

FRAMING THEORY

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■ **Abstract** We review the meaning of the concept of framing, approaches to studying framing, and the effects of framing on public opinion. After defining framing and framing effects, we articulate a method for identifying frames in communication and a psychological model for understanding how such frames affect public opinion. We also discuss the relationship between framing and priming, outline future research directions, and describe the normative implications of framing.

INTRODUCTION

The economist Albert Hirschman once noted that having opinions might be essential to a person's well being. A person should hold opinions of his own and cannot have self-respect without opinions that define and identify him. Hirschman (1989, p. 76) wrote, "Vacillation, indifference, or weakly held opinions have long met with utmost contempt, while approval and admiration have been bestowed on firmness, fullness, and articulation of opinion."

Despite Hirschman's ideal of firm, full, articulate opinions, from the earliest days of public opinion research, citizens have been found to have low-quality opinions, if they have opinions at all. In the public opinion literature, high-quality opinions are usually defined as being stable, consistent, informed, and connected to abstract principles and values. The general conclusion among scholars is that such opinions are rare in the mass public (e.g., Converse 1964, Zaller 1992).

Early studies of mass public opinion conducted in the 1950s and 1960s raised serious doubts about the competence of citizens to participate in political affairs. On the whole, citizens were woefully uninformed about the institutions of American government, political office holders, and contemporary political issues. Their views on issues were superficial and unconnected to overarching principles such as liberalism or conservatism. When asked the same policy questions at different points in time, their answers displayed little stability. Their support for basic democratic values was fragile. Individuals endorsed democratic values such as free speech and free association when these principles were stated in abstract honorific terms, but they failed to defend the application of these rights in specific circumstances.

In light of these studies, it was much debated whether a sizable proportion of the general public could even be said to hold meaningful attitudes. From their haphazard responses to survey questions, it sometimes appeared that respondents chose their answers based on a flip of a coin.

What is particularly vexing in public opinion research is a phenomenon known as “framing effects.” These occur when (often small) changes in the presentation of an issue or an event produce (sometimes large) changes of opinion. For example, when asked whether they would favor or oppose allowing a hate group to hold a political rally, 85% of respondents answered in favor if the question was prefaced with the suggestion, “Given the importance of free speech,” whereas only 45% were in favor when the question was prefaced with the phrase, “Given the risk of violence” (Sniderman & Theriault 2004).¹ Similarly, about 20% of the American public believes that too little is being spent on “welfare,” but about 65% says that too little is being spent on “assistance to the poor” (Rasinski 1989, p. 391). In these and many other cases, the alternative phrasings of the same basic issue significantly alter its meaning to respondents, even when the change in connotation is not immediately identifiable by the researcher (Zaller 1992, p. 34).

Some have interpreted such dramatic fluctuations to indicate that opinions are too superficial to be indicative of public preferences. Either the public has no attitudes on many political issues, or it holds so many fragmentary and conflicting attitudes that it cannot reconcile or resolve them. If opinions can be arbitrarily manipulated by how issues are framed, there can be no legitimate representation of public interests (Riker 1986, Zaller 1992, Entman 1993, Bartels 2003).

In this review, we situate framing within the broader democratic process that links politicians and other opinion leaders to the public, primarily through the mass media. We examine the psychological mechanisms behind framing effects and the individual-level mediators and moderators of framing. Beyond the individual, we explore the social and political processes that have the potential to reduce framing effects. We also clarify conceptual issues in the study of framing and identify promising areas for future research. Although we focus most heavily on framing effects in public opinion toward policy issues, we suggest how the theoretical ideas developed in this context can be applied more generally to related concepts such as priming. Finally, we offer normative assessments of the consequences—negative or positive—of framing effects for the operation of a democratic political system.

WHAT IS FRAMING?

The major premise of framing theory is that an issue can be viewed from a variety of perspectives and be construed as having implications for multiple values or considerations. Framing refers to the process by which people develop a particular conceptualization of an issue or reorient their thinking about an issue.

¹The respondents in this example were self-identified egalitarians.

A more precise definition of framing starts with a conventional expectancy value model of an individual's attitude (e.g., Ajzen & Fishbein 1980, Nelson et al. 1997b). An attitude toward an object, in this view, is the weighted sum of a series of evaluative beliefs about that object. Specifically, $Attitude = \sum v_i * w_i$, where v_i is the evaluation of the object on attribute i , and w_i is the salience weight ($\sum w_i = 1$) associated with that attribute.

For example, one's overall attitude, A , toward a new housing development might consist of a combination of negative and positive evaluations, v_i , of the project on different dimensions i . An individual may believe that the project will favor the economy ($i = 1$) but harm the environment ($i = 2$). Assuming this individual places a positive value on both the economy and the environment, then v_1 is positive and v_2 is negative, and his attitude toward the project will depend on the relative magnitudes of v_1 and v_2 discounted by the relative weights (w_1 and w_2) assigned to each attribute (Nelson & Oxley 1999).

The conventional expectancy model is an idealized conception of an attitude as a summary of a definable set of beliefs that an individual holds about a subject. In practice, an individual may have only vague notions on many political topics and may not have developed overall evaluations that could be called attitudes. He or she might express a few considerations that came to mind in response to a survey question but be unable to determine their relative importance or to aggregate them into a summary score. In such cases, the survey question at best elicits an imperfect representation of a person's feelings based on the subset of beliefs that are accessible at that moment.

