

The Structure of Washington Lobbying Networks Mapping the Ties that Bind

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Abstract

Making use of a newly collected dataset consisting of the employment histories of a sample of lobbyists registered under the Lobby Disclosure Act of 1995, we provide a comprehensive analysis of the networks that connect Washington lobbyists to their former federal government employers. For each of 1,717 lobbyists who have registered in any six-month reporting period from 1998 to 2006, we have compiled a database including reference to each of their former government and private sector employment positions, some 8,670 positions overall. Additionally, these registered lobbyists can be linked to data on lobbying activities from 87,739 semiannual lobbying disclosure reports filed over the course of nine years. Lobbyists in the dataset previously held every conceivable policy-related government position, ranging from members of Congress, White House political appointees, and cabinet secretaries to legislative staff, obscure budget analysts, and regulatory attorneys. This new dataset allows us to review comprehensively the linkages connecting government offices and lobbyists, the largest statistical treatment so far undertaken of the revolving door between public service and private interest representation.

We assess the social network “centrality” of each government office, and of each lobbying firm / employer. That is, for each entity, we assess the degree to which it has links with a large or a small number of active participants in the system. This allows us to note which government agencies provide the central locus for future lobbying work in the largest range (and greatest number) of lobbying organizations, and which lobbying firms and clients have the most and the broadest range of linkages with government agencies and congressional offices.

Of course, since the data are available for each six-month period from 1998 to 2006, we can assess differences associated with shifts in partisan control of government, and we can systematically investigate the differences in Democratic and Republican patterns of interaction using measures of network density.

Introduction

We look for the first time at the structure of relations among Washington lobbyists using the largest database so far constructed to show the ties that bind in the Washington policy community.¹ Using information gathered from semi-annual reports filed by all lobbyists under the Lobby Registration Act of 1995, we assess the level of activity of various lobbying firms, showing the extreme concentration of lobbying activity by a relative handful of extremely large public relations and law firms and highly active organizations with lobbyists on staff. Second, we look at the résumés of those individuals listed as lobbyists and show the linkages between current employment as a lobbyist and previous employment in various government and public relations positions. The structure of the Washington lobbying community can then be mapped using standard techniques from network analysis to show the centrality of the White House, various executive branch agencies, congressional offices, and other lobbying firms. Not surprisingly perhaps, previous employment on the staff of the White House emerges as the single most central position, closely followed by such executive agencies as the Departments of Treasury, Commerce, and Defense.

Structure and Nature of our Data

The original data set for this paper was compiled as part of the Center for Responsive Politics' Revolving Door project, which seeks to identify people whose career trajectory has taken them from public service employment in Congress, the White House, and other federal government offices to the lobbying firms and government relations offices that populate Washington's legendary K Street. According to the Center, the "Revolving Door Database is the most

¹ We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Sunlight Foundation and the excellent research assistance from Jihan Andoni, Greg Gasiewski, Brooke Hallett, and Abigail Stecker. Jon Moody and Shaun Bevan at Penn State also provided useful programming help or comments.

comprehensive source to date to help the public learn who's who in the Washington influence industry, and to uncover how these people's government connections afford them privileged access to those in power."² Additionally, the data set of biographical information was linked to the Center's Lobbying database, which is a reconstruction of data included in semiannual reports filed with the US Senate Office of Public Records. The Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 requires organizations spending or earning more than \$10,000 in a six-month period on lobbying the federal government to report the amount spent or earned, the issue areas in which they were active, and to list the names of individual lobbyists active in each of 78 issue-areas. By combining both employment history data and lobbying disclosure data, we can analyze the professional social networks that connect Washington lobbyists to their former federal government employers.

We followed several steps to create the original biographical data set of registered lobbyists in Washington. First, we assembled employment history data from a combination of proprietary and publicly available sources. The primary proprietary source for employment data is a set of 7,745 people with professional biographical entries the *Washington Representatives* directory of lobbyists and other public affairs professionals published by Columbia Books, Inc., as of September 29, 2006. In addition, we used proprietary database resources such as Martindale-Hubbel law directories, Marquis *Who's Who in American Politics*, Hoover's business information databases, and Lexis-Nexis, as well as publicly available sources such as newspapers, press releases, and lobbying firm websites continuously to update the data with additional biographical information. An observation was considered fully-researched once all available sources had been consulted.

