Copyright 2001 FDCHeMedia, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  
FDCH Political Transcripts
September 20, 2001, Thursday
TYPE: COMMITTEE HEARING

LENGTH: 23750 words

COMMITTEE: SENATE APPROPRIATIONS TRANSPORTATION SUBCOMMITTEE

HEADLINE: U.S. SENATOR PATTY MURRAY (D-WA) HOLDS HEARING ON AVIATION SECURITY ISSUES

SPEAKER:
U.S. SENATOR PATTY MURRAY (D-WA), CHAIRMAN

LOCATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.

WITNESSES:

PANEL ONE
NORMAN MINETA, TRANSPORTATION SECRETARY
JANE GARVEY, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
PANEL TWO
THE HONORABLE KENNETH M. MEAD, INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
MR. GERALD L. DILLINGHAM, PH.D., DIRECTOR, PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE ISSUES, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
MR. HANK QUEEN, VICE PRESIDENT, ENGINEERING & PRODUCT INTEGRITY, THE BOEING COMPANY

BODY:

 
U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS: SUBCOMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION HOLDS A JOINT HEARING ON AVIATION SECURITY ISSUES
 
SEPTEMBER 20, 2001
 
SPEAKERS, SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION:
U.S. SENATOR PATTY MURRAY (D-WA)
CHAIRWOMAN
U.S. SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD (D-WV)
U.S. SENATOR BARBARA A. MIKULSKI (D-MD)
U.S. SENATOR HARRY REID (D-NV)
U.S. SENATOR HERB KOHL (D-WI)
U.S. SENATOR RICHARD DURBIN (D-IL)
 
U.S. SENATOR RICHARD C. SHELBY (R-AL)
RANKING MEMBER
U.S. SENATOR ARLEN SPECTER (R-PA)
U.S. SENATOR CHRISTOPHER BOND (R-MO)
U.S. SENATOR ROBERT F. BENNETT (R-UT)
U.S. SENATOR BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL (R-CO)
 
SPEAKERS, HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION:
 
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE HAROLD ROGERS (R-KY)
SUBCOMMITTEE CHAIRMAN
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FRANK WOLF (R-VA)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TOM DELAY (R-TX)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE SONNY CALLAHAN (R-AL)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TODD TIAHRT (R-KA)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE ROBERT B. ADERHOLT (R-AL)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE KAY GRANGER (R-TX)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JO ANN EMERSON (R-MO)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JOHN E. SWEENEY (R-NY)
 
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE MARTIN OLAV SABO (D-MN)
SUBCOMMITTEE RANKING MEMBER
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JOHN W. OLVER (D-MA)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE ED PASTOR (D-AZ)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE CAROLYN C. KILPATRICK (D-MI)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JOSE SERRANO (D-NY)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JAMES E. CLYBURN (D-SC)
 
SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE:
 
SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD (D-WV)
COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN
U.S. SENATOR DANIEL K. INOUYE (D-HA)
U.S. SENATOR ERNEST F. HOLLINGS (D-SC)
U.S. SENATOR PATRICK J. LEAHY (D-VT)
U.S. SENATOR TOM HARKIN (D-IA)
U.S. SENATOR BARBARA A. MIKULSKI (D-MD)
U.S. SENATOR HARRY REID (D-NV)
U.S. SENATOR HERB KOHL (D-WI)
U.S. SENATOR PATTY MURRAY (D-WA)
U.S. SENATOR BYRON L. DORGAN (D-ND)
U.S. SENATOR DIANNE FEINSTEIN (D-CA)
U.S. SENATOR RICHARD DURBIN (D-IL)
U.S. SENATOR TIM JOHNSON (D-SD)
U.S. SENATOR MARY LANDRIEU (D-LA)
U.S. SENATOR JACK REED (D-RI)

U.S. SENATOR TED STEVENS (R-AK)
RANKING MEMBER
U.S. SENATOR THAD COCHRAN (R-MS)
U.S. SENATOR ARLEN SPECTER (R-PA)
U.S. SENATOR PETE V. DOMENICI (R-NM)
U.S. SENATOR CHRISTOPHER (KIT) BOND (R-MO)
U.S. SENATOR MITCH MCCONNELL (R-KY)
U.S. SENATOR CONRAD BURNS (R-MT)
U.S. SENATOR RICHARD C. SHELBY (R-AL)
U.S. SENATOR JUDD GREGG (R-NH)
U.S. SENATOR ROBERT F. BENNETT (R-UT)
U.S. SENATOR BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL (R-CO)
U.S. SENATOR LARRY CRAIG (R-ID)
U.S. SENATOR KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON (R-TX)
U.S. SENATOR MIKE DEWINE (R-OH)
 
HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE:
 
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE C.W. BILL YOUNG (R-FL)
COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE RALPH REGULA (R-OH)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JERRY LEWIS (R-CA)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE HAROLD ROGERS (R-KY)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JOE SKEEN (R-NM)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FRANK R. WOLF (R-VA)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TOM DELAY (R-TX)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JIM KOLBE (R-AZ)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE SONNY CALLAHAN (R-AL)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JAMES T. WALSH (R-NY)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE CHARLES H. TAYLOR (R-NC)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE DAVID L. HOBSON (R-OH)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE ERNEST J. ISTOOK JR. (R-OK)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE HENRY BONILLA (R-TX)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JOE KNOLLENBERG (R-MI)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE DAN MILLER (R-FL)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JACK KINGSTON (R-GA)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE RODNEY P. FRELINGHUYSEN (R-NJ)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE ROGER F. WICKER (R-MS)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE GEORGE R. NETHERCUTT JR. (R-WA)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE RANDY "DUKE" CUNNINGHAM (R-CA)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TODD TIAHRT (R-KS)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE ZACH WAMP (R-TN)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TOM LATHAM (R-IA)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE ANNE M. NORTHUP (R-KY)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE ROBERT B. ADERHOLT (R-AL)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JO ANN EMERSON (R-MO)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JOHN E. SUNUNU (R-NH)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE KAY GRANGER (R-TX)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JOHN E. PETERSON (R-PA)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JOHN T. DOOLITTLE (R-CA)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE RAY LAHOOD (R-IL)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JOHN E. SWEENEY (R-NY)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE DAVID VITTER (R-LA)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE DON SHERWOOD (R-PA)
 
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE DAVID R. OBEY (D-WI)
COMMITTEE RANKING MEMBER
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JOHN P. MURTHA (D-PA)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE NORMAN D. DICKS (D-WA)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE MARTIN OLAV SABO (D-MN)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE STENY H. HOYER (D-MD)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE ALAN B. MOLLOHAN (D-WV)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE MARCY KAPTUR (D-OH)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE NANCY PELOSI (D-CA)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE PETER J. VISCLOSKY (D-IN)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE NITA LOWEY (D-NY)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JOSE E. SERRANO (D-NY)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE ROSA L. DELAURO (D-CT)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JAMES P. MORAN (D-VA)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JOHN W. OLVER (D-MA)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE ED PASTOR (D-AZ)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE CARRIE P. MEEK (D-FL)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE DAVID E. PRICE (D-NC)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE CHET EDWARDS (D-TX)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE ROBERT E. "BUD" CRAMER, JR. (D-AL)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE PATRICK KENNEDY (D-RI)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JAMES CLYBURN (D-SC)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE MAURICE D. HINCHEY (D-NY)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE LUCILLE ROYBAL-ALLARD (D-CA)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE SAM FARR (D-CA)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JESSE L. JACKSON, JR. (D-IL)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE CAROLYN C. KILPATRICK (D-MI)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE ALLEN BOYD (D-FL)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE CHAKA FATTAH (D-PA)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE STEVEN ROTHMAN (D-NJ)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE VIRGIL GOODE (I-VA)



*


MURRAY: Good afternoon. This joint committee will come to order.

We are meeting today under extraordinary circumstances. Our country has been attacked, our people are in mourning and our nation is preparing for a long battle against terrorism.

There is little we can say today to bring comfort to those who lost friends and loved ones in the attacks on September. Our thoughts and prayers are with all of the victims, their families and their friends.

We are all grateful to the rescue workers and the relief organizations who are containing the damage and comforting the affected. We are grateful to the military families of our nation who may be called on to protect and defend us in the coming months.

In the past few days, I've been struck by how all Americans have come together to show our national unity.

MURRAY: At this hearing, we have Democrats and Republicans from the House and from the Senate, all coming together to improve aviation safety. I just want to add that whatever the coming days may bring, we've got to hold onto this sense of unity we've discovered in the past nine days.

Because the attacks were launched from our nation's own transportation system, today we have brought together the Transportation Subcommittees of the House and the Senate for the first joint hearing in recent memory.

I want to thank Chairman Rogers especially for recommending that we do this hearing jointly and I welcome the leadership of the chairman and all of our colleagues from the House.

The terrorist attacks have revealed gaping holes in our transportation system and in our intelligence gathering system. My purpose in calling this hearing is not to place blame on any one individual or agency. I want to be very clear that there were many failures here.

We are not here to blame those workers who operate x-ray machines or who screen passengers. We also had a failure of our intelligence system on which we spend billions of dollars each year. We cannot expect an $8 an hour security screener to foil an attack that a multi- billion dollar intelligence system could not prevent. Those airport security workers are no more responsible than the airlines that hired them. And the airlines are no more to blame than the FAA for allowing a vulnerable system to persist.

Similarly, I don't believe the FAA is any more responsible than the intelligence agencies that are charged with monitoring suspected terrorists and thwarting their efforts.

On Monday, I met with a number of security screeners in Seattle. I was impressed by their dedication, but I am concerned about the lack of consistent standards, training and experience throughout each airport and throughout our country.

For too long we have focused on how to do security inexpensively. From now on, we have to focus on how to do it well. In truth, these workers are just part of our transportation system. From the airport parking garage, to the terminal, from the gates to the cockpit, and from the tower to the cabin, thousands of people are responsible for our safety when we step on an airplane.

These are human beings and they are making decisions about safety and security in a fast-moving environment with little margin for error. I want to make sure that those workers have the most experience and best training possible, because our transportation security system is only as strong as its weakest links.

As we have all seen in this past week, the aviation industry is a key part of our economy, a part that we cannot allow madmen to shut down. We must be safe, but we must also keep our transportation systems running efficiently.

In recent days, airlines and suppliers have cut service and laid off employees. The Boeing Company has just announced it's laying off as many as 30,000 employees because aircraft orders have been cancelled or delayed.

I am vigorously supporting efforts to help the ailing aviation industry and its workers. As chairman of this subcommittee, I will work to make sure that the funding is there, both to get this critical industry back on its feet and to make our aviation system, once again, the safest in the world.

We've called this hearing today to answer these two questions: is it safe to fly today and what steps must we take to prevent future tragedies.

To answer these questions, we have here this afternoon the secretary of transportation, Norman Mineta, and FAA administrator Jane Garvey. We will also have testimony from the DOT inspector general and the General Accounting Office, which both have done extensive work in this arena.

We will also have a representative from the Boeing Company to discuss specific issues of securing cockpit doors and the safety tradeoff that comes with that enhanced security measure.

With the help of our witnesses today, we will take the lessons of this tragedy and turn them into safer airports and safer travel.

Because we have a large number of colleagues here today, I will call on our chairman and ranking members of the full committee and subcommittee for opening statements. Then we will have the testimony from all of our witnesses, and then each member that is here will have an opportunity to make a statement as they ask their questions after the testimony from our witnesses today.

Chairman Rogers, thank you so much for joining us here today and please join me with your opening statement.

ROGERS: Thank you very much, Madam Chairman.

First, I'd like to thank Senator Murray and Ranking Member Shelby for agreeing to this joint hearing today. There will be many hearings in the aftermath of September 11, but this is the first one that shows the unity of both Houses of Congress and both political parties.

This is the first bipartisan, bicameral hearing on the crucial subject of aviation security. We stand united before the American people today to create a stronger front against terrorism.

We will do our part on these subcommittees and do it quickly. We will ensure that aviation security is fortified and that the American people are assured of their safety as they return to our aviation system.

First, we need to recognize and applaud the extraordinary effort being made the secretary, the FAA administrator, and the thousands of departmental employees who are addressing this crisis.

We need to recognize the hard work of our air traffic controls on September 11, who helped guide thousands of aircraft, tens of thousands of people to the ground, quickly, amid the most confusing and harrowing of circumstance.

My own view is that many lives were saved by that step and I congratulate, Mr. Secretary, you and the administrator particularly, for that decision.

We owe all of the employees a big debt and the American people should be proud of the job you're doing on their behalf.

Transportation, as Senator Murray has said, is critical, of course, to the nation's economy. Already we are seeing the economic side effects spreading throughout the nation. Turmoil in the airline industry leads to cancelled orders for aircraft. That, in turn, causes cancelled orders for aircraft engines, avionics, other critical parts. And when transportation suffers, the retail, conference and tourism sectors are also equally damaged.

Terrorist organizations, of course, know this. They know the importance of our transportation system as the events of September 11 have so dramatically revealed.

We must get our transportation networks and transportation industries back on their feet. We must show these organizations that we will not be defeated by these heinous acts.

It is important to look backward to find the holes in our safety net and patch them up, but we must remember that this type of attack has never occurred before. Never has someone used a commercial airliner to deliberately create destruction on the ground, to strike the national symbols and infrastructure of a country.

Since this was an attack, using our own transportation system, it's urgent that our particular subcommittees focus on immediate preparedness. This must include a review of current security programs and their effectiveness, as a starting point for a coordinated plan of improvements.

But we must also be inspired, to be creative, innovative, daring. We must think of new ways of doing business and develop breakthroughs to meet this threat to our nation and to our way of life.

