

**PLSC 541, Public Policy and Agenda-Setting**  
**Penn State University**  
**Fall Term, 2006, Thursdays 2:30–5:30**  
**Room 236 Pond Building**

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Office hours: Th 1:30–2:30 and by appointment

This is a graduate course on agenda-setting. We will cover the basics but the focus will be especially on what I think of as the frontiers in the area. This will take us into a lot of different disciplines, including economics, sociology, psychology, physics, computer science, math, paleobiology, and even brief forays into the study of such things as earthquakes, avalanches, and forest fires. The focus in reading so widely is obviously not on the substance, but rather the methods of analysis and the theoretical models that people have built for these other applications. In reading something completely outside of your field, your job is to think: How might a similar model apply in the area where I am interested? Much of our class discussion will hinge on these ideas. Of course, we also have to understand the readings on their own terms, so we'll discuss that first. But, believe me, there is a reason why you are going to read so widely and the reason is to help think about how diverse models from other disciplines can help us move this literature forward by adopting those models to our own purposes.

In spite of the broad range of readings, there is no need to have a broad background in the literature before taking this course. One thing you do have to do is the readings and come to class prepared to discuss them. You do not necessarily have to *understand* the readings (though you should certainly try!). But if there are points you do not understand then you need to come to class with questions and when I open up the discussion you need to ask those questions. If you don't have *reactions* to the readings, then you should have *questions* about them. Mutism is not acceptable behavior in a graduate seminar.

Each week I will give a set of questions / points for discussion for the following week's readings, and I will expect someone in the class to sign up for all the topics. This should work out so that each person needs to do one of these assignments about 6 times during the semester, or every other week on average. (Actual numbers may vary depending on the enrollment.) Even if you do not do an assignment that week, you should read the questions first, then as you are doing the readings be thinking of these questions. We will use the discussion questions as an agenda for the class session, in addition to the questions you may bring. If you do an assignment, you need to write a short paper (no longer than 2 pages, single spaced) addressing the question and also be prepared to lead the class discussion, or at least start it, on that topic.

Each student will also do a term paper, which may be an original research paper or a literature-based essay. I will expect to see regular progress on the term paper throughout the term in the form of: 1) proposed topic by October 5 (multiple possible topics are ok too); 2) a list of

references by October 19; 3) a proposed outline for the paper by October 26; and 4) a rough draft of the entire paper by November 16 (it can have sections missing but must have notes for what you are going to do for the entire paper). The more complete each of these assignments is, the more helpful my feedback to you will be. Staying on target and getting lots of feedback will lead to a better term paper. Take advantage: I'll give you lots of feedback, but only based on what you give me. The length of the paper will vary by individual case but none will be less than 20 pages, double-spaced.

Assignments and grading:

Class participation	20%
Short papers throughout the term, based on discussion questions:	30
Term paper drafts	10
Final term paper	40
 Total:	 100%

Late assignments: Short assignments are due 24 hours before the start of class. Assignments handed in after that, but before class, will be accepted but marked down 5 points (half a grade). Assignments are not accepted after class, even if you don't attend class. That's just not fair to write a paper on a topic that has already been discussed. Term papers will not be accepted after the deadline, period. You should be in touch with me throughout the term about your term paper progress.

Falling behind: Note that in a graduate seminar it's easy to fall behind. Don't do that. Stay up to date. If you ever come to class and for some extraordinary reason you have not done all the readings that were assigned, give me a piece of paper indicating what readings you have not been able to do. If it is an isolated incident, I'll understand. If it's a pattern, I'll be uncomprehending. If you don't tell me what you did not read and class discussion reveals it I'll mark you down 20 points on class participation each time it happens. Do not allow this to happen. Reading is fundamental. If something happens and you can't do the bulk of the reading for some reason some week, let me know and attend class anyway. Don't skip class, ever.

Biographical note: For good or ill, the topic of this class is the focus of my own research. You can see this either as a good thing or a bad thing. On the up-side, I know more about this literature than most people and have lots of current research projects relevant to this set of topics. On the down-side, I have my own opinions about how to do work in this area, and you're going to read a lot of stuff on which I'm an author or co-author, which can be awkward in class some times. There is no way around this, so let's just make the best of it. I have thick skin so do not hesitate to ask questions or give critiques.

