Copyright 2002 FDCHeMedia, Inc. All Rights Reserved. Federal Document Clearing House Congressional
Testimony
July 25, 2002 Thursday
SECTION: CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY
LENGTH: 5999 words
COMMITTEE:SENATE COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
HEADLINE: AVIATION SECURITY
TESTIMONY-BY: GERALD L. DILLINGHAM, DIRECTOR,
AFFILIATION: PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE ISSUES
BODY: Statement of Gerald L. Dillingham, Director,
Physical Infrastructure Issues United States General Accounting Office
Committee on Senate Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
July 25, 2002
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
Nearly a year has passed since the terrorist attacks of September 11
turned commercial aircraft into missiles, killing thousands of people,
destroying billions of dollars' worth of property, and realigning our national
priorities. With these attacks, the safety and security of the nation's civil
aviation system assumed greater importance, and efforts to strengthen the system
were the subject of much congressional attention. Through dozens of reports and
testimonies published since the early 1990s (see app. I), we have contributed to
the national discussion on aviation security and to the reforms enacted last
November in the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (the act).1 Among these
reforms was the creation of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA),
which was assigned responsibility for security in aviation and other modes of
transportation. The act also set forth deadlines by which TSA was to implement
specific improvements to aviation security.
We are
pleased to be here today to discuss TSA's progress in enhancing aviation
security and in implementing the act's provisions for addressing security
weaknesses in aviation and other modes of transportation. Our testimony, which
is based on our prior work as well as our ongoing work for this Committee,
includes observations about (1) what TSA has done since September 11 to
strengthen aviation security, (2) what immediate challenges TSA faces to
strengthen transportation security, and (3) what longer-term challenges TSA can
anticipate as it organizes itself to enhance security in all modes of
transportation.
In summary:
-
Since September 11, TSA has assumed responsibility for aviation security and
focused on meeting congressionally mandated deadlines for strengthening aviation
security. TSA's accomplishments to date include 1P.L. 107-71, November 19, 2001.
developing plans and implementing procedures for using federal workers to
conduct security screening at 429 commercial airports; hiring and beginning to
train almost 4,000 key security personnel; and implementing more rigorous
background checks of employees with access to secure areas of airports. TSA
faces an extraordinary challenge in hiring and training 33,000 federal workers
to conduct passenger security screening by November 19. As of July 13, TSA had
hired only 2,475. In addition, deploying explosive detection systems to screen
all checked bags by December 31 poses major challenges. Of approximately 1,100
explosive detection systems and 6,000 explosive trace detection machines TSA
plans to purchase and deploy at 429 airports, only 200 explosive detection
systems and 200 trace detection machines were in use at 56 airports as of June
12, 2002. It is currently uncertain whether, by December 31, TSA can purchase
the remaining equipment and hire enough staff to operate and maintain the
equipment, whether airports can complete and pay for any modifications required
to install the equipment, and whether the equipment will operate as intended.
- TSA faces immediate challenges in assuming
responsibility for security in other transportation modes, in improving
screeners' performance, and in addressing aviation security issues not covered
by the act's current-year deadlines. First, while TSA has begun to coordinate
and cooperate with DOT's modal administrations and with other federal agencies,
most of the work with these agencies lies ahead. Second, other aviation security
challenges facing TSA include improving screeners' ability to detect weapons and
explosives and to conduct screening in accordance with federal requirements.
Recent TSA tests showed, for example, that screeners at 32 of the nation's
largest airports failed to detect fake weapons and explosives in almost a
quarter of the tests, and observations by the DOT Inspector General found that
contract screeners were not consistently following federal screening
requirements. While newly hired federal screeners are being trained to follow
these requirements, contract screeners are still conducting screening at most
U.S. airports and have not received upgraded training. Third, other actions are
required or have been proposed: for example, the act requires TSA to improve
cargo security, and proposed legislation would require TSA to authorize the arming of pilots.