Bearing in mind this caveat, the expectancy value model's general assumption that an individual can place different emphases on various considerations about a subject is a useful abstraction for discussing the psychology of framing. This conceptualization applies to any object of evaluation; for instance, a voter's attitude toward a candidate may depend on whether the voter favors the candidate on dimensions that are of varying importance (e.g., the voter may view economic issues as more important than foreign affairs and personality) (see Enelow & Hinich 1984; cf. Jones 1994). Or the extent to which an individual assigns blame to a welfare recipient may depend on evaluations of the recipient's personal efforts to stay off of public assistance (dimension 1) and the situational factors that the recipient has faced (dimension 2). Similarly, one's tolerance for a hate group rally may hinge on the perceived consequences of the rally for free speech, public safety, and other values, with each value receiving a different weight. If only one value dimension matters, the individual places all of the weight ($w_i = 1$) on that dimension in forming his attitude. Alternatively, without loss of generality, we can think of i as a dimension (Riker 1990), a consideration (Zaller 1992), a value (Sniderman 1993), or a belief (Ajzen & Fishbein 1980).

The set of dimensions that affect an individual's evaluation constitute an individual's "frame in thought." For example, if an individual believes that free speech dominates all other considerations in deciding whether a hate group has the right

to rally, that individual's frame in thought is free speech. If, instead, he or she gives consideration to free speech, public safety, and the effect of the rally on the community's reputation, then his or her frame in thought consists of this mix of considerations.

Obviously, one's frame in thought can have a marked impact on one's overall opinion (e.g., a free speech frame inclines one to support the group's right to rally). For this reason, politicians attempt to mobilize voters behind their policies by encouraging them to think about those policies along particular lines. This is accomplished by highlighting certain features of the policy, such as its likely effects or its relationship to important values (e.g., Jacoby 2000, p. 751). In so doing, the speaker is invoking a "frame in communication" (on the distinction between frames in thought and frames in communication, also see Kinder & Sanders 1996, Scheufele 1999, Druckman 2001c, Brewer 2003). For example, if a speaker states that a hate group's planned rally is "a free speech issue," then he or she invokes a free speech frame. Straightforward guidelines on how to identify (or even define more precisely) a frame in communication do not exist. In the next section, we review extant work on identifying frames in communication, and we put forth an inductive approach to gathering data.

Frames in Communication

A frame in a communication "organizes everyday reality" (Tuchman 1978, p. 193) by providing "meaning to an unfolding strip of events" (Gamson & Modigliani 1987, p. 143; 1989) and promoting "particular definitions and interpretations of political issues" (Shah et al. 2002, p. 343). Over the past decade, the identification of frames in communication—that is, the key considerations emphasized in a speech act—has become a virtual cottage industry. Scholars track frames to identify trends in issue definitions, compare coverage across media outlets, and examine variations across types of media (e.g., Semetko & Valkenburg 2000). Although uniform measurement standards do not exist, the most compelling studies tend to take the following steps.

First, an issue or event is identified (Entman 2004, pp. 23–24). A frame in communication can be defined only in relation to a specific issue, event, or political actor. For example, the frames for social security reform differ from the frames for immigration reform. Even the same issue at different times may invoke alternative frames (e.g., the frames used for social security reform in 1997–2000 are not identical to those invoked in 2003–2005).

Second, if the goal is to understand how frames in communication affect public opinion, then the researcher needs to isolate a specific attitude. For example, one could focus on overall attitudes toward welfare reform or, alternatively, on attributions of reasons why people are on welfare. Different frames may underlie each of these attitudes. The frame defining attitudes toward welfare reform may include considerations of economic costs, humanitarianism, and individualism (Feldman & Zaller 1992). Causal attributions relevant to welfare might employ an episodic

frame such as an individual's work ethic or a thematic frame such as the economic opportunities available in society (Iyengar 1991).²

Third, an initial set of frames for an issue is identified inductively to create a coding scheme. Prior work in the academic and popular literatures serves as a good starting point; for example, the book *Framing the Social Security Debate* (Arnold et al. 1998) would be an obvious source for gathering contemporary social security frames. Gamson & Modigliani (1987, p. 144; 1989, p. 7) suggest going further by examining the frames produced by various elite actors and organizations on both sides of the issue in court opinions and briefs, editorial writings, and the publications of interest groups or social movements (also see, e.g., Brewer 2003). This provides the set of "culturally available frames" in elite discourse (Gamson & Modigliani 1987, p. 144). These elite sources can be complemented by asking samples of individuals to record the considerations that come to mind on a given issue, using open-ended questions (see Chong & Druckman 2007 for discussion). Taking these steps in our own analysis of proposals for reforming social security between 1997 and 2000, we identified an initial set of seven frames that emphasized the following themes: the magnitude of the problem, the beneficiaries and victims of change, the goal of ensuring security in old age, the value of providing individual choice, the projected outcomes of reform, the partisan political strategies on the issue, and the importance of an egalitarian solution.

Fourth, once an initial set of frames is identified, the next step is to select sources for content analysis. These might include the aforementioned advocacy communications (e.g., from social movements), but more typically, scholars analyze mass media sources including major newspapers, magazines, web sites, and television broadcasts. The choice of specific news outlets depends on the researcher's intent—for example, to capture general trends in coverage or to compare specific types of coverage across media. Articles or stories are identified via searches (such as key word searches on electronic data bases) and typically serve as the unit of analysis (cf. Tankard 2001, p. 101; Dimitrova et al. 2005). Coders then analyze a sample, identifying the presence or absence of one of the predefined frames in the story or article.

²de Vreese et al. (2001, pp. 108–9) distinguishes issue-specific and generic frames. The former pertain to "specific topics or news events [and the latter are] broadly applicable to a range of different news topics, some even over time, and potentially, in different cultural contexts." Examples of generic frames include episodic and thematic frames, conflict frames, or strategic frames. We agree that some frames apply across issues and are more general descriptions of news; however, we prefer to link a frame explicitly to an issue and an evaluation (also see Callaghan & Schnell 2004, Entman 2004). This obviates the need to specify how general a frame must be in order to be classified as generic. For example, is an economic frame a generic frame? de Vreese et al. (2001) suggest it is, but it also serves as a specific issue frame for welfare reform according to Shen & Edwards (2005). Also, if there is a feature in the communication such as conflict that is not connected to an issue and evaluation, we suggest using a term other than frame (Entman suggests "script").