Undergraduate students: There may be some undergraduate students in the class. They will have reduced expectations in terms of reading and written assignments.

Final note: A syllabus is like a contract, so I've tried to specify lots of things here, sometimes in relatively harsh language. Don't be turned off. We'll read a wide variety of really interesting

things and you'll learn a lot in this class. I'm very excited to teach it and am looking forward to each week of what follows. I certainly hope it will be the best course you ever take.

Reading assignments: All the articles should be available on JSTOR, on my web site (teaching section), or both. I did not order the books at any local bookstore so you should order them ASAP on line. Note that there is one book required for the second week of class so please purchase that immediately.

Books for purchase:

1. Barabasi, Albert-Laszlo. 2005. *Linked*. New York: Penguin.
2. Baumgartner, Frank R., and Bryan D. Jones. 1993. *Agendas and Instability in American Politics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.<sup>1</sup>
3. Jones, Bryan D. 2001. *Politics and the Architecture of Choice*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
4. Jones, Bryan D., and Frank R. Baumgartner. 2005. *The Politics of Attention: How Government Prioritizes Problems*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.<sup>1</sup>
5. Kingdon, John W. 1995. *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*. 2d. ed. New York: HarperCollins.
6. Riker, William H. 1986. *The Art of Political Manipulation*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
7. Schattschneider, E. E. 1975 [1960]. *The Semi-Sovereign People*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich College Publishers

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<sup>1</sup> I know, it is extremely obnoxious to have to buy a book from your professor, much less two for the same class. They really are on the topic, however! Anyway, I do get royalties, so I will refund you a dollar each. That's actually a little more than I get for two books, combined.

Please note the following announcements concerning University policies.

### **Academic Dishonesty**<sup>1</sup>

The Department of Political Science, along with the College of the Liberal Arts and the University, takes violations of academic dishonesty seriously. Observing basic honesty in one's work, words, ideas, and actions is a principle to which all members of the community are required to subscribe.

All course work by students is to be done on an individual basis unless an instructor clearly states that an alternative is acceptable. Any reference materials used in the preparation of any assignment must be explicitly cited. In an examination setting, unless the instructor gives explicit prior instructions to the contrary, whether the examination is in-class or take-home, violations of academic integrity shall consist of any attempt to receive assistance from written or printed aids, or from any person or papers or electronic devices, or of any attempt to give assistance, whether the one so doing has completed his or her own work or not.

Other violations include, but are not limited to, any attempt to gain an unfair advantage in regard to an examination, such as tampering with a graded exam or claiming another's work to be one's own. Violations shall also consist of obtaining or attempting to obtain, previous to any examinations, copies of the examination papers or the questions to appear thereon, or to obtain any illegal knowledge of these questions. Lying to the instructor or purposely misleading any Penn State administrator shall also constitute a violation of academic integrity.

In cases of a violation of academic integrity it is the policy of the Department of Political Science to impose appropriate penalties that are consistent with University guidelines.

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<sup>1</sup>Much of the text above has been directly obtained from the sections of the Princeton University website <http://www.princeton.edu/pr/pub/rrr/99/pages/OI.htm> concerning academic integrity (Rights, Rules, Responsibilities introductory text as well as pages 55-69) as well as from the website of the Department of Economics at The Pennsylvania State University.

### **Disabilities**

The Pennsylvania State University encourages qualified people with disabilities to participate in its programs and activities and is committed to the policy that all people shall have equal access to programs, facilities, and admissions without regard to personal characteristics not related to ability, performance, or qualifications as determined by University policy or by state or federal authorities. If you anticipate needing any type of accommodation in this course or have questions about physical access, please tell the instructor as soon as possible. Reasonable accommodations will be made for all students with disabilities, but it is the student's responsibility to inform the instructor early in the term. Do not wait until just before an exam to decide you want to inform the instructor of a learning disability; any accommodations for disabilities must be arranged well in advance.

### Weekly assignments and topics

For each week I've listed the general topic and the required readings first. I've also given supplemental readings for some of the weeks. Those are not required, but may be useful if your term paper goes in that direction or if you just want to read more.