- TSA faces several
longer-term challenges as it organizes itself to protect the nation's
transportation system. These challenges include strategically managing the
workforce, controlling costs, and sharing threat information. TSA is charged
with creating a federal screener workforce to replace a private workforce that
had been plagued by performance and retention problems. In addition, long-term
attention to strong systems and controls for acquisition and related business
processes will be critical both to ensuring TSA's success and to maintaining its
integrity and accountability.
Such attention includes
establishing cost control mechanisms and monitoring contractors' performance
with respect to cost, schedule, and quality. This is particularly important
because of TSA's large acquisition and personnel needs. Finally, the agency
depends on access to timely, accurate information about threats, but information
sharing among agencies that gather and maintain such information has been
hampered by organizational cultures that make agencies reluctant to share
sensitive information and by outdated, incompatible computer systems.
Background
The task of securing
the nation's aviation system is unquestionably daunting. The enormous size of
U.S. airspace defies easy protection. Furthermore, given this country's hundreds
of commercial airports, thousands of planes, and tens of thousands of daily
flights, as well as the seemingly limitless means terrorists or criminals can
devise to attack the system, aviation security must be enforced on numerous
fronts. Safeguarding airplanes and passengers requires, at the least, ensuring
that perpetrators are kept from breaching security checkpoints and gaining
access to aircraft. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), which was
responsible for aviation security before TSA was created, developed several
mechanisms to prevent criminal attacks on aircraft, such as adopting technology
to detect explosives and matching boarding passes to identification cards at the
gate to ensure that passengers are positively identified before boarding a
flight. Despite the development of these preventative measures, we and others
often demonstrated that significant, long-standing aviation security
vulnerabilities existed. These vulnerabilities included inadequate controls for
limiting access to secure areas at airports, failure to detect threats when
screening passengers and their carry-on bags before they board aircraft, and the
absence of any requirement to screen checked baggage on domestic flights. As we
reported in May 2000,2 our special agents used counterfeit law enforcement
badges and credentials to gain access to secure areas at two airports, bypassing
security checkpoints and walking unescorted to aircraft departure gates. The
agents, who had been issued tickets and boarding passes, could have carried
weapons, explosives, or other dangerous objects onto aircraft. In addition,
FAA's tests of screeners found that their abilities to detect test threat
objects located on passengers or contained in their carry-on luggage declined
during the 1980s and 1990s, and this problem persists today.
Over the years, plans were developed to address some of these
vulnerabilities, but they were not implemented promptly or at all. For example,
the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 authorized a certification
program that would have established performance, training, and equipment
standards for screening companies, but FAA never issued final regulations for
the program. In addition, many initiatives were not linked to specific
deadlines, making it more difficult to monitor and oversee their
implementation.
On November 19, 2001, the Congress
passed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, which created TSA within
the Department of Transportation (DOT) and defined its primary responsibility as
ensuring security in all modes of transportation. The act also shifted
responsibility for the security screening of air passengers and their baggage
from the airlines to the federal government, making TSA responsible for
overseeing screeners. Finally, the act established a series of requirements for
the new agency with mandated deadlines (see app. II), the most important of
which are
-to deploy federal screeners at 429
commercial airports across the nation by November 19, 2002, and
- to have explosive detection systems in place at these airports for
screening every piece of checked baggage for explosives not later than December
31, 2002.
Recent proposals would move TSA to the
proposed Department of Homeland Security.
To help fund
its security initiatives, the act authorized air carriers to collect a fee for
passengers of $2.50 per flight segment, not to exceed $5.00 per one-way trip or
$10.00 per round trip. In addition, the act authorized the Under Secretary of
Transportation Security to impose a fee on air carriers if revenues from the new
security fee were insufficient to meet the needs mandated by the act. For fiscal
year 2002, TSA is seeking a total of $6.8 billion in appropriated funds--$2.4
billion of which has already been appropriated and an additional $4.4 billion in
supplemental funding.