² The Center for Responsive Politics edits and publishes money in politics data at its award-winning Open Secrets website. The searchable Revolving Door database is continually updated and can be found at <http://www.opensecrets.org/revolving/index.asp>.

Second, individuals who are registered to lobby the federal government were identified by name from lobbying disclosure reports filed for each semiannual reporting period from 1998 through 2006. From the original list of over 7,000 names, we randomly selected lobbyists who met two criteria: (1) their employment histories were fully researched using all available sources as of August 30, 2007, and (2) they were registered to lobby in any six-month reporting period in our time frame. Lobbyists in the data set have held jobs in every conceivable policy-related government position, ranging from members of Congress, White House political appointees, and cabinet secretaries to legislative staff, budget analysts, and regulatory attorneys.

The data primarily identify specific employers like government agencies, the offices of specific members of Congress, or congressional committee and leadership offices. The hierarchical coding scheme for employment in the executive branch was adopted from the *US Government Manual*, and originally included 211 federal offices. For ease of interpretation, we collapsed these codes down to 118 offices; each office in the collapsed dataset must have employed at least five lobbyists in our sample. These offices include 10 employers in the Executive Office of the President such as the White House Office (i.e., the “West Wing”) and the Office of Management and Budget, 48 cabinet and sub-cabinet agencies like the Department of Defense and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and 60 independent agencies like the Federal Communications Commission and the Environmental Protection Agency. In the legislative branch, employers in our original coding scheme include 675 personal offices of members of Congress, 152 committees and subcommittees of Congress, and 31 leadership and administrative offices. By aggregating subcommittees to their respective parent committees and by combining legacy committees that have made minor changes in name and jurisdiction over time, we collapsed employment down to 25 Senate committees and 31 House committees. We collapsed

the various legislative administrative offices into one each for the House and Senate, resulting in a total of 15 leadership offices in Congress. Finally, we collapsed the different regional and jurisdictional courts down to the Supreme Court, Courts of Appeal, District Courts, Special Courts, and Administrative offices. All told, the subsequent data set includes 1,717 registered lobbyists who have held 8,670 public and private sector jobs during their careers. They can be linked to 87,739 lobbying reports filed in any six-month period between 1998 and 2006.

Who the Lobbyists Are

Along with private organizations, all employers were then categorized according to type, such as federal agency, lobbying firm, lobbying client, and other private organizations, as well as a dummy variable for current employer. Table 1 shows all twelve employer categories, ordered by the total number of former and current employers.

(Insert Table 1 about here)

Looking at the columns labeled “Former” shows where the currently registered lobbyists used to work; personal offices of members of Congress are the most likely source of government employment for future lobbyists, followed by federal agencies, congressional committee staffs, independent agencies, and the White House. Among current employers, lobbying firms are by far the predominant category, followed by registered client organizations (e.g., organizations that have their own in-house government relations staffs registered under the LDA), with only small numbers of lobbyists employed by other types of offices.

Previous research indicates that the number of reports filed correlates almost perfectly with the number of lobbyists, the number of issues on which an organization lobbied, and the amount of money spent on lobbying, and is therefore a strong indicator of the level of lobbying

activity.³ Therefore, as our indicator of lobbying activity throughout this paper, we use the number of reports filed that mention the name of a lobbyist in our data set. Readers should note that lobbying firms file reports for each client that retains them in any six-month reporting period, and that clients with in-house lobbyists file reports on behalf of themselves as well. Each report may indicate lobbying in any one of 78 different issue-areas in which a mentioned lobbyist is active. In other words, an individual lobbyist may be linked with as few or as many of the issue-areas mentioned in a report. For our purposes, we count a “report,” or a single unit of lobbying activity, as each instance that a lobbyist in our data set is mentioned as being active in an issue-area. Each mention of a lobbyist can be counted to reflect the level of their individual lobbying activity, effectively weighting the most active lobbyists more heavily than those who are active only on a single issue.⁴

Lobbyists in our sample have represented clients that spent just over \$4.56 billion to lobby the federal government over nine years, which is about one-quarter of the \$17.17 billion spent overall on lobbying activities from the late 1990’s through 2006. Consistent with earlier findings about lobbying organizations, our sample of individual lobbyists is disproportionately highly active. Though they account for more than 25% of the lobbying activity, they represent less than 6% of the 32,470 lobbyists registered during this time. As we will show, this sample reflects the fact that the vast bulk of the lobbying is done by just a few highly connected individuals.