#### Week 1. Sep 7. Intro, no readings

#### Week 2. Sep 14. Classics and Basic Background

1. Schattschneider, E. E. 1975 [1960]. *The Semi-Sovereign People*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich College Publishers.
2. Bachrach, Peter and Morton Baratz. 1962. The Two Faces of Power. *American Political Science Review* 56: 947–52.
3. Downs, Anthony. 1972. Up and Down with Ecology: The Issue Attention Cycle. *Public Interest* 28: 38–50.
4. Cobb, Roger W., Jeannie Keith-Ross, and Marc Howard Ross. 1976. Agenda Building as a Comparative Political Process. *American Political Science Review* 70: 126–38.
5. Walker, Jack L., Jr. 1977. Setting the Agenda in the U.S. Senate: A Theory of Problem Selection. *British Journal of Political Science* 7: 423–45.

Additional books to buy if you ever run across them:

1. Cobb, Roger W., and Charles D. Elder. 1983. *Participation in American Politics: The Dynamics of Agenda-Building*. 2d ed. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
2. Crenson, Matthew A. 1971. *The Unpolitics of Air Pollution*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
3. Gaventa, John. 1980. *Power and Powerlessness: Quiescence and Rebellion in an Appalachian Valley*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Review articles that you might find useful:

1. Baumgartner, Frank R. 2001. Political Agendas. In Niel J. Smelser and Paul B. Baltes, eds. *International Encyclopedia of Social and Behavioral Sciences: Political Science*. New York: Elsevier Science and Oxford: Pergamon, pp. 288–90.
2. True, James L., Bryan D. Jones, and Frank R. Baumgartner. 2006. Punctuated Equilibrium Theory: Explaining Stability and Change in American Policymaking. In Paul Sabatier, ed., *Theories of the Policy Process* 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. Boulder: Westview Press. Forthcoming.
3. Robinson, Scott E. 2006. Punctuated Equilibrium Models in Organizational Decision Making. In *Handbook on Human Decision-Making*. Ed. Goktug Morcol. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, pp. 133–149.

#### Week 3. Sep 21. Kingdon, Ambiguity, and Multiple Streams Models

1. Kingdon, John W. 1995. *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*. 2d. ed. New York: HarperCollins.
2. Cohen, Michael, James G. March, and Johan P. Olsen. 1972. A Garbage Can Theory of Organizational Choice. *Administrative Science Quarterly* 17: 1–25.

The background on where this came from and where it may be going:

1. Cyert, Richard M., and James G. March. 1992. *A Behavioral Theory of the Firm*. 2nd ed. New York: Blackwell.
2. March, James G., and Herbert A. Simon. 1993. *Organizations*. 2nd ed. New York: Blackwell.
3. Cohen, Michael D., and James G. March. 1986. *Leadership and Ambiguity: The American College President*. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press.
4. Zahariadis, Nikolaos. 1999. Ambiguity, Time, and Multiple Streams. In *Theories of the Policy Process*, ed. Paul A. Sabatier. Boulder, Colo: Westview, pp. 73–96.

#### **Week 4. Sep 28. Punctuated Equilibrium**

1. Baumgartner, Frank R., and Bryan D. Jones. 1993. *Agendas and Instability in American Politics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
2. Eldridge, Niles, and Stephen J. Gould. 1985 [1972]. Punctuated Equilibria: An Alternative to Phyletic Graduation. In Niles Eldredge, *Time Frames: The Evolution of Punctuated Equilibrium*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, Appendix, pp. 193–223. [Originally published in Thomas J. M. Schopf, ed., *Models in Paleobiology*. San Francisco: Freeman, Cooper, pp. 82–115]

If you are interested in an application:

1. Repetto, Robert, ed. 2006. *Punctuated Equilibrium Models and Environmental Policy*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

#### **Week 5. Oct 5. Riker and Heresthetics**

(Note: We may have to reschedule this class to another day this week. Sorry)

(Proposed term paper topics due in class today)

1. Riker, William H. 1986. *The Art of Political Manipulation*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
2. Riker, William H. 1984. The Heresthetics of Constitution-Making: The Presidency in 1787, with Comments on Determinism and Rational Choice. *American Political Science Review* 78 (1): 1–16.

