keep the passengers in that little small place from ever getting back. I can tell you that, and I'll use that as a weapon as mass destruction.

So I'm trying my best, not necessarily to get pistols or not get pistols, I'm trying to get the door, because either way you've got to get the door. If you're not going to have a secure cockpit -- and I want to relieve those pilots of that responsibility. They've got the responsibility strictly to fly and take off and land, and that's all. And of course we've got the bathroom needs and everything else of that kind to work out, with eyesight television so you can look back and know that you have to go to the ground as soon as possible and that kind of thing, what's going on in the cabin.

Mr. Coy, when I heard your testimony, I turned to the staff behind me, I said, "Is that fellow telling the truth?" I never heard such get up and go and dedication and hard charging, and that's exactly what I asked the White House for. They gave me a bureaucrat. I said this is really tough. This isn't easy. You're going to have to take on about 50,000 people. You've got get it geared up. We've got the door, we've got the pilots, we've got the airports, we've got the equipment. It's one royal headache and what we need is a hard charger. And I thank you very, very much specifically because that's the attitude -- we can't pass laws to get the thing done right. Only you folks can get it done. And that's what we're trying to do, is work with the committee -- I agree with Senator Burns. I voted too for it to go to the Justice Department because I knew I could get some hard chargers over there.

I've had difficulties over here at the Transportation Department getting anything moving. And literally that's the figure we have and that's what Mr. Daniels was telling us in the conference committee on the emergency supplemental -- they can't spend the money. And here I'm having the secretary coming up and saying, "Oh, I need -- I'm already shy a billion dollars for the next two months." Of course he couldn't spend a billion dollars in two months, but I mean that's his testimony. And then the other committee is giving him $150 million more and that kind of thing. So each of you, you have really favored the committee very much with your patience and sticking with it this long.

Senator Burns --

SEN. BURNS: Do you want to respond to that door comment?

MR. LUCKEY: Yes, sir, if you don't mind. Sir, with all due respect and I respect your opinion very much and your work and your dedication to the country over the years. But, sir, terrorism is a tactic. It's a method of attack. Counterterrorism is just that as well and it's a method to repel an attack. I think there's some misconception here that in our tactical response we have to open that door sometimes. And the safety of flights, and I think Captain Davidson will agree with me, we have to go back sometimes. We have to look at the wings, we have to look at control services, we have to listen to noises, we have to do things that are only -- they're specific to the pilots. Nobody else could do this. We couldn't delegate this responsibility to anyone else.

And in the event of an assault, we don't open that door to get at the terrorists, we only utilize that piece of emergency equipment in the event that door is defeated. And that door can be defeated. Trust me, it can be defeated. There isn't a barrier in the world that can't be defeated. And when that door is opened, there's two methods of response tactically. One of course is for an explosive entry that happens fast, the other -- and this is probably 95 percent of the occurrences -- you're going to have some premonition, some pre- indication or pre-warning so that you can take a tactical position on that particular perpetrator.

So I think there's some misconception here in this door thing. I know a lot of things that the Israelis have on their aircraft that we're not talking about in here today for obvious reasons. They've got some very, very specific and very well intended things that put the oil on the squeak, so to speak. They don't spend a lot of money on WD-40 and throw it up in the air and hope some of it lands on what's making the noise. They put it right where it needs to be, and that's where I'd like to see us go.

SEN. HOLLINGS: Mr. Coy?

MR. COY: Mr. Chairman, I would -- not to comment on the door, I don't want to get into that discussion, but just to comment on your kind remarks. I would be remiss if I didn't acknowledge it wasn't just my work, it was the work of the very hardworking employees at Massport. But if you're having any difficulty finding where to send money, you may send it here and I can guarantee you we'll spend it.

(Laughter.)

SEN. HOLLINGS: Yes, sir.

And, Mr. Luckey, I've been flying for a good 60 years at least. If I ever had the pilot coming back looking to see whether the wing's fallen off or something like that --

(Laughter.)

-- I can tell you right now I would try to get that thing down on the ground, start saying my prayers. You go from bad to worse, man.

(Laughter.)

MR. LUCKEY: No really, seriously, Mr. Chairman, how many pilots have you seen coming back through there and to be looking out the window --

SEN. HOLLINGS: They do that, there are rules they get. This is life and death --

(Cross talk.)

SEN. BURNS: No, but I will tell you there's a lot of times when that pilot comes walking back through that cabin.

SEN. HOLLINGS: Well they come back now to go to the bathroom --

SEN. BURNS: No, no, they come walking back through there and they don't say nothing to anybody, hi, how are you, but they're looking at something. They ain't back there because they want to be back there. Remember that. Thank you very much. Great hearing.

SEN. HOLLINGS: Thank you, gentlemen, very, very much. The committee will be in recess subject to call of the chair.

(Adjourn)

END

LOAD-DATE: July 30, 2002