

The Determinants and Effects of Interest-Group Coalitions

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Prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association,
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Abstract: We analyze who participates in lobbying coalitions, on what types of issues, and to what effect. Our analysis is based on a random sample of 98 issues that were the object of lobbying activity in the federal government between 1999 and 2003 and on information concerning each of over 2,000 actors that played a major role in lobbying on them. By using information about both organizational resources and issue characteristics, we work toward a more complete model than most presented in the literature on lobbying coalitions. We incorporate a new measure of success in achieving preferred policy outcomes and can therefore assess whether joining a coalition helps a group achieve its goals. In this way we can address both the questions of who joins as well as what difference it makes.

Very few factors at the issue-level help explain the presence of coalitions. Similarly, organizational characteristics themselves are of little help in explaining participation in coalitions. Rather, the issue-context, interacting with individual-level characteristics, appears determinative. Organizations participate in coalitions when they are involved in issues involving little conflict and high salience within the Washington community. Organizational resources and type are largely unrelated to coalition behavior, though the largest membership organizations are less likely to join coalitions. Many organizations with high levels of resources sometimes do and sometimes do not participate in coalitions. Finally, in contrast to expectations from the literature, coalition participation is *negatively* associated with success in achieving policy goals. Lobbying coalitions may be more an indication of danger rather than a sign of strength. Our conclusions differ from many in the literature possibly because our data stem from a large and random sample of issues rather than from only a small or purposively selected one. Coalitions may well be effective in many instances. On average, however, they may be a sign of trouble.

Introduction

Interest-group coalitions abound in the Washington lobbying process.¹ From high-profile cases such as the massive struggles in the Clinton administration relating to Permanent Normal Trade Relations with China to more prosaic issues such as Amending the Windfall Elimination Provisions and Government Pension Offsets for certain federal workers, we find formal and informal coalitions of policy advocates active across the board, in all types of issues. What groups join these coalitions, and why do they do so rather than work on their own? What do they expect to gain and how does participation in a coalition affect the likelihood of policy success? We report analysis here from a massive study of lobbying and public advocacy conducted with several colleagues over the past five years. Our large study, based on a random sample of policy issues across the full range of areas of governmental activity and on over 300 interviews, allows us to answer a number of questions about who participates in coalitions, why, and to what effect.

The Causes and Consequences of Coalition Participation

A surprising variety of perspectives is apparent in reviewing the literature on why organizations participate in lobbying coalitions and what effect these have. On the one hand, coalitions may not be necessary since like-minded policy advocates can informally coordinate their efforts relatively easily. On the other hand, there are many economies of scale and possibilities of benefiting from a tighter form of coordination that can come only with a more formal coalition or organizational structure of some sort. While there are potential benefits to be reaped, coalition-

¹ This paper draws on research conducted collectively with Jeffrey Berry, Marie Hojnacki, Beth Leech, and David Kimball. Research was supported through NSF grant # SBR-9905195 for the period of August 1, 1999 to December 31, 2000 and NSF grant # SES-0111224, July 1, 2001 to June 30, 2004, with significant additional support from Penn State University.

building involves start-up costs and there is always the problem of free-riding members once the coalition is established.

The creation of a large and diverse coalition signals to government policymakers that broad support is apparent and that significant opposition may not be expected; therefore it can be helpful. On the other hand, this can sometimes be done without bothering to create a formal coalition, simply by actors working on their own. In this section we briefly review some expectations about organizations' decisions to join a coalition, the types of issues on which coalitions should be expected, and finally about the value of coalition participation in terms of achieving one's policy goals.

Who Participates?

A great diversity of hypotheses, some directly contradictory, abound in the scholarly literature on lobbying coalitions. Many of the contradictions stem from considering behaviors that are expected in different types of issues. In reviewing the literature on coalition membership among lobbying organizations, we can see at least the following expectations.

First, coalitions are the weapons of the weak. They present a relatively low-cost mechanism either to participate in the policy process by lending one's name to a pre-existing coalition, or (for those organizing the coalition) to gain the credibility that comes with an impressive list of supporting groups. As Whitford puts it coalitions are a low-cost means for assembling minority interests into more powerful blocks (2003, 45). Sharing resources among members of the coalition, each contributing a part, is another benefit thought to be especially helpful to the relatively poorly financed lobbying organizations or those that are involved in a great range of issues rather than those groups are active in only one domain. Thus it should be expected among citizen groups, nonprofits, unions, and especially consumer and environmental

organizations. According to this logic, we should not expect to see lobbying in coalitions so much among the resource-rich or among trade associations, large corporations, and the like.

Second, coalitions are the weapons of the rich and powerful. It costs money to hire a coalition coordinator (or a PR firm to do this work), to assemble the membership list, to assess dues, to coordinate activities, and to overcome the organizational obstacles that such things require. And many groups will be free-riders in any coalition, taking the benefits of coalition membership but contributing little to its activities. According to this logic, it is more likely that the best endowed organizations, perhaps trade associations (whose internal structure is often already somewhat akin to a coalition), would be the most likely participants in coalitions. Certainly for large coalitions such as those existing commonly on very high visibility public debates, we see impressive lists of high-profile corporations, trade groups, and major Washington players active in coalitions. A number of scholars have addressed the organizational resource question as it relates to participating in coalitions (Bacheller 1977; Schlozman and Tierney 1986; Walker 1991; Hula 1995; Hojnacki 1998). Heaney (2004) suggests that a more appropriate model would be that the poor organizations may be free-riding members of the coalition not contributing to its leadership while the wealthy groups may become coalition leaders; his statistical analysis showed no significant relation between resource levels and leadership position within coalitions however; rather, groups became active on those coalitions that were central to the group's core missions (see also Wilson 1973).

Third, some authors have suggested some types of organizations just simply are less likely to engage in coalition activity relative to other actor types. Clark and Wilson (1961) suggest that cooperation is more likely among utilitarian groups and less likely among purposive groups which are more restricted in their activities due to incentive systems (1961, 162). Caldeira

and Wright in their study of *amici curiae* activity suggest public firms and peak associations are less likely to cooperate (1990, 799). Thus perhaps actor type predicts of coalition membership.

Why would an organization join a coalition rather than only lobby on its own? For one, if its goals happen to coincide completely with the goals of the broader coalition, and if the coalition is going to do most of the work, then this is an easy decision. But we should not assume this to be the case. Certainly, in the contemporary policy process in Congress, massive pieces of legislation often involve huge numbers of disparate elements of policy, merged into a single whole by a process that no single lobbyist can control. In these diverse and complex policymaking environments, for example in the case of the Patient's Bill of Rights that was hotly debated during the period of our interviews in Washington, many diverse organizations may share certain goals (say, increased Medicare reimbursement rates for doctor's visits in general, or certain provisions regarding the privacy of medical information), but they may diverge on the particulars (which doctors? which bits of medical information?). "Peeling off" from a coalition to protect a more particularistic benefit is certainly not uncommon. In any case, lobbying on one's own for particular benefits does not preclude lobbying as part of a coalition for some broader goals. Groups may well do both: Lobby alone and in a coalition.

From the perspective of the lobbying group coalitions can provide many benefits. Perhaps most importantly they can demonstrate the breadth of support that one's position enjoys. Scholars from Mayhew (1974) to Kingdon (1981) to Esterling (forthcoming) have suggested that policymakers look for signs that a policy proposal has broad support among affected constituencies. This may be because it signals that technical research has been done and the policy is likely to work as advertised, according to those with specialized knowledge (see Esterling, forthcoming) or because Members of Congress simply want to know whether a vote in

favor of this provision will later be used against them in the next election by some organization (see Mayhew 1974; Kingdon 1981). In any case, a broad coalition with the right members signals a lot to policymakers; this can be invaluable in building support (see Hula 1995).

Organizations may become involved in coalitions as they seek to broaden the appeal of their issue. While organizations do not control the nature of the issues with which they deal single-handedly, groups seeking a particular policy change from government may sometimes benefit from expanding the definition of the issue to include other similarly situated potential allies. Expanding the issue (say) from being one that affects your company's ability to gain a favorable regulation affecting one factory's emissions to one affecting the nation's overall emissions regulation policy may or may not be the way to go, depending on a variety of factors. But a coalition is neither necessary nor likely to be possible in the first case, whereas it may be easy in the second. Particularistic goals do not mesh with broad coalitions; more general policy goals are compatible with creating a broader coalition. Some groups may avoid coalitions because they prefer to seek narrow policy goals. Other groups, seeking broader goals affecting many similarly situated organizations, may be more likely to be coalition activists.