³ See Frank R. Baumgartner and Beth L. Leech. 2001. Issue Niches and Policy Bandwagons: Patterns of Interest Group Involvement in National Politics. *Journal of Politics* 63, 4 (November, 2001): 1191–1213.

⁴ Technically, a report contains a different section for each issue-area on which the lobbyist engaged in activity for a given client (or on their own behalf, in the case of a registered client). In this paper, we treat each issue-area as its own report. Therefore the numbers of reports filed on behalf of a single lobbyist can sometimes be in the dozens, reflecting activity for multiple clients, on many issues, and in many issue-areas.

In the next sections, we discuss in more detail where the lobbyists work, where they used to work, and then give an overview of the structure of Washington employment networks. In future analysis we expect to look in greater detail at differences by Presidential administration and by issue-area.

Where the Lobbyists Are

Figure 1 shows the extremely skewed distribution of lobbying activity by firm; the majority of the lobbying is done by just a few lobbyists in a small handful of firms.

(Insert Figure 1 about here)

The very high peak of data at the extreme left side of Figure 1 corresponds to the large numbers of lobbying firms that were active on just one or two issues. The extremely long right-hand tail of the distribution reflects a tremendous level of activity from a relatively low number of firms. While most lobbying firms filed only a small number of reports, one firm filed 580 reports and overall a large percentage of the reports were filed by just a handful of the firms. Table 2 shows these data in greater detail, listing by name the firms that filed the largest number of reports, and then summarizing at the bottom the number of firms that filed fewer than 125 reports each, including over 400 firms that filed fewer than 10 reports; data are for the June 2006 reporting period, the most recent one in our database.

(Insert Table 2 about here)

We get a strong sense of who the power players are on Washington's K Street by reading down the list of names in Table 2. Six firms filed more than 300 reports in the June 2006 period; 15 firms filed more than 200 reports, and 31 firms filed more than 125 reports. At the same time, as the rows at the bottom of the table indicate, 411 firms filed fewer than 10 reports.

The skewed distribution reflected in Figure 1 and Table 2 is not peculiar to the Bush period. Figure 2 and Table 3 show similar information for the first period in our database, in 1998.

(Insert Figure 2 and Table 3 about here)

Figure 2 shows a distribution similar to that from Figure 1, though the most active firm in 1998 was not as active as the most active firms in 2006. Still, the skewness of the distribution is equally striking. Table 3 gives a list of the most active firms in the first period for which we have data. The table shows a similar distribution as in the previous table. But note the significant change-over in some of the particular organizations that are the most active on K Street. Of the top ten firms in 2006, only six were also in the top ten in 1998. Any differences for individual firms likely reflect changes in the highly competitive and increasingly concentrated business climate in the lobbying industry, not necessarily any theoretically-meaningful changes in the political climate in Washington. Whether there is a Democrat or Republican in the White House, the long right-hand tail distribution that characterizes lobbying changes little over time. A few actors emerge as the top dogs. The dogs change over time, however.

Where the Lobbyists Come From

Table 4 lists the most common former employers of lobbyists active in the first half of 2006.