Prior to coding, it is necessary to specify how any particular frame can be identified. When researchers rely on computer programs to analyze large volumes of text, they must identify the universe of words that mark the presence of a frame. For example, in his study of public attitudes toward government efforts to promote racial equality, Kellstedt (2003) tracked the use of two media frames over time: individualism and egalitarianism. He created a dictionary of words and phrases that indicated the presence of each of these frames (e.g., mentions of “fairness” and “equal protection under the law” denoted the egalitarianism frame) and then used content-analysis software to analyze more than 4000 *Newsweek* articles and 2500 *New York Times* articles. Shah et al. (2002) used a similar approach to examine how the Clinton-Lewinsky scandal was framed in nearly 20,000 news articles (see Simon & Xenos 2004 for a proposed computer-based approach).

In contrast to machine coding, manual or human coding guided by prototypes instead of exact terminology allows greater flexibility to discover new frames that were not identified in the initial coding scheme. For example, in our analysis of social security reform frames from 1997 to 2000 in *The New York Times*, coders regularly encountered discussion of how evaluations of reform proposals depend on uncertain future forecasts; therefore, we added a forecasting frame to the initial set of seven frames described above. This added flexibility, however, comes with a potential cost of lower reliability and smaller samples. In general, checks for intercoder reliability are imperative when manual coding is used.

There are copious examples of research on frames in communication using approaches similar to those outlined above, including analyses of affirmative action (e.g., Gamson & Modigliani 1987), support for war (e.g., Dimitrova et al. 2005), opinions about stem cell research (Nisbet et al. 2003, p. 48), cynicism toward government (Brewer & Sigelman 2002), and attributions of responsibility for the obesity epidemic (Lawrence 2004). These analyses provide insight into cultural shifts (Schudson 1995, Richardson & Lancendorfer 2004, p. 75), media biases (Tankard 2001), public understanding (Berinsky & Kinder 2006), and opinion formation. They also demonstrate that framing is best conceptualized as a process that evolves over time. The dimension of time allows us to separate new issues from previously debated issues that are familiar to those who pay attention to politics. Although new issues are often variants of other issues that have been in the news, they are distinguished by the absence of general agreement about how to construe them, whereas older issues have a defined structure and elicit more routine considerations.

“Traditional” issues can therefore potentially be transformed into “new” issues by reframing. In the 1980s and 1990s, for example, proponents of hate speech regulations on college campuses made considerable headway by drawing a parallel between racial harassment in the university and sexual harassment in the workplace (Chong 2006). They argued that without speech code regulations, universities could become hostile educational environments in which some students were deprived of an equal opportunity to thrive (Delgado 1982, 1991; Matsuda 1989; MacKinnon 1993). Thus, by arguing that hate speech was not a traditional First Amendment

issue, they shifted the value dimension corresponding to the issue and reframed the debate in terms of whether hate speech violated the civil rights of women and racial and ethnic minorities.

Effects of Frames in Communication on Individuals

Frames in communication matter—that is, they affect the attitudes and behaviors of their audiences. Politicians often adopt communication frames used by other politicians, the media, or citizens (e.g., Riker 1996, Edwards & Wood 1999, Druckman et al. 2004). Likewise, media frames sometimes mimic those used by politicians, social activists, other media outlets, or citizens (e.g., Scheufele 1999, p. 109; Entman 2004; Carragee & Roefs 2004; Fridkin & Kenney 2005). and, not surprisingly, citizens regularly adopt frames they learn in discussions with other citizens (e.g., Gamson 1992, Druckman & Nelson 2003, Walsh 2003). The bulk of attention in the political science and communications literatures, however, has been on how frames in the communications of elites (e.g., politicians, media outlets, interest groups) influence citizens' frames and attitudes. This process is typically called a framing effect.

There is disagreement about the best measure to use to gauge the magnitude of framing effects. One standard is the variance in preferences produced by alternative frames on an issue. For example, in assessing tolerance of a hate group rally, a comparison would be drawn between respondents who received a free speech frame and those who received a public safety frame. A second standard is the variation in the correlation between alternative framed preferences and personal values relevant to the issue, such as freedom versus law and order on the hate group issue (Sniderman & Theriault 2004). This standard assumes that a particular value dimension represents one's "true" preference on the issue, so that low correlations indicate large framing effects. A third standard involves comparing treatment groups to a control group that receives basic descriptive information about the issue without being exposed to any frames (Druckman 2001a). Each standard can contribute useful information about the effect of a frame, and the "best" standard for any particular study may depend on that study's assumptions and purpose.

Using one or more of these standards, scholars have demonstrated framing effects with experiments, surveys, and case studies across a range of issues including government spending (Jacoby 2000), campaign finance (Grant & Rudolph 2003), support for the Supreme Court (Nicholson & Howard 2003), evaluations of foreign nations (Brewer et al. 2003), and many others. Some studies focus on how different communication frames bias the weight individuals give to various considerations (Druckman 2001c). Other studies examine how different frames alter overall opinions without explicitly tracing changes in underlying considerations.

For example, Kinder & Sanders (1990) show that an "undeserved advantage" frame increases the salience of racial resentments in white respondents' evaluations of affirmative action. A "reverse discrimination" frame increases their concern for

group interests, such as their educational and economic opportunities (also see, e.g., Kinder & Sanders 1996, Nelson & Kinder 1996). In contrast, Sniderman & Theriault (2004) show that attitudes toward government spending for the poor depend on representations of the consequences of such policies, but they do not directly measure changes in respondents' considerations (also see, e.g., Haider-Markel & Joslyn 2001). Despite differences in focus, all such studies assume the same model of attitudes outlined above, in which framing changes attitudes by ostensibly altering the underlying considerations used in one's evaluation (e.g., Berelson et al. 1954, pp. 253–73; Nelson et al. 1997b; Scheufele 1999, p. 117).