Groups may join coalitions because they may falsely believe it will be useful. Folklore abounds in Washington and there are many examples of impressive policy successes that came about at least partly because of the efforts of organized coalitions. (The large number of equally impressive policy failures may not be remembered as well.) Coalition entrepreneurs, possibly seeking financial support, may be effective salespersons, convincing many potential "consumers" that they should join a coalition and contribute resources to it because doing so will increase the likelihood of policy success. Whether or not this is true is a completely different story.

A final reason to join a coalition is simple: it is relatively low-cost and a rational lobbyist may try out many lobbying techniques knowing that they cannot always know ahead of time which particular technique will be useful. This type of “all directional” lobbying simply involves using a greater number of tactics rather than fewer, without necessarily targeting the choice of tactics so carefully (Coen 1997; Pijnenburg 1998). In this scenario, relatively low-cost tactics such as joining a coalition make good sense even if the precise pay-off to this one tactic may be uncertain. Especially in the case of a relatively high-salience issue, we may find that organizations involved in such issues use a great number of lobbying tactics. In this sense, coalition participation may be simply a part of a rising tide of lobbying activity in general on those issues that demand lots of energy. This implies that high salience issues involving many actors will also involve more coalitions, just as they involve more of other types of activities and tactics.

When Do Coalitions Emerge?

On what types of issues would coalitions be expected to emerge? Here again we see diverse and opposite expectations emerging from the literature. On the one hand, narrow issues may have clear and relatively homogeneous sets of groups that can easily be assembled into a coalition. Similarly, on narrow issues operating within a relatively restricted issue-niche, policymakers might expect to see coalitions and the absence of one might be taken as a sign of serious conflict. With regular participants in a well defined issue-niche, with consensus on goals, it should be straightforward to create a coalition (Browne 1990).

On the other hand, broad issues cutting across previously established policy boundaries may call for coalitions, making these temporary structures more valuable than when dealing with repetitive issues with the same actors over and over again (Salisbury et al., 1987). A broad

coalition encompassing both energy producers and environmental groups can signal to policymakers that an unusual consensus is possible at least in a particular issue. So we might expect coalitions on those issues that span across traditional policy domains, or where heterogeneous combinations of actors can be brought together.

Many organizations have the capacity to lobby directly on their own for particular benefits they seek or as part of a trade or industry organization for issues that affect them and other similarly situated organizations (e.g., Ford Motor Company can lobby on its own, but it can also rely on the Automobile Manufacturers Association in some cases when this trade group can speak for a consensus view among all its members). To the extent that issues are broader, spanning even across more than one industry, then we might expect coalitions to be more prevalent. After all, why work through an ad-hoc coalition when so many trade and professional groups already exist whose very purpose is to lobby in those cases where membership interests are relatively consensual? As above, lobbying as part of a coalition certainly does not preclude lobbying on one's own (see Pijnenburg 1998).

It seems clear from the literature that more scholars expect coalitions to arise on highly conflictual issues than on narrow issues. First, highly conflictual issues will attract coalitions because conflict gives groups an incentive to band together to face a common threat (Gais and Walker 1991; Hojnacki 1997; Whitford 2003). Second, issues taking place within the context of large issue-networks rather than in smaller policy communities attract coalitions because interest groups can use the coalition structure as a means to work out differences among themselves before approaching government officials (Hecklo 1978; Hula 1995). Finally, highly salient issues in terms of media attention attract coalitions because of the higher resource needs in this type of lobbying and because of the greater value of asserting a broad base of support. So we can see

reasons to expect coalitions on many different types of issues. The results are likely to relate to a combination of contextual and individual factors for each group.

Do Coalitions Help Groups Achieve Success?

There are many examples of powerful coalitions where groups working together have accomplished notable policy successes that any one of them could not have expected to accomplish if working alone. Washington lobbyists invest tremendous resources hiring staff, renting offices, and investing in the organizational infrastructure to make coalitions work. (Other coalitions are more informal, of course.) Clearly, many believe that coalitions increase the chance of policy success; otherwise why would there be so many of them, and why would groups invest so much in them?

While it would seem obvious that groups would join coalitions because they believe these will help them influence policy outcomes, few have actually studied whether in fact they do. Rather, more common seems to be an assumption that rational lobbyists simply would not be investing resources in something that is unsuccessful. After all, President Clinton may not have been successful in pushing through his highly controversial but finally successful proposal to promote Permanent Normal Trade Relations with China without the activities of three supporting coalitions: the Business Coalition for U.S.–China Trade, the U.S. High-Tech Coalition on China, and the Agriculture Coalition for U.S.–China Trade. But how can we assess this question systematically? In fact there are many possible outcomes from the creation of a coalition, and there are many reasons for an organization to create or participate in a coalition that are unrelated to ultimate policy success.

Coalitions may be ad hoc or long-standing. Once a coalition has been created it may be relatively inexpensive to keep it going. Whether this means simply maintaining a mailing list

and monthly meeting date after one lobbying campaign ends and a similar one appears on the horizon, or if it extends to a more formal stage of creating a staff, a headquarters, and a budget, some coalitions are pre-made and others have to be made from scratch. This is largely stochastic or unrelated to the nature of the issue today, as it relates more to the history of action on the issue in previous years. In sum, one reason for the presence of coalitions—policy history—may be generally unrelated to current circumstances or to the potential for success in the current policy battle.

Coalitions may be a sign of trouble. Their presence could be more commonly associated with efforts to mitigate disasters rather than attempts to achieve new policy victories. After all, for each organization attempting to push public policy in some new direction, other groups may need to mobilize to protect the status quo or their own interests. Some coalitions may be proactive; others, reactive, the result of a coalitional arms-race, so to speak. Many reactive coalitions may get created after organizations with similar stakes in the issue recognize that major changes adversely affecting their interests are either possible, likely, or inevitable. A defensive mobilization attempting to limit the degree of policy change, or stop it altogether, may be a very common lobbying situation. If so, then we may not see coalitions normally being associated with policy victories, but with failures. These reactive coalitions may emerge either in reaction to formal coalitions on the other side, or simply in response to threats that may not necessarily involve a rival coalition. In either case, they may be related more with policy failure rather than success.

Coalitions can be “successful” if the outcome of their activities is to limit the degree of policy change its members suffer. However, this type of policy success (e.g., limiting one’s losses) is quite different from actually achieving a new policy victory, so in our analysis we will

treat successes only as achieving one's goals and failures will be reciprocal to successes. That is, in our empirical analysis below if we code one side as successful then we count the opposing side as unsuccessful. If coalitions largely emerge as reactive and defensive efforts to limit damage, then they will be associated with policy failures in our analysis if policy changes occur. If they emerge on average in the context of efforts to gain new policy advantages, and if these efforts tend to succeed, then in our analysis we will see coalition activity statistically to be associated with increased policy success. (Of course, we also allow for partial successes.)

From the perspective of a coalitional entrepreneur attempting to recruit members (or even a rational organization deciding whether to join), mitigating a disaster can be just as valuable as gaining a new success. From the perspective of a policy analyst, however, it seems worth separating out proactive use of coalitions by those seeking new policy gains from the reactive use of the same strategy by those seeking to protect the status quo. Our analysis does exactly this. We can therefore assess the degree to which coalitions are associated with policy success as defined as new policy gains. Of course, the simplest hypothesis remains the most straightforward: Groups join coalitions because they expect them to be successful.

Summary: A Difficult Research Problem

As in many areas of the literature on lobbying, contradictory and confusing expectations abound concerning when one would expect to see an organization lobby through a coalition as opposed to working only on its own. The reasons for these different expectations are largely similar to those that affect the field of lobbying studies in general: Lobbyists are active in a variety of ways on many issues and adjust their tactics both in relation to their own particular resources as well as to the characteristics of the issue at hand. In fact, the same organization will follow very different tactics on different issues, as the situation demands. This is easy enough for all to

recognize, but surprisingly difficult to study in a systematic manner because general surveys of groups have tended to ask organizations to generalize about what they *usually* do, and issue-specific studies have typically been based on such a small number of issues (often just one; typically fewer than five; see Baumgartner and Leech 1998, chapters 7 and 9). Our study is based on a large number of randomly selected issues and on information regarding a complete set of major participants in that sample of issues. As such, we should be able to address a number of hypotheses conclusively.