The table sorts in descending order by frequency, and also reports a measure of network “centrality.” Centrality is a commonly used metric in sociology to assess the degree to which people or organizations are bound by strong or weak ties.⁵ In our case, centrality reflects the

⁵ See Mark S. Granovetter, “The Strength of Weak Ties,” *American Journal of Sociology* 78, 6 (1973): 1360-1380 and, “The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited,” *Sociological Theory* 1 (1983): 201-233 for theoretical groundwork, and Daniel Carpenter, Kevin Esterling, and David Lazer. “The Strength of Strong Ties: A Model of Contact Making in Policy Networks with Evidence from U.S. Health Politics,” *Rationality and Society* 15,

degree that a given employer has common ties with other actors in the network (e.g., employees who once worked there and who *also* previously worked in other offices within the network).⁶

The White House stands out as by far the most common place of former employment and, as we will see in greater detail below, the most central player in the system.

(Insert Table 4 about here)

Table 1 listed the places of former employment among the 1,717 lobbyists in our study; only 304 individuals previously worked in the White House. Table 4 shows that these individuals are the most active, by far, in the lobbying community as they filed over 1,800 reports in the first half of 2006 alone. They also had the greatest number of connections with other lobbyists in the form of common places of former employment. Other major players are the Republican National Committee, several major committee staffs, the Department of Defense, presidential transition teams, presidential campaign offices, and other executive branch agencies. Some of the major lobbying firms themselves show up as leading places of former employment, reflecting the revolving door going from lobbying firms to government and back to lobbying firms, and the competition among firms to recruit top lobbyists from their rivals. In this profession, network centrality is clearly an employment boost. The skewed nature of the distribution in Table 4 is laid out graphically in Figure 3.

(Insert Figure 3 about here)

4 (2003): 411-440 and James H. Fowler, "Connecting the Congress: A Study of Cosponsorship Networks," *Political Analysis* 14 (2006): 456-487 for recent applications in American national politics.

⁶ Technically speaking, a measure of "betweenness centrality" is calculated using a common large-scale network analysis package, Pajek, and is specifically "the proportion of all geodesics between pairs of other vertices that include the vertex." See de Wouter Nooy, Andrej Mrvar, and Vladimir Batagelj, *Exploratory Social Network Analysis with Pajek*. (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2005) for further detail.

Figure 3 shows that the skew in the distribution of where the lobbyists come from is at least as great as where they currently work. A very small number of government offices produce highly central alumni networks that supply the most active lobbyists.

Table 5 and Figure 4 show the same information for the earliest reporting period available to us, from June 1998. While there are important differences in the particular offices from which those lobbyists active in 1998 had previously worked, the structure and skewness of the system was virtually identical.

(Insert Table 5 and Figure 4 about here)

A White House Alumni Club

The central role that employment in the White House plays would suggest a special position for those with the types of connections and inside knowledge that can be gained from employment at the very center of executive power. Of course, White House employment is not the only place to gain important (and lucrative) experience, but the data make clear it stands alone. Tables 6 and 7 show these points clearly.

(Insert Tables 6 and 7 about here)

Table 6 shows the lobbying firms filing the greatest number of reports listing former White House employees, for the June 2006 reporting period. (Table 7 gives the same data for June 1998.) The tables make clear that large percentages of LDA reports are routinely filed by individuals with White House experience. Significant proportions of the lobbyists at many of the largest lobbying firms in Washington have White House experience, and a number of smaller firms apparently specialize in hiring those with a Presidential résumé. Comparison of the 1998 to the 2006 reports suggests that White House experience has become even more important over time, as the numbers increase across the board. This increase over time may reflect the fact that

policy elites have had time to gain experience with the current administration, only to move quickly to the private sector to capitalize on Bush's second term in office. In future work, it will be interesting to see if this pattern replicates itself with a new administration, regardless of which party—or which *candidate*—occupies the White House beginning in 2009. Surely the patterns for individual lobbyists would be as different for a Democrat or Republican administration as they would be for a Clinton or Obama administration. Of course, only time and a hard-fought election will give us any clue as to whose network of lobbyists and political operatives will reap the benefits of White House access.

Mapping the Ties that Bind

Given the structure of our dataset including all former positions of employment among current lobbyists, we can assess the links that connect lobbyists by noting common places of previous employment. Those who previously worked for the Senate Judiciary Committee may also have clerked for Justice O'Connor, and they may currently work for a certain type of lobbying firm. By assessing the linkages among lobbying firms and government offices, we can see which offices are most centrally located in the network of connections that link the Washington lobbying community and, by contrast, which firms or government offices are relatively peripheral to the network. The analyses that follow make use of former employment information to map out these connections. Figure 5 shows the structure of the Washington lobbying community in June 2006.