Personally, I am focusing on improving three areas of our aviation security posture. I hope the witnesses will address these issues today. I'm sure you will. First, of course, the Sky Marshal Program. We must deploy sky marshals, as I know we already are, and do it as quickly as possible.

Second, we must secure the cockpit against intrusion by highjackers and deprive them of the capability of using that aircraft as a guided missile and develop clear procedures to prevent cockpit takeover.

And thirdly, we must find ways to improve security on the ground, including passenger screening and unauthorized access to aircraft operating areas on the tarmac.

For the good of the nation, we must all continue to work together. Other committees must work together, even as we are. Federal agencies must coordinate, communicate, cooperate for the security of our people. We can do this, we can accomplish this. The American people deserve it and the urgency of our situation demands it.

Thank you.

MURRAY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The ranking member of the Senate Transportation Committee, Senator Shelby, is unable to be here at this moment.

Without objection, I will include his statement in the record.

I will turn to the ranking member of the House, Representative Sabo.

SABO: Thank you, Madam Chairman.

We are here to examine the devastating acts of the terror in New York, Washington and Pennsylvania of last week and to evaluate measures necessary to ensure civil aviation security and restore public confidence in air travel.

First, I extend my deepest sympathies to the victims and their families. The human loss and senseless destruction are incomprehensible. I also commend the heroic acts of public servants and private citizens who addressed the crisis as it was happening. They worked hard to rescue victims and they continue to conduct rescue and recovery operations.

As we begin this hearing, I hope we will proceed with cool and clear heads, focusing first on the appropriate short-term actions we must take now to heighten aviation security. We must also commit to carefully thinking through longer-term measures needed to maintain security in air travel and across other transportation modes.

I thank you.

MURRAY: Chairman Byrd?

BYRD: Thank you, Madam Chairman.

I commend you for calling this hearing today. I welcome Chairman Rogers, Mr. Sabo and our other colleagues. And especially I welcome Mr. Roby (ph), and my bosom friend, Ted Stevens.

I also welcome Secretary Mineta, FAA Administrator Garvey and other witnesses here this afternoon.

It is most appropriate that this hearing take the form of a joint hearing between the House and Senate.

Secretary Mineta, what you see is a bipartisan and bicameral committee, ready, willing and able to help.

Just 72 hours after the tragic events of September 11, the Congress demonstrated its ability to respond and to respond quickly by appropriating $40 billion to address the crisis -- not a small amount, by any means -- forty dollars for every minute since Jesus Christ was born.

That supplemental appropriation bill provided $40 billion for five stated purposes, one of which was to improve aviation security. The House and Senate appropriations committees have been funding the Department of Transportation's initiatives in the area of aviation security for years. We have met or exceeded the administration's request, including a substantial increase in funds that were sought after Pan Flight 103 exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland and when TWA Flight 800 exploded over the Atlantic Ocean.

Over the years, at the request of the current and prior administrations, we have provided billions of dollars for the deployment of explosive detection systems and for the hiring of hundreds of security inspectors stationed at airports across the country and abroad.

Clearly, however, the DOT's efforts in this area have been misguided, to a certain extent. At a minimum, they were directed at only one portion of the threat, because just last week, four teams of terrorists permeated our aviation security measures with apparent ease and triggered the most horrifying series of events witnessed in our country since the invasion of the United States at Pearl Harbor.

BYRD: As an immediate step to accompany the reopening of the air traffic control system, the FAA has imposed new safety requirements. If we want a safe and efficient air transportation system, we're going to need to step up to these and other requirements. Some of those requirements will bear a considerable cost, and we should have an honest and straightforward discussion on how we expect to pay for these new requirements.

For example, I've heard one proposal that we take all the personnel that work at security checkpoints and make them federal employees. That proposal would relieve the airlines of at least $1 billion cost every year, and transfer that amount, or more, onto the taxpayers.

If that is what is necessary to ensure that we have effective safety at the checkpoints, then we should do it. But five or 10 years from now, when attention to this tragedy may have faded a bit, I hope that there will not be a repeated cause to shrink the size of the federal government.

In addressing the costs of these new security procedures, I am particularly concerned about the burden that will be placed on the nation's smaller airports, airports like the ones we have in Bluefield, Clarksburg, Beckley, Parkersburg, West Virginia.

These airports have had modest operating budgets. Just the interim security enhancements that were ordered by the FAA last week will work a hardship on these small airports.

This is not to be unexpected, but as we look into the costs that are incumbent on us to improve aviation safety, we must recognize the needs of the smaller and more remote outposts of the aviation network.

Separate from the issue of whether emergency funding is need for airports, I am aware of proposals to provide very sizeable appropriations of direct grant assistance to bail out the airlines.

The airline industry is essential to this nation's commerce, producing about $125 billion annually and creating work for manufacturers and other companies.

The federal government cannot allow this industry to fold without seriously disrupting the U.S. economy. And I'm fully aware of that, fully supportive of doing whatever needs to be done to keep that from happening.

But, if we have now reached the point that this industry must live off the generosity of the U.S. taxpayer, then I think we have a responsibility to ensure that the taxpayers are well served. I'm thinking particularly about our constituents that live in smaller cities and towns, in rural America.

Ever since we deregulated the airlines in 1978, these citizens have been asked to pay through the nose for infrequent and in most instances, quite poor air service.

Now, at the same time that the airlines are cutting back service between cities and eliminating service to others, they are asking for a federal bailout.

I'm not necessarily against providing some measured assistance to pump some fresh blood into the airlines. But I must ask how we will ensure that the airlines are accountable with the taxpayer's money. I must also ask whether we need to look at reregulating the airlines to ensure that all taxpayers, not just those in the big cities -- I have nothing against those in the big cities -- but not just those in the big cities -- get their money's worth.

During the time of war, we should require that there will be air service to all parts of America to ensure that there is mobility for all Americans.

Mr. Secretary, I was the majority leader in 1978 when we deregulated the airlines. And in sackcloth and ashes, I have wept and kicked myself repeatedly over the years since 1978 for going along with the deregulation of the airlines.

Why? Because the big airlines pulled out of West Virginia as soon as we deregulated the airlines and left us hanging, without adequate service. And then they gouged the taxpayers in these rural communities for service. We pay -- I can get the figures, you have them -- $600 to $800 for a round trip ticket to Charleston, West Virginia? That's unfair.

The airlines provide service to London and back, in many instances, for less money than they require from the coal miners, the steel workers, the farmers, the schoolteachers, the little people, if we might call them "little" -- in West Virginia and other rural communities.

Now, I'm going to ask these airlines, you can believe that, because some of this money is going to flow through appropriations committee -- "What are you going to do for our little people?" -- if you want to call them "little". We've been treated like little people and we're tired of it.

And I'm seething, seething with anger at myself for voting for deregulation. Now there has come a time when you, the airlines, need help. I'm going to be there to help you. I want to help you, because we're all in this boat together. But I'm going to ask you some questions about what kind of service you're going to give us, the people in the rural communities all over America.

Thank you.

Thank you, witnesses.

Thank you, Madam Chairman.

MURRAY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Young is not here. He has a statement for the record. We will submit it at the appropriate place.

Senator Stevens?

STEVENS: Thank you very much, Madam Chairman.

In the interests of time, I would like to have my statement put in the record. I would just make two comments.

One is that I'm certain that our two committees -- the House and Senate Appropriations Committees will provide the funds to restore and repair the critical transportation services of our country, not just the airlines but also rail, the port facilities, the highway facilities. They all must be looked at as far as security is concerned.

And secondly, I want to say, as I said this morning, our two witnesses here highly deserve greater recognition that anyone really realizes, because between them, they ordered the airplanes to come to the ground that probably contained other terrorists who would have wrecked -- would have damaged, not only in the country, but particularly right here in this city. I hope, Mr. Mineta, you will relate, as you did this morning, how you came to that conclusion and you came to it very fast, because there were planes that were in the air or on the taxi strip that could have caused us all great harm had you not taken that action.

I publicly congratulate you and I think we're very, very privileged to have two people such as Secretary Mineta and Administrator Garvey to help this team for us in terms of this particular subject -- general aviation and commercial aviation.

Thank you very much.

Representative Obey?

OBEY: I thank the chair for calling these hearings and I agree with much that Senator Byrd and Senator Stevens have said.

Today we simply need information. We need action. It would be nice if that action is accompanied by some thought. We also need a sense of balance. We do not need scapegoats. Members of Congress are going to have plenty of time to make their views known on this subject. Today we need to hear the witnesses.

You don't need any opening statement from me. I think we just need to get on to the testimony.

MURRAY: Thank you very much.

We will now turn to our witnesses that are here today.

Secretary Mineta, we will begin with you.

MINETA: Chairman Murray, Chairman Rogers, Chairman Byrd, Senator Stevens, Congressman Sabo and Congressman Obey, and members of the two transportation appropriation subcommittees, it is with both sadness and resolve that Administrator Garvey and I appear before you today.

I join all Americans in my sadness and anger about the lives that were lost during the heinous, cowardly terrorist attack on September 11. I also follow President Bush with a firm, unfaltering commitment to help our nation, and specifically, our transportation system, to respond, rebuild and recover.

Although we will never overcome the sorrow that we feel for the families and friends who lost loved ones, we will ensure public safety and protect economic vitality.

And while it may take time to recreate comfortable, confidence in travel, I can assure this committee that we can and we will enjoy a transportation system that is safe, secure and stable.

I want to also publicly express my gratitude and pride to the performance of the Department of Transportation's employees throughout the crisis. I would like to call particular attention to the professionalism displayed by the FAA from Administrator Jane Garvey, Deputy Administrator Monte Belger on down.

The FAA has performed magnificently as have crucial players in our department, including the United States Coast Guard, all of those who worked so well and who were well prepared at our Department of Transportation Crisis Management Center.

The morning of Tuesday, September 11, I was having breakfast with the Deputy Prime Minister of Belgium Isabelle Durant, who is also their minister of transport and my chief of staff, John Clerity (ph) came in and said, "Excuse me, Mr. Secretary, may I see you?"

So, I excused myself and went into the office and the television set was on. The first thing I see is smoke billowing from the World Trade Center building. He said, "We don't know what it is, we think it is some sort of an explosion". So, I said, "Well, keep me posted", and I went back into the meeting with Mrs. Durant.

About five, six minutes later, he came back in and said, "Mr. Secretary, may I see you?" So, I came back out. He said, "It's been confirmed, it's an airplane that went into the World Trade Center."

And as I'm sitting there watching the television, all of a sudden from the right came this gray object, and then all of a sudden this plume of orange smoke came out from the other side of the building.

So, I immediately went into the conference room and said to Mrs. Durant, "You'll have to excuse me. I'm going to have to attend to some matters here." By that time, I had been called by the White House to come immediately to the White House and I went over there, walked into the White House, went into the situation room and was briefed by Dick Clarke, the member of the staff of the National Security Council.

Then he said, "You've got to join the vice president over in the Operations Center". So, I was escorted by the Secret Service over to the Operations Center.

You know, when one of something occurs, it's an accident. When two of the same things occur, it's a pattern and while we were in the Operations Center, we then heard about an explosion at the Pentagon. We thought we heard also that it might have been a helicopter. Then it became apparent that it was an American airline -- air carrier -- that had gone into the Pentagon.

But when you have three of the same thing occur, it's a pattern. And so, immediately I called the FAA and I said, "Get all the airplanes down right now. We don't know what's going on. All we're getting, frankly, are watching CNN, talks and reports coming into the operations center.

Well, within -- and at that point, I believe there were a little over 4,500 aircraft in the air.

PASTOR: I just have to remind my friends what happened in Oklahoma. Those were U.S. citizens, and so we just need to be careful in how we translate loyalty to status.

I know you're undergoing investigations and with the evidence you have of how the terrorist got onto the planes and what they carried, what security measure right now in place do you think would avoid it happening again?

MINETA: Next question. I don't have a good answer for that one.

PASTOR: Well, let me give a suggestion. This last weekend I traveled back to Phoenix and back to D.C. And I still see people carrying as many bags as they want...

MINETA: We haven't done anything on the limits that we have. We were just talking earlier about limiting it to one bag per person, including purses for women. That's not in effect yet.

PASTOR: I understand that.

MINETA: The question is: should we be doing things like this?

PASTOR: Oh, I saw in Dulles Saturday where people had their carry-on bags and the impatience of many of the passengers, the pressure put on the people looking through the bags. I have to tell you that even though they're untrained and they're trying to beef up security, I'm sure there were some things that passed through those bags that we would not want to have carried on airplanes.

MINETA: I experienced the same thing when I went to BWI to watch what was happening there on Saturday, and the long lines and the whole function of wanding an individual was sort of a function of how long is the line. If it was a long line, nobody got wanded. And yet, we said specifically "random wanding of passengers coming through the security point". Rather than say, "give up wanding because you've got a long line", it still said, random wanding.

PASTOR: But then who would be selected randomly? Why not everybody, because there are certain people that obviously...

MINETA: But by the same token, I know that when the line got shorter, everybody got wanded.

PASTOR: Well, I would think possibly they might look at me and I might profile something that I shouldn't be carrying and I may be wanded, but someone who may not look like a terrorist might not be wanded. I think you need to wand everybody, even though it takes time.

I've got to tell, when I saw those bags, especially the people who carry the computers and all that other stuff, people try to look in those bags, but I have to tell you that I was unsecure as I went on through the whole security system.

I think you're going to have to look at the situation. People ought to be limited to carrying one bag that is small enough that can be monitored and be made secure and at least allow the person to carry an ID and maybe the plane ticket and a few things. I think that is going to stop probably 90 percent or more of the things you don't want to have on airplanes not to get on airplanes.

MINETA: IDs are required.

PASTOR: I understand that. What I am saying is the bag you carry should be small enough that it can be secured with a reasonable amount of time, but allow the things that you need to carry on to be carried on, your ID, your ticket and a few things, pocketbooks, you know, stuff like that.