Many hypotheses stemming from the literature make perfect sense for certain groups in certain circumstances, but may not hold across the board (though they may be presented as general expectations). Much of the literature appears to be addressing groups starting out from scratch attempting to achieve some new policy benefit. In fact, virtually all issues in the federal government that are the object of lobbying at any given point are on-going issues, having been present for several years and expected to be present continually for the foreseeable future. The continuing nature of most policy debates is insufficiently recognized in the literature, but many behaviors may have more of a reputational value in the long run rather than a short-term instrumental value relating to the issue at hand, as Michael Heaney discusses (2004). Similarly, the reactive nature of much lobbying is not given the attention it deserves. After all, for each group hypothesized to push in one direction, there may be several others ready to react. The overall effect, including reactions, may be quite different than only the direct behaviors most often discussed in the literature. This may be particularly the case when we consider the overall success of lobbying through coalitions. Creating a coalition may well be a good idea, other things being equal. However, other things in Washington are not equal; rivals will react to one's decision. Therefore, it is important to think through the ultimate impact of a given decision,

including the reactions of rivals. This may help explain why lobbying through coalitions is less often associated with policy success than the literature would lead one to expect. We turn now to our evidence after explaining our analytic approach.

Our Approach and Evidence

We make use of the data collected as part of the Advocacy and Public Policymaking Project.

This project involves interviews with over 300 policymakers and advocates on a random sample of 98 issues that were the object of federal government lobbying between 1999 and 2003.

Appendix Table 1 lists each of the issues and the coalitions present on each one.²

Our project defines a “major actor” as a policymaker or advocate identified by others as playing a significant role in the policy process. We and our colleagues interviewed a large number of these major actors, generally one from the leadership of each of the major perspectives on the issue. Our data are not limited to those whom we interviewed, however. In this paper we make use of information we collected about every major actor, whether we interviewed them or not. Using publicly available sources such as web sites, government directories, IRS reports (form 990s for nonprofit organizations), the *Associations Unlimited* web site, *Washington Representatives*, and business directories such as Fortune.com and Hoovers.com, we gathered a range of information about each of the major participants in every issue. In all, we identified a total of 2,160 major actors across our sample of issues.

For every policy advocate active in each of our issues, we know whether they were a member of a coalition or not. We gathered membership lists of all 91 coalitions that were active across our 98 cases and coded whether our major actors were members of the coalitions. These

² Table A-1 lists all 98 issues. We have not completed coding of all the actors for two issues and therefore have coalition data only on 96 issues. Some tables have slightly fewer than 96 cases because of missing data on one of the independent variables.

lists were drawn from our interview materials, their website or their leadership's website.

Further, we can assess whether they and their allied organizations were successful in gaining the policy outcomes they sought. Combined with a wealth of information about their material resources, group type, and set of allies, we can then test in a straightforward manner a variety of hypotheses from the literature. Note that because our dataset is limited only to those who played a significant policy role, we will not address hypotheses concerning free-riders or others who lend their names to a coalition but do not play an active role on the issue. Rather, we can assess whether being a part of a coalition is a lobbying strategy reserved for only certain types of organizations or not and any possible linkage between coalition activities and policy success.

Table 1 shows the distribution of coalitions across our issues.

(Insert Table 1 about here)

Coalitions were active in just over half of our cases. About one-third of the cases involved only a single coalition, and about one-quarter of the issues involved two or more coalitions. (Note that our analysis includes only coalitions identified by others as playing an important role; there could well have been other, relatively invisible and ineffective coalitions on these issues as well; these are omitted from our study.) Among the 1,050 participants who were not themselves Members of Congress, Congressional staff, or executive branch officials, 429 were involved as active members of coalitions, or 41 percent. Just as we gathered significant information about each participant in the process, we also know a great deal about each of our 98 issues, including the level of news coverage, the number of participants, which types of government officials were involved, and the level of lobbying activity. We can systematically address variables at both the individual- and issue-level using these combined data sources, and we have significant variation on our key variables. We turn to this analysis now.

Analyzing Coalition Behavior

Coalitions were present in 55 of our issues, absent 43 times. What distinguishes these issues? In general, issue-level factors alone simply do not explain the differences, as we will show in the next section. We then move to the individual level where we can assess not only the individual characteristics of the organizations that join lobbying coalitions, but also the particular issues on which they become active. In fact, characteristics of the issues at hand have a strong impact on the decision to participate in a coalition, much stronger than organizational resources alone. Do those groups that participate in coalitions achieve their policy goals? Here, results show that coalition participation is not related to success; in fact it appears more commonly associated with failure. Rather than being the certain route to policy success, lobbying coalitions may even more commonly be associated with losing battles to protect the status quo after a challenge has emerged. This does not mean that joining a coalition is a mistake; rather it more likely means that some groups may join coalitions for proactive reasons but an even larger number join coalitions when they see their interests threatened.

When Do Coalitions Emerge?

In Table 2 we present a model of the emergence of coalitions; a simple probit model that predicts the presence of a coalition on the basis of two measures of issue-salience, the types of conflict present, and the total number of participants on the issue.

(Insert Table 2 about here)

Table 2 shows that the total number of participants active on the issue is barely a significant predictor of the presence of a coalition. Moving from the mean value of that variable to one standard-deviation above the mean (with all other variables held at their means) increases the odds of a coalition being active by seven percent. No other variables have any significant impact, including the amount of newspaper and TV coverage (outside salience index), the

volume of congressional testimony and other inside-Washington activity (inside salience index), whether there exist directly opposing positions (Conflict 2) or more than one perspective active on the issue (Conflict 1). Overall, the model performs poorly, explaining little of the variation in coalition activity across the issues. These findings are surprising given the literature that would lead one to expect some significant relations, especially between conflict, salience, and coalition behavior.

Table 2 showed that virtually none of our issue-level predictors of coalitions has a strong impact on the likelihood that a coalition will be present in a given issue. It included two dummy variables for the types of conflict that may be present in a given issue. Table 3 shows the bivariate relation between conflict and coalition activity.

(Insert Table 3 about here)

The table shows that 14 of our issues had no conflict whatsoever. This includes situations where advocates were seeking a policy goal that was not opposed by any other actor in the system (though many advocates faced serious impediments to favorable action, such as being able to get the attention of prominent government officials or generalized concerns about budget scarcity; these issues however were characterized by the absence of any form of organized conflict or even different perspectives on the issue). In these 14 cases, coalitions were present six times, absent eight times. (This absence of conflict is the baseline model for the dummy-variable analysis in Table 2.)

The next level of conflict, affecting 10 of our cases, concerns differing but not directly opposing perspectives on the issue. This would be for example when one side is seeking a revision to a given bill and another set of actors seek a different, but not directly opposing, shift in policy. Actors seeking these two different goals may compete for the attention of

policymakers but the outcomes they seek are not directly opposed. Coalitions might be expected here on the grounds that groups need to gain greater attention and support for their perspective, given the alternative perspective also being pushed in the policy process by rivals. However, here as well the evidence is split, with seven cases showing coalitions and three showing no coalitions. (In fact, this 70% rate is the strongest among the three categories of conflict, but Table 2 shows this to be a statistically insignificant difference in the multivariate context, and given the small number of cases we think it unwise to interpret too strongly that difference which may seem apparent in the data.)

The bulk of our cases, 73 of 97 in fact, involve the direct competition of opposing sides. Here is where one might expect the greatest level of coalition activity, since these are the cases where opposing sides are competing for the attention and support of government officials. In fact, however, there is no greater likelihood of coalitions emerging in these cases than in the others; 58% of these cases have a coalition present as compared to 57% in the dataset overall. The insignificant tau-*b* and Chi-sq. statistics shown make clear that conflict is not what drives coalition activity.

The lack of any significant relations between conflict or other issue-level variables and the presence of a coalition may at first seem surprising. Surely conflict, the sheer size of the issue (that is, the total number of major advocates involved), media or inside-Washington salience should matter, at least based on the literature. Clearly, however, our data show that a model at the issue level will not work. After all, for a coalition to be present, some lobbyist or other advocate must take the initiative to create it. Some coalitions we know are standing ones; others are ad-hoc. So it may not be so surprising after all that we cannot predict the presence of coalitions by looking at issue-level characteristics alone.

