Copyright 2002 The San Diego Union-Tribune The San
Diego Union-Tribune
July 26, 2002, Friday
SECTION: OPINION;Pg. B-9
LENGTH:
804 words
HEADLINE: A very high price for
airport security
BYLINE: Robert Poole; Poole, an
MIT-trained engineer, directs the transportation studies program at Reason
Foundation, a Los Angeles-based think tank.
BODY: No one ever wants to witness another passenger
jet fly into a building. Unfortunately, the emotion and memory of Sept. 11
haven't translated into secure airports.
The
Transportation Security Administration is a mess, and our security is suffering.
The 10-month old TSA has already seen its top man quit (read get pushed out) and
its budget already exceeds the FBI's annual budget -- Congress recently approved
$3.8 billion in additional funding for the agency.
Remember, despite all that money, the TSA is only responsible for
passenger and baggage screening. The airports themselves are still responsible
for securing all the other crucial elements of the airport. Nevertheless, the
TSA now estimates they'll need over 60,000 employees, up from the original
28,000.
The TSA's failings will soon take center stage
because a couple of unreachable airport security deadlines are rapidly
approaching.
The TSA is supposed to have federalized
security screeners in place at all of the nation's airports by mid-November. But
tens of thousands of workers still need to be hired and trained. If you are
looking for a good-paying government job, make a quick check of the major online
job sites -- you'll find plenty of listings for airport security screeners and
managers.
Once that deadline is missed, the TSA will
fail to meet the Dec. 31 deadline for screening baggage for explosives. Airports
face multimillion-dollar construction projects just to house the mini-van sized
explosive detection machines.
Bruce Baumgartner,
manager of aviation at Denver International Airport, tells Time magazine, "I can
have either machines or people in my terminal. I can't fit both."
The image of people standing outside in the snow, in
December, in Denver and other cities across the country, makes the airlines
shiver. Air travel is down since the terrorist attacks. And with the exception
of Southwest Airlines, all the major carriers just posted second quarter losses.
People standing out in the snow while federal workers go through bags by hand is
a sure-fire way to kill air travel in this country.
Baumgartner and 38 other airport operators saw enough problems with the
current system that they stuck their necks out and signed a letter to
Transportation Secretary Norm Mineta asking him to reconsider the deadlines.
Taking a public stance like that isn't always a good career move. But these
airport officials are in the trenches, and they aren't saying the current
airport security legislation is bad simply because it is inconvenient or
expensive; they are speaking out because it isn't improving security.
A number of elected officials have heard the cries for
help. Rep. John Mica, R-Fla., Rep. Dick Armey, R-Texas, and Rep. Kay Granger,
R-Texas, pushed for an extension of the baggage-screening
deadline. But some Democrats instantly paint them as anti-security.
Extending the deadlines would be a start, but it isn't
enough. A recent study I co-authored for the Reason Foundation found that the
machines the TSA has purchased to screen luggage give false positives, or miss
explosives entirely, more than 30 percent of the time. Additionally, these
machines are agonizingly slow. The explosive detection systems purchased by the
TSA scan just 150-200 bags per hour under real-world conditions. Salt Lake City
International Airport used the TSA's explosive trace detection machines during
the 2002 Winter Olympics and averaged just 76 bags per hour.
Because the machines are so slow, the TSA will need a lot more than
they have planned and budgeted for. The Reason study estimates taxpayers will
have to pay $3 billion to $12 billion, yes billion, just to purchase the baggage
screening machines; staffing them will cost several billion more each year. With
all the threats we face, is $12 billion for baggage screening machines, three
times the FBI's annual budget, the best use of resources?
There are better, cheaper machines available. But, in typical
government fashion, the most reliable and quickest screening machines currently
in use in Europe's airports haven't been approved for use in the United States
yet. So instead, the government is buying unreliable, expensive machines to meet
a self-imposed deadline.
Following the 1988 Pan Am
bombing over Lockerbie, England instituted a baggage-screening program. They
gave themselves eight years, not one, to implement the plan.
We've learned a lot about airport security since Sept. 11. As we
approach the one-year anniversary of that tragic day, we can put that knowledge
to good use and improve our system. Or we can cross our fingers and hope another
group of terrorists doesn't show us that we've spent billions of dollars trying
to meet random deadlines and failed to secure our airports in the process.
Document 44 of 81. 