TSA has begun addressing
weaknesses in aviation security but may encounter problems in meeting key
congressional deadlines. In the 10 months since September 11, TSA has focused on
meeting congressionally mandated deadlines for assuming security
responsibilities, upgrading aviation security measures, and reporting to the
Congress on its progress. Among other accomplishments, TSA has assumed
responsibility for overseeing security screening at 429 commercial airports,
established qualifications for federal screeners, developed a plan to hire and
train federal screeners, contracted with companies that screen passengers, and
overseen the implementation of a variety of federally approved methods to check
all bags for explosives. As of July 13, 2002, TSA had also hired about 4,000
staff, including nearly 2,500 passenger screeners, 1,034 former employees of
FAA, and 529 other staff. These other staff included federal security directors
for airports, attorneys, program analysts, computer information technology
specialists, personnel specialists, and administrative staff. In addition, TSA
has made significant progress in expanding the federal air marshals service.3
Finally, TSA has worked with airlines to implement critical interim security
measures, such as strengthening cockpit doors.
However,
TSA has encountered problems in responding to the congressional mandates that it
federalize the screener workforce by November 19, 2002, and provide for
screening all checked baggage using explosive detection systems by December 31,
2002.
Difficulties in Hiring and Training Passenger
Screeners Pose Challenges for TSA Initial difficulties in hiring and training
the passenger screener workforce will make it challenging for TSA to meet the
deadline for federalizing this workforce. According to TSA's estimates, this
effort will involve hiring and training an estimated 33,000 passenger screeners
so that 429 commercial airports can be staffed with federal screeners. TSA
planned to hire 3,700 passenger screeners and supervisory screeners during May
and projected that it would then need to hire and train more than 5,000
passenger screeners a month from June through November. As of July, TSA had
hired only 2,475 screeners in total. Because of delays, the DOT Inspector
General now estimates that TSA will need to hire 7,600 passenger screeners each
month to meet the deadline.
TSA Faces Difficulties in
Meeting Baggage Screening Deadline TSA faces several challenges in trying to
provide for screening 100 percent of checked baggage using explosive detection
systems by the end of calendar year 2002. To accomplish this mandate, TSA plans
to purchase and deploy an estimated 1,100 bulk explosive detection systems (EDS)
and 6,000 explosive trace detection machines (trace devices). The installation
of the large EDS equipment may require significant modifications to airports. As
of June 12, 2002, 200 EDS and 200 trace devices were being used at 56 airports
to screen checked baggage.
To expedite installations at
other airports, TSA has hired the Boeing Service Company to (1) conduct site
assessments at over 400 airports, (2) submit proposals to TSA on what equipment
each airport will have and where that equipment will be installed, (3) modify
facilities to accommodate this equipment, (4) install and make the equipment
operational, (5) maintain the equipment, and (6) train approximately 30,000
screeners to operate the equipment. Given the magnitude of this task, it is
unclear whether enough bulk EDS machines can be manufactured, deployed, and
operationally tested and whether enough staff can be hired and trained to use
the bulk EDS and trace devices by the deadline. Finally, the performance of the
existing technologies for detecting explosives has been less than optimal: for
example, the machines frequently sound false alarms.
Furthermore, TSA's decision to deploy a combination of bulk EDS and
trace devices could have long-term budgetary implications. Although funding is
available for airports to purchase the equipment, no specific funding has been
provided for airport modifications. These modifications are expected to cost
millions of dollars at some major airports. In addition, TSA's plan to install
bulk EDS in airport lobbies first and then to move them to the baggage handling
areas at certain airports will involve additional costs. It is unclear how much
this relocation will cost or who will pay for it. Furthermore, the initial
procurement costs may quickly be overshadowed by the costs of the personnel
needed to operate the equipment, which might exceed $1.6 billion each year.