But there are still things on the airline in first class. I saw the attendant opening a bottle of wine with a corkscrew -- one of those -- and it's longer than four inches. What are you going to do with the glass that's still being used because there are bottles that are given out? There's different ways people can still use what is being used today on the airlines to handicap an attendant or possibly create chaos on an airline.

Senator Byrd asked a question -- in Japan, they use the subways as a terrorist act. What are we doing to ensure that our subways, our trains are secure?

MINETA: Well, both Federal Railway Administration and the Federal Transit Administration have been having conversations with either APTA with AAR on specific things are going to be required of the railroads to increase their surveillance and security measures.

Part of it, I suppose, goes back to that earlier question that was raised by someone about the cost of this kind of surveillance, especially with public transit agencies. How do you do it with a transit agency that has, I don't know, let's say 57 buses or 1,300 buses. And how do they inspect those vehicles to make sure as they are going through, I don't know, the Holland Tunnel, that they don't have some unwanted baggage on it.

Those are being talked about right now and hopefully, today being Thursday that the early part of next week I hope to be getting a report back on some of the specifics that they will be looking at, incorporating in terms of their operation.

PASTOR: I thank the panel, Madam Chairman.

MURRAY: Senator Durbin?

DURBIN: Thank you, Madam Chairman and Chairman Rogers. Thank you for this hearing. I think this is appropriate and timely. I also want to thank Secretary Mineta and Administrator Garvey. You've got a tough job and you've done good work on that job and in fact, in many ways, your public service has saved lives, particularly in light of this national crisis.

But I'd like to focus, if I can, on an area of questioning which has already been addressed.

There has been a lot of attention since I returned to Washington on our airlines. I think it is appropriate and I hope that we move very quickly to respond.

It appears that the legislation moving forward is focusing on the solvency of the airlines, loans, grants, tax considerations, questions of liability. These are all very important and without the prompt attention of Congress and our action, I'm afraid that we'll face an even greater crisis in our airline industry.

This is the first hearing that I'm aware of that has focused on the security aspect of this. I would suggest to everyone here that the fact that yesterday, in the United States of America, airlines operated at 31 percent of their capacity. It has much more to do with security than it does with solvency.

I think people are reluctant to use our airports and our airlines, which brings me to my question, Secretary Mineta.

I don't think there is anything that has come forward in this hearing today which will make people feel safer about using our airports and our airlines. I'm sad to report that, because I want us to return to normal as quickly as possible.

But the questions that have been compounded and answered and the testimony that we have about the gross inadequacies of the screening systems in American airports have to give every member of this panel pause, let alone the flying public.

The suggestion that we have gone to the lowest bidder time and again, hired people who are not well trained, not as conscientious as they should be, who are not well supervised, who have often been found to fail in their attempts to stop people who would bring weapons on airplanes, has to be a matter of great concern to all of us.

My specific question to you, Mr. Secretary, is this -- on September 11, 2001, in a matter of moments, you made a decision, which saved lives. You brought down the planes across America, as you said, in less than two hours. Because of that decision, people are alive today that might have otherwise have been alive.

I would like to ask you this: are you prepared now, through the FAA, to make an order that at every screening station in every airport in America, there will be a uniformed law enforcement officer to supervise the activity of these screeners until Congress can respond with the administration and federalize this activity, with the appropriate people, to give us the sense of security we need.

MINETA: I know that at Baltimore, they're doing that. There is a police officer at the screening point overseeing that operation. That is what I saw Saturday. Now, whether or now we are considering doing that nationally, let me ask either Administrator Garvey or General Canavin (ph).

GARVEY: Senator, the major airports are doing just that. We contacted them immediately and said, "We'd like you to use your local state police, your local county police, metro police, whatever, and beef up the security checkpoints". So, I think, in many cases -- in fact, I was looking at some numbers the other day and they are dramatic.

The challenge for us is that many of the federal marshals that we want to use, we are using for the federal marshals on the aircraft, so in many ways we are relying on some of the local officials at the local level. But I do think at the larger airports they have done that.

We are going, in fact, this weekend we're going to be visiting some of the major airports to see if there are additional things we can do.

DURBIN: May it suggest that it seems imminently sensible, based on what we've heard today at this hearing, that we have an order coming from the FAA at every airport in America, that every screening team, every screening device, have a uniformed, law enforcement officer there.

I think it accomplishes two things: it reminds the employees of the seriousness of what they're doing, and it could certainly discourage some wrongdoers from trying anything.

Yesterday I went through Lambert Airport in St. Louis. There were five people at my screening station. Three were conscientiously doing what they were trained to do and two were involved in a kind of game playing and horseplay that high school teachers wouldn't tolerate. That is unacceptable. If this is truly our first line of defense, before we start talking about arming pilots and sky marshals, should we put a law enforcement official at every screening device in every airport?

GARVEY: One option, too, is to use the AIP funding. The secretary asked for a recommendation on that to use AIP funding so they can supplement those forces.

DURBIN: Thank you very much.

Thanks, Madam Chairman.

CHAIRMAN: Mr. Callahan?

CALLAHAN: I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll be brief, because I think it's important that we go into executive session as quickly as we can.

Obviously, we have some very chilling deficiencies in our system. I don't think this committee's role here is to lay a finger of blame on anyone, but rather to, as appropriators, is to find out what resources you need to correct the problems. We're not an authorizing committee and we are not committees that make rules and regulations, we are appropriators.

I think that we've shown a great willingness to the administrative branch of government, both with the financial problem facing the airline industry and with you all by telling you, "We have deficiencies, that you admit that, come to us and tell us what you need to correct the problems."

This business of just asking people if they packed their own bags is not working. In fact, it's asinine that we go through that, and the fact that we have these aliens that are scanning people that can't even speak English -- I'm not talking about the passengers, I'm talking about the aliens working there -- undereducated, unable to speak English, and not doing a proper job because they're undertrained and underpaid.

We are coming to you as our representatives in the administrative branch of government, telling you we have the money. We will provide it for you, provided you tell us what you want. And we need answers immediately. I think, Madam Chairman, the quicker we go into executive session so we can find out some of these problems, the more concerned we're going to be and the more willing we're going to be to work with you to correct the problems.

We need to do this, Mr. Secretary, immediately. We need to begin this process before we recess this year, which we're going to try to do before the end of October. We need to provide you with resources if indeed; you need them, or authorization, if you need any authorization.

So, I'm ready, willing and able to go into session to listen to the other horror stories that we don't want to make public and with good cause, but to tell you that our role in this play is of appropriators, that we provide resources. We're willing to do that. You justify what you need the money for.

MINETA: That's very reassuring, Congressman Callahan. Thank you very much.

MURRAY: Senator Bond?

BOND: Thank you very much, Madam Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, Administrator Garvey, first I join in saying thank you for the tremendous job that you've done. Really, you took heroic actions to minimize potential future danger. In the long and very difficult hours since then, you have been very responsive. I can only imagine the amount of burdens on your shoulders. Thank you for doing it.

Now, there are a number of things that I may or may not be able to touch on in this time, but I am interested in security issues and I happen to feel that somehow we need to have federal law enforcement officials doing the screening.

MEAD: I must say that Mr. Dillingham of GAO and ourselves in the inspector general's office have, for at least a decade, perhaps a little more, made numerous recommendations for strengthening the aviation security system on a broad front.

Reports showing vulnerabilities in screening of passengers, check-in and carry-on baggage and cargo, access to secure areas of the airport and issuing and controlling the airport identification badges.

Most recently, a private security company was placed on 36 months probation, ordered to pay over $1 million in fines for failing to conduct background checks, falsifying training records, for employees entrusted with security screening at a major U.S. airport.

As recently as Friday, we arrested 12 non-U.S. citizens for illegally obtaining airport access media or an identification badge. I wanted the subcommittees to know we've temporarily detailed also some of our staff, our law enforcement staff, to the Air Marshal's Program. I think it's a very wise decision to beef that up, make it more robust. I think it will go a long way towards restoring confidence and having a deterrent effect.

I think we all know that the events of last week show the need to tighten up aviation security, that there are vulnerabilities in it. But, it's not going to be foolproof, especially when you have people that are willing to die in the commission of their criminal acts. That's why I think it's always important in discussion of the subject of aviation security that's why it's important, also, to root out this terrorism to begin with, because it's going to be impossible to design a system that will be foolproof.

I'd like to highlight two sets of issues. One has to do with the governance and organization of aviation security -- how we deliver it in this country and secondly, just highlight a few aviation security areas I think can be strengthened in addition to the measures that have already been put in place over the past week.

Given the scope and complexity of the security challenge as we know it now, coupled with a long-standing history of problems with the aviation security program, I think the time has come to revisit the option of vesting governance of the program and responsibility for the provision of security in one federal organization or a not-for-profit federal corporation.

This doesn't mean that everybody has to be a federal employee, but it does mean a much more robust federal presence and control. That entity would have security as its primary and central focus, profession and mission.

Under our current system, we've asked FAA to oversee and regulate aviation security and those charged with providing the security, the airlines and the air force themselves face other priorities, missions, and indeed, in some cases, competing economic pressures.

I think a centralized, consolidated approach with a security mission would require passenger and baggage screeners to have uniform, more rigorous training and performance standards applicable nationwide. I think that would result in more consistent security across this country and a higher quality, also.

We won't be able to do this overnight. A transition period would be required, so in the interim, some measures have to be put in place to make the best of what we have and restore public confidence.

I would like to just make a few points that way in this regard. Congress has put a lot of money into these explosive detection machines. I believe they are substantially underutilized, they continue to be substantially underutilized and I think that we should immediately increase the utilization of these machines.

They detect sophisticated explosive devices. We did a good job, I think, in researching and developing them and now is the time to use them, even though it may mean some extra delay in checking in the passenger.

Screening checkpoint security -- it's imperative that we get tougher standards out there for these screeners and soon and that will probably have a resultant effect of increasing their pay somewhat. That has been a problem going back 14 years.

Airport access control -- this is very important, too. This is where you don't go through a passenger screening station; instead, you go through a door off the concourse. There's a technique called "piggybacking" where a legitimate employee walks through the door and someone can follow that person right out if they're not careful. So, it's very important that we tighten up; we have tight security in the airport secure operations area.

I think also we should immediately begin doing criminal background checks on employees at the airport and these screeners, even though they have been employed by them for a while, in other words, not just new employees. And those are a few steps I think we can take in addition to the ones that are already in place.

Thank you.

MURRAY: Thank you.

Dr. Dillingham?

DILLINGHAM: Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Thank you for the opportunity to be here this afternoon. We join with others in acknowledging that we don't know all the elements of our nation's aviation security system that failed and served as a contributing cause to the horrendous disaster that occurred on September 11.

We also are cognizant of the fact that aviation security is a shared responsibility and that no security system will be 100 percent safe.

However, we do believe that more can be and should be done to increase the effectiveness of our nation's aviation security system.

The work we've done for this committee and other committees of the Congress over the last few years has identified weaknesses and potential vulnerabilities throughout the system. As a basis for going forward this afternoon, I'd like to present a summary of our assessment of security concerns in three areas: one, air traffic control, or ATC; two, unauthorized access to secure areas, and; three, the performance of the passenger and carry-on baggage screening system, including how the United States and selected other country systems differ.

I would also like to offer some suggestions as to some immediate actions that might improve aviation security in these areas.

With regard to ATC security, our reviews of ATC security have identified significant deficiencies in the physical security of facilities that house ATC systems, the systems themselves and the security status of the FAA personnel and contract personnel who affect these systems.

The potential implication of these deficiencies is tremendous. The ATC system is the heart of our aviation system. It is a system that manages the tens of thousands of aircraft that cross the nation on a daily basis.

Over the past few years, we've made nearly 25 recommendations to address these identified deficiencies. To its credit, FAA has worked to address these recommendations and is making some progress. However, most have yet to be completed.

With regard to secure areas: in May 2000, we reported that our special agents had used fictitious law enforcement badges and credentials to gain access to secure areas in airports. They bypassed security checkpoints at two airports. They walked unescorted to airport departure gates. These agents had been issued tickets, boarding passes and could have potentially carried weapons, explosives or other dangerous objects onto the aircraft.

FAA acted immediately to require airport law enforcement officers to review the credentials of all armed law enforcement officers seeking to board aircraft. This was an interim measure as a more permanent fix is being developed.

With regard to passenger and carry-on baggage screening: this has been a long-standing problem. In 1978, our research showed that screeners were missing about one out of 10 threat objects that FAA used to test performance. FAA and the airlines characterized that level of performance as significant and alarming.

By 1987, they were missing two out of 10. For the decade of the '90s, tests results show that in some cases, screening performance has gotten worse.

In our latest research, we found that as testing gets more realistic, that is, as the tests become more closely approximate to how a terrorist might attempt to penetrate a checkpoint, the screener performance declines significantly.

A principle cause of performance problems is a rapid turnover among screeners. It exceeds 100 percent annually at most large airports, leaving few skilled and experienced screeners on the job, to say nothing of the security issues associated with that.

People leave these jobs because of low wages, with few, if any, fringe benefits, the repetitive, monotonous nature of the work, and by in large, the efforts today to address this problem area have been slow and largely ineffective.

We believe the tools; techniques and technologies are available to address these challenges. Generally, they have either not been used, or not used effectively or just taking more time than should.

A case in point is a promulgation of rules to implement the provision of FAA's Reauthorization Act of 1996 that would establish screening company certification programs. The relevant rule is now scheduled for issuance this month, more than two and a half years later than originally scheduled.

Now, I'd like to turn briefly to what we found in our examination of screening companies -- screening programs in foreign countries. The question is: are there lessons we can learn from other countries? The answer is "maybe". The foreign screening operations we examined differed significantly from U.S. operations in many of the issues we listed as challenges in the U.S.