In the next section therefore we turn our attention to a different question, at a lower level of aggregation. Rather than looking at our 98 issues, asking which ones will see coalitions emerge, we look at our 1,000+ policy advocates, asking which ones will participate in coalitions on which issues. We find much more success in isolating the determinants of coalition participation when we combine both individual-level factors with issue-level characteristics. Paradoxically, given the lack of any relationship between issue and coalitions in this section, we find very strong effects of the issue-context in the next section. Lobbyists participate in coalitions only on certain types of issues. But not every organization has the capacity to participate in a coalition, or to create one. Now we turn to this combined individual-level and issue-level analysis.

Who Participates in Coalitions?

Table 4 presents a combined model of participation in a coalition. Part A presents a model for membership organizations, and Part B a similar model for corporations. In the model for organizations, we first include a series of group-type dummy variables designed to test whether certain types of groups are more likely to be involved in coalitions. Then, in both models, we include a number of measures of material resources: membership size (or Fortune 500 status, for corporations), having a Washington DC office, having a hired outside PR/lobbying firm; number of professional staff in the government relations department; the number of affiliated PACs; and finally an overall budget resources index made up of several highly correlated measures of staff and monetary resources.³ Third, similarly for both models, we present a series of issue-level

³ We created this index using Stata's "factor" and "score" commands from information on the organization's 1) income and 2) assets from either the IRS databases on non-profits or the IRS database maintained by *Associations Unlimited* as well as information on 3) staff size and 4) budget size from *Washington Representatives*. If an actor was missing data on any of the four items, we used the available variables, adjusting their weights to account for the number of

variables. For each organization we include measures of how many other actors were involved in the issue (issue size); two measures of salience (inside and outside Washington DC);⁴ and two measures of conflict (rival but not conflicting perspective present—Conflict 1—and direct opposition—Conflict 2). Finally, we include a variable designed to assess the counteractive nature of coalition formation: Whether a coalition exists on the opposite side of the same issue. The model for corporations is similar to the model for membership organizations with the group-type variables excluded and minor other adjustments.

(Insert Table 4 about here)

Looking first at the organizational type variables, it is apparent that there is little systematic pattern. Organizations of government units are relatively unlikely to participate in coalitions, though this value is barely above statistical significance. None of the other group-type variables is statistically significant; unions, trade associations, citizen groups, professional associations are all equally likely to participate in coalitions, depending on other factors. What other factors tend to matter? The data point to issue-specific characteristics, especially the level of conflict. For organizations, inside-Washington salience has a strong positive effect on coalition membership, and any type of conflict has a strong negative effect. For corporations, conflict also appears to deter coalition membership, though the effect is weaker. In both models we see only modest and mostly insignificant results for organizational characteristics.

missing variables and using regression coefficients from a model predicting the index only for those cases with all valid data. In this way we were able to estimate the budget resources index for virtually all the relevant cases.

⁴ The Inside Salience Index is created from data on the number of floor statements made on the issue in Congress; the number of web articles on the issue on the House of Representatives website; the number of witnesses presenting testimony on the issue in Congressional hearings; and the number of National Journal articles on the issue. The Outside Salience Index is created from data on the number of news articles on the issue in major national newspapers and the number of network television news reports on the issue.

The most powerful signals coming from the results laid out in Table 4 are two-fold: First, individual-level factors including comprehensive measures of group and corporate resources have little effect across the board on coalition behavior. Organizational type similarly has little to no impact, other things held constant. Second, issue-context seems to play the most important role. Groups react to the level of salience and to the level of conflict. They are systematically more involved in coalitions on those issues with higher Washington salience and lower levels of conflict. Mostly, however, the model shows a great number of hypothesized variables to play little to no systematic role, with the exception of these two issue-specific factors. This is particularly striking considering our finding on Table 2 that we could explain little about the likely presence of a coalition by looking *only* at the nature of the issues. In a combined analysis, Table 4 shows in fact that issue-characteristics predominate, but only when included in a model also incorporating individual resources and characteristics. Clearly, a combined approach at several levels is necessary.

Table 4 showed that our series of organizational-type dummy variables generally were not significant in the multivariate context. These negative findings, given the expectations from the literature, are surprising enough to merit some further investigation. Here we look at this question in more detail, taking advantage of the fact that many organizations were involved more than once in our various issues. We can therefore assess whether their behavior is similar in different contexts. Our analysis confirms and extends the results in Table 4 that organizational type has little to do with choice of tactics; issue context matters. Table 5 shows the simple bivariate relation between coalition participation and organizational type.

(Insert Table 5 about here)

Table 5 lays out the types of organizations in our study roughly in order of their proclivities to participate in coalitions: Those with the highest percentage participation are listed at the top, with only some miscellaneous categories with few cases listed out of order towards the bottom. (Government officials themselves were not coalition members by definition, but we include them in the table for the sake of completeness.) It does seem that corporations, trade groups, and business associations are the most likely to participate in coalitions, for reasons that we laid out in the first section of this paper. However, the differences are not very strong. Citizen-based groups, unions, foundations, and professional groups are also quite likely to participate, at least among those types of organizations where we have a significant number of cases in our study. While there are differences apparent in Table 5, they are not strong and the multivariate analysis in Table 4 shows that these are probably accounted for by other factors, such as the types of issues on which these organizations are involved. No particular type of lobbying organization avoids or craves coalition participation absolutely. It all depends on the issue. Including issue-specific factors, as we do in Table 4, renders virtually all of our group-type variables insignificant.

We can see more strongly that there are few absolute organizational predispositions by looking at the organizations which appeared in our study multiple times. Recall that our sample is one of issues on which lobbyists are active, and for each issue we include those actors that are considered by others to be the major participants. The same organization can be a major participant on more than one of our cases. When this happens, we can assess whether it always, sometimes, or never participates in a coalition. We can also compare these “repeat players” (many of whom are Washington heavyweights) with those who appear only once; if the repeat players are more likely to participate in coalitions it may suggest this is a tactic reserved for the

particularly well connected or most active. Table 6 presents this analysis, and Table 7 shows the patterns of coalition behavior among our most commonly recurring advocates.

(Insert Table 6 about here)

If coalition participation is learned behavior or reserved only for the best connected Washington lobbyists, evidence for this is completely absent in Table 6. Among organizations (that is, membership groups of all types), there are literally no differences in the likelihood of participating in coalitions among those which appear just once in our dataset and those which are active on more than one of our issues. Thirty-six percent of the one-time actors are in coalitions, and 36 percent of the repeat players are as well. Among corporations, 42 percent of the one-time actors are in coalitions, and 43 percent of the repeat players are. Clearly, repeat player status has nothing to do with coalition participation. In Table 7 we see some of the reasons for this.

(Insert Table 7 about here)

Table 7 lists some of the most well known names in American politics. The first part of the table lists every organization that appeared in five or more of our issues, 20 organizations in all. If coalition participation were a result of organizational characteristics alone, as some of the literature might lead one to expect, then we should expect to see common patterns of behavior, or predominant patterns with groups either (almost) always or (almost) never participating in coalitions, no matter what the issue. We do not see this. Rather, 18 of the 20 organizations sometimes do but sometimes do not participate in a coalition across the different issues on which they were major actors. Looking at corporations in the second part of the table, results are similar but slightly more mixed because we did not have as many repeat-player corporations in our study so we report in Table 7 every organization that appeared twice or more. Even here, we see strong evidence that contextual factors matter. The typical multiply active corporation

sometimes does, but sometimes does not, participate in a coalition. Clearly, organizational factors alone cannot account for coalition behavior.

In this section we have seen that organizations of all types participate in coalitions, but they do not do so in all situations. Organizational capacity is not very strongly related to participation in coalitions, a fact that could possibly be related to some censoring within the set of organizations included in our study (including only those recognized by others involved as major participants in the policy process). Certainly there are groups out there that simply do not have the resources or connections to participate in a coalition in Washington. However, among important players, we find little organizational effect. Rather, groups pick and choose which coalitions to join on the basis of the issue. Looking at these conclusions and comparing them to those of the previous section where we analyzed the 98 issues which compose our sample, it is difficult to avoid a point of methodological irony: Issue-characteristics dominate the model at the individual level but an issue-only analysis fails to find any significant patterns. We will return to this issue in the conclusion to the paper. For now, we turn to the question of whether joining a coalition helps a group achieve its goals.