HOW FRAMING EFFECTS WORK

Mediational Processes

Over the past decade, researchers have increasingly sought to understand the psychological processes that explain framing effects (e.g., Iyengar 1991, Zaller 1992, Cappella & Jamieson 1997, Nelson et al. 1997a,b, Price & Tewksbury 1997, Gross 2000, Brewer 2001). Chong & Druckman (2007) attempt to integrate this work by tracing the psychological mechanisms behind framing effects.

In order for a framing effect to occur, a given consideration—say free speech in the evaluation of a hate group's right to rally—needs to be stored in memory to be available for retrieval and use. If, for example, an individual fails to understand the concept of free speech, then free speech is not an available consideration and the individual will not be affected by a free speech frame.

In addition to being available, the consideration must be accessible, meaning its activation potential must exceed a certain threshold so that the consideration is retrieved from long-term memory. One way in which accessibility increases is through regular or recent exposure to a communication frame emphasizing the consideration. Considerations become accessible through a passive or unconscious process.

Individuals sometimes base their opinions on available and accessible considerations without conscious deliberation (Higgins 1996). Other times, an individual will consciously evaluate the applicability of accessible considerations (i.e., accessibility will not be a sufficient condition for influence). The perceived applicability of a given communication frame, and thus the likelihood it will affect an individual's opinion, increases with perceptions of its strength or relevance (Eagly & Chaiken 1993, p. 330).

Evaluations of applicability occur if one of the following two conditions is met. First, if individuals are sufficiently motivated, they will weigh competing considerations that either come to mind spontaneously or are suggested by a frame (e.g., Stapel et al. 1998). Second, all individuals will become more motivated to engage in conscious evaluation when they are exposed to opposing considerations. Thus, either personal motivation or the competitive context will stimulate individuals to deliberate over alternatives in order to reconcile conflicting considerations (see

Druckman 2004, Kuklinski et al. 2001 for discussion of the relevant psychological literature).

In sum, people draw their opinions from the set of available beliefs stored in memory. Only some beliefs become accessible at a given moment. Out of the set of accessible beliefs, only some are strong enough to be judged relevant or applicable to the subject at hand. Framing can work on all three levels, by making new beliefs available about an issue, making certain available beliefs accessible, or making beliefs applicable or “strong” in people’s evaluations.

Despite the connotation of these adjectives, there is nothing inherently superior about an applicable or strong frame other than its appeal to audiences. Strong frames should not be confused with intellectually or morally superior arguments. They can be built around exaggerations and outright lies playing on the fears and prejudices of the public. Strong frames often rest on symbols, endorsements, and links to partisanship and ideology, and may be effective in shaping opinions through heuristics rather than direct information about the substance of a policy. Indeed, it is troubling when the rationale for policies is built around frames only because they are known to resonate with the public and not because they address central features of the issue. The strength of arguments in political debate and their fairness and relevance as arguments must be judged separately. In the area of civil liberties, constitutional frames that invoke Supreme Court rulings have been found to hold disproportionate influence over individual attitudes (Chong 1993). Such confirmation of the power of legal norms to guide opinions is comforting to those who believe in the wisdom of the Court or in the rule of law. However, we can also cite countless examples of the successful use of frames that have been designed to rally people around racism, xenophobia, ideological extremism, and other less ennobling values (e.g., Lipset & Raab 1970, Williamson 1986).

Chong & Druckman (2007) detail how individuals evaluate the strength of a frame. The important point here is that framing effects depend on a mix of factors including the strength and repetition of the frame, the competitive environment, and individual motivations. Additionally, under certain conditions, the aggregate impact of a mix of frames may differ from the sum of their individual effects.

Moderators

A number of studies identify moderator variables that condition framing effects. Perhaps the clearest limit on framing effects is provided by individual predispositions such as values (e.g., Druckman 2001c, p. 241; Haider-Markel & Joslyn 2001; Edwards 2003; Barker 2005; Lau & Schlesinger 2005; Shen & Edwards 2005). For example, Brewer (2001) shows that prior opinions about gay rights fundamentally shape individuals’ reactions to and evaluations of alternative gay rights frames—individuals who have strong values are less amenable to frames that contradict those values (also see Gross 2000, Brewer 2003).

In general, strong predispositions reduce framing effects by increasing one’s resistance to disconfirming information. Nonetheless, even those with firm values

are susceptible to framing on new issues that have yet to acquire a settled interpretation. Elite frames aim to appeal to the partisan and ideological leanings of the audience. President Bush's argument that the current social security program is unfair to minorities is an example of an argument designed to connect a conservative Republican policy to a liberal value in order to expand support for the policy. A committed liberal Democrat who believes that government policy should reduce racial inequality may experience cross-pressures between his belief in equality and his partisanship.

Studies of another individual-level moderator—knowledge—have produced conflicting results. Some framing studies find stronger framing effects on less knowledgeable individuals (e.g., Kinder & Sanders 1990, Haider-Markel & Joslyn 2001), whereas others report the opposite (or Nelson et al. 1997b, Slothuus 2005; also see Miller & Krosnick 2000). Druckman & Nelson (2003) argue that the conflicting results stem, in part, from a failure to control for prior attitudes, as knowledgeable individuals tend to possess entrenched priors that, as mentioned, reduce susceptibility to framing. After controlling for prior attitudes, knowledge enhances framing effects because it increases the likelihood that the considerations emphasized in a frame will be available or comprehensible to the individual.