Given the cost of procuring, installing, and operating
bulk EDS and trace devices to examine all checked baggage, some security experts
and academicians have suggested that an alternative be considered. These
individuals advocate adopting a risk-based approach that would match resources
to risk levels by establishing a screening process that begins with passengers
and concludes with baggage. First, with the use of computer-assisted passenger
screening,4 they believe that passengers could be sorted into different risk
groups, such as those who might represent a threat, those about whom little is
known, and those about whom enough is known to make them low risk. Second,
baggage- screening resources could be targeted according to risk. The passengers
who might represent a threat, for instance, could be personally screened, and
all available tools (such as explosive detection equipment and manual searches)
could be used to ensure that no explosives were present in their checked
baggage. The stated advantage of such an approach is that fewer expensive bulk
EDS may be needed and the costs may be lower than TSA is projecting. In
addition, advocates believe that more cost- effective decisions can be made to
replace equipment as newer technologies become available. Conversely, concerns
have been raised by TSA and others that the suggested approach increases the
risk of not detecting explosives because, for the first level of screening, it
uses technology that can screen large numbers of passenger bags quickly but may
be less effective in detecting explosives.
Many
Immediate Challenges Remain to Improve Transportation Security
Many immediate challenges remain for TSA to improve both the security
of other modes of transportation and to strengthen aviation security in areas
not covered by specific deadlines. TSA has not yet assumed full responsibility
for the security of other modes of transportation, such as highways, railroads,
mass transit, ports, and pipelines; however, it has established a number of
functions to collaborate and communicate with the DOT agencies responsible for
these other modes, as well as with other government agencies. For example, TSA
officials told us that the agency has created a broad memorandum of
understanding with the U.S. Coast Guard that will serve as a template for such
agreements between TSA and other agencies, including the Federal Transit
Administration (FTA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). In addition,
other DOT modal agencies have various initiatives under way to improve security
during this transition period. FTA has, for example, launched a multipart
initiative to assess the security of over 30 transit agencies, provide free
emergency preparedness and security training for transit agency personnel and
first responders, and make grants available for organizing and conducting
emergency response drills.
Similarly, the U.S. Coast
Guard has acted as a focal point for assessing and addressing security concerns
for the nation's ports.
Other challenges also confront
TSA as it attempts to strengthen aviation security. Passenger screeners still
fail to detect weapons and other threat objects (e.g., knives, scissors, and
sharp objects) at unacceptable rates, and enhanced screening procedures are
unevenly applied among airports. In November 2001, staff from the DOT Inspector
General's office observed private contractors carry out screening at 58 security
checkpoints and concluded that they were not consistently and uniformly
following FAA's screening requirements. For example, in some cases screeners
were not checking passengers' identification against their boarding passes, were
not adequately screening carry-on bags for threat objects, and were not
performing continuous random secondary screening measures, such as manually
searching carry-on items or using wands to screen passengers. Recent TSA testing
found that screeners at 32 of the nation's largest airports failed to detect
fake weapons (guns, dynamite, or bombs) in almost a quarter of the undercover
tests at screening checkpoints. Since TSA took over aviation security
responsibilities on February 17, 2002, discoveries of guns, knives, and other
potential weapons on passengers who had passed security checkpoints have
prompted evacuations at 124 airports and resulted in 631 flights being called
back to terminals so that passengers could be searched again.
Furthermore, the enhanced security procedures have contributed to
longer waits and congestion at airport terminals. TSA's goal is to process
passengers through security in 10 minutes or less, but airlines have reported
significantly longer waits during peak times at a number of the nation's major
airports. These conditions can discourage air travel and adversely affect the
travel industry.
Finally, the challenge of identifying
and removing airport workers who cannot meet new requirements for background
checks continues. Last October FAA ordered background checks on an estimated
750,000 airport and airline employees with access to secured areas of airports.
By April 28, 2002, federal law enforcement officials had arrested or indicted
more than 450 workers at 15 airports for being in the United States illegally or
using phony social security numbers. These workers, who were employed by private
companies that clean airplanes, operate airport restaurants, and provide other
airport services, had security badges giving them access to planes, ramps,
runways, and cargo areas. Completing these background checks will enhance
aviation security.