Generally speaking, the screening operations required more extensive screener qualifications and training, including higher pay, better benefits and often included different screening techniques, such as a physical pat down of some passengers.

One other significant difference is that in most of these countries, responsibility for screening is placed with the government or airport authorities instead of air carriers.

The foreign screener operations reported significantly lower screener turnover and there is some evidence that they may have better screener performance as well.

FAA and the air carriers have implemented new controls that have promised a greater sense of security. We believe that to further minimize the vulnerabilities in our aviation security system, more needs to be done.

Some immediate actions that we would suggest is limiting passengers to one carry-on bag, to increase manual searches; screen all airport and airline employees who have access to sterile and secure areas, including mechanics, ramp workers, food service workers, vendors, store employees, at the same time limiting access; strengthen, and I think this is the most important, strengthening intelligence sharing among law enforcement agencies, FAA and cleared airport and airline personnel.

A key action is to complete the promulgation of the screening companies' certification regulation. Concurrently, it might be time for Congress to reconsider whether airlines should continue to bear primary responsibility for screening operations at the nation's airports.

It has been observed that previous aviation tragedies have resulted in a cycle of activities, but the long-term resolve and actions to correct flaws in the system diminishes as the memory of the crisis recedes.

The future of the nation's aviation system, and we are only beginning to fully understand so much more, hinges, in large part, on overcoming this cycle. The GAO continues to stand ready to assist this committee in this most extraordinary, difficult challenge.

Thank you.

MURRAY: Thank you, Dr. Dillingham.

I especially want to welcome Mr. Queen for being here today. He is the vice president of engineering and product integrity for the Boeing Company. He has spent a great deal of time, I know, assisting the secretary of transportation. I spent a great deal of time with him earlier this week out in Seattle and he flew out here with me yesterday from Seattle, so we appreciate you coming all the way across the country and the Boeing Company for working with all of us as we try to make sure we've done the right thing for the safety of our airlines.

Mr. Queen?

QUEEN: Thank you, Madam Chairman Murray and Chairman Rogers.

As you said, I'm Hank Queen. I'm vice president of engineering of product integrity for Boeing commercial airplanes. I'm responsible for the design, certification, product development and continued operational safety for all Boeing commercial airplanes.

I'd like to start by offering on the behalf of the entire Boeing Company, our condolences to the friends and families of the victims of the terrible events of September 11.

QUEEN: We build a little bit of ourselves into one of those airplanes and it was truly horrifying to us to see our airplanes used as weapons of destruction.

The Boeing Company supports the measures already taken to strengthen the security of the aviation system and we agree that the aviation system security is paramount and must be taken to a higher level.

Boeing is pledging total cooperation and support to this effort. On September 12, Boeing began working with the airlines, the government airline associations, pilot associations and flight attendant associations on immediate and longer-term actions to address this new threat. We must take a systematic approach to aviation security.

The first line of defense is airport security. The crew and the airplane should be the last line of defense.

I am here today specifically to address improved aircraft security. As we consider our options for achieving that goal, we must ensure that we do not jeopardize safety in other unintended ways.

As you know, every part of the airplane is subject to federal aviation regulations established to ensure airplane safety. These regulations require a delicate balance of multiple safety objectives.

For example, cockpit doors must be lockable but not inhibit emergency evacuations. Also, the structure of the flight deck must be able to withstand pressure differences in the event of a rapid decompression. That's why cockpit doors are designed with vents that open or the entire door opens whenever there is a significant pressure difference between the cockpit and the cabin.

There have been over 600 decompressions in commercial jet transportation history. Half of these were severe enough to cause the oxygen masks to deploy. Approximately 50 of these rapid decompressions could have stressed the structure. In fact, two of these led to accidents that resulted in new requirements and changes in the commercial airplane fleet. So, solutions to enhance the integrity of the flight deck door must allow for rapid decompression.

There is another important consideration, as we look at changes. There are more than 7,000 commercial jet airplanes registered in the United States, with over 40 different flight deck door designs. We need to keep these numbers in mind as we consider any design changes to improve aircraft security.

Finding solutions that can be implemented quickly, with a large number of airplanes is essential. We face many challenges, however, we have a dedicated team working to meet these challenges. They are coordinated with the government airline manufacturing efforts since September 11, 2001, and we include in this effort examining such possible changes as crew procedural changes to restrict access to flight decks; using all the resources in the cabin to overpower highjackers and potential maneuvering of the aircraft.

Also, a near-term design and hardware changes to further inhibit entry into the flight deck, longer-term solutions such as a secure and hardened flight deck to deny access to highjackers and technology to prevent the use of the airplanes as a weapon.

We're also working with NASA and the FAA on other technologies such as bomb protection and advanced ballistic materials.

So, in summary, we do recognize a need for immediate improvements in aviation security. We are actively working with the airlines and the FAA, pilot associations, flight attendant associations and others to rapidly develop solutions in response to the acts of September 11.

Thank you.

MURRAY: Thank you, Mr. Queen.

We will now move to the question portion of this hearing. There are a number of colleagues here who have questions to ask, so we're going to restrict the hearing to the five-minute time.

I will open with the questions, turn to Mr. Rogers and then go back and forth from side to side as we move to all of our committee members. I would like to remind all of our colleagues that at 4:30, we will go into a closed hearing session, so we have a lot of people to get through in a short amount of time and I would ask our witnesses to keep their answers as short as -- giving us the information we need as quickly as possible.

Mr. Mead, let me begin with you. You stated in your remarks that we have arrested 12 non-U.S. citizens since last Friday with illegally obtained security badges that would allow them access to the secure sections of the airport.

Can you tell us if all airport personnel have been revalidated and granted new badges since September 11?

MEAD: No, I do not believe so.

MURRAY: So, is it likely that we still have some individuals with bogus credentials?

MEAD: Yes.

MURRAY: Ms. Garvey, can you respond and tell us what we are doing about that?

GARVEY: Madam Chair, actually we have directed all the airlines and the airports to revalidate the badges. There is more perhaps we could add in the closed session. So that process -- they were directed to do that, I believe, yesterday or the day before yesterday. That's both for airports and the airlines.

MURRAY: So, that process is in place?

GARVEY: It's underway.

MURRAY: Mr. Secretary, the Department of Transportation has received numerous recommendations to close the loopholes in our security system. The inspector general, GAO, NTFC, Pan Am 103 Commission, Gore Commission, many, many commissions. The FAA's record for moving out on these recommendations has been painfully slow.

Can you tell us what some of the principle causes for these delays are and what measures you have put in place to make sure that these specific delays do not repeat themselves now at this critical juncture?

MINETA: Madam Chairman, let me speak to the time since I've been secretary of transportation, 25 January.

One of the problems that I found when I got here to the department was the prolonged time that it does take to get rules and regulations out. That now has changed. We are getting the rules and regulations out on a timely basis.

Last year Senator Hutchison had a bill on airport -- improving security. We got those rules out this year and those were pending at OMB. This is the one that gave the FAA more authority to increase the level of training requirements, the kinds of standards as related to the screeners.

And so, I was at OMB when September 11 occurred and so, OMB is holding it up right now pending any improvements we may want to add to that rule. But in terms of my stewardship, I'm going to make sure, as I have since the January 25, that rules and regulations are promulgated on a timely basis.

MURRAY: Ms. Garvey, you put out a number of emergency procedures since September 11 regarding security of this system. Should we expect further system directives in the very near term?

GARVEY: Madam Chair, you will be seeing more. Every day we're really in constant communication, both with the airports and with the airlines. Some of that is for further clarification and some of the emergency rules the secretary mentioned -- we're doing that.

As the secretary mentioned that we are also, as a result of the rapid response teams, expecting some additional recommendations, so there will be more to come. I think we will, in some cases, be seeing a very fundamental change.

MURRAY: In the next several days?

GARVEY: Well, actually, in the next several days there may be additional rules -- amendments, rather, -- based on what we're hearing from the airlines. I talked with some of the airline officials today and they were focusing more on clarification in a couple of areas. So, almost on a daily basis we're putting out some clarification where need be.

And if I could also make one very quick mention. You are right. We take too long in government to get rules out. The public process sometimes in responding to some of the comments, I think as the certification as one of them, are sometimes overwhelming. We should make no excuses there. We should simply do better.

I will say, with the Gore Commission, we have 31 recommendations and 26 actually have actually been implemented. We have six, including the two rules that you (inaudible) that you spoke about, rather, that are pending and ready to go. One thorny negotiation with the Post Office that I see coming to rapid conclusion, in part, as a result of this terrible tragedy.

MURRAY: So, I can assume that your agency is moving forward quickly to enact as many of these as possible?

GARVEY: Certainly, yes, you can, Madam Chair.

MURRAY: Mr. Mead and Dr. Dillingham, let me ask you this question. As you know, there have been many reports that have criticized the airlines for failing to do adequate screening at security checkpoints. Your investigators, you testified, have brought weapons and bomb-like devices on aircraft with relative ease and unauthorized personnel have been in secure places around the aircraft just as easily.

To your knowledge, has the FAA ever used its authority to shut down a concourse temporarily when it finds its screeners are not doing an adequate job?

MEAD: I can't speak to that in open session.

MURRAY: Well, let me ask you if you think the fines that the FAA has imposed on airlines in the past are adequate.

MEAD: In some cases, yes, in come cases no. I see a lot of variance among FAA regions. It's not consistent across the board. I think they could do a lot more in the enforcement end of things.

MURRAY: Do you think increasing fines would mean increasing responsibility of the airlines to do the right thing?

MEAD: In my opinion, Senator Murray, it would help, but I think the issue needs to be tacked to the front door. And I think the front door is making sure we that we have screeners of higher caliber that are better motivated and have some type of career path.

MURRAY: Dr. Dillingham?

DILLINGHAM: If fines are increased, the agency will have to stick with the fines. You can't have a fine where you pay 50 cents on the dollar or 25 cents on the dollar if you hold up long enough.

MURRAY: Mr. Secretary, let me just end with you. Can you show us how the FAA's enforcement posture has changed regarding the screening and access violations since September 11?

MINETA: Since the 11th? Well, it has increased appreciably. After we increased the requirements being placed on airports and airlines, at each of the airports -- well, not at each of the airports, but there are FSMs, federal security managers -- and those FSMs are responsible for making sure that the airports that are under their jurisdiction were adhering to the new increased stringent requirements.

And so, before any of the airports could be cleared to be added back on to the list to be able to have planes go in and out, the FSM had to sign off that the airport was now meeting those stringent requirements. A lot of those are visible, the stringent requirements, some of them are not.

MURRAY: Your agency has authorized the FAA to take enforcement activity on these?

MINETA: Take enforcement action?

MURRAY: Take enforcement on these since the 11th, on violations, fines, shutting down airlines...

MINETA: I'll have to ask Administrator Garvey if there have been any airports since Tuesday the 11th that have been fined or whatever.

GARVEY: We have asked our security managers and by the way, also the airport directors, I spoke with 31 of the top airport directors on Monday, asked them to pull together their security companies and their airport station management -- their airline station managers, to talk directly with them and making sure everybody understands what the regulations are, what the changes are, what needs to be done, report back to their security managers if they were having any difficulties.

We've asked our security managers to redouble their efforts in those areas. They've got a lot to keep up with, but they are circling back and getting to us. Whether or not there's been any specific or additional fines since the 11th, I'd have to get back to you on that. I don't know of any now. I know they've been given a strong direction to be as aggressive as they need to be.

MURRAY: And they understand those will be enforced?

GARVEY: Yes, yes they do.

MINETA: One of the -- if I might -- one of the questions I asked Administrator Garvey last week -- since these are contracts between the security company and the airline at any given airport, I asked, "Can we as the DOT/FAA go in and abrogate those contracts and pull them off the property"?

MURRAY: Can we?

MINETA: We're in the middle of still looking at that. It's very difficult for us to go in and do that since it's an airline security company contract. But if they're not meeting standards...

MURRAY: But it is my understanding that you can shut an airport or an airline down if they don't meet the enforcement standards that you put out, correct?

Thank you. I will move to Mr. Rogers.

ROGERS: Well, following up on the same point, and that is, security of the personnel, of the passengers and the baggage that's allowed on an airplane, the airlines have the obligation, do they not, to check passengers and baggage that come on their plane. Is that not correct?

MINETA: That's correct.

ROGERS: And so, they've contracted at various airports, the airlines have, with security companies to perform that chore for them, correct? Is that not a low bid contract?

MINETA: Generally they are.

ROGERS: And so the security company is interested, and the airlines, assumably, in getting the job done as cheaply as they can, correct?

MINETA: There are certain standards that are required, even if it is low bid.

ROGERS: But those standards have not been enforced, have they?

If fact, we've been waiting now for three years or more, the Congress, for the FAA to issue a final rule on the performance of screeners. Is that not correct, Madam Director?

GARVEY: Mr. Chairman, that is the rule that the secretary was referring to that is ready to go, but we are looking at again to make sure that in light of what we experienced last Tuesday, do we want to make any additional changes.

But it is ready to go, and you're right. That is something that has been required.

ROGERS: Let me ask Mr. Mead. Have you checked at Dulles Airport, for example, on the qualifications of the employees of the -- is in Argenbright Company that has the security contract?

MEAD: Yes. I think you may be referring to the -- the Dulles Airport work is ongoing. And Philadelphia Airport clearly had a problem...

ROGERS: I want to ask you about Dulles. Did you check on the employees of the screening operation at Dulles Airport?

MEAD: Yes, we are checking on the citizens...

ROGERS: Tell us the makeup of the staff there in terms of their citizenship in the U.S., for example.

MEAD: Yes, a substantial percentage of them are not U.S. citizens.

ROGERS: What percent?