Recommended:

1. Riker, William H. 1988. *Liberalism Against Populism*. Prospect Heights, Ill.: Waveland Press.
2. Riker, William H. 1996. *The Strategy of Rhetoric*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

#### **Week 6. Oct 12. Framing**

1. Quattrone, George A., and Amos Tversky. 1988. Contrasting Rational and Psychological Analyses of Political Choice. *American Political Science Review* 82, 3 (Sept.): 719–736.
2. Stone, Deborah A. 1989. Causal Stories and the Formation of Policy Agendas. *Political Science Quarterly* 104, 2 (Summer): 281–300.
3. Schneider, Anne, and Helen Ingram. 1993. Social Construction of Target Populations: Implications for Politics and Policy. *American Political Science Review* 87: 334–47.

4. Leiberman, Robert C. 1995. Social Construction (Continued): Comment. *American Political Science Review* 89, 2 (June): 437–441.
5. Schneider, Anne, and Helen Ingram. 1995. Social Construction (Continued): Response. *American Political Science Review* 89, 2 (June): 441–446.
6. Nelson, Thomas E., Rosalee A. Clawson, and Zoe M. Oxley. 1997. Media Framing of a Civil Liberties Conflict and Its Effect on Tolerance. *American Political Science Review* 91, 3 (Sept.): 567–583.
7. Gilliam, Franklin D., Jr., and Shanto Iyengar. 2000. Prime Suspects: The Influence of Local Television News on the Viewing Public. *American Journal of Political Science* 44, 3 (July): 560–573.

### **Week 7. Oct 19. Empirical Studies of Framing and Its Limits**

(Preliminary bibliography for your term paper due in class today)

1. Druckman, James N. 2001. On the Limits of Framing Effects: Who Can Frame? *Journal of Politics* 63, 4 (November): 1041–66.
2. Druckman, James N., and Kjersten R. Nelson. 2003. Framing and Deliberation: How Citizens' Conversations Limit Elite Influence. *American Journal of Political Science* 47 (4): 729–45.
3. Druckman, James N. 2004. Political Preference Formation: Competition, Deliberation, and the (Ir)relevance of Framing Effects. *American Political Science Review* 98 (4): 761–86.
4. Berinski, Adam J., and Donald R. Kinder. 2006. Making Sense of Issues Through Media Frames: Understanding the Kosovo Crisis. *Journal of Politics* 68, 3 (August): 640–56.
5. Baumgartner, Frank R., Jeffrey M. Berry, Marie Hojnacki, Beth Leech, and David Kimball. 2006. The Structure of Policy Conflict. Paper presented at the annual meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association, April 20–23.
6. Baumgartner, Frank R., Suzanna De Boef, and Amber E. Boydstun. 2005. Issue-Definition and Policy Change: Capital Punishment and the Rise of the “Innocence Frame,” 1960–2003. Working paper. (Note: An updated version of this may be available before we get to this. Stay tuned.)

Further readings on the general topic if you want to go further:

1. Pollock, Philip H. III. 1994. Issues, Values, and Critical Moments: Did “Magic” Johnson Transform Public Opinion on AIDS? *American Journal of Political Science* 38: 426–46.
2. Terkildsen, Nayda, and Frauke Schnell. 1997. How Media Frames Move Public Opinion: An Analysis of the Women’s Movement. *Political Research Quarterly* 50:879–900.
3. Cobb, Roger, and Marc Howard Ross, eds. 1997. *Cultural Strategies of Agenda Denial*. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas.

### **Week 8. Oct 26. Cognition and Bounded Rationality**

(Note: We will have to reschedule this class for the morning or an earlier day this week. Sorry.)

(Draft outline of your term paper due in class this week.)

1. Jones, Bryan D. 2001. *Politics and the Architecture of Choice*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
2. Jones, Bryan D. 1994. A Change of Mind or a Change of Focus? A Theory of Choice Reversals in Politics. 1994. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 4: 141–77.
3. Simon, Herbert A. 1985. Human Nature in Politics: The Dialogue of Psychology with Political Science. *American Political Science Review* 79: 293–304.

Further reading, background

1. Jones, Bryan D. 1994. *Reconceiving Decision-Making in Democratic Politics: Attention, Choice, and Public Policy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
2. Jones, Bryan D. 2003. Bounded Rationality in Political Science: Lessons from Public Administration. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 13: 395–410.
3. Simon, Herbert A. 1997. *Administrative Behavior* 4th ed. New York: Free Press.
4. Simon, Herbert A. 1983. *Reason in Human Affairs*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
5. Simon, Herbert A. 1996. *The Sciences of the Artificial*. 3rd ed. Cambridge: MIT Press.