Some other immediate challenges,
such as the security of cargo and general aviation, were discussed in the act
itself, and more recent legislative proposals have raised these and other
outstanding aviation security issues. To address these issues, bills have been
introduced to arm pilots, enhance cargo security, require background checks for
all foreign applicants to U.S. flight schools, prohibit the opening of cockpit
doors during flights, train airline personnel to conduct passenger
identification checks, make it a criminal penalty to intentionally circumvent
airport security, and provide whistleblower protection for air carrier and
airport security workers. (See app. III for a summary of pending legislation on
aviation security.) All of these are complex and controversial issues. In moving
forward, TSA must work with stakeholders to assess the risks and vulnerabilities
of the various options and carefully weigh both the policy implications and the
implementation strategies required for their success, keeping in mind the
long-term implications of short-term decisions.
To
illustrate the challenges and complexities TSA faces in attempting to strengthen
aviation security, we examined some of the issues raised by proposals to arm
pilots; establish a "trusted traveler" program, which would use biometric
identifiers to expedite security checks; and enhance cargo security. Arming Pilots Last month, at the request of this Committee's
Chairman, we provided information on, among other things, reasons for and
against arming pilots and questions to be addressed if pilots
were to be armed.5
- Proponents of arming
pilots cited the potential deterrent value of firearms, their usefulness as
a last line of defense, and past regulatory precedents, while opponents cited
the moral dilemma pilots would face if they were prohibited from leaving the
cockpit, as they would be by the legislation, when passengers or crew members
were being threatened in the cabin. Opponents also said that arming pilots would introduce another 10,000 to 100,000 guns into
our society, which they believe would have negative effects.
- Questions to be addressed if pilots were to be armed included (1) who
would regulate and oversee pilots' carriage of weapons; (2) what qualifications
and training pilots would need to carry weapons; (3) what types of weapons would
be carried and how they would be maintained, stored, and transported; (4) what
aircraft modifications would be required; and (5) how much it would cost to arm
pilots.
TSA has not yet completed its evaluation of the
benefits and disadvantages of a trusted traveler program. Such a program, if
successfully implemented, could reduce airport waits and speed security checks
for passengers who voluntarily submit information about themselves and undergo
background checks. It could also minimize the economic disruption caused by
congestion at the terminal by allowing airline and TSA staff to focus more
attention on lesser known passengers who could present greater security risks.
However, such a program has the potential to increase the system's vulnerability
by using reduced security measures for some passengers. If terrorists were to
steal the identities of trusted travelers, the consequences could be
particularly dire.
The trusted traveler concept
presents many procedural questions that would need to be answered before a
decision could be reached on implementing the program. Such questions include
which passengers would be eligible to enroll, what information would be
collected, how frequently their status would be updated, what entity would run
the program, and what biometric identifiers would be used to positively identify
the passengers.
Aviation Cargo Security
Both the act and recent legislative proposals have raised the security
of aviation cargo as an issue. The act requires that all cargo transported in
all-cargo aircraft be screened as soon as practicable, but it is silent on how
best to accomplish this screening. TSA has not announced how it plans to meet
this requirement, in part because it has focused most of its efforts on meeting
the deadlines for screening passenger bags. Two recent legislative proposals (S.
2668 and S. 2656) call for enhancing aviation cargo security by tightening the
security of the "known shippers" system--the major system currently used to
ensure aviation cargo security. The DOT Inspector General and others have
identified gaps in this program, which allows shippers who meet DOT's
requirements to ship their cargo without inspection. The proposed legislation
calls for investigating known shippers more thoroughly to ensure they are who
they say they are, establishing a documentary "chain of custody" for all
shipments, and inspecting a greater percentage of cargo than is currently done.
These legislative proposals are intended to address the most difficult problem
in ensuring cargo security-- screening the vast amount of cargo without major
disruptions in service--by increasing the level of scrutiny on shippers,
middlemen, and recipients.
TSA Faces Longer-Term
Institutional Challenges
TSA faces several longer-term
challenges as it organizes itself to protect the nation's transportation system.