MEAD: I think it's about 80 percent. It may be somewhat more.

ROGERS: Eighty percent of the people checking for terrorists at Dulles Airport are not American citizens?

MEAD: I believe that's so, sir.

ROGERS: Is that one of the airports where one of these planes originated the other day?

MEAD: Yes.

ROGERS: Have you checked Logan in Boston in the same fashion?

MEAD: No.

ROGERS: Or Newark?

MEAD: No.

ROGERS: What about whether or not those employees have been checked for a criminal record?

MEAD: New employees under a law that was passed recently have to undergo a criminal background check. That does not apply to existing employees.

In my statement, sir, I recommended that it should apply to all employees.

ROGERS: Well, the company that does -- that has been employed by the airlines at Dulles, what is the name of the company there at Dulles?

MEAD: Argenbright.

ROGERS: Do they also have the Philadelphia contract as well?

MEAD: Yes, sir.

ROGERS: Have you noticed any unusual things happening under that contract at Philadelphia?

MEAD: In Philadelphia less than a year ago, because of falsification of training methods and problems of background checks, there was a criminal plea to a $1 million fine.

ROGERS: A criminal plea by who?

MEAD: By Argenbright.

ROGERS: In criminal court?

MEAD: Yes, sir.

ROGERS: Have they paid the fine?

MEAD: I don't know if they've paid the fine.

ROGERS: Do they still the contract at Philadelphia?

MEAD: Yes, they do.

ROGERS: And at Dulles?

MEAD: Yes, sir.

ROGERS: And other airports?

MEAD: Yes.

ROGERS: Where?

MEAD: 46 other airports.

ROGERS: Let me get this straight. One company is checking for terrorists at 46 of our nation's airports and the company itself is in violation of America's criminal laws.

MEAD: That was true at least in Philadelphia.

ROGERS: At one of the other airports that you are very familiar with, Dulles, 80 percent of their employees screening for terrorists are not even citizens of the United States of America.

MEAD: No, sir. Currently -- I am not sure this particular security company should be singled out there, because there is no requirement in the program currently that they be U.S. citizens.

ROGERS: Has this company been in trouble at any of the other airports that they work in?

MEAD: I can't speak to that, sir. I'd have to get back to you on the record.

ROGERS: What about the turnover rate, Mr. Dillingham? I've been reading the GAO's report on aviation security, issued June 2000. I think you are the principle author, are you not?

DILLINGHAM: Yes, sir.

ROGERS: Tell us about the type of personnel that screening companies are hiring around the country at the airports to screen for terrorists?

DILLINGHAM: Let me go back just a little bit to the point you raised before.

Screeners don't have to be U.S. citizens. They can have a resident alien card as well. The other point you raised with regard to Argenbright -- Argenbright is also a foreign-owned company as well.

With regard to the types of personnel that are being hired -- one of the requirements is that you have a high school diploma or a GED. We have not checked the records of individual companies, but in the course of doing our work, we clearly got the idea that this was not a job where you would find the most skilled workers.

ROGERS: They are minimum wage jobs, are they not?

DILLINGHAM: Yes, sir.

ROGERS: And the turnover rate is exorbitantly high, is it not?

DILLINGHAM: Yes, sir.

ROGERS: In one airport, the turnover rate is 400 percent a year, correct?

DILLINGHAM: Yes, sir.

ROGERS: In Atlanta it is 375 percent a year, at Baltimore- Washington 155, Boston-Logan 207, Chicago-O'Hare 200 and Houston 237 percent a year, at St. Louis, 416 percent a year. Is that correct?

DILLINGHAM: Yes, sir.

ROGERS: So, these are untrained, inexperienced, the lowest paid personnel, many of them certainly non-citizens, by a company that got the contract by the lowest bid.

DILLINGHAM: Yes, sir.

ROGERS: Now what's wrong with this picture?

DILLINGHAM: I think the picture is clear to everyone. There are a couple of things that even make this a little more problematic. It's not only the high turnover rate means the people who are doing the baggage checking have very little experience, but it's also the case that you're there long enough to learn the techniques of baggage screening and going through screening points.

So, you have a huge number of people out there who know parts of how aviation security works. And that's probably as important as the lack of experience on the screening (inaudible).

ROGERS: Let me ask anyone that may know and Madam Chairman, thank you for the time.

We had 19 highjackers get through the system the other day. None of them were stopped. I assume that all 19 of those names, or at least a goodly portion of them, were on a watch list, were they not?

GARVEY: Mr. Chairman, they were not on a list that was provided to the aviation community. Perhaps we can say more in closed session.

Could I just add one note to what Mr. Mead said about the Dulles situation?

Mr. Mead has been very forthcoming with us at the FAA about his investigation, has reported to us as recently as a few days ago about the status of it and we are working very closely with him. Although these are contracts, obviously, nationwide these are contracts with airlines; we're working closely with him to look at what options are available, so we know this is a real issue.

ROGERS: Well, this system, not the curbside baggage curbing, not checking on checked baggage, none of those things were relevant, not the proximate cause of Tuesday -- the proximate cause. The real cause was these people got through our screening system at three of our nation's airports.

So, we know where we need to do the work, do we not, Mr. Secretary?

MINETA: Mr. Chairman, the only problem is that even though they did get through the screening system, the question is, what is it that would have triggered them to be stopped. They were carrying either plastic-type knives. They had box openers, which are this long with a sharp hook -- razor sharp. But under the 4-H (ph) requirement at the time, it would have not been picked up as being an illegal carry-on.

ROGERS: Well, we've got a thing called CAPS.

MINETA: But as Administrator Garvey says, the -- and I'm not sure at this point as to whether or not those names were part of the CAPA.

They were held by the immigration. They knew. They had them on the immigration watch list. But again, there's no requirement that immigration submit that to DOT or to FAA to pass it along to the airlines to be part of the CAPS.

ROGERS: It seems to me that if you're on a terrorist watch list, one of the places that it may ought to go quickly is the FAA to go into the computer system profile system.

MINETA: Well, Mr. Chairman, that's something we can discuss more fully in a closed session.

ROGERS: Thank you.

MURRAY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Byrd?

BYRD: Madam Chairman.

I think that the line of questioning by Mr. Rogers is one that ought to be pursued, perhaps quite extensively in closed session.

This goes to the weakness of the five-minute limitation on questions.

Let me shift to another area and I'll try to be brief. I have to leave soon.

What steps, in view of the likelihood, Mr. Mineta, that in the future terrorists will turn their attention to still other untried mechanisms to disrupt our way of life, either on the water or on the railways. What steps have you been able to take to minimize the risk of terrorism in all modes of transportation: railroads, bridges and so on, since September 11.

MINETA: Well, first of all, right from September 11 when we activated the crisis management center, with all of the DOT modes, they notified all of the companies or facilities within those jurisdictions, whether they be ports, pipelines, truck companies, railroads, et cetera, were all notified in terms of taking increased security measures.

Pipeline companies employed helicopters to check their pipelines. Railroads, whether they be at the station or at their -- whether it's a freight rail or Amtrak, they increased their security measures and that's something I ask that each of our modes every day as to what is going on.

When someone says, "Well, I talked to the railroads or talked to whomever", to me, that's not satisfactory. What I want to know is what are they doing and once they institute those measures, are we monitoring them to make sure that they are, in fact, doing what they told us.

So, we are trying to be as comprehensive and inclusive as possible, in order to make sure that at least the -- the problem, I suppose, partially, is and I get a briefing every morning at 8:30 or 8:00 from the intelligence agencies, as does Administrator Garvey.

MINETA: I asked on Wednesday, the 12th of September, whether or not all these things we've been told and read about, whether or not there's a matrix that we could build with all that information we knew, since I've been there on January 25, to even come near indicating that an airplane would be used as a lethal weapon, where the targets might be, what kinds of things that might occur.

BYRD: Excuse me, if I may interrupt.

MINETA: Yes, sir.

BYRD: In other words, you are saying to me, I hope, that while everyone is focused, quite properly, on the new threat of highjacked aircrafts being used as weapons, I hope you're assuring me that you're also focusing on the containment of other threats, other vulnerabilities in our transportation system, such as railroads, bridges and so on.

MINETA: Absolutely. That was why I said in the statement our responsibility is to be equally concerned about other modes of transportation. We are focusing not just on aviation, but on the security aspects of all modes of transportation.

BYRD: Good, good. I'm pleased to have that assurance.

I have one other question. I introduced it in my opening remarks. I happen to believe that the airlines should not be allowed to take billions of dollars in relief from the general treasury and simultaneously reduce or eliminate air service to taxpayers in small cities and rural communities.

Now, this sounds very critical of the airlines. I guess you can understand why I seem to be a little bitter in the light of the history which I've also already mentioned, that is to the treatment that small communities have had in rural areas of this country beginning with the deregulation of the airlines, a concern which I feel very badly with respect to my own vote.

But let me ask you specifically: how does your statutory proposal address the issue of maintaining air service to our small cities, our towns and rural communities during this industry downturn?

MINETA: In the package that is being discussed right now, there's no further enhancement of the essential air service program. It stands as it is right now at $50 million a year and hopefully there would be some discussion about the possibility of increasing that amount, but right now it is $50 million for the essential air service program as we know it right now.

BYRD: Mr. Mineta, I just hope that we'll get more attention than that to our rural areas in this country.

MINETA: Yes. You and I, sir, have had many conversations about this, so to the extent that it has been a budgetary limitation, it's been kept at $50 million.

BYRD: Well, you and I really haven't had many conversations along this line. Perhaps the fault is mine. But we're looking ahead now and I hope that we will focus our attention, conservatively at least, on the plight of these small areas, these communities, these small towns in the rural areas of this country, as we quite properly consider helping the airlines, bailing out the airlines, which in times past and in considerable measure, have turned their backs on the rural areas in this country.

Madam Chairman, I want to thank you. I want to thank all other members and I beg their pardon for having to leave without hearing their questions. I have to go and meet with Senator Stevens and Mr. Young and Mr. Obey concerning an appropriation bill.

Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Mineta.

MINETA: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN: Mr. Sabo.

We wish Senator Byrd well in his meeting.

SABO: Before I start, I would like to yield 30 seconds to our colleague Frank Wolf who has to get back to the floor quickly.

WOLF: I thank you; Mr. Sabo and I thank both the chairmen. Very, very quickly, with the airlines in trouble financially, they're not going to move ahead aggressively. Secondly, we need a federalized inspection service immediately including it has to deal with the baggage and doing background checks. We can't do background checks on people who have only been a here for a year, because you can't go back over to the country to find out.

Thirdly, it ought to be in the Department of Justice, with the law enforcement agency, so the FAA is not conflicted with promoting aviation. It should be in law enforcement.

Also, we should secure the cockpit. When we come back in private session, I'll raise some of the issues that you already know. We should have air marshals, but we have armed pilots in certain airlines. We have air marshals. We have pilots who are well trained, and these pilots, particularly got up and left the seats, I believe the pilots ought to be given weapons as in some other airlines, whereby they can be, in essence, an air marshal.

Had the pilots; in this case had weapons, this three would not have happened.

With that, I'll yield back the balance of my time and thank you. But we ought to federalize this. There is no contracting out. There is nothing any private sector or non-profit can do. We don't contract out the FBI; we don't contract out the custom service. We ought not contract out this.

I thank the gentlemen.

SABO: Let me indicate -- I really think this issue of how we deal with the cockpit is absolutely crucial. As everything we discover, all issues are more complicated than one thinks. But that clearly would have dealt with the heart of the problem of September 11. I think also fundamentally deals with the problem of other highjacking. If the highjackers know they aren't going to get control of the plane, there isn't much reason for doing it.

But let me ask a question on a different subject. I understand that the administration is sending up their request on the airline package, which includes $5 billion. I'm curious as to the source. I assume it does not come from the $40 billion. Is it an emergency supplemental that's being requested? What form is it taking?

MINETA: I'll tell you. Let me ask our deputy secretary, Michael Jackson (ph), to come up because he just returned from a meeting with the House and Senate leadership, I believe it was -- or at least the House leadership, on discussions relating to the package that is being considered for submission to Congress.

SABO: As I understand it, you're allocating $3 billion from the $40 billion for some of the enhanced security measures.

MINETA: The $3 billion, I believe it comes from the original $20 billion and I'll have to see where they came out in this meeting today.

JACKSON (ph): Congressman, we're proposing that the additional $5 billion would be a new emergency appropriation.

SABO: OK. It is not something that is coming out of this committee's jurisdiction.

JACKSON (ph): It will have to have an appropriation and so, the House and Senate will have to deal with that issue as an appropriation, I'm understanding.

SABO: Mr. Chairman, I'll yield and let you move on to other committee members.

MURRAY: Thank you very much.

Senator Kolh?

KOHL: Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Earlier this week, a number of my staff discovered some disturbing facts regarding the chartering of aircraft we're talking about private jets. We called several companies that charter these jets of all sizes and tried to determine how difficult it would be to rent a jet. And I don't want to get into the details of what she discovered, but let me just summarize by telling you that one representative actually said to this person on my staff and I quote, "Renting one of our jets is not that different from renting an automobile," that the procedures are not entirely dissimilar.

And so, I'd like to get into this whole question of private aircraft and how people secure them, how they get a hold of them, what kind of security we have with respect to private aircraft. I can tell you in my own experience, I use private aircraft from time to time. And I've never had any security, whatever, in connection with the boarding of an aircraft, myself and the people with whom I travel, my friends.

When you (inaudible) after you've secured an aircraft, if you are renting it and the pilots, you simply walk into the place and they say, "Are you Mr. Kohl", and I say, "Yes, I am" and off we go. And everything else is come as come be.

Now, there is no, from my experience and from what I've been able to learn in the last week, there is literally no security with respect to private aircraft in this country.