(Insert Figure 5 about here)

The White House, as the single most common position in common across all the LDA reports filed in 2006 is, by convention, placed at the center of the network. The size and darkness of the nodes and connections among them indicate the degree of centrality of that node

or the strength of the linkages among the nodes. One can see that the White House is tightly connected to the White House Transition Office (no surprise there), and to the Departments of Justice, State, Commerce, Defense, and Transportation. House and Senate Committee positions are relatively central in the network as well, and a number of individual congressional offices are prominent, even if they are toward the outside of the network. Of course, all these linkages concern not those currently employed in these positions but the previous experiences of those who filed as lobbyists in June 2006. The linkages reflect the previous employment patterns of the current lobbyists. The tightness of the linkages, and the prevalence of the most central executive agencies is striking.

(Insert Figure 6 about here)

Figure 6 shows the same data for those lobbyists filing in the June 1998 period. The White House, State Department, Presidential Transition Staff, Treasury Department, and congressional committee staff positions are particularly central. The entire structure of the network is considerably less dense, reflecting the lower numbers of lobbyists and the weaker ties that connect them to their previous employers. Clearly, from the late-1990s to 2006, the density of the Washington revolving door system has grown considerably. The cause of the increased density over time remains unclear, though it may simply reflect lobbyists' attrition over time due to lateral career changes or retirement. Based on our results, though, the more likely explanation is that the professional connections cultivated by staff in the Clinton White House became much less relevant as the Republican Party consolidated power in both the executive branch and Congress until 2006.

We complete our analysis with a focus on only those lobbyists with White House experience. Figure 7 shows all the places of previous employment of lobbyists those who

worked at some point in the White House, and Figure 8 shows just the connections to lobbying firms.

(Insert Figures 7 and 8 about here)

Figure 7 shows that, across all administrations since 1998, those lobbyists with White House experience were particularly likely also to have worked at the Departments of State, Commerce, Treasury (DoT in the figure), Justice (DoJ), HUD, EPA, OMB, for the Vice President, in the Foreign Service, or on the Presidential Transition. The Dole for President campaign was also a common connection for many. These highly connected lobbyists were far more likely to move across government positions than to move into private positions. Figure 8 shows the connections these lobbyists had with private lobbying firms. It is based on the same analyses that underlie Figure 7. While the bulk of movement is within government (perhaps moving to the White House after experience elsewhere), the links from the White House to private lobbying firms are highly selective. While a great number of firms have some small connection to the White House, a few have much more substantial links.

Conclusion

We have introduced a new and important database that allows us to begin mapping out the structure of professional and social ties in the Washington lobbying community, with special focus on the revolving door between the public and private sector. In this initial look, we have not conducted the type of systematic analysis of the structures connecting individual lobbying firms to each other or to particular government agencies that we expect to do in the future. However, even this quick overview of the data has made clear a number of points. Perhaps the most striking point in the data is the extreme skew associated with all of it. In each relation that we discussed, a select few lobbyists working for a select few firms or government offices

generate a vast proportion of the lobbying activity, as well as creating the strongest connections between government and private lobbying firms. Further, the density of the linkages among Washington lobbyists is great and apparently growing greater over time.

In future analyses, we expect to look in more detail at these questions by analyzing how they have differed for those serving in Democratic and Republican administrations, those generating lucrative lobbying contracts at the most powerful firms, and those populating different policy networks. Do Republicans produce more powerful lobbyists than Democrats, or is lobbying centrality a function of which party is currently in power? Do some lobbying firms corner the market for policy influence simply by hiring well connected public servants? And, do some policy domains reveal greater density than others? By mapping the revolving door between public service and private influence, we promise to contribute new insight into enduring dilemmas of interest representation and public policy. Further, studies of social processes that generate highly skewed distributions suggest self-organizing properties of the Washington lobbying community that reward certain kinds of experience. Clearly, laying out the incentive structures that generate these remarkably skewed distributions, where a few become such prominent players, will be key to understanding the structure and bias of the Washington lobbying-for-hire system.