These challenges include strategically managing its workforce, controlling
costs, and sharing threat information. Strategic Human Capital Management Is
Essential for Maximizing TSA's Performance A human capital strategy is critical
for TSA, which may have a workforce as large as 70,000. To assist agencies in
managing their human capital more strategically, GAO has developed a model of
strategic human capital management that identifies cornerstones and related
critical success factors that agencies should apply and steps they can take.6
Our model is designed to help agency leaders effectively lead and manage their
people and integrate human capital considerations into daily decision making and
the program results they seek to achieve. In ongoing work for this Committee, we
are reviewing aspects of TSA's implementation of results-oriented practices,
such as human capital management. Today we would like to share some preliminary
observations on TSA's progress in this area.
TSA's
success in protecting the nation's transportation system depends in large part
on its ability to recruit, train, and retain key people. Our prior work on
aviation security identified problems with the training and retention of
contract screeners. TSA has been charged with hiring and training a federal
screener workforce and has encountered unexpected difficulty in doing so,
especially in large metropolitan areas. For example, at Baltimore- Washington
International Airport--the first of 429 airports to be staffed with federal
passenger screeners-- TSA's hiring of screeners was delayed because high
percentages of applicants did not show up for or did not pass their prehiring
assessment. Only about a third of the qualified applicants who were contacted to
schedule an assessment reported for their assessment, and of those who reported,
only about a third passed. If TSA experiences similar problems in trying to
staff other airports, then the hiring challenge facing the agency is
daunting.
A critical success factor in human capital
management is to tailor human capital approaches to meet organizational needs by
using the full range of tools and flexibilities available to an agency under
current laws and regulations. The act allows TSA to use and modify the personnel
system established by FAA, which is exempt from many federal personnel
provisions. To meet its need for talented resources quickly, TSA officials told
us that they made use of flexibilities such as temporary hiring authority, on-
the-spot hiring authority, and the authority to use detailees from other
agencies and executives on loan from the private sector. TSA is also basing its
compensation system on FAA's pay banding approach, which allows the agency to
hire employees anywhere within broad pay bands for their positions. For example,
the pay band for screeners ranges from $23,600 to $35,400 (from about $11 to $17
per hour).7 Pay banding is one approach that can support a more direct link
between pay and an individual's knowledge, skills, and performance if an
agency's performance management systems can support this link.
Another critical success factor is linking individual performance to
organizational goals. The act requires TSA to establish a performance management
system and performance agreements, with organizational and individual goals for
employees, managers, and executives. TSA has made progress in setting up the
performance management system. The agency has drafted but not approved an
interim employee performance management system for the current fiscal year. The
system lays out the processes and procedures for establishing performance
agreements that include organizational and individual goals and objectives,
measuring and monitoring performance, determining employees' development needs,
and appraising and rewarding employees. Until the interim system is approved,
TSA has implemented a temporary performance agreement for newly hired screeners
and supervisory screeners. The temporary performance agreement contains a
general description of duties and the manner in which the duties should be
performed; it does not include specific individual and organizational goals.
Finalizing a performance management system linked to organizational goals is
critical to motivating and managing staff, ensuring the quality of screeners'
performance, and, ultimately, restoring public confidence in air travel.
Cost Controls and Contractor Oversight Are Critical for
Ensuring TSA's Success Federal organizations have a stewardship obligation to
acquire goods and services at reasonable prices; expend federal tax dollars
appropriately; ensure financial accountability to the President, Congress, and
American people; and prevent waste, fraud, and abuse. Long-term attention to
cost and accountability controls for acquisition and related business processes
will be critical both to ensuring TSA's success and to maintaining its integrity
and accountability. Such attention includes establishing cost control mechanisms
and monitoring contractors' performance with respect to cost, schedule, and
quality. This is particularly important because of TSA's large acquisition and
personnel needs.