I'd like you to please comment on that, not with respect so much to what has been, but respect to what is going to be, because the citizens of America need to be protected from all the things that could happen as a result of a private aircraft being highjacked as it is from commercial aircraft.

Isn't that true, Secretary Mineta?

MINETA: Let me have Administrator Garvey address that issue.

GARVEY: Senator, I will take your cue and focus on the going forward. You are right that aircraft with 30 seats or less do not have to meet the same security requirements. Public charters, who have individual passengers pay for their individual seats, do have to go through the same security requirements.

Aircraft with 30 or less have not, to date -- this is going to change in November of this year. This is an issue we felt was an issue even before this incident occurred and had been developing a change -- a regulation change, which is to go into effect as of November of this year. With the new requirements, private charters will be treated the same as public charters, but that is with private charters of 30 or less.

I think what we need to do in the next few days is see if we can move that November date up even sooner and we are doing that.

One note, though, of really a compliment to the general aviation airports and to the fix (ph) bay operators who operate on larger aircrafts, they are, of their own, really stepping out and putting in place some additional security measures, using, in many cases, a number of the local police force.

But again, November of this year was the original date for the change. We'll see about moving it up.

KOHL: So you do recognize the danger inherent in that whole private aircraft business?

GARVEY: Yes, sir. And the new requirement will treat them in the same way with the same security requirements.

KOHL: I'll be looking forward to seeing that and you're saying, hopefully even sooner than November.

GARVEY: That's correct, Senator.

KOHL: I thank you.

Thank you very much.

I thank you, Madam Chairman.

CHAIRMAN: Mr. Olver?

OLVER: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I'm going to attempt something I've never done before, which is to try and get three questions in in my five minutes.

I have a very short follow up, to the question really posed by Senator Byrd here a little bit earlier.

Many of the airlines have announced 20, 25 percent reduction in the total flights that they expect to be carried out in the near future.

So, is anybody from the secretary or the administrator or the IG's office, is anybody watching whether the flight reduction is coming disproportionally from any sector of the country or from large communities or small communities. Is there any pattern beginning to emerge from that and if there isn't, if it hasn't been looked at, shouldn't we be looking at it somewhere in your area?

MINETA: Our office has not. It's something that I will take a look at.

MEAD: I think it should be looked at. I think it's probably a little early to say exactly what the patterns are going to be. But I agree wholeheartedly that it is something that needs to be watched.

We'll do that.

OLVER: OK. I think I'm getting agreement that it should be looked at and I trust that you will look at it rather carefully as it develops.

I want to follow up on what Mr. Wolf, my colleague from the House said, earlier on two issues -- cockpit security that was number one.

OLVER: Mr. Queen, you had mentioned that there something like 7,000 planes and 40 designs and I wondered, do you know either national airline companies from other countries that have a system of restricted access all the way to, well, I think this goes through a process of hardening, perhaps all the way to an access, which is totally outside the access from the passenger cabin, a separate access for the flight deck.

Is that true that there are companies, national companies or other than our companies that do that sort of thing?

QUEEN: I'll tell you what I know and I don't know.

I do know there are some customers, that after delivery, have done what they call "door hardening", for example...

OLVER: The customer has done it?

QUEEN: Airlines, yes, after delivery from Boeing and I know that we, Boeing, on one's customer's airplanes, two different model types in the late '80s, added Kevlar to their doors on their cockpits.

OLVER: Is there any kind of a report that would summarize the kind of hardening mechanisms that are in place by airlines, different airlines or different nations?

QUEEN: I personally don't know. I think we have an opportunity in a working group that we have together to gather that kind of information. To be honest, most airlines are a little reluctant to share that, because they don't want to share the details of what they've done to enhance their security, but I can certainly ask the question.

OLVER: It's obvious that they would be reluctant, but I would be very interested in seeing what we can know about that kind of thing from, again, whoever would know it.

QUEEN: We'll try to find out.

OLVER: And then my third one -- I'm getting close to doing this -- has to do with Mr. Mead and Mr. Dillingham.

Mr. Mead, you had -- each of you have used some cases of the breakdown of the security system, some of them looking fairly egregious and some of them looking like just a pattern of here and there, a randomized pattern, almost.

Mr. Mead, you had said, "It is time." I think those were very close to your words for federal responsibility for security, the whole of that security system.

Mr. Dillingham said, "It might be time to give back this responsibility". It seems that the case is fairly strong. That's Mr. Wolf's other zeroed in point.

I'm curious if the secretary and the administrator would give us their estimate of how close we are to time to do this kind of overall security and responsibility directly under a federal agency.

GARVEY: The rapid response team, of course, that the secretary mentioned, will be coming to the secretary very soon with a response. I can tell you the principles going in is that we absolutely need a fundamental change in the way we approach screening.

The second principle going in is that we absolutely need to have a much stronger federal presence. And I think some of the questions that Chairman Wolf pointed to, for example, should it be in Treasury, you know, as Mr. Mead said -- we were talking about this issue this morning and he said, "The devil is sometimes in the details," and so, we're very, very close to coming to the secretary with this options very much fleshed out.

But the fundamental principle about it: it must change, it must change. We need to have a much stronger presence, whether that assumes a true federalization is, I think, the issue we're focused on now.

OLVER: Any other comments, Mr. Secretary?

MINETA: I guess what we're trying to do throughout the system as we see these shortcomings is to try to plug, so to speak, the loophole, because there's no question that life is vastly different for all of us, whether you're a passenger or an airline operator in terms of the requirements. We're going to be looking at -- we are looking at all of these requirements.

OLVER: How long would it take to get a thoughtful response to that question of whether we need to do that nationalization?

MINETA: We hope to be able to do that very quickly and it may be -- part of the solution may be in the funding that's available through the emergency supplemental bill.

MURRAY: I would remind all of us that we do want to go into a closed hearing in a half hour, so if we could keep our questions and answers short.

MEAD: I just wanted to say if (inaudible) federalization and nationalization and I think it's a term that is not self-defining and as Ms. Garvey said, I think the devil is in the details on exactly what we mean by that.

MURRAY: Thank you.

Senator Specter?

SPECTER: Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Let me thank you and Chairman Rogers for suggesting this joint hearing. I think it's been a very good hearing, and also interesting to work with our House colleagues to see the interaction, something we perhaps ought to do more often.

Mr. Secretary, just in the few minutes I have, I'm going to direct my questions to you and at the outset, let me say that it's reassuring to have you in this tough position in these tough times with your legislative background and your capabilities in this arena.

I think that Congressman Rogers has been very effective in his examination in pointing out some major deficiencies, which really need very prompt correction. It's very distressing to hear Inspector General Mead comment about the criminal conviction and the payment of a large fine for a company which is handling security clearance in many places, and then to hear that they oughtn't to be singled out, that there may be similar problems other places.

I quite agree with Dr. Dillingham that it's fine to have resident aliens with green cards in key positions, but I do believe that it merits some inquiry to be sure that they are not part of some plan with some foreign conspirators. There's no inference that that is so, but it requires a look.

And would you, Mr. Secretary, say that there's no causative factor established because some of the evidence is box cutters and knives. Of course, we do not know as we sit here, probably will never know what happened on all the planes, whether others had guns or what they had.

I think it is becoming very obvious that the existing checks at airports need to be corrected immediately. We've seen the very serious deficiency in the law enforcement officials and immigration not notifying the FAA as to what has happened. So, there's a good blueprint, which is emerging fairly rapidly in a fairly brief hearing.

Mr. Secretary, the questions that I want to cover with you in the couple of minutes that I have relate to the response on the airlines. It seems to me that there is a solid legal basis at least for consideration on losses, which are directly attributable to the terrorist acts, being born with the country, as opposed by any specific business entity or individual.

This is really an attack on the country and we are at war. And when we try to figure out what is fair and just, some consideration ought to be given to how we're going to bear these costs, whether they aren't national costs, as a cost of war.

I had asked you informally, before the hearing started, that's where people might be interested to know we transact most of our business, as opposed to a formal question and answer session, which may be somewhat guided or inhibited by the television cameras.

But the constituent U.S. Air is only symbolic of the entire airline industry as to what is happening and the $5 billion in cash has to be supplemented by the stopgap loan guarantees of $12.5 billion behind it. Speed is really the essence of what we have to accomplish.

The Congress, to its credit, which is somewhat unusual, responded very promptly last week with $40 billion as the president requested in another resolution for the use of force. It's my hope that we will move promptly with a package, which will stop the hemorrhaging now.

Last week, had there been $2.5 billion advanced, it is entirely possibly that might have foreclosed the matter for a larger advance. So, I would hope that you would weigh in from your authoritative position to couple the $5 billion with the backup of a $12 billion loan guarantee.

MINETA: Senator Specter, let me -- since those negotiations were going on while I was here and I sent Deputy Secretary Jackson (ph) to those meetings that went on between the White House and the House leadership. I believe he can bring us up to date on what is going to happen on that issue specifically of loan guarantees.

SPECTER: Thank you.

JACKSON (ph): Senator, the administration has reached a position where we would be supportive of a package of additional supplemental aid for the near term and believe that is an important component of the stabilization of the airlines.

So, we're supporting money for safety, as the secretary described in his opening remarks, and money for the $5 billion initial recapitalization and cash infusion, some prospective and retroactive insurance liability, more insurance, terrorism insurance provisions and a few other items that are being discussed this afternoon.

So, on the longer-term financial mechanisms, we are supporting some measure there.

SPECTER: And the $12.5 billion back-up line of credit?

MINETA (ph): Senator, I think the amount is something that is still in flux. I think the subject matter you're interested in is part of the package. As to much it is specifically is still open.

JACKSON (ph): And how that would be structured.

MINETA: And how it would be structured and as to whether...

SPECTER: Madam Chairman, I have one further aspect.

MURRAY: Very quickly. You're two minutes over your time.

SPECTER: Mr. Secretary, with respect to National Reagan Airport, very important for the nation, especially for U.S. Airways, the biggest occupant there, it's very close to the Capitol, about 90 seconds, but it's comparable to Dulles, which is two and a half minutes.

I know it's a security issue, but could you give us some idea as to what may happen at Reagan National Airport with respect to reopening?

MINETA: Senator, you have hit it on the head. It is a security issue. We are working with the National Security Council, and more specifically, with the United States Secret Service on this issue in trying to fashion some way to get Reagan National Airport back on line.

The desire is to have takeoffs to the south and arrivals from the south and nothing going north or approaching from the north. But, you know, that can't be done all the time, because the laws of nature and the physics of aircraft lift require a different set of wind conditions and they don't always exist in terms of a southerly approach or a southerly take off.

But in any event, I suggested maybe putting a sky marshal on every flight that departs National or comes into National. Well, that's a whole slug of flights in terms of the number of air marshals that we will have.

In any event, every day we're talking to the National Security Council/U.S. Secret Service about coming up with alternatives as to what we might be able to do to get Reagan open and up again, recognizing that there is a major airline that is on the precipice.

SPECTER: Thank you.

MURRAY: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN: Mr. Pastor?

PASTOR: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank the leadership for this subcommittee for holding this joint hearing. I also want to express my condolences and heartfelt sympathy to the pilots, attendants and passengers who perished in this tragic attack.

Hopefully from this hearing, we will secure the airline industry, but also secure the entire transportation industry.

One of the things -- these hard times, we look for culprits, but I have to tell you that a person's status, legal immigrant, does not translate into loyalty. I know that we have to do background checks, I know we have to secure -- but being here legally, but not being a citizen does not translate to loyalty.

PASTOR: I just have to remind my friends what happened in Oklahoma. Those were U.S. citizens, and so we just need to be careful in how we translate loyalty to status.

I know you're undergoing investigations and with the evidence you have of how the terrorist got onto the planes and what they carried, what security measure right now in place do you think would avoid it happening again?

MINETA: Next question. I don't have a good answer for that one.

PASTOR: Well, let me give a suggestion. This last weekend I traveled back to Phoenix and back to D.C. And I still see people carrying as many bags as they want...

MINETA: We haven't done anything on the limits that we have. We were just talking earlier about limiting it to one bag per person, including purses for women. That's not in effect yet.

PASTOR: I understand that.

MINETA: The question is: should we be doing things like this?

PASTOR: Oh, I saw in Dulles Saturday where people had their carry-on bags and the impatience of many of the passengers, the pressure put on the people looking through the bags. I have to tell you that even though they're untrained and they're trying to beef up security, I'm sure there were some things that passed through those bags that we would not want to have carried on airplanes.

MINETA: I experienced the same thing when I went to BWI to watch what was happening there on Saturday, and the long lines and the whole function of wanding an individual was sort of a function of how long is the line. If it was a long line, nobody got wanded. And yet, we said specifically "random wanding of passengers coming through the security point". Rather than say, "give up wanding because you've got a long line", it still said, random wanding.

PASTOR: But then who would be selected randomly? Why not everybody, because there are certain people that obviously...

MINETA: But by the same token, I know that when the line got shorter, everybody got wanded.

PASTOR: Well, I would think possibly they might look at me and I might profile something that I shouldn't be carrying and I may be wanded, but someone who may not look like a terrorist might not be wanded. I think you need to wand everybody, even though it takes time.

I've got to tell, when I saw those bags, especially the people who carry the computers and all that other stuff, people try to look in those bags, but I have to tell you that I was unsecure as I went on through the whole security system.

I think you're going to have to look at the situation. People ought to be limited to carrying one bag that is small enough that can be monitored and be made secure and at least allow the person to carry an ID and maybe the plane ticket and a few things. I think that is going to stop probably 90 percent or more of the things you don't want to have on airplanes not to get on airplanes.

MINETA: IDs are required.

PASTOR: I understand that. What I am saying is the bag you carry should be small enough that it can be secured with a reasonable amount of time, but allow the things that you need to carry on to be carried on, your ID, your ticket and a few things, pocketbooks, you know, stuff like that.