Do Coalitions Help Lobbyists Achieve Their Preferred Policy Outcomes?

For every organization active in each of our 98 issues, we can assess the degree to which they achieved their policy goals. Table 8 presents a simple frequency distribution of a summary variable assessing the level of success that each group had across six possible measures of success (each of the six measures of success could be scored 0 for no success; 1 for partial; 2 for complete success).⁵ The variable has a hypothetical maximum score of 12.

⁵ The six items are: Did the organization succeed in achieving their goal regarding: 1) federal budget 2) state and local budgets 3) private actors 4) established programs 5) new programs and 6) government authority or jurisdiction.

(Insert Table 8 about here)

Table 8 shows considerable variation: about 42 percent of our advocates achieved absolutely nothing that they were seeking, with the remaining 58 percent accomplishing some of their policy goals, at least partially. Since different groups may have been seeking different types of things (or a different number of things), Table 9 presents a revised measure of outcome success simply adjusting the raw scores from Table 8 by dividing by the number of goals that the advocate in fact did seek; it has a maximum score of two and a minimum of zero. We will use this measure in the analysis below; we prefer it to the raw scores in Table 8 because each of the six types of goals was not relevant or applicable to all advocates.

(Insert Table 9 about here)

Table 9 shows that we have a wide range of policy successes present among our advocates; about equal proportions (40 to 45 percent) achieved none of their goals and all of their goals. Roughly 14 percent of our advocates fell in the middle, achieving some but not all that they wanted. We can use this measure of success in achieving policy goals as a dependent variable then in an analysis including coalition membership and other control variables; this should give us a straightforward way to assess whether coalition membership is helpful in achieving policy goals, other things equal.

We are now in a position to estimate the determinants of success and to show whether being a member of a coalition helps a lobbying organization achieve the policy goals that it seeks. In addition to the individual- and issue-level variables included in our model predicting coalition membership, we introduce two more independent variables here. First, of course, we have a simple measure of whether the actor was a member of a coalition; this is the variable of greatest interest for us in this paper. Second, since the literature suggests that the composition a

coalition may be determinative, we construct a measure of its heterogeneity. The Proportion Business in Coalition variable has a score of 1.0 if all the members of a coalition are business firms; 0.0 if none are corporations.⁶ Other variables in our model have been previously introduced. Table 10 presents our model.

(Insert Table 10 about here)

Coalition membership is highly significant in our model of lobbying success, but it is strongly related with failure rather than success. Being active within a coalition is strongly related with achieving a lower proportion of one's goals. Other significant variables include issue-size (that is, the total number of advocates involved in the debate), the presence of direct conflict among the major perspectives on the debate, and, perhaps surprisingly, just one of the group type dummy variables: being a corporation (which is negatively related to success). Among organizational resource variables, only one, having an outside counsel, is significant in our model (also negatively related to success). The most powerful predictors are issue-size, coalition membership, and direct conflict.

What conclusions can we draw from these findings? For one, large conflictual issues apparently draw in many actors who achieve at least partial success. For two, joining a coalition and hiring outside counsel may be associated with those organizations (often business firms apparently) who sense trouble brewing and who are attempting to reduce their losses.

We can discount a few potential rival explanations. First, coalitions do not form only in cases of high conflict. We saw in Table 2 above that there is in fact no relationship between the level of conflict on an issue and the presence of a coalition. We ran an alternative specification

⁶ We also tested an alternative specification measuring coalition heterogeneity which has a maximum value when half the members of a coalition are businesses and half are other types and a value of zero when the members of the coalition are either all businesses or exclude businesses. Neither is significant.

of the model in Table 10 in which we interacted our coalition variable with our conflict variables; this was not significant. Some further evidence that a dynamic of limiting damage may be operating comes from the finding that larger coalitions are less successful than smaller ones. Including a variable for coalition size when we also include the dichotomous coalition measure creates problems of multicollinearity but both variables have negative coefficients. Dropping the dichotomous measure and including only the coalition size measure leads to a very strong negative coefficient for the coalition size variable ($b = -.047$; $\text{prob.} < .001$). We will return to the implications of this later.

In all, the findings presented in Table 10 point to several conclusions. First, coalitions are not successful on average. Second, the determinants of policy success in Washington are quite complex. A great number of reasonable hypotheses can be discounted. No single type of organization is more likely to be successful than any other, with one exception: Business firms are slightly more likely to be on the losing side of things than other types of groups. In terms of material resources, none are related to policy success. The determinants of policy success, like the determinants of participation in a coalition, appear to be complex and mostly related to the nature of the issue at hand rather than to any simple set of organizational characteristics including monetary resources, having a PAC, having a large DC-based government relations department, having a large membership, or any other set of resources.

Conclusion

In this paper we have presented a great amount of information concerning the correlates and effects of joining a coalition. Coalitions emerge on issues for reasons that cannot be predicted or understood with reference to characteristics of the issues alone. Organizations join coalitions for reasons that cannot be predicted only on the basis of organizational resources and characteristics.

Rather, advocates choose to become involved in coalitions for reasons that are heavily contingent on the nature of the issue at hand and the behaviors of their allies and rivals. Are coalitions helpful? Here the evidence is clear: Joining a coalition is more likely a sign of policy trouble than a clear route to policy success. Coalition membership is related to lower rather than higher levels of policy success.

The strategic choice of lobbying tactics, including coalition participation, depend more on the nature of the issue at hand than on the set of resources available to individual groups. All types of groups, from large to small, public interest groups as well as self-interested corporations and trade associations, participate in coalitions. They do so largely for reasons associated with the issue at hand, not their individual characteristics. The degree to which participation in coalitions helps these groups achieve their goals is highly mixed and appears to differ substantially, as does the decision to join them in the first place, on the basis of characteristics of the issue rather than characteristics of the individual group. Whether we look at policy success or at the decision to participate in a coalition in the first place, we find that individual resources interact with issue-characteristics in determining behaviors and outcomes. In neither case will a model solely at one level of analysis explain much of what we have observed. This simple fact may help explain much of the contradictory nature of the literature in this area.

Our analysis of the determinants of policy success makes clear that influence in Washington cannot be easily predicted or explained. A great many factors affect whether an advocate achieves its goals. What are the possible reasons why joining a coalition would be *negatively* rather than positively associated with policy success? Why do groups continue to join coalitions if they more often than not result in policy failure? We would point to three possible reasons: Reputational effects, threat effects, and diffusion of goals.

Groups may be willing to participate in, or lead, coalitions even if they expect them to be failures. In the face of a strong policy threat, it can be valuable to become the leader of the “valiant effort” to save a cherished policy. Going down with the ship, so to speak, or being one of the most visible and prominent defenders of a policy position that is temporarily outvoted by one’s opponents, can still have long-term benefits for an organization. Heaney (2004) suggests that these reputational effects may be very strong. Our analysis suggests that these may indeed be more important than any immediate policy effect.

The threat of impending policy changes that adversely affect a set of organizations may make it easier to recruit advocates to join and become active in a coalition hoping to protect the status quo. If on average, coalitions are easier to form and to recruit members in those cases where a policy threat appears on the horizon, then our finding could be due to a selection effect, in essence (Heaney 2004 suggests this threat hypothesis though Truman 1951 is the more common citation). We noted that the size of our coalitions (measured by the number of organizations in the coalition who are recognized by others as major actors on the debate) was *negatively* associated with success. One possible reason for this finding is that threats induce participation by those hoping to mitigate the damage more than possible policy gains mobilize those who may seek to benefit from them.

Finally, it is possible that the dynamics of creating a coalition may push organizations towards broader policy objectives, and broader objectives may be less likely to be fully successful than narrow objectives. Individual organizations working with few allies may seek narrowly defined goals but if they want to work through a coalition they may need to broaden their goals. Narrow goals may require no coalition. We will leave this question to a future paper

but it is worth noting that our finding could be due either to a selection effect or to some way in which joining a coalition affects a group's goals, and therefore its likelihood of achieving them.

