Hearing on
Implementation of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act with a Focus on the 60-day Deadline for Screening and Checked Baggage
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The purpose of this hearing is to review implementation of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act with a particular focus on how well the airlines and DOT have met the 60-day deadline for screening checked luggage.
After the September 11th attacks, people became more aware that not all checked luggage was being screened by explosive detection systems. Currently, airlines use a computer profiling system, known as the Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS), to select those passengers who pose the greatest risk and whose baggage should be subject to a more rigorous inspection.
However, since most passengers do not fit the computer profile, most checked baggage is not subject to examination by an explosive detection machine.
In response to the failures of September 11th, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (P.L. 107-71) transferred responsibility for aviation security from the FAA to a new Transportation Security Administration (TSA) within DOT. In response to concerns about checked baggage in particular, Section 110 of that Act amends Section 44901 of Title 49 to establish firm deadlines for the screening of all checked baggage.
Section 110 establishes two separate deadlines for checked baggage screening. The first deadline--60 days after enactment or January 18, 2002--required that all checked baggage be screened by some means. The law listed four possible ways that checked baggage could be screened. The four methods are:
The second deadline is at the end of this year. It requires the Under Secretary for Transportation Security to take all necessary action to insure that explosive detection systems are deployed at all U.S. airports in sufficient numbers to screen all checked baggage.
Last month, on December 7th, the Subcommittee held a hearing on the problems DOT would encounter in meeting that second deadline. The purpose of this hearing is to focus on the first deadline, the one that required action by January 18th.
Transportation Secretary Mineta set off a furor late last year when he stated that he did not think the January 18th deadline could be met. In response, many Members of Congress wrote to the Secretary expressing concerns about his comments and urging him to guarantee that aviation security measures will meet the deadlines and requirements set in the security Act. Also, late in the legislative session, the airlines made an unsuccessful effort to try to have the 60-day deadline extended. More recently, however, both the airlines and DOT have stated that the 60-day deadline would be met. One of the purposes of this hearing is to determine whether and how they did so and the impact of those actions on passenger service and security.
One of the problems with complying with the 60-day deadline is that each of the methods for compliance has its drawbacks.
The airlines claim that a bag-match program will significantly slow down the system each time they have to climb inside the cargo hold and remove a bag because the passenger who checked that bag did not board the plane. They also say that a bag match program will not be effective in stopping a suicide terrorist. Proponents of bag match point to studies that demonstrate such a program would not significantly slow down the commercial aviation system. They acknowledge that bag match would not be effective in stopping a suicide terrorist, but point out it is now used on international flights and would be effective in stopping other terrorists such as the terrorists who blew up Pan Am 103 in 1988.
Manual search is also criticized for being slow.
Search by bomb sniffing dogs can be effective but it takes a long time to train the dogs and each dog can work for only a short period of time before they lose their effectiveness. Currently, there are not enough dogs available to cover all airports.
The fourth option for meeting the 60-day deadline, “other means or technology approved by the Under Secretary,” is criticized for not being precise or clear. Some may argue that this could include an enhanced passenger profiling system under which more bags would be selected for inspection. Opponents of this interpretation argue that the Act was intended to require major changes in methods being used to inspect baggage and that allowing profiling to be a means of inspection would permit the Act to be administered to require little change in the pre-enactment method. At the time the Act was passed, the airlines had been using profiling for many years to determine which bags should be inspected, and between September 11, 2001, and the date of passage, profiling had been enhanced to require random checks of additional bags. Therefore, opponents of this interpretation argue that allowing enhanced profiling as an acceptable “means” under the Act basically permits a continuation of the status quo.
Another means that could be used to screen checked baggage are the explosive detection machines that must be deployed by the end of the year. At those airports where explosive detection machines are currently deployed, the law requires that they be fully utilized. Since 1996, FAA has spent $441 million for the purchase of security equipment. This includes both the uncertified trace detection devices as well as the certified bulk detection machines such as those manufactured by CTX and L3, which were the subject of last December’s hearing. For FY 2002, DOT received $293 million to purchase additional security equipment. Even so, this will not be enough to purchase enough explosive detection machines to deploy at all U.S. airports by the end of the year as required by the security law.