But there are still things on the airline in first class. I saw the attendant opening a bottle of wine with a corkscrew -- one of those -- and it's longer than four inches. What are you going to do with the glass that's still being used because there are bottles that are given out? There's different ways people can still use what is being used today on the airlines to handicap an attendant or possibly create chaos on an airline.

Senator Byrd asked a question -- in Japan, they use the subways as a terrorist act. What are we doing to ensure that our subways, our trains are secure?

MINETA: Well, both Federal Railway Administration and the Federal Transit Administration have been having conversations with either APTA with AAR on specific things are going to be required of the railroads to increase their surveillance and security measures.

Part of it, I suppose, goes back to that earlier question that was raised by someone about the cost of this kind of surveillance, especially with public transit agencies. How do you do it with a transit agency that has, I don't know, let's say 57 buses or 1,300 buses. And how do they inspect those vehicles to make sure as they are going through, I don't know, the Holland Tunnel, that they don't have some unwanted baggage on it.

Those are being talked about right now and hopefully, today being Thursday that the early part of next week I hope to be getting a report back on some of the specifics that they will be looking at, incorporating in terms of their operation.

PASTOR: I thank the panel, Madam Chairman.

MURRAY: Senator Durbin?

DURBIN: Thank you, Madam Chairman and Chairman Rogers. Thank you for this hearing. I think this is appropriate and timely. I also want to thank Secretary Mineta and Administrator Garvey. You've got a tough job and you've done good work on that job and in fact, in many ways, your public service has saved lives, particularly in light of this national crisis.

But I'd like to focus, if I can, on an area of questioning which has already been addressed.

There has been a lot of attention since I returned to Washington on our airlines. I think it is appropriate and I hope that we move very quickly to respond.

It appears that the legislation moving forward is focusing on the solvency of the airlines, loans, grants, tax considerations, questions of liability. These are all very important and without the prompt attention of Congress and our action, I'm afraid that we'll face an even greater crisis in our airline industry.

This is the first hearing that I'm aware of that has focused on the security aspect of this. I would suggest to everyone here that the fact that yesterday, in the United States of America, airlines operated at 31 percent of their capacity. It has much more to do with security than it does with solvency.

I think people are reluctant to use our airports and our airlines, which brings me to my question, Secretary Mineta.

I don't think there is anything that has come forward in this hearing today which will make people feel safer about using our airports and our airlines. I'm sad to report that, because I want us to return to normal as quickly as possible.

But the questions that have been compounded and answered and the testimony that we have about the gross inadequacies of the screening systems in American airports have to give every member of this panel pause, let alone the flying public.

The suggestion that we have gone to the lowest bidder time and again, hired people who are not well trained, not as conscientious as they should be, who are not well supervised, who have often been found to fail in their attempts to stop people who would bring weapons on airplanes, has to be a matter of great concern to all of us.

My specific question to you, Mr. Secretary, is this -- on September 11, 2001, in a matter of moments, you made a decision, which saved lives. You brought down the planes across America, as you said, in less than two hours. Because of that decision, people are alive today that might have otherwise have been alive.

I would like to ask you this: are you prepared now, through the FAA, to make an order that at every screening station in every airport in America, there will be a uniformed law enforcement officer to supervise the activity of these screeners until Congress can respond with the administration and federalize this activity, with the appropriate people, to give us the sense of security we need.

MINETA: I know that at Baltimore, they're doing that. There is a police officer at the screening point overseeing that operation. That is what I saw Saturday. Now, whether or now we are considering doing that nationally, let me ask either Administrator Garvey or General Canavin (ph).

GARVEY: Senator, the major airports are doing just that. We contacted them immediately and said, "We'd like you to use your local state police, your local county police, metro police, whatever, and beef up the security checkpoints". So, I think, in many cases -- in fact, I was looking at some numbers the other day and they are dramatic.

The challenge for us is that many of the federal marshals that we want to use, we are using for the federal marshals on the aircraft, so in many ways we are relying on some of the local officials at the local level. But I do think at the larger airports they have done that.

We are going, in fact, this weekend we're going to be visiting some of the major airports to see if there are additional things we can do.

DURBIN: May it suggest that it seems imminently sensible, based on what we've heard today at this hearing, that we have an order coming from the FAA at every airport in America, that every screening team, every screening device, have a uniformed, law enforcement officer there.

I think it accomplishes two things: it reminds the employees of the seriousness of what they're doing, and it could certainly discourage some wrongdoers from trying anything.

Yesterday I went through Lambert Airport in St. Louis. There were five people at my screening station. Three were conscientiously doing what they were trained to do and two were involved in a kind of game playing and horseplay that high school teachers wouldn't tolerate. That is unacceptable. If this is truly our first line of defense, before we start talking about arming pilots and sky marshals, should we put a law enforcement official at every screening device in every airport?

GARVEY: One option, too, is to use the AIP funding. The secretary asked for a recommendation on that to use AIP funding so they can supplement those forces.

DURBIN: Thank you very much.

Thanks, Madam Chairman.

CHAIRMAN: Mr. Callahan?

CALLAHAN: I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll be brief, because I think it's important that we go into executive session as quickly as we can.

Obviously, we have some very chilling deficiencies in our system. I don't think this committee's role here is to lay a finger of blame on anyone, but rather to, as appropriators, is to find out what resources you need to correct the problems. We're not an authorizing committee and we are not committees that make rules and regulations, we are appropriators.

I think that we've shown a great willingness to the administrative branch of government, both with the financial problem facing the airline industry and with you all by telling you, "We have deficiencies, that you admit that, come to us and tell us what you need to correct the problems."

This business of just asking people if they packed their own bags is not working. In fact, it's asinine that we go through that, and the fact that we have these aliens that are scanning people that can't even speak English -- I'm not talking about the passengers, I'm talking about the aliens working there -- undereducated, unable to speak English, and not doing a proper job because they're undertrained and underpaid.

We are coming to you as our representatives in the administrative branch of government, telling you we have the money. We will provide it for you, provided you tell us what you want. And we need answers immediately. I think, Madam Chairman, the quicker we go into executive session so we can find out some of these problems, the more concerned we're going to be and the more willing we're going to be to work with you to correct the problems.

We need to do this, Mr. Secretary, immediately. We need to begin this process before we recess this year, which we're going to try to do before the end of October. We need to provide you with resources if indeed; you need them, or authorization, if you need any authorization.

So, I'm ready, willing and able to go into session to listen to the other horror stories that we don't want to make public and with good cause, but to tell you that our role in this play is of appropriators, that we provide resources. We're willing to do that. You justify what you need the money for.

MINETA: That's very reassuring, Congressman Callahan. Thank you very much.

MURRAY: Senator Bond?

BOND: Thank you very much, Madam Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, Administrator Garvey, first I join in saying thank you for the tremendous job that you've done. Really, you took heroic actions to minimize potential future danger. In the long and very difficult hours since then, you have been very responsive. I can only imagine the amount of burdens on your shoulders. Thank you for doing it.

Now, there are a number of things that I may or may not be able to touch on in this time, but I am interested in security issues and I happen to feel that somehow we need to have federal law enforcement officials doing the screening.

BOND: I advise that. At St. Louis Airport, the turnover in screeners is 416 percent per year. That kind of makes you wonder about how well qualified they could be if they're turning over that fast.

But I have been exploring and discussing on the floor a number of things we need to do to help the airline industry and I want to take this opportunity, since this is my only opportunity to get to you, Mr. Secretary, in a public forum, to ask your view on the liability issue, because we are preparing to put in probably $5 billion to the airlines, $3 billion to security.

It is my view that if we don't do something to limit the scope of liability to the carriers and provide backup so that everybody with a legitimate claim can be paid, that we will be dropping $5 billion down a rat hole.

I made this argument on the floor and it was countered by someone saying, "Well, don't worry about liability because any lawsuit is three to five years down the road.

It's my understanding, and I'd ask for your comment on this, Mr. Secretary, is it's not how many lawsuits will ultimately result in judgments for plaintiffs. But the fact that there are potentially 5,000 plus, plus, plus lawsuits out there that is inhibiting the ability of the airlines -- even the relatively well-to-do airlines, getting the continuing funding they need, the short-term funding and inhibiting the ability of other airlines just to get the cash they need to keep operating for the next couple of months, and the prospect of unlimited liability of going forward without some war risk protection that you have proposed, makes it unlikely that they would be able to buy the insurance that you require them to have before they operate.

Would you comment on that for the record, please, sir.

MINETA: First of all, New York has what is referred to as a collateral damage liability law, and so right off the bat, United and American airlines are facing tremendous liability.

CALLAHAN: If I may interrupt, Continental conducted the screening and U.S. Air brought some of the passengers in, so there's a heck of a lot of airlines involved.

MINETA: You're absolutely right. I supposed if you wanted to, if I get in a taxi and get on Continental and get on United Airlines, that someone could take it all the way back to the taxi company if they wanted to.

But in any event, part of the problem is now, the capital markets have dried up for the airlines. And so, that's why in this legislation that will be coming to you, there is a provision dealing with the whole issue of liability, both retrospective as well as prospective. The details of that are being worked out right now.

But the liability issue is very, very big for all the airlines, and so that is going to be an integral part of that package.

CALLAHAN: In your judgment and I might ask the administrator to comment on it, are we likely to see airlines -- significant airline carriers -- unable to continue because of a lack of availability of access to the financial markets without this liability limitation?

MINETA: I believe that's the case. That is the case right now.

CALLAHAN: Madam Administrator?

GARVEY: (inaudible) percent of it.

CALLAHAN: So, you would say that if we're going to appropriate money as I strongly believe we must, and I support what appears to be the developing of the administration's package, that must, in addition to including the assistance for the airlines' security measures, it must include liability protections as well.

MINETA: That's correct.

And the other piece of it is the fact that in some instances in meeting with -- one of the CEOs of an airline said that they had already received their seven-day cancellation notice. Others are finding tremendous increases in their insurance premiums.

So, it's not only a case of insurance premiums going up, but it's also, in some instances, insurance not being available to them at all.

CALLAHAN: Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

Thank you, Madam Chair.

CHAIRMAN: Ms. Kilpatrick?

KILPATRICK: Thank you. Thank you, Senator Murray as well at the Congressman for having this hearing.

Of the money being appropriated, $3 billion from what I understood the secretary to say earlier, are the part of the $40 billion that was passed last week, another $5 billion, which we think will be in a new supplemental would recapitalize the industry, and $12.5 billion in loan guarantees, is there language, and I'm stressing this as strongly as possible, that there would be language to make sure that those dollars go not just to security but the employees.

We've heard today over the last 24 hours that nearly 100,000 employees will be laid off. Where will those employees be laid off? What kind of benefits will they have. What kind of health care will they be able to obtain for themselves and their families.

I want to make sure that these monies don't go to the CEOs and other high ranking officials who already make over $1 million a year. I want to make sure that the money does not go to the stockholders, although I am a stockholder and some of it we may take a brunt.

It has to go to the families who have also been serving these airlines. There's been a lot discussion, and I'd like you to answer that, Mr. Mineta, I want to make sure that when we do infuse the money into the industry, that it goes to securing the industry and making whole as much as possible those employees who have served well. No more curbside check-in, so that's an inconvenience for a lot of us. What happened to all those employees. What happens to the baggage handlers in all of that?

MINETA: The latter part of last week, maybe on Thursday or so, because most of the focus was on foreign relations and military operations, the president established what is called a DCPC -- Domestic Consequences Policy Committee -- and so there are a number of us who are part of that domestic consequences policy committee.

One of the things that the president has explicitly outlined is to make sure that unemployment benefits, that retraining monies and programs that are similar to what would be otherwise available under the Trade Adjustment Act, assistance would be there for those in the airline industry.

KILPATRICK: After the hearing, I want to continue to work with you on this.

Finally, from me, this company that's in 46 airports that has a low bid contract with non-citizens that handles security and has criminal convictions, who hired them?

MINETA: The airline is the one that contracts with each individual...

KILPATRICK: An airline? One airline? So, did they all go together and hire them or did each airline hire them on its own?

MINETA: The airline hires the company and then the airline -- well, let me have Ken maybe go into that because he's maybe got the list of airports with the contractors.

MEAD: The different airlines can hire the same security company and that does happen.

KILPATRICK: Obviously. It's low bid, so there's more...

MEAD: Some airports, Dulles, for example, the airlines get together there and they hire one vendor. In the case of Dulles, it's Argenbright. In the case of other airports where you have an airline, say, that has a dedicated concourse and you have two or three concourses at that airport, you may have, in fact, three different firms providing the security, each hired by a separate airline.

KILPATRICK: Thank you.

I said finally, but really, finally for me is the suggestion of much of what I've read today and what's been before us, is suggesting the federal government become more active in that, that we take that responsibility from the airlines and perhaps do something more federal.

Mr. Secretary, Madam Garvey, what is your position on that?

MINETA: We are looking very actively at that whole issue of what some people have called nationalization, some people have referred to it as federalization. In any event, it is going to be an enhanced system, better than where we have been, let's say, on September 11 and that is being -- in fact, right away, before the airlines were able to get back in, we had increased the security measures, but on the screeners, specifically, one of the things we will be looking at is this whole issue of federalization.

Thank you.

Thank you, Madam Chair.

MURRAY: Thank you.

I'm going to ask one just quick question and then turn it back over to the members who have not an opportunity.

Mr. Queen, while you're here and we have the opportunity, we've heard a lot in recent days about hardening the cockpit doors with Kevlar or some kind of suggestions like that.

From your expertise, can you tell me if there are specific safety trade offs if we were to require those doors to be hardened?