Other moderators influence the perceived applicability or strength of a frame—for example, frames delivered by credible sources are more likely to shift opinions (Druckman 2001b), as are frames that invoke longstanding cultural values (Gamson & Modigliani 1987, pp. 169–70; Chong 2000). The success of any given attempt to frame an issue also depends on whether other information is available to the audience. For example, Price & Na (2000) show that access to deliberations on a particular issue (e.g., mayoral control of public schools) prior to exposure to an elite communication frame limits the frame's impact, whereas Druckman & Nelson (2003) demonstrate that conversations with people who hold varying opinions, after exposure to a media frame, also mute the effect of the communication.

The Effects of Competition

In a provocative and influential study, Sniderman & Theriault (2004) argue that in many political contexts, people are not exposed to just one frame of an issue or problem, as in the conventional framing experiment (e.g., a free speech frame *or* a public safety frame); rather, they are exposed to competing frames. These authors argue that when citizens receive different views of an issue, they choose the alternative that is consistent with their values or principles. "In short, being exposed to opposing sides of an argument increases consistency among decisions taken on specific policies and underlying principles" (Sniderman & Theriault 2004, p. 147; also see Brewer & Gross 2005).

To test this claim, Sniderman & Theriault examine issues that are (a) of major importance, (b) longstanding, and (c) competitively contested. Examples include government spending on the poor and free speech for political extremists. The authors show, for example, that egalitarians are more likely to support government

spending, and economic growth advocates are more likely to oppose spending, when they receive a dual message than when they receive a one-sided message that is contrary to their values. Those who are most knowledgeable are most likely to express a preference on the issue that is consistent with their values.

However, we suspect these results apply only when individual preferences on an issue are anchored by a core value dimension, such as freedom versus social order on civil liberties issues or individualism versus egalitarianism on affirmative action issues. When an issue is new to the agenda, the public is uncertain of its stakes and of how competing positions relate to their values. In the formative stages of an issue, opposing sides may each contend that its position is consistent with the core values and priorities of the voters it is targeting.

To elaborate on our earlier example, President Bush promoted his plan to overhaul social security by arguing that the current system is unfair to African-Americans because they have shorter life expectancies compared to other groups and therefore can expect to draw lower total benefits. If egalitarian voters had responded favorably to Bush's egalitarian frame, and ignored the contention of Democrats that the Bush plan rewards Wall Street investment firms, they would have been acting in accord with their values. But would we say that by doing so, they showed immunity to framing effects? It would seem more accurate to conclude on the contrary that the Bush framing strategy had worked to perfection in this scenario by appropriating a liberal value for a Republican policy.

As we have elaborated elsewhere, little is known about the dynamics of framing in competitive contexts (Chong & Druckman 2007). We need to study further whether competing frames cancel one another and reinforce existing values, push people in conflicting directions, or motivate a more careful evaluation of the applicability of competing alternatives. Our own experimental analysis of competitive contexts found that individual preferences are a function of prior values *and* the relative strengths of the competing frames. The participants in our experiment were asked to evaluate a local proposal to regulate development and conserve open space by creating an urban growth boundary. They were presented with competing arguments of varying strength on both sides of the issue. We found that people's preferences on the policy were stabilized by the relative priority they placed on protecting the environment versus promoting economic growth. However, individuals also gauged the relative strengths of alternative frames and were influenced to a greater degree by the stronger frame in the debate.

These results suggest that, in competitive contexts, the strength of the opposition frame determines the distance one is pulled away from his or her values even when the frame that is congruent with those values is represented in the debate. If frames canceled, then individuals who received a congruent frame would agree with that frame to the same degree regardless of whether the competing frame was strong or weak.

Our research therefore shows that either side, through the creative use of frames, can create alternative home positions for voters. It is generally not the case that a campaign can anchor all its supporters unilaterally with a reassuring

value-consistent frame. Each side has the potential to draw voters away from its opponents using frames for its own position that may also appeal to the other side's voters. Some voters (extreme ideologues and partisans especially) may not be movable from one side to the other through framing because they resist discrepant information or rely heavily on source cues, but most voters may be partially susceptible to competing messages.

CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONS

There is substantial conceptual confusion about types of framing effects and the relationship between framing and related concepts. Druckman (2001c, 2004) distinguishes between emphasis or issue framing effects—on which we have focused—and equivalency or valence framing effects. Equivalency effects occur when “different, but *logically equivalent*, phrases cause individuals to alter their preferences” (Tversky & Kahneman 1987). This typically involves “casting the same information in either a positive or negative light” (Druckman 2004, p. 671).

Examples of equivalency communication frames include alternative descriptions, such as “90% employment” versus “10% unemployment” or “97% fat free” versus “3% fat.” These are similar to emphasis or issue communication frames insofar as both put the respondent's focus on specific considerations (e.g., free speech or public safety; unemployment or employment). However, equivalency frames employ materially identical descriptions (e.g., 90% employment = 10% unemployment; from a rationality perspective, the frames should not matter), whereas emphasis frames focus on qualitatively different yet potentially relevant considerations (e.g., free speech or public safety). Unless increasing free speech logically entails reducing public safety, one cannot equate the two types of frames; the most that can be claimed is that public discussions of civil liberties issues have encouraged perceptions—which we might call “socio-logic”—that there is a direct tradeoff between the two values.

The psychological model we outlined above should apply to both types of effects (e.g., compare with Druckman 2004, p. 674); however, in the case of equivalency frames, if an individual is motivated to judge their applicability, he or she would presumably recognize the equivalence of the two frames and be indifferent between them.