On January 16, 2002, Secretary Mineta announced guidance on what the airlines must do to comply with the January 18th deadline for screening checked baggage. According to Secretary Mineta, every available EDS machine will be used to its maximum capacity, and the bags of passengers selected by CAPPS will continue to be screened by EDS.
Where sufficient EDS machines are not yet available to screen all bags, the other options outlined in the Act will be used. Every bag will be screened by one of the methods listed in the Act -- either bag-match, manual search, search by explosive detecting K-9’s, or by other technology (for example, trace detection devices). However, if bag-match is the chosen method, it will only be done on originating flights, not on connecting flights. This has raised concern because, to be an effective deterrent, bag-match must be done on each segment of a trip. DOT estimates that about 70 percent of all bags fly directly to their destination, while 30 percent have to make a connection. It is this 30 percent of bags that appears to be potentially at risk under the guidelines announced by DOT on January 16th.
The Act contained two other 60-day deadlines, regarding screener training and crew training.
Screener Training
Section 111 of the Act required DOT to develop within 60 days of enactment a plan for the training of security screener personnel. The plan shall require, at a minimum, that a screener (1) has completed either 40 hours of classroom instruction or a program that the Under Secretary determines will provide an equivalent level of proficiency; (2) has completed 60 hours of on-the-job instruction; and (3) has successfully completed an on-the-job examination prescribed by the Under Secretary.
In addition, the Act requires that a screener may not use any screening equipment unless the screener has been trained on that equipment and has successfully completed a test on its use.
Finally, the Act requires that screeners be trained in using the most up-to-date technology and in recognizing new threats and weapons, including dual use items that may seem harmless but that may be used as a weapon.
Crew Training
Section 107 of the Act requires the FAA Administrator, in consultation with the Under Secretary of Transportation for Security, to develop guidance for a scheduled passenger air carrier flight and cabin crew-training program to prepare crew members for potential threat conditions. The guidance shall require such a program to include, at a minimum, elements that address (1) how to determine the seriousness of any occurrence; (2) crew communication and coordination; (3) appropriate responses to defend oneself; (4) use of protective devices assigned to crew members (to the extent such devices are required by the Administrator or Under Secretary); (5) psychology of terrorists to cope with hijacker behavior and passenger responses; (6) live situational training exercises regarding various threat conditions; (7) flight deck procedures or aircraft maneuvers to defend the aircraft; and (8) any other subject matter deemed appropriate by the Administrator.
In addition to the issue of bomb detection equipment, other security issues have arisen recently that may be discussed in the hearing. For example, DOT was recently criticized for not requiring all security screeners to have a high school diploma. Section 111 of the security Act establishes the qualifications for screeners. That section requires that a screener either possess a high school diploma, a general equivalency diploma or have experience that the Under Secretary has determined to be sufficient for the individual to perform the duties of the screener position. In addition, the law requires that a screener be able to read, speak and write English, be a U.S. citizen, and have completed 40 hours of classroom instruction and 60 hours of on-the-job instruction.
Another issue that has been in the news recently involved general aviation
security. Earlier this month, a 15-year old student pilot committed suicide by
flying his small plane into a building in Tampa, Florida. There are several
provisions in the Aviation and Transportation Security Act that address general
aviation security. For example, Section 132(b) requires DOT to transmit a report
within 30 days on airspace and other security measures that can be deployed to
improve general aviation security. DOT submitted that report on December 19,
2001. That report provides an overview of general aviation, a summary of
potential vulnerabilities and a discussion of the types of security measures
that could be taken. The report also offered to provide Members of the Committee
with a classified briefing to discuss these issues in more detail. In addition,
the general aviation community has provided the TSA with several recommendations
to enhance the security of general aviation operations.