Table 1. Where the Lobbyists Work, and Where they Used to Work

	Sector	Former		Current		Total	
		N	%	N	%	N	%
LDA-Registered Lobbying Firm	Private	1,143	16.44	1,163	67.73	2,306	26.60
Congressional Personal Office	Public	1,412	20.31	9	0.52	1,421	16.39
LDA-Registered Client	Private	909	13.07	385	22.42	1,294	14.93
Federal Agency	Public	823	11.84	11	0.64	834	9.62
Unregistered Private Organization	Private	671	9.65	126	7.34	797	9.19
Congressional Committee Office	Public	750	10.79	3	0.17	753	8.69
Independent Agency	Public	316	4.54	2	0.12	318	3.67
White House	Public	304	4.37	5	0.29	309	3.56
Party/PAC	Private	249	3.58	5	0.29	254	2.93
State/Local Government	Public	176	2.53	4	0.23	180	2.08
Congressional Leadership Office	Public	101	1.45	3	0.17	104	1.20
Judiciary	Public	99	1.42	1	0.06	100	1.15
Total		6,953	99.99	1,717	99.98	8,670	100.01

Note : Cell entries are number of lobbyists in our sample of LDA reports who are currently or were previously employed by organizations in the given category. The acronym LDA refers to the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995.

Table 2. Frequency of Current Employers of Lobbyists, June 2006

Place of Current Employment	Number of Lobbying Reports Filed
Fierce, Isakowitz & Blalock	580
PMA Group	484
Ernst & Young	394
Washington Group	382
Van Scoyoc Assoc	343
Johnson, Madigan et al	329
American Continental Group	294
K&L Gates	272
Normandy Group	272
Patton Boggs LLP	269
Williams & Jensen	236
Hogan & Hartson	227
McBee Strategic Consulting	207
BKSH & Assoc	206
Livingston Group	206
C2 Group	195
Clark & Weinstock	194
Winning Strategies Washington	192
Holland & Knight	186
Brownstein, Hyatt et al	170
Alpine Group	164
Ogilvy PR Worldwide	160
Mintz, Levin et al	157
Quinn, Gillespie & Assoc	148
Dutko Worldwide	142
Barbour, Griffith & Rogers	140
Loeffler Group	138
Meyers & Assoc	132
Blank Rome LLP	128
Akin, Gump et al	127
McAllister & Quinn	126
28 additional firms	75-125
89 additional firms	25-74
145 additional firms	24-10
411 additional firms	1-9

Table 3. Frequency of Current Employers of Lobbyists, June 1998

Place of Current Employment	Number of Lobbying Reports Filed
Collette Group	241
Ernst & Young	175
K&L Gates	168
PMA Group	141
Patton Boggs LLP	140
Capitol Hill Consulting	133
Blank Rome LLP	99
Washington Group	98
Dubenstein Group	95
Johnson, Madigan et al	95
Olsson, Frank & Weeda	91
Capitol Assoc	88
Alston & Bird	81
DLA Piper Rudnick	81
Hogan & Hartson	81
BKSH & Assoc	80
Dutko Worldwide	74
Honeywell International	74
Timmons & Co	74
Johnston & Assoc	73
American Chemistry Council	72
Ryan, Phillips et al	68
Barbour, Griffith & Rogers	64
MGN Inc	63
Akerman Senterfitt	60
Jolly/Rissler Inc	59
Mayer, Brown et al	58
Williams & Jensen	55
Van Ness Feldman	54
Cassidy & Assoc	52
National Group	52
Palumbo & Cerrell	50
30 additional firms	25-49
110 additional firms	10-24
301 additional firms	1-9

Table 4. Frequency and Centrality Scores for Former Employers of Lobbyists, June 2006