A distinction that generates perhaps even more confusion is between framing and priming. When Iyengar & Kinder (1987) introduced the term priming to the study of mass communications, they defined it as follows: “By calling attention to some matters while ignoring others, television news influences the standards by which governments, presidents, policies, and candidates for public office are judged. Priming refers to changes in the standards that people use to make political evaluations” (p. 63; also see Iyengar et al. 1984). For example, individuals exposed to news stories about defense policy tend to base their overall approval of the president (or some other political candidate) on their assessment of the president's performance on defense. Thus, if these individuals believe the president does an

excellent (or poor) job on defense, they will display high (or low) levels of overall approval. If, in contrast, these individuals watch stories about energy policy, their overall evaluations of the president's performance will tend to be based on his handling of energy policy. Scholars have amassed a sizable amount of evidence for priming effects (see Miller & Krosnick 1996).

This connotation of priming differs from how most psychologists use the concept. For instance, Sherman et al. (1990, p. 405) state that "priming may be thought of as a procedure that increases the accessibility of some category or construct in memory." The typical "procedure" for increasing accessibility is not the same as exposing individuals to continual media emphasis of an issue (see Druckman 2001c, p. 240). Yet, Iyengar & Kinder and many others assume that media emphasis on an issue passively increases the accessibility of that issue. Miller & Krosnick (2000) present evidence to the contrary in arguing that media emphasis on an issue does not work through accessibility and thus is not akin to priming as defined by psychologists.

In our view, the psychological model of framing presented above can be generalized to priming by assuming that each v_i constitutes a separate issue dimension or image (Druckman & Holmes 2004) used to evaluate a politician. When a mass communication places attention on an issue, we expect that issue will receive greater weight via changes in its accessibility and applicability. If this is correct, then framing effects and what communication scholars have called priming effects share common processes, and the two terms can be used interchangeably.

A final conceptual distinction concerns framing and persuasion. Nelson & Oxley (1999) differentiate framing from persuasion by referring to the former as a change in the weight component, w_i , of an attitude in response to a communication, and the latter as a change in the evaluation component, v_i . For example, in assessing a new housing project, framing takes place if a communication causes economic considerations to become more important relative to environmental considerations. Persuasion occurs if the communication alters one's evaluation of the proposal on one of those dimensions—e.g., by modifying one's beliefs about the project's economic consequences. This distinction reflects that most research on persuasion focuses on the evaluation components of an attitude. To date, little attention has been given to whether the moderators and mediators of framing and persuasion are similar.³

The distinction between changing the content of one's beliefs and changing the weight assigned to different beliefs in one's overall attitude is useful to maintain analytically. However, as we noted above in discussing the expectancy value model, many attitudes are fragmentary and consist of vague or ambivalent beliefs that have not been summarized in an overall attitude. Frames in communication therefore

³Another concept is media agenda setting, which focuses directly on how media coverage leads to changes in the importance of different considerations. There is a tangentially related debate in the mass communications literature on the distinctions among framing, priming, and agenda setting (e.g., Scheufele 2000, Brewer et al. 2003, McCombs 2004).

often introduce new considerations about a subject in addition to highlighting existing beliefs (Chong & Wolinsky-Nahmias 2005).

For example, if they have presided over a prosperous economy during their first term, presidential incumbents seeking re-election will want voters to give greater weight to economic evaluations in their choice. But their campaign messages emphasizing the economy must accomplish two things: They must get across the message that their administration has done a good job on the economy, and they must convince voters that the economy should be the basis of their evaluation. These are simultaneously persuasive messages and framing messages that strengthen the connection between the object and the attribute (e.g., “the Democrats have created jobs and increased disposable income”) and that increase the weight given to that object-attribute belief.

DIRECTIONS FOR RESEARCH

Mediators and Moderators

Even the earliest work on framing effects recognized the importance of developing a theoretical base by identifying mediators and moderators. Yet, much work remains to be done. Above, we focused on how frames in communication affect frames in thought and overall attitudes. Others explore the impact of communication frames on belief content (Slothuus 2005), open-ended responses (Chong 1993, 1996; Brewer & Gross 2005), narratives (Rhee 1997), emotion (Brewer 2000, Gross & D’Ambrosio 2004), and perceptions of public opinion (Joslyn & Haider-Markel 2001). The relationships between these effects and their moderators remain unclear.

What Makes a Strong Frame?

A related challenge for future work concerns the identification of factors that make a frame strong. Strong frames are those that emerge from public discussion as the best rationales for contending positions on the issue. These frames strike opinion leaders and audiences as being more compelling than alternative arguments. The typical political strategy is to connect a proposal to a positive idea or value that is widely available in the population. For example, conservation organizations have found they can garner support for government programs to buy land from private interests by associating the program with universally supported goals such as “clean drinking water.” Therefore, their campaigns often suggest that conserving land from development will improve water quality (Chong & Wolinsky-Nahmias 2005).

But frames built around a particular value do not work on every issue. The environmental frame is a strong frame when used in local debates over regulating growth, but it has been of secondary influence in presidential elections. The same frame is not necessarily judged applicable across issues and contexts. Unfortunately, extant work on persuasion provides little guidance on the conditions

of strength—for example, dual-process models distinguish the origins of strength (e.g., cues or argument quality) but say little about what factors matter when, and what makes for a high-quality argument (or frame).

A number of studies have examined the effectiveness of different kinds of appeals on particular subjects without drawing conclusions about the elements common to persuasive frames. Gerber & Green (2000), for example, examined the relative influence of different appeals to vote and found it made no difference whether the message centered on civic duty, neighborhood solidarity, or the closeness of the election. Scholars have tried to identify whether appeals to self-interest are more likely to be effective on certain issues than others. Studies of civil liberties controversies indicate that constitutional principles and attitudes toward political groups tend to be the primary frames people use to decide whether to tolerate controversial groups (Chong 1993). Thus, we have an inventory of specific results on the persuasiveness of alternative frames on different issues but lack a general theory that can allow us to anticipate which frames are likely to emerge as being the most applicable on an issue.