**Week 9. Nov 2. Attention**

1. Jones, Bryan D., and Frank R. Baumgartner. 2005. *The Politics of Attention: How Government Prioritizes Problems*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

**Week 10. Nov 9. Threshold Models, Increasing Returns, Positive Feedback**

1. Granovetter, Mark. 1978. Threshold Models of Collective Behavior. *American Journal of Sociology* 83: 1420–43.
2. David, Paul A. 1985. Clio and the Economics of QWERTY. *American Economic Review* 75: 332–37.
3. Crenson, Matthew A. 1987. The Private Stake in Public Goods: Overcoming the Illogic of Collective Action. *Policy Sciences* 20: 259–76.
4. Arthur, W. Brian. 1989. Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-in by Historical Events. *Economic Journal* 99 (394): 116–131.
5. Becker, Gary S. 1991. A Note on Restaurant Pricing and Other Examples of Social Influence on Price. *Journal of Political Economy* 99: 1109–16.
6. Bikhchandani, Sushil, David Hirshleifer, and Ivo Welch. 1992. A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades. *Journal of Political Economy* 100: 992–1026.
7. Kirman, Alan. 1993. Ants, Rationality, and Recruitment. *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 108 (1): 137–56.
8. Lohmann, Susanne. 1994. The Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The Monday Demonstrations in Leipzig, East Germany, 1989–1991. *World Politics* 47: 42–101.
9. Pierson, Paul. 2000. Path Dependence, Increasing Returns, and the Study of Politics. *American Political Science Review* 94: 251–67.

Additional readings:



1. Granovetter, Mark S., and Roland Soong. 1988. Threshold Models of Diversity: Chinese Restaurants, Residential Segregation, and the Spiral of Silence. *Sociological Methodology* 18: 69–104.
2. Kuran, Timur. 1991. The East European Revolution of 1989: Is it Surprising that We Were Surprised? *American Economic Review* 81, 2 (May): 121–125.
3. Arthur, W. Brian. 1994. *Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
4. Bak, Per, and Maya Paczuski. 1995. Complexity, Contingency, and Criticality. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America* 92, 15 (July 18): 6689–6696.
5. Bak, Per. 1996. *How Nature Works: The Science of Self-Organized Criticality*. New York: Copernicus.

### **Week 11. Nov 16. Power Laws**

(Draft of your term paper due in class today.)

1. Barabasi, Albert-Laszlo. 2005. *Linked*. New York: Penguin.
2. Barabasi, Albert-Laszlo. 2005. The Origin of Bursts and Heavy Tails in Human Dynamics. *Nature* 435 (12 May): 207–211.
3. Mitzenmacher, Michael. 2004. A Brief History of Generative Models for Power Law and Lognormal Distributions. *Internet Mathematics* 1 (2): 226–51.
4. Merton, Robert K. 1968. The Matthew Effect in Science. *Science* 159: 56–63.

Deep Background:

1. Zipf, George Kingsley. 1949. *Human Behavior and the Principle of Least Effort*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. (Note: If anyone ever finds this book for sale, and it's less than 50 bucks let me know.)
2. Simon, Herbert A. 1955. On a Class of Skew Distribution Functions. *Biometrika* 42 (3/4, December): 425–440.

Other summaries, explanations, reviews of the broad literature:

1. Watts, Duncan J. 2003. *Six Degrees: The Science of a Connected Age*. New York: Norton.
2. Johnson, Steven. 2001. *Emergence*. New York: Scribner.

Thanksgiving Nov 23.

### **Week 12. Nov 30. Budgets, Stochastic Inputs, and More Power Laws**

1. Jones, Bryan D., Frank R. Baumgartner, Christian Breunig, James A. Stimson, Martial Foucault, Abel François, Christoffer Green-Pedersen, Peter John, Peter B. Mortensen, Scott Robinson, Stuart Soroka, Frédéric Varone, Stefaan Walgrave, and Chris Wlezien. 2006. Are Political Systems Poised between the “Order” of Friction and the “Chaos” of Urgency? Public Budgeting in Comparative Perspective. Working paper. Draft available on-line.
2. Baumgartner, Frank R., Christian Breunig, Christoffer Green-Pedersen, Bryan D. Jones, Peter B. Mortensen, Frédéric Varone, and Stefaan Walgrave. 2006. Punctuated

Equilibrium and Institutional Design in Comparative Perspective. Working paper. Draft available on-line.