Groups adopt their lobbying tactics partially with reference to their skills and capabilities. But most significant groups have the skills and capabilities to engage in a wide variety of tactics including joining coalitions. Rather than look here for explanations, we should be looking at combined analyses of individual resources as these interact with the nature of the issue. Groups choose what to do in reaction to what those around them are doing and what the situation demands. As this is a strategic decision, it should not be surprising that many models treating it as purely determined by organizational factors alone have not been successful. Further work may be necessary to understand these dynamics entirely, but in this paper we have shown strong evidence that the decision to join a coalition is more strongly related to issue-characteristics rather than individual resources. Further, since it is negatively related to policy success, it is most likely a lobbying tactic chosen on average more by those groups attempting to limit their losses rather than those attempting to achieve a new policy victory. Coalitions may well be the right strategy in many circumstances. On average, they are a sign of trouble brewing.

Finally, on a methodological note, it is worth noting the paradox of our findings at different levels of analysis and considering the implications of this for the literature on lobbying and the most advisable research strategies to follow. Our analysis reported in Tables 1 through 3 showed virtually no significant variables in predicting the emergence of coalitions when the unit of analysis was our 98 issues. Moving to the individual level of analysis however we found that issue-specific variables in fact dominated the individual-level variables, a fact that we attributed to the selective and context-driven behavior of individual lobbying organizations. Our data clearly show that joining coalitions is typically not an organizational attribute at all. Rather, on

any given issue, organizations will work in coalitions or not, depending on the context. This type of multi-level analysis is possible only in complex research designs involving a sampling strategy which allows the researcher to discuss both a large and random sample of issues as well as a sample of participants in those issues. A great number of contradictions and confusions in the literature on lobbying are undoubtedly related to the combination of survey-based research designs that are insensitive to issue-context on the one hand and case-study based projects that lack broad generalizability, on the other. The larger Advocacy and Public Policymaking Project of which this paper is a part presents what we hope will be a model for combining attention both to individual factors and issue-specific ones within a single project.

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Table 1. Number of Coalitions per Issue

Number of Coalitions	None	One	Two	Three	More Than Three	Total
Number of Issues	43	32	13	6	2	96

Table 2. Issue-Level Determinants of the Presence of a Coalition

	B (SE)	Prob	Predicted Probabilities				
			(min)	(-1sd)	(mean)	(+1sd)	(max)
Issue Size	0.020 0.012	0.091 *	0.680	0.726	0.808	0.872	0.973
Conflict 1	-0.195 0.641	0.761	0.808				0.584
Conflict 2	-0.076 0.402	0.85	0.808				0.786
Inside Saliency Index	0.247 0.176	0.161	0.726	0.704	0.808	0.885	0.996
Outside Saliency Index	0.233 0.228	0.306	0.774	0.726	0.808	0.872	0.997
Constant	-0.171 0.430	0.69					
N	91		LR chi2(5): 14.05				
Log likelihood	-55.6034		Prob > chi2: 0.0153				
Pseudo R2	0.1122						

Note: Entries are Probit estimates. * indicates significant at 0.10 level.

Table 3. Level of Conflict and Coalition Activity

	Level of Conflict			Total
	No Conflict	Multiple Perspectives, Not Directly Opposing	Direct Conflict Among Perspectives	
Coalition	6 43%	7 70%	42 58%	55 57%
No Coalition	8 57	3 30	31 42	42 43
Total	14 100%	10 100%	73 100%	97 100%

Note: Tau-b = 0.0464; Chi-sq. (2 d.f.) = 1.8339 (prob. = .400)

Table 4. The Determinants of Coalition Participation

Part A. Organizations	B	S.E.	P>z	Predicted Probabilities				
				(min)	(-1sd)	(mean)	(+1sd)	(max)
Group Types								
Citizen	-0.341	0.228	0.135	0.484				0.352
Foundation	-0.656	0.685	0.338	0.484				0.243
Union	0.480	0.322	0.137	0.484				0.670
Professional Association	-0.166	0.253	0.511	0.484				0.418
Trade	0.262	0.222	0.238	0.484				0.588
Governmental Unit	-0.819	0.438	0.062*	0.484				0.195
Membership Size	-0.000	0.000	0.076*	0.533	0.711	0.484	0.262	0.000
DC Office	0.581	0.400	0.147	0.276	0.437	0.484	0.531	0.494
Number of Professional Staff	0.003	0.008	0.733	0.474	0.474	0.484	0.494	0.527
Hired Outside Counsel	-0.034	0.019	0.075*	0.508	0.532	0.484	0.436	0.162
Number of PACs	-0.057	0.141	0.686	0.493	0.495	0.484	0.472	0.448
Budget Resources Index	-0.073	0.051	0.154	0.512	0.547	0.484	0.422	0.162
Organizational Age	-0.003	0.002	0.165	0.546	0.526	0.484	0.442	0.274
Issue-Characteristics								
Issue Size	-0.003	0.004	0.538	0.513	0.501	0.484	0.467	0.436
Outside Salience Index	-0.081	0.053	0.123	0.505	0.524	0.484	0.444	0.244
Inside Salience Index	0.102	0.039	0.010***	0.429	0.424	0.484	0.544	0.752
Conflict 1	-0.537	0.283	0.057*	0.484				0.282
Conflict 2	-0.705	0.234	0.003***	0.484				0.228
Presence of opposing coalition	-0.204	0.174	0.240	0.484				0.403
Constant	-0.157	0.481	0.743					
N	527			LR chi2(19)		56.05		
Log likelihood	-276.0			Prob > chi2		0		
Pseudo R2	0.0922							

* < .10; ** < .05; *** < .01 probabilities

Part B. Corporations	B	S.E.	P>z	Predicted Probabilities				
				(min)	(-1sd)	(mean)	(+1sd)	(max)
Fortune 500	-0.192	0.336	0.568	0.184				0.137
DC Office	-1.016	0.534	0.057*	0.513	0.268	0.184	0.119	0.163
Number of Professional Staff	0.049	0.027	0.065*	0.108	0.101	0.184	0.301	0.648
Hired Outside Counsel	-0.042	0.033	0.205	0.263	0.258	0.184	0.125	0.016
Number of PACs	-0.074	0.299	0.804	0.191	0.193	0.184	0.175	0.171
Issue Size	0.000	0.012	0.986	0.186	0.185	0.184	0.183	0.182
Outside Salience Index	-0.358	0.197	0.069*	0.246	0.279	0.184	0.112	0.033
Inside Salience Index	0.045	0.142	0.752	0.170	0.172	0.184	0.197	0.282
Conflict 1	1.409	0.674	0.037**	0.184				0.695
Conflict 2	0.821	0.579	0.156	0.184				0.469
Presence of opposing coalition	-0.312	0.400	0.435	0.184				0.113
Constant	0.009	0.786	0.991					
N	110			LR chi2(11)		21.07		
Log likelihood	-64.23			Prob > chi2		0.0327		
Pseudo R2	0.1409							

* < .10; ** < .05 probabilities

Table 5. Coalition Participation by Organizational Type

Type	Not in a Coalition	In a Coalition	Percent in Coalition	Total
Corporations – Non Fortune 500	36	31	46	67
Corporations – Fortune 500 or Global 500	63	43	41	106
Trade Associations	148	87	37	235
Business Associations	21	12	36	33
Professional Associations	102	53	34	155
Unions	47	24	34	71
Foundations, non-profit providers	29	15	34	44
Citizen ideological or cause oriented group	251	87	26	338
Association of Governmental Units	36	4	10	40
Think Tank or Research Institute	36	1	3	37
Coalition	1	90	99	91
Institutions (Hospitals, Universities)	3	2	40	5
Lobbying or Consulting Firm	4	2	33	6
State and Local Government official	3	1	25	4
Governmental Unit	4	1	20	5
Miscellaneous	18	4	18	22
Association of Institutions	19	2	10	21
Religious groups	10	0	0	10
Congressional Caucuses	0	1	100	1
Members of Congress	752	1	0	753
Members of the Executive	174	0	0	174
	1,547	430	22	1,977

Table 6. Coalition Participation by Repeat Player Status

<u>Part A. Organizations</u>	<u>One-Time Actors</u>		<u>Repeat Players</u>	
	N	%	N	%
Does not Participate in a Coalition	352	64.23	318	64.37
Coalition Member	196	35.77	176	35.63
Total	548	100.00	494	100.00
<u>Part B. Corporations</u>	<u>One-Time Actors</u>		<u>Repeat Players</u>	
	N	%	N	%
Does not Participate in a Coalition	83	58.04	21	56.76
Coalition Member	60	41.96	16	43.24
Total	143	100.00	37	100.00