The Production of Frames

How frames in communication emerge continues to befuddle researchers. We have to deal with the production side of the equation by developing a model of elite strategies of framing to accompany research on the conditions that affect their success (e.g., using credible sources, repetition, or different types—moral, emotional, normative—of appeals).

Entman's (2004) cascade model serves as a provocative baseline on which others might build. Entman argues that, at least on foreign policy issues, frames originating from the administration shape the frames used by other elites (e.g., members of Congress), media outlets, and the public. However, the public's reaction to the initial frame feeds back to the media and other elites, who then influence the administration's (revised) view. This process determines the amount of debate on an issue—that is, whether a single frame dominates or there is parity between competing frames (see Gamson 2005 for discussion of the model).

A virtue of Entman's model is that it takes account of multiple actors who attempt to influence and anticipate one another in their creation of frames. Most framing studies assume that the communicators are elite actors such as politicians, the media, scientific experts, and other opinion leaders, and that the audience consists of members of the general public (cf. Gamson 1992, Walsh 2003). But the influence is not likely to be exclusively one-way even if there is asymmetrical influence. Frames are chosen with audience in mind, so the preferences of the audience will have a bearing on the position taking of elites (Chong 1996).

Strategies of Framing

Scholars also have sought to explain the strategies behind the creation of frames. Perhaps the most advanced research in this area comes out of the social movement

literature that explores how different groups employ frames for mobilization purposes (e.g., Snow & Benford 1992, Polletta & Ho 2006). This literature discusses framing as a tactic used by political entrepreneurs to coordinate individuals around particular interpretations of their problems. Although much of this work remains separate from the public opinion scholarship that is the focus of our review—despite both literatures' using Gamson's work as a critical building block—there have been some recent strides toward integration (e.g., Chong 2000, Levin 2005).⁴

Do Citizens Learn Over Time?

We discussed above how an issue's frames evolve over time, in some instances transforming the public's basic understanding of what is at stake. How this evolution occurs continues to be poorly understood; however, even less studied is how time qualifies the impact of frames on individuals. Most studies of framing effects consist of a single session for each subject, with effects tested shortly after exposure to communications. Future studies should examine the impact of framing across longer durations of time, with individuals being exposed to streams of competing information intended to parallel the give and take of political campaigns. This would allow us to examine how varying rates of learning and forgetting influence the magnitude of framing effects, and to identify conditions under which individuals might become inoculated against attempts to manipulate their preferences.

The quality of public opinion depends on whether citizens are able to learn over time. Learning refers to the ability to process and retain information and to use that information in developing a stable preference on an issue. Citizens should be more susceptible to framing in the early stages of exposure to an issue, when they are less knowledgeable about the consequences of the issue. We think public opinion ought to be malleable at this stage because it would show that people are open to arguments and information.

A characteristic we desire in public opinion is increased stability and therefore reduced susceptibility to framing conditional upon exposure to information on both sides of an issue. Public opinion should solidify over time as citizens encounter, through the media or in conversations, the range of arguments surrounding an issue. Resistance to framing is a more important quality in public opinion after individuals have had an opportunity to deliberate over the merits of the available alternatives.

Theoretically, we expect that framing effects diminish with active engagement with issues. In particular, biased representations of issues should be less influential

⁴Other work looks at how candidates strategically employ alternative frames (e.g., Petrocik 1996, Riker 1996) and the consequences of these strategies for campaign discourse (J. Jerit, unpublished manuscript). Liebes (2000) offers an intriguing case study of how the media choose between competing frames. Nelson (2004) categorizes distinct types of frames in communication, including frames that rank the importance of different considerations, assign an ambiguous consideration to a familiar category, or accentuate a critical consideration relevant to a specific institutional context.

as citizens become exposed to the full array of alternative arguments. Competition makes accessible a more representative sampling of underlying considerations than one-sided communications and therefore provides a broader frame of reference for locating one's preference on an issue. Just as two-sided survey questions yield more reliable responses, debate and electoral competition motivate evaluation of the relevance of alternative rationales and ease identification of the policies that are consistent with one's values. The knowledge acquired during a competitive campaign should reduce susceptibility to biased frames by increasing one's ability to evaluate the applicability of alternative frames.

However, these conjectures remain untested. No studies have shown whether exposure to a full range of alternatives makes one less vulnerable subsequently to biased communications. If the benefits of competition prove to be short-lived, they may not offer any lasting protection against one-sided frames. Balanced debate can diminish framing effects only if citizens are capable of learning over the course of a campaign. An individual can claim to have an opinion only if his or her views can be distinguished from the set of considerations temporarily made accessible by the content of a communication. A "doorstep opinion" or an opinion constructed "on the fly" is not a real opinion if it is inseparable from the context in which it was elicited.

The inferences we can draw from previous studies suggest only limited inoculation against framing effects in all but the most knowledgeable members of the public. If citizens are inoculated on longstanding issues, we should see considerable resistance to one-sided frames on these issues. However, studies show that experimental participants continue to be affected by one-sided frames on issues that have been much debated in the past. For example, in experiments using the well-known civil liberties issue involving an extremist group's right to conduct a rally, one-sided frames influence the preferences of most individuals (though they have a greater impact on those who are less knowledgeable). The lack of resistance to one-sided frames suggests that alternative considerations of free speech and social order do not come spontaneously to mind for many individuals. People's familiarity with this issue prior to the experiment does not appear to have inoculated them against manipulation.

Competition therefore may only increase the short-term accessibility of alternative considerations. A more enduring resistance to framing requires long-term learning, in which individuals are able to evaluate biased presentations of arguments by independently generating counterarguments against one-sided frames. Studies have also shown that experimentally induced framing effects endure only briefly (Druckman & Nelson 2003). These results may appear to render framing effects more innocuous, but they may also indicate that individuals are continually susceptible to the most recent communication. If people soon forget what they learn, then they are less likely to be inoculated against subsequent attempts to influence them. The benefits of a balanced debate in a political campaign depend on the capacity of citizens to retain information about alternative positions so that they are not unduly influenced by the latest message they receive.

