U.S. House Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure
U.S. Rep. Don Young,
Chairman
Contact: Steve Hansen (Communications
Director) (202)
225-7749
Justin Harclerode
(Communications Assistant) (202)
226-8767
To: National Desk/Transportation
Reporter
December 7,
2001
Aviation Security Experts
Say Meeting Deadlines
On New Baggage Explosive
Detection Screening May Be Difficult;
Bush Administration Pledges
Do Everything Possible To Implement
New Security Systems By
December 31, 2002 Deadline
Washington, D.C. - Aviation security experts with experience in
implementing major baggage security screening programs testified today that it
may be difficult for the United States to meet the new deadlines requiring the
explosive detection screening of all checked bags on commercial
flights.
The testimony came during a hearing today by the U.S. House Subcommittee
on Aviation.
“There is no doubt that
meeting the deadline for deployment will be a difficult task,” U.S. Rep. John
Mica (R-FL), the Chairman of the Subcommittee said during his opening
statement. “Few agencies have ever
been directed to undertake such a formidable assignment.
“Even at the time we were
considering the bill, there was concern about the deadline. If it were solely up to me, the
directives mandated by the legislation would have been different. But at the time, it was apparent that
some in Congress, the media, and the public were not in the mood for an extended
debate on this issue.
“Now, I am concerned that
the pressure to meet the December 31, 2002 deadline will cause DOT to spend huge
amounts of money quickly without any assurance that the equipment they buy will
detect the explosives that could bring down an aircraft. Unfortunately, that was the approach
taken after TWA 800 in 1996.
“We need only remind ourselves of the $441 million that was spent on
equipment since 1996. Some of that
equipment worked, some did not work, and some sat idle. We cannot afford to repeat those
mistakes,” Mica said.
Ian Hutcheson, Head of Group
Security for BAA in the United Kingdom, outlined how his security
firm installed 100 percent screening systems “virtually from scratch “ at seven
airports in the United Kingdom at a cost of just over $300
million.
Hutcheson said after making
several logistical modifications the implementation time for the airports ranged
from nine to 30 months at different terminals at Heathrow.
“These time scales assume
the development of a design brief, that a baggage handling contractor is
available, that equipment is available from manufacturers, and includes
overcoming issues of baggage integration, confidence trials and commissionings,”
Hutcheson said.
President Bush recently signed into law the “Aviation and Transportation Security Act” which establishes firm deadlines for the screening of checked baggage. It also transferred responsibility for aviation security from the FAA to a new Transportation Security Administration (TSA) within DOT.
Within 60 days, the law requires that all checked baggage be screened by any approved means. This could include, for example, the use of explosive detection machines where available, matching bags to passengers, profiling high-risk passengers with additional searches of their baggage, hand searches, or the use of bomb-sniffing dogs.
By December 31, 2002, the law requires that explosive detection systems be deployed to screen all checked baggage. The law does not actually require that all checked baggage be screened by those machine on that date - although Congressional authors of the legislation have stated that this was their desire - only that the explosive detection machines be deployed by that date and when enough machines are deployed, all checked baggage must be screened by them. Until enough machines are in place, alternative means, such as those previously mentioned above, must be used to screen checked baggage.
Roger W. Rimington, Chief Aviation Security Consultant for Glenealy
International Ltd. in the United Kingdom, said despite the “enormity of this
task, given the 300-plus qualifying airports in the United States” he believed
the deadline could be met - if explosive detection systems (EDS) can be
manufactured in time, if the terminals don’t require significant structural
modifications and if the training for screening personnel can begin
immediately.
Steve Zaidman, Associate Administrator for Research and Acquisitions
at the Federal Aviation Administration, told the Committee: “In order to meet the December 31, 2002
goal of 100 percent EDS screening of all checked bags, over 2,000 EDS must be
deployed - that’s over 1,800 more than we currently have.
“Today, products of two EDS vendors have been certified and variations of
these products are currently going through the certification process. Consequently, the Department and
Transportation Security Administration will need to work with the companies that
manufacture these machines to see how quickly they can produce more of these
systems and work must continue to explore all new technologies being developed
by manufacturers for the next generation of screening
technologies.”
Chairman Mica’s Opening
Statement
Today, we begin our oversight of the Aviation and Transportation Security
Act that was passed last month.
This hearing will focus on the law’s mandate to deploy explosive
detection systems to screen all checked baggage by December 31,
2002.
Before we passed that law, I
don’t think most people were aware of how little checked baggage was actually
subject to inspection.
Until recently, checked baggage was screened by a profiling system that
resulted in the actual inspection of only a small percentage of the
bags.
The Security Act we passed mandates that we make dramatic changes in that
process. It establishes an
aggressive schedule to deploy explosive detection systems at all airports by the
end of next year. This is one year
sooner than was required by the House-passed version and much sooner than the
FAA had originally planned.
While the public should
understand that the Congressional deadline might be difficult to meet, there are
other measures in place now, such as strengthened cockpit doors, which have
significantly improved passenger safety.
To meet the December 31,
2002 deadline, some experts have estimated that it may require more than 2,000
machines at a cost that could exceed $5 billion. In addition, these machines will not
operate by themselves. There will be substantial additional costs to man
them.
There is no doubt that
meeting the deadline for deployment will be a difficult task. Few agencies have ever been directed to
undertake such a formidable assignment.
Even at the time we were
considering the bill, there was concern about the deadline. If it were solely up to me, the
directives mandated by the legislation would have been different. But at the time, it was apparent that
some in Congress, the media, and the public were not in the mood for an extended
debate on this issue.
Now, I am concerned that the
pressure to meet the December 31, 2002 deadline will cause DOT to spend huge
amounts of money quickly without any assurance that the equipment they buy will
detect the explosives that could bring down an aircraft. Unfortunately, that was the approach
taken after TWA 800 in 1996.
We need only remind ourselves of the $441 million that was spent on
equipment since 1996. Some of that
equipment worked, some did not work, and some sat idle. We cannot afford to repeat those
mistakes.
It is not enough to simply
buy whatever is available in order to meet the deadline in the law. The Security Act also authorized $50
million for research and development.
I would hope that DOT would use these funds to ensure that we develop the
very best explosive detection systems possible.
The manufacturers of explosive detection systems have displayed their
various technologies on Capitol Hill.
Some of them will testify today.
But before we proceed in haste, we need to have a plan—one that insures
that not only is every bag screened, but also that the screening actually
detects the articles that pose a threat to passengers and
crew.
I believe the British experience can be instructive. As a result of the Pan Am 103
tragedy, they made dramatic expenditures and worked several years to achieve
100% baggage screening.
Furthermore, we must recognize that it is not just the machines that are
expensive. Integrating those
machines into the existing baggage delivery system will take a great deal of
time and money.
While the UK experience may be informative, rather than retrofit several
dozen airports, the United States faces the formidable task of deploying new
technology at hundreds of locations.
Today we will hear from witnesses that have actually participated in
converting airports to a 100% checked baggage screening requirement. We are pleased to have two witnesses
from Great Britain here to give us the benefit of their experience. I would like to thank them for traveling
such a long distance to be with us today.
We also have the key manufacturers of bomb detection equipment, 2 who
have certified systems and 2 who will be seeking certification of their
systems.
Finally, I would like to
thank Steve Zaidman of the FAA for taking time out from his work on STARS to
share with us the current plans for meeting the statutory
deadline.
I would also like to particularly recognize Sam Graves from Missouri and
Mark Kirk from Illinois. They
both worked diligently to ensure that strong provisions were included in this
historic legislation to deal with checked baggage.”
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