Place of Former Employment	Number of Lobbying Reports Filed	Centrality
White House	1828	0.2089
Republican National Cmte	808	0.0336
House Energy & Commerce	711	0.0555
House Transportation & Infrastructure	689	0.0156
Senate Appropriations	675	0.0229
Dept of Defense	637	0.0477
House Appropriations	598	0.0227
Senate Health, Educ, Labor & Pensions	582	0.0236
Presidential Transition Team	567	0.0291
Senate Commerce, Science, & Transportation	546	0.0257
Ernst & Young	501	0.0063
Dole for President Cmte	468	0.0147
Dept of Agriculture	444	0.0276
Senate Judiciary	427	0.0197
Dept of Justice	385	0.0373
Akin, Gump et al	385	0.0085
Dept of Health & Human Services	384	0.0330
Dept of Commerce	383	0.0230
K&L Gates	379	0.0118
Collier, Shannon et al	362	0.0054
Dept of Transportation	350	0.0357
PMA Group	345	0.0082
Cassidy & Assoc	343	0.0199
House Ways & Means	335	0.0288
House Education & Labor	330	0.0171
Senate Finance	330	0.0156
Fleischman & Walsh	330	0.0021
Kennedy, Edward M	323	0.0128
Senate Armed Services	304	0.0074
20 additional firms or agencies	200-303	
113 additional firms or agencies	100-199	
221 additional firms or agencies	50-99	
861 additional firms or agencies	10-49	
1149 additional firms or agencies	1-9	

Centrality is a measure of common connections among actors in a network. In this case, the connections in question are shared previous employment with a common employer. Therefore, the score indicates the degree to which each employer has alumni who previously worked at a large number of well connected other previous employers. A score of zero indicates no common connections with other actors in the network.

Table 5. Frequency and Centrality Scores for Former Employers of Lobbyists, June 1998

Place of Former Employment	Number of Lobbying Reports Filed	Centrality
White House	835	0.2336304
House Transportation & Infrastructure	402	0.0140251
House Energy & Commerce	321	0.0506634
Senate Appropriations	303	0.015195
Presidential Transition Team	286	0.0394472
Commonwealth of Massachusetts	262	0.006646
Senate Homeland Security & Govt Affairs	253	0.051976
Republican National Cmte	251	0.0169758
Jorden Burt LLP	251	0.0006572
Bingham, Jonathan Brewster	241	0
City of New York, NY	241	0
American Psychological Society	241	0
Children's Defense Fund	241	0
K&L Gates	224	0.0090732
Ernst & Young	204	0.0080656
House Ways & Means	196	0.025043
McClure, Gerard & Neuenschwander	185	0.0044773
Cassidy & Assoc	184	0.0187662
Dept of Transportation	182	0.055525
R Duffy Wall & Assoc	179	0.0015331
Dept of Interior	179	0.0237085
Dept of State	178	0.0452121
Dept of Agriculture	170	0.0127146
Dept of Defense	166	0.0300454
Dole for President Cmte	156	0.016382
Verner, Liipfert et al	150	0.0251023
Bentsen, Lloyd	148	0.0138479
Senate Judiciary	142	0.0273066
House Education & Labor	137	0.0151932
23 additional firms or agencies	100-136	
86 additional firms or agencies	50-99	
430 additional firms or agencies	10-49	
1040 additional firms or agencies	1-9	

Centrality is a measure of common connections among actors in a network. In this case, the connections in question are shared previous employment with a common employer. Therefore, the score indicates the degree to which each employer has alumni who previously worked at a large number of well connected other previous employers. A score of zero is given when a vertex is not situated between other vertices.