NORMATIVE ASSESSMENTS OF FRAMING EFFECTS

Framing can be construed in both positive and negative terms. It can be viewed as a strategy to manipulate and deceive individuals, or it can refer more neutrally to a learning process in which people acquire common beliefs, as in the coordination of people around a social norm (see Kinder & Herzog 1993, Chong 2000). In the social movements literature, individuals overcome collective action problems by developing shared frames about their predicament and agreeing on the best course of action.

In the public opinion field, however, framing usually takes a negative connotation because framing effects suggest that distributions of public preferences are arbitrary, and that political elites can manipulate popular preferences to serve their own interests. The assumption in much of this research is that we should identify means to counteract framing effects. Researchers therefore have become interested in social and institutional mechanisms that may diminish framing effects and are reassured when they identify conditions (e.g., involving deliberation or competition) in which individuals are less affected by framing (Sniderman & Bullock 2004, Sniderman & Levendusky 2007).

But framing effects are also intrinsic to the formation of attitudes and opinions. Public opinion formation involves the selective acceptance and rejection of competing frames that contain information about candidates and issues. Discussion and debate over the appropriate frames for conceptualizing an issue lead ultimately to common perceptions and judgments about the consequences of a policy. Framing effects are a liability only if individuals never develop a basis for discriminating among frames and remain constantly vulnerable to changing representations of issues. As noted above, resistance to framing is also problematic if it means that individuals cannot recognize and accept good arguments for changing their preferences. If debate cannot introduce new considerations in people's minds, but can only serve to remind them of their existing values, then persuasion through the exchange of information is impossible. Deliberation is pointless.

Individuals who possess strong attitudes are not only more likely to recognize which side of an issue is consistent with their values, they are also more likely to engage in motivated reasoning, defined by Lodge & Taber (2000, p. 184) as "the tendency to evaluate incoming information to support preconception and to devalue contrary evidence." Individuals who hold strong attitudes are least susceptible to new information, most likely to counterargue against contrary information, and most likely to recognize information consistent with their prior beliefs. Lodge & Taber (2000, p. 205) write that "when one is operating in partisan mode, the decision maker is trying to build the best possible case for a preferred conclusion."

Stability of opinions *per se*—divorced from the process by which judgments are formed and maintained—is therefore a misguided criterion for evaluating the quality of political evaluations. Stable attitudes can reflect sophisticated reasoning or dogmatism and inflexibility. Hence, both excessive instability and excessive stability of public opinion can be liabilities in a democracy. At one extreme we have

citizens without sufficiently developed attitudes, who can be routinely manipulated by alternative framings of a problem; at the other extreme, we have citizens whose attitudes are held so tightly that they seek only to reinforce existing views, and every frame elicits the same closed-minded response. It is not apparent which portrait of the public is less desirable.

Openness to contrary evidence is an essential quality that should be fostered in a democracy. Individuals who are motivated to find information that is consistent with their prior positions may be more immune to framing effects but at the price of being rigid, prone to rationalization, and impervious to information. As Hirschman (1989) observed, the ideal is located somewhere in the middle: a citizenry that has informed opinions but is tolerant of alternative perspectives and amenable to change in the face of a compelling argument.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

We began this review by noting the apparent deficiencies of public opinion in a democratic society. We identified framing as a possible source of such deficiencies and went on to explain exactly what framing entails. We offered guidelines for identifying frames in communication and a model of how such frames affect individuals' opinions. We discussed moderators, particularly the impact of competition, and we clarified the relationship between framing and other concepts. After noting areas in need of more research, we returned to a discussion of the normative implications of framing for democratic public opinion.

Such conversations about the implications of framing are timely, as it is commonplace nowadays for polling to be used to test the effectiveness of alternative methods of presenting policy proposals. To the extent that people do not have independent ideas on the issues they are being asked to vote on, they can more easily be manipulated by the framing of proposals. If people remain outside the political process, their opinions are vulnerable to being shaped arbitrarily by how the issue is represented.

However, our review suggests that it is possible for people to have the firm, full, and articulate opinions that Hirschman idealizes—opinions that are less susceptible to manipulation and framing effects. Deliberation, discussion, and exposure to information and alternative arguments can raise the quality of public opinion by reducing ambivalence and uncertainty. People who are better informed about the issues are more likely to have established a frame of reference for their opinions and are less likely to be swayed by how other people frame the issues for them.

We need an active public debate to inform people about the issues. But having opinions is only half the problem in a democracy; the other half is that people must balance their strong opinions with a capacity to be flexible and open-minded. The process of becoming informed and engaged in politics can produce knee-jerk ideological beliefs as well as reflective thinking on issues. It is important that opinions be the product of some degree of rumination.

Back in the 1950s, when survey research found citizens to be apathetic about politics, one response was that perhaps this state of affairs was not so undesirable (Berelson et al. 1954). Because democracy requires compromise and the building of coalitions, it was suggested that the actual portrait of the electorate is perhaps a better underpinning for a stable democratic system than a hypothetical ideal electorate of highly interested, politically active citizens. High interest, it was predicted, would lead to constant factional disputes and little collective reconciliation on important issues. This is a problem of having too many strong opinions as opposed to too few.

How can we have a more participatory democracy and yet prevent the development of an intense and intransigent collective public that is inimical to democratic debate and discussion? Somehow, the taste for opinions has to be tempered by a taste for deliberation and open-mindedness. The findings from survey research on popular support for democratic values provide glimmers of hope on this matter (e.g., McClosky & Brill 1983). One of the most dependable findings is that people who participate to a greater degree in public affairs, irrespective of their ideological leanings, are also more likely to support such basic democratic values as the right to free expression.

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