TSA oversees many large-dollar
contracts; however, according to the DOT Inspector General, it could improve its
controls over these contracts, which total $3.1 billion in fiscal year 2002. For
example, TSA initially budgeted $2,500 per screener for background checks but
was able to reduce this estimate to $200 per screener after the Inspector
General expressed concern. This change is projected to save the agency
approximately $95 million in fiscal year 2002 alone. According to the Inspector
General, although TSA has made progress in addressing certain cost-related
issues, it has not established an infrastructure that provides an effective span
of control to monitor contractors' costs and performance.
Cost controls are also important in establishing employee compensation
levels and controlling salaries. While pay banding can be used to ensure that
salaries are commensurate with position duties, it should not be used to
arbitrarily set salaries higher than comparable positions in other agencies. For
example, TSA is hiring law enforcement officers from a number of other law
enforcement agencies. TSA's starting salary for most federal air marshals is
$36,400, which is supplemented by a 25- percent law enforcement pay differential
that raises it to $45,500. In contrast, the starting salaries for law
enforcement employees at the Defense Protective Service, the U.S. Capitol
Police, and the Federal Protective
Service--where some
of the new federal air marshals previously worked--are capped at $37,000, in
part because they do not include this pay differential. Further cost reductions
due to efficiencies and economies of scale may be possible if TSA is moved to
the proposed Department of Homeland Security. Costs reductions might be possible
by consolidating administrative, technical, or other types of staff. As a
result, TSA should exercise caution in staffing certain positions, such as
creating its own criminal investigative workforce, when such functions might be
merged with an already existing workforce. For example, under the President's
proposal, Customs and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), which
have a combined criminal investigative workforce of about 5,000, would join TSA
in reporting to an Under Secretary for Border and Transportation Security.
Information Sharing and Coordination Among Agencies Are
Crucial for Threat Identification and Response Timely, accurate information
about terrorists and the threats they pose is vital to TSA's mission. Such
information is gathered and maintained by numerous law enforcement and other
agencies, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), INS, the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the State Department. Timely information sharing
among such agencies has been hampered by organizational cultures that make
agencies reluctant to share sensitive information and by outdated computer
systems that lack interoperability. For example, INS, FBI, and the State
Department all need the capacity to identify aliens in the United States who are
in violation of their visa status, have broken U.S. laws, or are under
investigation for criminal activity, including terrorism. In the immediate
aftermath of September 11, it was reported that the computerized database
systems of INS and State were incompatible, making data sharing difficult and
cumbersome.
Increased coordination among agencies with
responsibilities for national security is called for in the act, as well as in
proposals for the creation of a new Department of Homeland Security.
Specifically, the act established a transportation security oversight board,
which is responsible for (1) facilitating the coordination of intelligence,
security, and law enforcement activities affecting transportation; (2)
facilitating the sharing of threat information affecting transportation among
federal agencies and with airlines and other transportation providers; and (3)
exploring the technical feasibility of developing a common database of
individuals who may pose a threat to transportation or national security. The
board includes representation from the DOT, CIA, National Security Council,
Attorney General, the Departments of Defense and Treasury, and the Office of
Homeland Security. Similarly, proposals to create a new Department of Homeland
Security include provisions to share and coordinate intelligence information
among many federal agencies. Moving TSA and agencies with responsibility for
border protection, such as INS, into the proposed Department of Homeland
Security may provide the opportunity for increased information sharing using
state-of-the-art technology to manage threat information.
Closing Observations
Mr. Chairman, it is worth
repeating the two central issues confronting TSA as it strives to improve
aviation security: it must meet mandated deadlines and demonstrate results
swiftly while it creates a federal agency whose plans, policies, and procedures
generally ensure long-term success. Achieving either goal would be challenge
enough; to accomplish both simultaneously requires truly extraordinary efforts.
Carefully considering how it strategically manages its large workforce, controls
costs, and coordinates with other agencies to share threat information will help
it meet its mission both now and in the future.
This
concludes my prepared statement. I will be pleased to answer any questions that
you or Members of the Committee may have.