Table 7. Coalition Participation among the Most Active Repeat Participants

	Number of Issues Active	Number of Issues in a Coalition	Pattern of Coalition Behavior
Part A. Organizations Involved in 5+ Issues			
U.S. Chamber of Commerce	12	4	Mixed
Sierra Club	11	1	Mixed
AFL-CIO	10	1	Mixed
American Medical Association	9	3	Mixed
Consumer Federation of America	9	2	Mixed
Consumers Union	8	1	Mixed
National Association of Manufacturers	8	5	Mixed
Natural Resources Defense Council	7	3	Mixed
AARP	6	0	Never
AFSCME	6	3	Mixed
American Farm Bureau Federation	6	1	Mixed
American Federation of Teachers	6	4	Mixed
Business Roundtable	6	2	Mixed
National Education Association	6	3	Mixed
Public Citizen	6	1	Mixed
United Auto Workers	6	1	Mixed
Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers	5	1	Mixed
Friends of the Earth	5	1	Mixed
Health Insurance Association of America	5	2	Mixed
US PIRG, Public Interest Research Groups	5	0	Never
Number of Groups Sometimes and Sometimes Not in a Coalition: 18 of 20			
Part B. Corporations Involved in 2+ Issues			
General Motors	4	0	Never
Merck & Co.	4	2	Mixed
Procter & Gamble	3	1	Mixed
AOL Time Warner	2	0	Never
AT&T	2	2	Always
Bell Atlantic	2	1	Mixed
Boeing Corporation	2	0	Never
Bristol-Meyer Squibb	2	1	Mixed
CIGNA Corporation	2	1	Mixed
Ford Corporation	2	0	Never
Glaxo-Wellcome, Inc.	2	1	Mixed
Hewlett-Packard	2	1	Mixed
Intel	2	1	Mixed
MasterCard International	2	2	Always

Pfizer	2	1	Mixed
Visa International	2	1	Mixed

Number of Businesses Sometimes and Sometimes Not in a Coalition: 10 of 16

Note: The table lists coalition participation by issue; some groups were also active on more than one coalition in a single issue. See text for details.

Table 8. A Raw Measure of Outcome Success

Level of Success	0	2	3	4	5	6	8	10	Total
No. Achieving This Level of Success	616	208	74	201	12	164	146	43	1,464
Percent	42.08	14.21	5.05	13.73	0.82	11.20	9.97	2.94	100.00

Note: Zero means an advocate achieved none of its goals; the theoretical maximum is 12 for an actor which achieved each of six possible goals. Not all groups sought all six goals. See text for details.

Table 9. A Proportionate Measure of Outcome Success

Level of Success	0	0.4	0.67	1.0	1.5	2.0	Total
No. Achieving This Level of Success	610	31	9	130	30	648	1,458
Percent	41.84	2.13	0.62	8.92	2.06	44.44	100.00

Note: Scores range from zero (no success) to 2 (achieved each of its goals). See text.

Table 10. Determinants of Success in Achieving Policy Outcomes

	b	SE	t	p
Group Types:				
Coalition	0.616	0.401	1.540	0.125
Citizen	0.181	0.238	0.760	0.446
Foundation	-0.435	0.431	-1.010	0.313
Religious	0.830	0.909	0.910	0.362
Union	-0.382	0.286	-1.330	0.183
Professional Association	0.113	0.252	0.450	0.655
Corporation	-1.522	0.915	-1.660	0.097*
Trade Association	0.096	0.229	0.420	0.674
Think Tank	0.506	0.406	1.250	0.214
Association of Institutions	0.528	0.456	1.160	0.248
Association of Government Units	0.210	0.335	0.630	0.531
Organizational Characteristics				
Coalition Membership	-0.371	0.129	-2.880	0.004***
Age	-0.000	0.001	-0.150	0.878
Membership Size	-0.000	0.000	-0.610	0.540
DC Office	-0.068	0.268	-0.250	0.801
Professional Staff Size	0.002	0.006	0.310	0.756
Hired Outside Counsel	-0.024	0.013	-1.880	0.061*
Number of PAC's	-0.049	0.103	-0.470	0.639
Budget Resource Index	0.008	0.033	0.240	0.807
Issue-Characteristics				
Issue Size	0.009	0.003	3.030	0.003***
Conflict 1	-0.154	0.229	-0.670	0.501
Conflict 2	0.415	0.176	2.360	0.019**
Outside Salience Index	-0.046	0.041	-1.100	0.271
Inside Salience Index	-0.029	0.051	-0.570	0.569
Presence of Opposing Coalition	0.109	0.126	0.870	0.387
Coalition Composition				
Proportion Business in Coalition	-0.561	0.569	-0.990	0.325
Constant	0.560	0.381	1.470	0.143

N=402

R-sq = 0.2104

Adj. R-sq. = 0.1557

* < .10; ** < .05; *** < .01

Table A1. List of Coalitions by Issue

Issue	Issue Name Coalition Name (if any)
1	Managed Care Reform / Patients' Bill of Rights Patient Activist Coalition Advocates for Practitioner Equity Coalition for Health Care Choice and Accountability Patients' Rights Coalition Access to Specialty Care Coalition Patient Access for Responsible Care Alliance Cancer Leadership Council Health Benefits Coalition
2	Extending the Patent Term for Drugs Undergoing FDA Review During the Enactment of Hatch-Waxman Patients and Consumers Coalition
3	Hearing Screening for Infants
4	Revising the Risk Adjustment Methodology for Medicare+Choice Capitated Payment Coalition for the Frail Elderly
5	Medicare Payment Rate for Pap Screenings People for Annual PAP Smears (PAPS)
6	Parity in Health Insurance Coverage for Mental Illness Mental Health Liaison Group Coalition for the Fairness in Treatment of Mental Illness
7	Medicare Payment for Clinical Social Workers
8	Appropriations for the AIDS Drug Assistance Program ADAP Working Group (Part 2, Pharmaceutical Industry Director)
9	Providing Health Insurance for the Uninsured National Coalition on Health Care
10	Medicare Funding of Graduate Medical Education
11	Coverage of Chiropractic Services Under Medicare+Choice Program
12	Prescription Insurance Coverage of Contraceptives
13	Revising the Criteria and Process Used by HCFA to Determine the Coverage of Medical Devices Under Medicare
14	Regulating Disinfection Byproducts in Drinking Water Campaign for Safe and Affordable Drinking Water
15	Authorization and Funding for Upgrades to the CH-47 Chinook Helicopter
16	Limiting Mine Waste Disposal at Mill Sites
17	Legislation and Regulations Affecting the Deployment of Broadband Technology / Long Distance Data Services Competitive Broadband Coalition

- 18 **Compulsory Licensing for AIDS-related Pharmaceuticals in Africa / Tax Credit
for AIDS Vaccine Research and Development**
- 19 **Postal Service Modernization / Reform**
Main Street Coalition for Postal Fairness (or Main Street Association)
Coalition for Postal Reform
Coalition Against Unfair USPS Competition
- 20 **Modifications to the Food Quality Protection Act of 1996**
Implementation Working Group
Campaign for Pesticide Reform
- 21 **Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards**
Coalition organized by AAM (not named)
Coalition for Vehicle Choice
- 22 **Standards for Low-sulfur Gasoline**
- 23 **Distribution of Low Power FM Radio Licenses**
- 24 **Repeal of the Federal Estate and Gift Tax**
Family Business Estate Tax Coalition
Americans Against Unfair Family Taxation
- 25 **Amending the Windfall Elimination Provision and Government Pension Offset
of the Social Security Act**
Coalition to Assure Retirement Equity (CARE)
- 26 **Providing Permanent and Mandatory Funding for Conservation Programs
Through the Conservation and Reinvestment Act and Related Legislation**
Land Trust Alliance
- 27 **Permanent Normal Trade Relations with China**
Business Coalition for U.S.-China Trade
U.S. High-Tech Coalition on China
Agriculture Coalition for U.S.-China Trade
- 28 **Defense Budget Line Item**
- 29 **Eliminating Budgetary Support for USDA's Predator Control**
- 30 **Elimination of the 3% Excise Tax on Phone Bills**
Excise Tax Repeal Coalition organized by Quinn, Gillespie & Asso
E-Freedom Coalition
- 31 **Regulation of Internet Prescriptions**
National Council for Patient Education and Information
- 32 **Credit Union Regulation - Field of Membership Issues**
- 33 **Bankruptcy Reform**
Carlton Bankruptcy Group
National Consumer Bankruptcy Coalition
- 34 **Preventing Needlestick Injuries**
- 35 **Requiring Commercial Railroads to Grant Unpaid Concessions to Commuter
Rail Services**