Table 6. The Importance of White House Experience, June 2006

Place of Employment	Number of Lobbying Disclosure Report Forms Filed	Number of Forms Submitted by White House Alumni	Percentage of Total Forms Filed by White House Alumni
Fierce, Isakowitz & Blalock	580	191	32.9
C2 Group	195	138	70.8
Patton Boggs LLP	476	130	27.3
American Continental Group	364	120	33.0
Duberstein Group	165	110	66.7
OB-C Group	98	98	100.0
Loeffler Group	138	75	54.3
Cline, John A	69	69	100.0
Murray, Montgomery & O'Donnell	69	69	100.0
Timmons & Co	135	68	50.4
Bracewell & Giuliani	134	66	49.3
Akin, Gump et al	512	65	12.7
Williams & Jensen	350	64	18.3
Dutko Worldwide	255	59	23.1
Andres-McKenna Research Group	57	57	100.0
Clark & Weinstock	215	56	26.0
McDermott, Will & Emery	87	48	55.2
BKSH & Assoc	245	48	19.6
Arter & Hadden	49	46	93.9
Hogan & Hartson	279	44	15.8
Holland & Knight	216	42	19.4
Commonwealth Consulting	41	41	100.0
Smith-Free Group	41	41	100.0
Manatt, Phelps & Phillips	170	35	20.6
McGuire, Woods et al	65	31	47.7
Balch & Bingham	30	30	100.0
IEP Advisors	30	30	100.0
Ricchetti & Assoc	30	30	100.0
Ricchetti Inc	30	30	100.0
Public Strategies	59	30	50.8


The Table lists the number of LDA reports filed, the number filed listing individuals who once worked at the White House, and the percentage of reports filed by those with White House experience.

Table 7. The Importance of White House Experience, June 1998

Place of Employment	Number of Lobbying Disclosure Report Forms Filed	Number of Forms Submitted by White House Alumni	Percentage of Total Forms Filed by White House Alumni
Timmons & Co	203	122	60.1
Duberstein Group	143	96	67.1
Patton Boggs LLP	232	63	27.2
Balch & Bingham	58	53	91.4
Barbour, Griffith & Rogers	66	53	80.3
IEP Advisors	53	53	100.0
Akin, Gump et al	95	44	46.3
Verner, Liipfert et al	150	44	29.3
Dutko Worldwide	157	40	25.5
Andres-McKenna Research Group	37	37	100.0
Public Strategies	43	32	74.4
Ricchetti & Assoc	32	32	100.0
Ricchetti Inc	32	32	100.0
American Continental Group	42	31	73.8
DLA Piper Rudnick	174	24	13.8
BKSH & Assoc	118	23	19.5
Smith-Free Group	23	23	100.0
Holland & Knight	46	22	47.8
Pillsbury, Winthrop et al	35	22	62.9
Cassidy & Assoc	236	21	8.9
Mayer, Brown et al	62	20	32.3
Mintz, Levin et al	103	15	14.6
Baker, Donelson et al	56	14	25.0
Collins & Co	36	14	38.9
Private Practice	14	14	100.0
Foley Government Relations	14	14	100.0
Global USA	14	14	100.0
Manatt, Phelps & Phillips	40	14	35.0
Commonwealth Consulting	13	13	100.0
Palmetto Group	35	13	37.1


The Table lists the number of LDA reports filed, the number filed listing individuals who once worked at the White House, and the percentage of reports filed by those with White House experience.

Figure 1. The Distribution of Lobbying Reports by Firm, June 2006




Note: The Figure shows that approximately 85 firms submitted just a single LDA report but that a small number of firms submitted 200 or more forms. One firm submitted 580 reports. See Table 2 for a list of the most active firms.

Figure 2. The Distribution of Lobbying Reports by Firm, June 1998




Note: See note to Figure 1. Table 3 shows the names of the most active lobbying firms.

Figure 3. Number of Lobbying Reports Including Employees with Experience in Various Government Positions, June 2006




Note: The Figure shows that 230 employers were listed on just a single LDA form. By contrast, a small number of employers were listed several hundred times, with the highest number (a single point not visible on the graph) being 1828 reports listing former employment in the White House. See Table 4 for a fuller description.

Figure 4. Number of Lobbying Reports Including Employees with Experience in Various Government Positions, June 1998




Note: See note to Figure 4, and Table 6 for a detailed list of employers.

Figure 7. All Employers with White House Alumni, All Periods



Note: See notes to Figure 5 and 6. The figure shows all data combined across nine reporting periods, 1998 to 2006. The darkness of the shading indicates higher degree centrality.

Figure 8. Lobbying Firms with White House Alumni, All Periods



Note: See notes to Figure 5 and 6. The figure shows all data combined across nine reporting periods, 1998 to 2006. The darkness of the shading indicates higher degree centrality.