QUEEN: The short answer is yes, because of you look at the doors of (inaudible) models today, anywhere between 80 pounds to 130 pounds of force is required to open the door and they're designed to open at that force because they are the vent path in the event of a decompression. So, at a very low delta psi to a quarter of one pound of pressure on that door, they open. It adds up to about that much.

The reason why that happens is you need to protect the basic structure of the airplane, so a quick example is on a 757, if you are able to increase that to one psi, hold the door to that level of pressure, you would put about 9,000 pounds of pressure on the bulkhead and 6,000 pounds of pressure on the cockpit floor and/or both the floor and the bulkhead have control cable runs that are critical to the control of the airplane. You couldn't assure that those bulkheads or floor wouldn't fail and you'd lose control of the airplane as a result of that.

Clearly, there are things we can do to make the doors more secure, but since they're the only available venting path out of the cockpit, we also have to make sure we meet that decompressure requirement, which is why we have to be careful not to rush into something without understanding all the consequences.

MURRAY: Thank you very much.

CHAIRMAN: Mr. Tiahrt?

TIAHRT: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I do have a statement I'd like to put in the record (inaudible) my questions.

Ahead of us, I think there is a bright day in aviation, but a lot of things are going to have to happen before we get there. We have talked about these things, I have seen it on the television, heard it on the radio, we've talked about it in this committee -- sky marshals, increasing the strength of cockpit doors, but there are some things that we haven't talked much about.

We're beginning to start to look at some of the employees whose lives have been disrupted and certainly we wouldn't forget those who lost their lives and their families. There's not been a comparison to the two, but when we look forward to the people's whose lives are going to be disrupted, I would hope, Mr. Secretary, that as the administration derives policy for these work interruptions and these layoffs, that they would allow employees who have lost their jobs, whether they're working for the airlines or for aircraft manufacturers, that we give them some benefits in terms of retraining in education, perhaps a hardship withdrawal on 401(k)s without any penalty, some things to sort of soften the blow. Perhaps they can come back, move from a technician to an engineer or from a parts deliverer to a machinist and let them improve their lives while they're work is interrupted.

In this regard, we did several things that I'd like you to consider and perhaps get back with me. They may be long and complicated. We're seeing some ripple effects that get to Wichita, Kansas. There may be as many as 4,000 to 5,000 people laid off at the Boeing Company alone. There are three other manufacturers in that area -- Lear Jet, Beech and Cessna.

Each of them are impacted because they're single engine aircraft. They're business jets, they're charted jets and they don't know the impact, but I'd like again, Mr. Secretary, if when we look at this financial stabilization package, I would hope that you include small manufacturers as well as the large manufacturers at Boeing, because they are going to be impacted by this horrible event that happened on September 11.

Just one sentence (ph) would solve that problem and allow them to stabilize the jobs they have for their people and also the industry that they're such a vital part of.

So, if you could give me some assurance that you'll fight for those people who are part of this ripple effect, I would be very happy.

MINETA: There is nothing in there to limit it in terms of what kinds of companies would be eligible other than that they're, for instance, some of the funds are for airports, some of the funds would be for airlines, and the airlines could be major commercial or it could be cargo or it could be a commuter...

TIAHRT: It could be charter airplanes, I would assume, too, charter airlines, I wonder if they would be included.

MINETA: I'm not sure. I don't think Part 91 is covered. I'm not sure. Part 135 and Part 121 are covered.

MINETA: I'm not sure it gets down to the Part 91 charters.

TIAHRT: As you and Deputy Secretary Jackson get into this recommendation that comes from the administration back to us, I hope that you will include small manufacturers as well as larger manufacturers of aircraft, the charter companies as they are part of this air transportation that is 10 percent of our gross domestic product.

They are a very important spoke in our economic wheel. If one part of it is shaken, I'm afraid it will have an additional bad effect.

Administrator Garvey, I'd like you to perhaps get back with me on any indication of security measures that may be proposed for general aviation as a result of these attacks, the terrorist attacks. And also, I know that the Pilots Association has been pretty good to work with as far as with the FAA. They've got some good recommendations. I'd like to know what guidance you've given your staff and these organizations that are involved in terms of helping craft a solution for Class B flight training prohibitions and what would be acceptable for the future.

My third concern is about these flight schools. We know that some of these terrorists were actually trained in America's flight schools. I think that's an awful, awful thing, certainly a cloud over them. But in the future, we want people to fly. We have a pilot shortage now. Perhaps we could develop some guidelines, some red flags.

I don't want to penalize flight schools because we had a deficiency in the INS. We should be able to give them some kind of guidelines so that they can operate safely and protect our skies, yet continue with the business of training future pilots. I think that's very important for our industry.

So, if you could give me some kind of idea of what guidelines or what direction it would go in those areas, because my goal, of course, is to have safe skies and get people back traveling again and feel confident in doing that.

GARVEY: Congressman, we actually are working on that today. That was one of the areas when we lifted the ban last night and some of the restrictions for general aviation, that was an area that was still outstanding.

We heard a suggestion this morning about perhaps doing some background checks on some of the students who would register at the flight schools and we're looking at a couple of other recommendations as well. So, if I could get back to you in the next day or two as we think those through and talk them through among ourselves, I will do that. We know it's a real issue, not just for your state, but for other states as well.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN: Secretary Mineta has another engagement that he's late for already. We've kept him now a half hour past the time he allotted to us. Before he leaves, if any of the remaining four members would have a quick question for the secretary before he is excused, we would entertain that now, but we hope that you can be very brief.

Mr. Aderholt?

ADERHOLT: Since last week, the terrorist attacks, I understand there has been use of computer data base scripting language mechanisms that have been used in the past by the Department of Defense where they would link different data bases together in order to compare and correlate their data.

I understand recently that there have been meetings between the FAA and companies that could provide this information without (inaudible) interest in this. I think this is something seriously the FAA should take consideration of to see if there can be an implementation of some kind of database so that they can review the technology and try to screen out those potential terrorists that could be on there.

I just wanted to ask you, is there a particular division or what your thoughts on that might be.

MINETA: Let me turn to Administrator Garvey on where we are on database technology.

GARVEY: You're absolutely right. Those discussions have been underway. It's something we're looking at aggressively and may very well be part of our program as we move forward with some of the money that we've received from Congress and from the president. This may be something that we will target. It's not something that's been, as you know, a high priority for us because of other competing interests in the past.

And we also obviously want to hook in with the FBI and with the other intelligence agencies as well, so those discussions are ongoing. I'd be happy to keep your staff informed of that, Congressman.

ADERHOLT: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN: And this only applies to the secretary. If you have a peculiar questions that only he can answer, let's ask those now and then we'll come back to the other panel.

Ms. Granger:

GRANGER: I have one question. I understand it takes 14 weeks additional for sky marshals for special training. If that's true -- if we said "Do it" or if you said, "Do it", how long before we'd have those marshals on the planes.

MINETA: We hope to have the sky marshals in the air -- in terms of the new group that we're getting in right now -- the implementation, very, very quickly. I don't know where the 14 weeks figure came from, but no, it's going to be much quicker than that.

Again, just for security purposes, we just haven't been talking about how many or when they're going to be on board. We already had a small force, but we're having it implemented through other agencies that are volunteering their folks to be trained quickly.

In the meantime, as we get those temporary folks into the airplanes, we're going to build up our own air marshal program.

So, those will be on board very quickly.

CHAIRMAN: Ms. Emerson?

EMERSON: Mr. Secretary, I'd love to ask you a question, but I'm going to save mine for Ms. Garvey.

CHAIRMAN: Mr. Sweeney?

SWEENEY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman; I'll be very brief. In fact, I want to thank the secretary and the administrator and the rest of the panel for being here.

I'm going to make a point, because I'm going to submit my questions to you or speak to your staff directly, but like Senator Byrd and many other members, I've had great consternation, as you know, as it relates to the airline performance.

Unless I appear to be gratuitous here, I as one member, suffered losses on the 11th. So, I would urge you in your negations with the airlines on this solvency package to develop as comprehensive a response in terms of their roles as corporate citizens because that mindset, I believe, as one member led in part to some of the lapses that we have now.

So, I would urge you to understand that many of us are going to move in the direction we need to move in because we recognize national priority here. But underneath that is a deeper problem, as you know.

MINETA: And we recognize that one as well, too.

CHAIRMAN: Mr. Secretary, we realize that you are late for your meeting and we deeply appreciate your agreeing to stay this extra half hour. We're going to let you go about your business. We hope that the other members of the panel can stay briefly for any remaining questions the four members have not had the chance to ask.

But thank you so much, Mr. Secretary, for being here today. We congratulate you on your good work and we wish you Godspeed.

MINETA: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Madam Chairman.

Thank you very much and to all the members of the panel.

MURRAY: Mr. Secretary, we appreciate your being here and we will let you go and I would ask our members that they have their five minutes to quickly ask their remaining questions. We do want to adjourn and reconvene in Hart 219 as quickly as possible in a closed session.

CHAIRMAN: Mr. Aderholt, do you have anything?

Ms. Granger?

Ms. Emerson?

EMERSON: I wanted to just address or just briefly talk and this might be something that we really need to talk about in closed session. But it goes back to what Robert (ph) was talking about, as well as others at the beginning.

I think we've got a lot to do for the second, third, fourth lines of defense, if you will, to stop a potential highjacker. We still haven't addressed and we still must address the first line of defense is which when somebody books a ticket on an airline, how can we find out very quickly if that person is on a potential list of suspects.

It's something that I have been studying that the Israeli government does and I think that it would be an important investment for us to try to determine how to best weed those folks out before we even proceed to a security checkpoint in an airport.

I can't tell you how strongly I feel about that, because it appears that if we were able to do that, and I'm certain the technology is there to do that, and cooperation could be there to do that, that many of these problems could possibly be averted in the future.

GARVEY: Congresswoman, thank you. Let me say, first of all, there is a process in place and I would appreciate the chance to talk about that in more detail in closed session.

Having said that, I think that you raised an excellent point, which is, are there more technologies out there, are there other procedures that we need to put in place.

So, again, what I'd like to do is cover what we do do in closed session and then offer some thoughts of other things we can do.

EMERSON: Thank you.

MURRAY: Thank you.

Senator Domenici has asked for three minutes of time before we adjourn and we have to allow him that.

DOMENICI: Thank you very much, Madam Chairperson.

I just wanted to make an observation for you all and ask you if you agreed. First, let me ask, before this terrorist act, were American citizens flying in airplanes safe? Was it a safe way to travel before? Has anything changed so that it is unsafe now as compared to three weeks ago? Should the American people be worried about flying in American airplanes once you release them to fly?

Who wants to answer that? Do you, Jane Garvey?

GARVEY: Thank you very much, Senator.

I think, certainly, before the 11th, I think all of us really believed that the system is safe and the system was safe. I think what we encountered on the 11th was something that none of us had ever imagined possible.

As I mentioned a little bit earlier and mentioned again this morning, much of what we had focused on in the area of security never took into account someone who was willing to commit suicide and was willing to use an airplane as a lethal weapon. So, in a sense, it has changed all the rules.

We are asking ourselves every day, of course, what else we should be doing, what else we can be doing. The Congress has certainly raised questions, as the chairman started, with the three areas that we are focusing on: more federal marshals, securing the cockpit, a much better security system, even federalizing it, as has been suggested. I think those are all steps we must take to deal with what is a very new reality for us.

DOMENICI: I just want to say before this act, it was my opinion, as one senator, that the American economy was in recession. I believe that will be proved up here in about a month or less, that we are growing at a negative rate. If you stay there for a couple of quarters, it's deemed to be America in recession.

I think that was going to happen whether or not the terrorist attack occurred, and what I'm fearful of is that it will last longer than it should because the American consumers will not return quickly to their original habits and be American consumers who buy a car, if that's what they intended to do or add to their house or go shopping and buy some new clothes for the ensuing season. If there's fear among the American people and they don't return to being consumers, I'm very fearful that we will have a recession that will last very long, because the consumers are going to lead us out of it.

So, I am very hopeful that wherever you can, everybody in charge of our American airline industry, as soon as possible, tell the American people with confidence that it is safe to fly.

I think in that context it is a safe today as it was three weeks ago, once you let the airlines all take off and clear the airports. I think that is what will be the case. It will be as safe or safer that it was.

I'm hopeful the American people will believe that's the case so they will start flying again and they'll also believe that it's time to buy the car they planned to buy, not wait around. The terrorists will have won if our consumers wait around because they're fearful.

Do you have any thoughts on that?

GARVEY: Restoring public confidence is really what we are very, very focused on. The measures that we're taking, the fact that we'll be using the system ourselves, I hope, will be the right step.

I think certainly the suggestions that we've heard today are, absolutely, initiatives we must undertake and undertake quickly.

DOMENICI: Thank you very much. I appreciate it.

MURRAY: Since Senator Shelby was unable to be here today, he was in New York City viewing the damage there, he's asking his questions be submitted for the record and I will do so.

Mr. Chairman, if there are no further questions for the panel, we want to adjourn this session, move into closed session as quickly as possible in Hart 219. We ask members to move there quickly so we can convene that hearing as quickly as possible.

END

NOTES:
???? - Indicates Speaker Unknown
    -- - Indicates could not make out what was being said. off mike - Indicates could not make out what was being said.

PERSON:  PATTY MURRAY (94%); ROBERT C BYRD (57%); HARRY REID (56%); HERB KOHL (56%); RICHARD J DURBIN (56%); CHRISTOPHER (KIT) BOND (55%); ARLEN SPECTER (55%); BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL (54%); HAROLD ROGERS (53%); FRANK WOLF (53%); TODD TIAHRT (52%); SONNY CALLAHAN (52%); TOM DELAY (52%); KAY GRANGER (51%); JO ANN EMERSON (51%); MARTIN OLAV SABO (50%); CHRIS JOHN (50%); 

LOAD-DATE: September 28, 2001