- New Starts Working Group
Surface Transportation Policy Project
- 36 **Criminal Justice Reforms**
Coalition for Criminal Justice Reform Working Group
Leadership Conference on Civil Rights
- 37 **Tax Concessions Related to Electric Utility Restructuring that must be Agreed to by both Public Power and Electric Companies**
Campaign for Local Control
- 38 **Appropriations for Funding of National Nuclear Waste Disposal Site**
- 39 **Aviation Trust Fund (Air 21)**
- 40 **Elementary and Secondary Education Act, Title I**
ESEA group
- 41 **OSHA's Proposed Ergonomics Standards**
National Coalition on Ergonomics
- 42 **Individuals with Disabilities Education Act**
- 43 **Funding for Legal Services**
- 44 **FCC Licenses for Religious Broadcasters**
- 45 **Repository for Spent Nuclear Fuel**
- 46 **Rise in Gasoline Prices**
- 47 **Roads in National Forests**
- 48 **Membership in the World Trade Organization**
- 49 **Proposed United Airlines-US Airways Merger**
Global Aviation Improvement Network
- 50 **Applying and Collecting Taxes on the Internet and Remote Commerce**
Internet Tax Fairness Coalition
E-Freedom Coalition (anti-tax groups)
E-Fairness Coalition (malls, developers, retailers, and realtors)
- 51 **Exempting Physicians and Pharmacists from Antitrust Laws**
Antitrust Coalition for Consumer Choice in Health Care
- 52 **Change How Companies Treat Foreign Earnings and Interest Expenses for U.S. Tax Purposes**
- 53 **Changing Class Action Law so that More Cases are Heard in Federal Court**
Tort Reform Coalition organized by Quinn, Gillespie & Associates
American Tort Reform Association
- 54 **Prevailing Wage Rules for Building Trade Workers in the Davis-Bacon Act**
Coalition to Repeal the Davis-Bacon Act
- 55 **Tax Code Depreciation Schedule for Computers and Peripheral Equipment**
- 56 **Legislation Allowing Off-duty and Retired Police Officers to Carry Firearms Across State Lines**
- 57 **Late-term Abortions**
Religious Coalition for Reproductive Choice

- 58 **Export Controls on Computers**
 Computer Coalition for Responsible Exports
- 59 **Airline Age 60 Rule**
- 60 **C-130 Procurement**
- 61 **On-Board Diagnostic Service Info Rule**
 Coalition for Auto Repair Equality
- 62 **Parents' Right to Know**
- 63 **Cuban Sanctions Reform**
 Emergency Committee of the Advancement of Trade
- 64 **Newspaper Crossownership**
- 65 **Global Steel Safeguard Investigation**
 Stand up for Steel Coalition
 Consuming Industries Trade Action Coalition
- 66 **International Property Takings Amendment to the Fast Track Trade Authority
 Bill**
- 67 **Medicare Prescription Drug Coverage**
 www.fairdrugprices.org Coalition
 Citizens for Better Medicare
 Business for Affordable Medicine
- 68 **Terrorism Re-insurance**
 American Tort Reform Association
- 69 **Government Outsourcing Reform (TRAC Act)**
 CARE – Coalition to Assure Retirement Equity
- 70 **Department of Defense Personal Property Movement and Storage Program**
 MMC-Military Mobility Coalition
- 71 **Proposal to Change the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act to Reduce Costs
 for Borrowers**
 National Community Reinvestment Coalition
- 72 **Legislation and Regulations Affecting the Deployment of Broadband Technology
 / Long Distance Data Services**
 Open-Net Coalition
- 73 **Maritime Security Act Reauthorization**
- 74 **FDA Food Allergen Labeling**
- 75 **Bear Protection Act**
- 76 **Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Employment Training Services**
 Coalition on Human Needs
 National Campaign for Jobs and Income Support
 Workforce Alliance
- 77 **Amendment for Commodity Futures Trading Commission Regulation of Over-
 the-counter derivatives**
- 78 **Reauthorizing Federal Funding for the State Revolving Fund Loan Programs**

- H2O Coalition
Water Infrastructure Network (47 member organizations)
- 79 **EPA Transportation Equipment Cleaning Effluent Limitation Guidelines**
- 80 **Medicare Funding for Optometric Clinical Education Training**
- 81 **Student Visas and Laboratory Security**
USA (United to Secure America)
- 82 **Disabled Recipients under Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
Reauthorization**
Consortium for Citizens with Disabilities
- 83 **Human Cloning Prohibition Act**
Coalition for the Advancement of Medical Research
- 84 **Funding for an Alternative to the EA-6B Prowler**
- 85 **U.S. Farm Bill**
- 86 **Wind Energy Tax Credit**
Sustainable Energy Coalition
- 87 **SMART Growth and the Transportation Bill Reauthorization**
Transportation Construction Coalition
Coalition for Smarter Growth
Tri-State Transportation Campaign
National Coalition to Defend NEPA
Smart Growth America
Americans for Transportation Mobility
Surface Transportation Policy Project
- 88 **Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards (107th Congress)**
Coalition for Vehicle Choice
Alliance to Save Energy
- 89 **Basic Education Funding for Developing Countries**
Basic Education Coalition
- 90 **PURPA Repeal within Energy Bill**
Energy Alliance
- 91 **Recreation Marine Employment Act**
Recreational Marine Employment Coalition
- 92 **Federal Public Safety Officers Amendment to the Affordable Housing for
Americans**
- 93 **Regulations on Relationships among Affiliated Gas and Electric Producers,
Pipelines, and Distributors**
- 94 **Math and Science Education Funding for K-12**
Business Coalition for Excellence in Education
Science, Math, Engineering and Technology Coalition (SMET)
- 95 **NIH Funding for the Cystic Fibrosis Clinical Research Network**
- 96 **Stock Option Expensing**

97 **Efforts to Weaken the Provisions and Enforcement of Title IX**

College Sports Council

National Coalition for Women and Girls in Education

Leadership Conference on Civil Rights

98 **Aviation Security and Stabilization**

Table A2. Table of Summary Statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Individual-Level Variables					
Membership Size	741	726,489	3.549M	4	40.0 M
DC Office	924	0.951	0.215	0	1
Number of Professional Staff	907	8.977	9.673	0	50
Hired Outside Counsel	907	2.470	4.330	0	36
Number of PACs	907	0.387	0.503	0	2
Organizational Age	858	56.759	38.436	0	261
Income	832	\$56.9M	\$133.0 M	0	\$1,220.0M
Assets	833	\$46.3M	\$114.0 M	0	\$1,050.0M
Budget Resources Index	890	0.429	2.161	-0.5341	13.432
Coalition	2160	0.040	0.197	0	1
Citizen	2160	0.154	0.361	0	1
Foundation	2160	0.020	0.141	0	1
Religious	2160	0.005	0.068	0	1
Union	2160	0.030	0.171	0	1
Professional Association	2160	0.059	0.235	0	1
Trade	2160	0.106	0.307	0	1
Think Tank	2160	0.017	0.130	0	1
Institution	2160	0.002	0.048	0	1
Governmental Unit	2160	0.002	0.048	0	1
Ass'n of Government Units	2160	0.019	0.135	0	1
Corporation	2160	0.081	0.273	0	1
Coalition Member	2160	0.201	0.401	0	1
Facing an Opposition Coalition	1872	0.232	0.422	0	1
Issue-Level Variables					
Issue Size	2148	30.433	15.926	3	89
Outside Salience Index	2087	0.095	1.210	-0.545	8.113
Inside Salience Index	2041	0.194	1.454	-1.150	7.301
Number of Coalitions	2148	1.149	1.317	0	8
Conflict Levels					
No conflict	2150	0.089	0.285	0	1
Multiple Perspectives, No Direct Conflict	2150	0.131	0.338	0	1
Direct Conflict	2150	0.780	0.415	0	1
Coalition-Level Variables					
Size of Actor's Coalition	2163	1.833	5.536	0	36
Business Strength of Coalition	2163	0.031	0.116	0	0.875