3. Baumgartner, Frank R., Bryan D. Jones, Christian Breunig, and Trey Thomas. 2006. Social Inputs and Government Outputs. Working paper. Draft available on-line.

A few applications: Read at least one of the following, focusing on the empirical findings:

1. Mandelbrot, Benoit B. 1967. The Variation of Some Other Speculative Prices. *Journal of Business* 40, 4 (October): 393–413.
2. Adler, Moshe. 1985. Stardom and Talent. *American Economic Review* 75, 1 (March): 208–212.
3. Chung, Kee H., and Raymond A. K. Cox. 1994. A Stochastic Model of Superstardom: An Application of the Yule Distribution. *Review of Economics and Statistics* 76, 4 (November): 771–775.
4. Gabaix, Xavier. 1999. Zipf's Law and the Growth of Cities. *American Economic Review* 89, 2 (May): 129–132.
5. Roberts, D. C., and D. L. Turcotte. 1998. Fractality and the Self-Organized Criticality of Wars. *Fractals* 6 (4): 351–357.
6. Christensen, Kim, Leon Danon, Tim Scanlon, and Per Bak. 2002. Unified Scaling Law for Earthquakes. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America* 99, 3, Supplement 1 (February 19): 2509–2513.
7. Farber, Daniel A. 2002. Earthquakes and Tremors in Statutory Interpretation: An Empirical Study of the Dynamics of Interpretation. *Issues in Legal Scholarship*. Berkeley, CA: Berkeley Electronic Press.

If you're interested in being scared out of the stock market:

1. Mandelbrot, Benoit B., and Richard L. Hudson. 2004. *The (Mis)Behavior of Markets*. New York: Basic Books.

### **Week 13. Dec 7. Sociological, public policy, and communications examples**

Pick one group and read the whole set:

#### Sociological studies

1. McAdam, Doug. 2002. The War at Home: Antiwar Protests and Congressional Voting, 1965 to 1973. *American Sociological Review* 67, 5 (October): 696–721.
2. Burstein, Paul, and April Linton. 2002. The Impact of Political Parties, Interest Groups, and Social Movement Organizations on Public Policy: Some Recent Evidence and Theoretical Concerns. *Social Forces* 82, 2 (December): 381–408.
3. Johnson, Erik W. Jon Agnone, and John D. McCarthy. 2006. Where and How Do Movements Matter? The United States Environmental Movement and Congressional Hearings and Laws, 1961–1990. Working paper.

#### Communications studies

1. McCombs, Maxwell, and Donald Shaw. 1972. The Agenda-Setting Function of Mass Media. *Public Opinion Quarterly* 36: 176–87.
2. Hilgartner, Steven, and Charles Bosk. 1988. The Rise and Fall of Social Problems: A Public Arenas Model. *American Journal of Sociology* 94: 53–78.

3. Neuman, W. Russell. 1990. The Threshold of Public Attention. *Public Opinion Quarterly* 54: 179–76.
4. Zhu, Jian-Hua. 1992. Issue Competition and Attention Distraction: A Zero-Sum Theory of Agenda-Setting. *Journalism Quarterly* 69: 825–36.
5. McCombs, Maxwell, and Jian-Hua Zhu. 1995. Capacity, Diversity, and Volatility of the Public Agenda: Trends from 1954 to 1994. *Public Opinion Quarterly* 59: 495–525.

Public Policy and “Who Leads Whom?” Studies

1. Edwards, George C. III, and B. Dan Wood. 1999. Who Influences Whom? The President, Congress, and the Media. *American Political Science Review* 93: 327–44.
2. Flemming, Roy B., B. Dan Wood, and John Bohte. 1999. Attention to Issues in A System of Separated Powers: The Macrodynamics of American Policy Agendas. *Journal of Politics* 61 (1): 76–108.
3. Flemming, Roy B., John Bohte, and B. Dan Wood. 1997. One Voice Among Many: The Supreme Court’s Influence on Attentiveness to Issues in the United States, 1947–92. *American Journal of Political Science* 41 (4): 1224–50.

**Week 14. Dec 14. Last class. Discussion and review.**

Term papers due. No reading assignments.